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America's Role in Asia

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AMERICA'S ROLE IN ASIA

BY HARRY PAXTON HOWARD



NEW YORK

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God grant that not only the love of Liberty but a thorough knowledge of the Rights of Man may pervade all the Nations of the Earth so that a Philosopher may set his foot anywhere and say: This is my Country.

Benjamin Franklin.

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ASIA IN UPHEAVAL

Chapter 1.

INTRODUCTION

ASIA is in upheaval. The mightiest of the continents is torn with convulsions which are changing the entire face of its lands and peoples. Whatever the outcome of the present war, Asia will never again be as it was in November, 1941, before the Japanese started their drive southward against the colonies of the Western Powers. The Asia we have known so long, the Asia of European empires, colonies and concessions, Western domination, "spheres" and privileges, is disappearing before our eyes. Some there are who are blind to this, who think that if Japan is defeated Asia will revert to something like the continent it was a generation or a half century ago. They look forward to the salvaging and re-establishment of Western Empires, and to the reduction of Japan to her semi-colonial status of 1890—or even to complete colonial subjection.

We are at war with the Axis Powers, and Japan is one of these Powers, linked with Germany and her Italian satellite in formal alliance. For a time, many Americans regarded Japan as a "stooge" of Hitler; but most of us know

now that this is not true, that Japan's imperialists have independent plans of their own. From the day the Nazis started their invasion of Soviet Russia, Hitler, urged, coaxed, and pleaded with the Japanese to assist him by attacking Russia in its Far Eastern "rear." Again and again, Berlin gave out optimistic reports about the imminence of Japanese action against Russia. Berlin subordinated its Far Eastern diplomacy to the service of Japan, and brought pressure on France to give the Japanese control of Indo-China, perforce abandoning its own expressed ambition to extend its domination over France and Holland to their Far Eastern Empires.

But the Japanese had their own aims. They maintained neutrality with Soviet Russia, and strengthened it by a further agreement. They struck southward, when they did strike, against the colonies and dependencies of Britain, Holland, and the United States. And in that last week of November, 1941, when the Japanese started moving southward in force, the Germans withdrew from Rostov and dug in for the winter, their last hope for an immediate knockout having disappeared. Since that time, the Japanese have conquered territories far greater than Hitler's. They are consolidating a vast domain of more than 700,000,000 subjects in southeastern Asia—greater than Hitler's empire in Europe. They aim to hold this empire for themselves, not to turn it over to Hitler or any other "Aryan." They are emphatically not fighting for one Western Empire against another in the Far East.

Until 1942, most Americans did not take Japan very seriously as a Great Power. Informed and competent military and naval observers, noting and warning of Japan's expanding strength and power, were ignored, laughed at, or regarded with deep suspicion. The most popular of the

newspaper columnists and platform "experts" were those who declared that Japan was a pushover, and could be disposed of immediately and effectively in a few weeks or months. Most of these "experts" had said the same thing about Soviet Russia during the previous summer, and had been shown to be completely wrong. But this hardly affected their popularity. Indeed, their contemptuous dismissal of Japan as a sham menace enhanced their reputations. Major George Fielding Eliot, the most popular of our platform military experts, who had in 1938 turned from writing war stories which were frankly fictional to war articles which purported to be factual, said to a million listeners in the United States on November 6, 1941, speaking from New York at a Town Hall Meeting of the Air:

"Exhausted and distressed by the material and moral drains of four years of unproductive war in China—a war which is not yet ended—further exhausted by the application of economic and financial sanctions by the Powers which were her chief sources of foreign trade and supply, vulnerable to blockade as is no other nation in the world, harassed by acute shortages of almost every industrial raw material and even of food, Japan is in no case to fight a war with a group of major opponents. Her army is sadly out of date. . . . Japanese air power . . . is almost nonexistent. Japan's total aircraft production . . . is inadequate to sustain an active fighting force of even five hundred planes. . . . The Japanese Navy is good, but inferior in strength to that of the United States, and hopelessly handicapped by lack of air support. . . .

"The American, British, and Dutch naval and air forces are fully capable of isolating Japan

from the world and bringing to bear the pressure of full blockade—a pressure which Japan could not long endure, but which she lacks the strength to break by force. . . . The people of the United States and those of the other nations now committed to the destruction of the Nazi menace may well ask themselves how long they propose to allow their efforts to be hamstrung and their forces immobilized by the sham menace of Japan. . . .

“Japan was the first aggressor of the postwar period; let her be the first to face the consequences. And let her face them now.”

Such monstrous misapprehension of the entire situation was by no means confined to Major Eliot. Every speaker and writer who was anxious to be popular expressed himself similarly. So widespread was this false understanding of the situation, and so few were the courageous voices of knowledge and reason, that a few months later publicists were successfully circulating a legend that: “No one knew how strong Japan is.” But this legend was just as much a fiction as was the presentation of Japan as a sham menace. On the same program with Major Eliot, on the evening on which the above statements were made, was Rear Admiral Reginald R. Belknap, one of the most experienced and competent of American navalists, who had served in three military-naval campaigns in the Pacific and was long naval aide to President Theodore Roosevelt. Cautiously but clearly, in terms revealing both our initial and subsequent disadvantages, Admiral Belknap said:

“We speak jokingly of having peace even if we have to fight for it, but a war with Japan would be no joke. The element of surprise, important in any offensive, would be denied to us,

so insistent is our demand for publicity to the last detail. To attempt a quick overpowering stroke across the broad Pacific would be futile.

"Five years ago, a campaign in the Far East by our one-ocean navy was deemed doubtful of success. Since then, air attack has greatly developed. Japan has gained military positions all along the coast from Korea to Indo-China, and presumably has prepared submarine and air force bases in her South Pacific islands from which to harass an enemy fleet and its supply convoys along the route from Hawaii to Guam and the Philippines. . . .

"The most effective military aim is at the enemy's heart . . . Germany's war machine. But an all-out offensive in the Far East would require enormous supply. The fifty destroyers and fifty tankers given to Britain would be sorely missed. America is called the land of unlimited possibilities. . . . But even with loyal support by everyone, the operating of our fleet in the Far East would inevitably curtail our support at the main front.

"We could not make a try at Japan and then withdraw. The issue is not a small one nor of temporary effect. It will reach far into the future."

It does reach far into the future. Admiral Belknap's warning has been corroborated in every detail. Indeed, it was so cautious as to be an understatement. Further, the Admiral's analysis was in the main restricted to the military-naval situation, the facts of which were available to everyone seriously interested in facts.

But Japan's power and aggrandizement have not been limited to armies and navies alone. There are issues political and economic, racial and social and religious,

for which men will fight—or may refuse to fight; and American wishful thinking has completely underestimated the power of Japanese propaganda and intrigue to gain allies in Asia through the exploitation of such issues. To most Americans it was clear that the Japanese propaganda slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics” meant “Asia for the Japanese.” Few of us could be deceived into thinking that it meant anything else. But few Americans, also, realized that this shrewd slogan might be a tremendously powerful appeal to hundreds of millions of Asiatics dominated by Western Powers. Few Americans, indeed, realized that these teeming millions of Asiatics under White domination in southern and southeastern Asia and the southwest Pacific were of any great importance. We knew of the brave Dutch, of course—there were several millions of them, and they were white men. But who ever heard of the 75,000,000 Indonesians under Dutch rule? “Where is Indonesia, anyway?”

Vague as our knowledge was, most Americans never doubted for a moment that these Asiatic peoples would stand with the civilized Whites against the savage Japanese. These Asiatics had for generations been obedient and many of them apparently grateful to the Western Powers which had so bravely borne what we called the White Man's Burden of governing and ordering these “lesser breeds without the law.” Millions of Chinese were already fighting the Japanese invaders of their homeland. The brutalities and atrocities of some of the Japanese forces were notorious.

And so there were many of us who did not expect that Siam, one of the most modern and advanced of independent Asiatic nations, should join the Japanese with barely a pretense of opposition, or that Malayan tribesmen and

native sovereigns should give quiet but effective co-operation to Japanese forces in the deep jungles of that mountainous peninsula, or that Chinese fifth columnists should guide and effectively assist the Japanese in the invasion and capture of Hongkong, or that Indonesia's vast Mohammedan population—some of the bitterest fighters in the world when aroused—should quietly acquiesce in the Japanese invasion and in some cases actively cooperate with the invaders.

Even in the Philippine Islands—where the democratic but not yet independent Philippines Commonwealth was truly a beacon of light in the despotic darkness of Asia—the Japanese invaders found allies and friends, with such leaders as Aguinaldo prepared to cooperate with them as soon as they demonstrated their superiority over the American forces in the islands. And even in Burma, though the British knew from bitter experience the strength of anti-British feeling among Burmese revolutionists, it was hardly expected that the Japanese would at once overwhelm the defending forces by the close and effective assistance of Burmese auxiliaries and fifth columnists, and that the Chinese forces which had been brought into Burma for defense of the country would actually find themselves fighting Burmese as much as Japanese.

To understand these things, it was necessary to understand Japan in its relation to the rest of Asia—but few Americans were interested in such things. There were plenty of books, but only a few “specialists” or other curious people read about such matters. Japanese themselves had written frankly about these things, and many of their works had been translated into English. Almost a decade ago, Lieut. Commander Tota Ishimaru frankly

outlined the immediate objectives of Japan's aggressive navalists—the "Southward" drive, and the capture of Hongkong and Singapore and other British colonies. His book, "Japan Must Fight Britain," was a shrewd outline of the military, naval, and diplomatic tactics required—some of which have been followed almost in detail. The book was a best-seller in Japan in 1933 and 1934, and roused enormous comment pro and con. But it was not translated into English until 1936. It was published in the United States by Stackpole Sons in 1937, but it was not a best-seller here. It was too fantastic! It was ignored by the fashionable political thinkers and critics of the moment.

Slowly and painfully, Americans are learning what some military and naval experts have known for many years—that Japan is not a pushover, but a great Power, led and directed by shrewd and determined men who utilize every military and naval advantage to the utmost, who know and have frankly stated the tremendous importance of surprise attacks. Americans are even slower to learn, through bitter experience, how successfully Japanese propagandists can exploit the possibilities of a race war against Western Powers in Asia, how easily the "Yellow Peril" cry is turned against us in Asia, how seductive is their appeal for support in a war against "White Imperialism," aiming to expel the white man as the dominating force of that vast continent.

Few Americans, even today, realize that if the Japanese can achieve their *immediate* aims—full leadership in China (with an area and population comparable to that of all continental Europe), and the lesser countries of southeastern Asia and the southwest Pacific—they will have an empire of more than 700,000,000 subjects under their

direct domination or leadership, with industrial resources greater than those of the United States and far greater than those of any other country in the world. Theirs would be a more powerful empire than Britain's was at its point of greatest expansion—when the British Empire and the British Dominions and dependencies numbered some 525,000,000 subjects. It would have, in fact, one-third of the population of the globe. It would be a tremendous step toward world empire.

Japan itself has a population of only 75,000,000, and its home resources are much less than those of the United States, Germany, Russia, or Britain. But Japan's imperial power has for half a century been expanded shrewdly and successfully—despite intermittent and often bitter internal opposition to the ever-increasing burdens of militarism and empire. This menacing expansion is likely to continue unless we devote ourselves seriously to studying the nature and the problems of Japan itself, and the relation of Japan to other Asiatic countries. These things are not Oriental mysteries. The books and the records are, for the most part, open to all.

We must understand not only what has happened to Japan, but what has happened to China and other Asiatic countries.

So far as China and Japan are concerned, the last century has seen a stupendous change in position and status. A hundred years ago, the Manchu Empire of China was still the Power of the Far East. Both in area and in population it was still the greatest empire in the world. Japan was a little group of feudal principalities, following under their feudal leader a policy of strict isolationism and possessing only the most limited contacts even with their nearest outside neighbors.

This past hundred years has seen China brought down deeper and deeper to subjection to outside powers, while Japan has become the great power of the Far East. *The principal reason for this amazing reversal of roles lies neither in China nor in Japan. It lies in the activities, influences, and pressures of Western Powers in the Far East.* The British, by their victory over China in the Opium War a century ago, opened the way for the ever greater aggressions which have finally reduced China to her present state. Japan, forcibly "opened" by the West, was for a time reduced to semi-colonial status like China, but was militarized and in time "emancipated" as a partner of Western Powers against China toward the end of the nineteenth century.

It was the ambitions of the Western Powers in the Far East—first of all in China—which lay behind all these developments. In one aspect, it was a Far Eastern balance-of-power policy, building up in Japan a military and naval power which would be an offset to the archaic but potentially enormous might of China. But the balance-of-power policy in the Far East involved factors much less evident than in its application in the West. Few of the Japanese militarists' British and American friends actually anticipated, in 1894, the rapid success of the Japanese forces in their "modern" invasion of Korea and China—when they occupied the most vital areas of South Manchuria, and were preparing to march on Peking when the Chinese Government capitulated. But the Russian Government, with the cooperation of Germany and France, ordered the Japanese out of South Manchuria—and the Japanese obeyed.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was a continuation of the balance-of-power policy, aimed this time to

encourage Japan as a "balance" to Russia. But the original aims of the British promoters were interfered with by the important role played by President Theodore Roosevelt, in 1905, in promoting peace (at the direct request of the Japanese Emperor) between the already exhausted Empire of Japan and the politically crumbling absolutism of Russia. In 1907, Japan and Russia formed an entente which developed into a full-fledged military alliance, and was terminated only by the Russian Revolution in 1917.

When Europe was divided into warring camps in the First World War, the Japanese had their great opportunity in China. The United States was the only Western Power able to interfere with Japan's new demands on China, and our interference was made ineffective both by miscalculation and by the conservatism which has usually characterized our official policy toward Far Eastern countries. Our backing of the Chinese military dictator Yuan Shih-kai, and American encouragement to his restoring the Empire, played directly into the hands of the Japanese, who shrewdly encouraged and aided the Chinese forces which opposed Yuan. And Japan, for the first time, became dominant at Peking.

In the desperate days in Europe in 1917 and 1918, it was American troops and American supplies that turned the tide of war. But Japan had already occupied the German (previously Spanish) islands north of the Equator, the stepping stones from Hawaii to the Philippine Islands. And when the war was over, and peace was signed, Japan was permitted to retain them. The American Government, in fact, made no serious effort even to secure their neutralization under joint American-Japanese control—which was the very least we could have demanded. Our Government might have demanded in 1917, as a condition

for our entry into the war, subsequent possession or internationalization of these vitally important islands. But it was the Japanese who demanded possession—and got it. They were looking ahead.

Whatever the military outcome of the present war, we can lose the peace to come just as certainly and far more disastrously than we lost the previous one if we do not understand more fully the problems of Asia. It is not enough to say, with smug complacency, that now that we have “reversed” our policy toward Japan everything will be all right. *For our fundamental policy has not been reversed. We are still trying to play the balance-of-power game—the sure and certain road to continued and perpetual war.* Japan became too powerful, and we at long last turned against our “progressive” and “modern” proteges—as our President and nearly all our press termed the Japanese militarists forty years ago—and started to give some assistance and encouragement to the Chinese, who we at least realized were fighting our battle in the Far East.

But here, again, we miscalculated. We came in too late—years too late. For we had been engaged for many years in a new variation of the balance-of-power game. We had been welcoming the Japanese militarists as partners in the struggle of imperialism and Chinese reaction against popular revolution in China. Widespread American hostility to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was toned down by the Administration's knowledge of some of the political factors involved, and the hope that Japan would continue to be a bulwark both against the Chinese Revolution and Soviet Russia. Not until 1935, after the Japanese had by their Manchurian oil monopoly slammed the “Open Door” on the fingers of our patriotic Standard Oil Corporation, did we begin substantially to encourage

the Chinese to a bolder stand against Japan. When war came, in 1937, we financed the Chinese by enormous purchases of silver at greatly inflated prices; but we simultaneously supplied the far better prepared Japanese with all the requirements of war. We continued this until the latter part of 1941.

All of this is history. Many of our miscalculations are now recognized—so far as the *details* are concerned. But how far have we revised our *fundamental* attitudes? How far has our Government gone in the realization that we must reverse not merely our attitudes as between one nation and another, but our entire balance-of-power policy? How far has our Government come to the realization that not merely Japanese Empire, but all domination of one people by another people means inevitable and unending conflict over the spoils of such Empire?

William Yandell Elliott, formerly of the War Production Board and then an instructor in the United States Army's school for its own officers at the University of Virginia, declared at the Institute of Public Affairs at that University on July 7, 1942:

"It was entirely within the grasp of the United States, of the British Empire, the Dutch Empire, the Belgian Empire, and the French Republic, with what was then the friendly collaboration of Soviet Russia, at any time from 1930 on to have destroyed the power of the Axis to rearm by simply withholding the strategic materials on which this rearmament depended.

"Are we not permitted to hope that in return for salvaging these empires for their present owners, the United States may insist upon a joint directorship in the control of their resources?

"The first thing, of course, is to do the salvaging, and that is a long and painful job, as the headlines of every day's newspapers bring home to us. We have, however, a destiny to face in the future which can only be that of world leadership if we succeed in this salvage."

This is what is being taught, at this writing, to American officers who are expected to take power in territories to be occupied by American forces. Will a peace based upon the salvaging of Western Empires in Africa and Asia have any prospect of permanence? Will our return to the *status quo* of 1930 insure permanent peace? Or will it simply mean starting all over again?

It would not, indeed, mean simply reversion to 1930. For there would be American leadership of a group of "United Empires"—united under our leadership and sharing directorship with ourselves. How long would these empires, based upon the subjection of the peoples of Asia and Africa, continue to take orders from us after the war? How long would our leadership and our joint directorship continue? How long would the "United Empires" remain united after the war?

Furthermore, the problem of maintaining the domination of the "salvaged" empires over Asia and Africa would be enormously increased by the problem of maintaining direct domination over the countries with which we are now at war. Secretary Hull's significant radio address of July 23, officially endorsed by President Roosevelt, was not only wholly in line with Mr. Elliott's statement quoted above, but added that:

"In the process of re-establishing international order, the United Nations must exercise surveil-

lance over aggressor nations until such time as the latter demonstrate their willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations."

This surveillance over Germany, Japan, Italy, and their satellites will mean still more serious problems for the post-war world. Such surveillance involves a measure of military occupation and financial and economic control of most of Europe, from Finland through Germany (and Hungary) to Italy, as well as over Japan and Siam in the Far East. How long would the United Nations remain united in such a program? How long did the victorious Allies remain united after the last war?

In the last war, indeed, four of the Allied Powers had launched an undeclared war, politely styled "intervention," against a former ally even before peace was made with Germany in November, 1918. How closely will the British Empire and Soviet Russia cooperate in the domination of central and eastern Europe when Hitler is defeated? And how long would such cooperation last? How closely is Soviet Russia cooperating with the British Empire and the United States in the Far East today? How would Moscow look upon American occupation of Japan, and how much is Moscow prepared to cooperate with the re-establishment of the British Empire and the large enhancement of American power in Asia?

These questions are not idle speculation. There is no plan or scheme for empire-salvaging which does not contain within itself the seeds of another war—even more terrible and destructive than the present war. And the great center of Empire and Imperial rivalry is Asia. If we aim to make the present war the last war, we must recognize that the day of Empire is gone, and that no people

has a right to rule other peoples. But we must recognize what this involves—and for this we must understand far more fully the problems of Asia.

The American “we” means everyone. It means the man in the street, the ordinary man and woman who hopes for peace and security and democracy, and who in the past has complacently left foreign affairs to the clever men at Washington who were supposed to be aiming at the same thing. And it means, especially, those earnest persons who are seriously trying to bring about a more equitable political and social order in the world, and who are trying desperately to realize just why our devoted effort to “make the world safe for democracy,” in fighting a “war to end war” twenty-five years ago, only prepared the way for brutalitarian terror and despotism such as the world has not known for generations.

The world *must* be made safe for democracy, if the American democracy is itself to survive. The menace of world despotism is far graver, and takes far more fearful forms, than was the case in 1917. The world has gone backward, and not forward. Another “victory” like that of 1918 will be our doom. Let us understand this, and make no mistake about it.

The darkest of perspectives opens before us, if peace is made by men as short-sighted as those who directed the war and the “peace” a quarter of a century ago. The salvaging of moribund empires, the destruction of the newest ones, and the establishment of our temporary leadership among the “United Empires,” will not bring peace. For the problem of peace is basically a problem of democracy. Powerful military rulers and dictators, some powerful economic interests, want war and intrigue for war and profit from war. The common people have nothing to

gain from war, and wherever they possess political power endeavor to use it to keep out of war. This is true in Asia, as in Europe.

The problem of maintaining peace in Asia is basically similar to the problem in western countries. But it is complicated by the long-established existence of alien empires, and the limited development of democratic institutions, and the ignorance of many of our people of political developments in Asia. The repeated setbacks to democratic developments in Asia have not been mainly due to "Asiatic backwardness." They have been mainly due to our consistent support of reaction and our consistent hostility to democratic forces in Asia.

Japan, whose unprovoked invasion of Manchuria in 1931 started the whole infernal cycle of war, is itself an example of the political conflicts within Asia. For it was not the Japanese people, through their elected representatives in Parliament, which launched this brutal attack upon a neighboring people. It was the Japanese Army, under its own feudal leaders responsible only to the Emperor, which dispatched troops from Korea to Manchuria against the emphatic opposition of the civilian Premier and Foreign Minister of Japan. This invasion of Manchuria, indeed, was in one most important aspect a military counter-revolution against the growing power of people and parliament in Japan—a power whose central demand was reduction of military and naval expenditures and a program of peace and retrenchment. For almost half a century the Japanese people through their parliamentary representatives had combated the power of the military, and the success of the latter in finally throttling and suppressing the voice of the common people is something for which every Western Power which assisted these

militarists in their foreign aggressions shares direct responsibility.

What is true in Japan is true elsewhere in Asia. The hope for permanent peace and freedom rests upon the liberation of Asiatic peoples from despotism and dictatorship—foreign or native—by the establishment of governments conceived in liberty. A powerful China, militarized under a determined and ambitious military regime and a one-party dictatorship, would not be a hope for peace, but a menace more terrible even than the militarism of Japan. But a strong China, united and free under a representative government such as the Chinese people themselves endeavored to create when they overthrew the monarchy and established the Republic in 1912, would be a real assurance of peace in eastern Asia. The republic was overthrown and destroyed by ambitious militarists—financed by foreign Powers jointly, and individually, against the Republic.

As in Japan and China, so elsewhere in Asia. The one hope for peace lies in popular government, devoting itself to the struggle against poverty and famine and economic and social injustice, instead of to conspiracy and intrigue and war against one's neighbors.

Americans do not generally realize that there are such popular political forces in Asia. Many of us have been led to believe, under stress of war propaganda, that "friendly" dictatorships are in fact "democracies," and that the triumph of these "friendly" dictatorships would be in fact a victory for democracy.

Here, again, is a clear formula for losing the peace. If we are to win the peace, we must understand clearly who are our friends and who are our enemies. Our friends are the common people of every land who seek peace and

security and detest war. Our enemies are the privileged groups in every land who seek personal power and promote war. In war-time, we take our allies as we find them. In our own American Revolution, 165 years ago, we were saved from defeat by the powerful assistance of the French navy, French supplies, and French soldiers on American soil. The French monarchy—one of the worst despotisms in Europe—had been our ally against Britain, for its own reasons of state. But Thomas Jefferson, as American Minister to the Imperial Government of France, had no friendship for the “government of wolves over sheep” which he found in France, and it was in Jefferson’s legation at Paris that Lafayette and his friends actually drew up their plans for the French Revolution—which spread the seeds of democratic revolution not only throughout Europe but throughout the American continent and even into the far Philippines. It was to preserve this developing democracy in Latin America that the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated—an emphatic veto upon the aims of European absolutism to re-establish its political system in South and Central America.

Our Government has long since departed from the Jeffersonian foreign policy. But if we are to preserve our democracy we must distinguish clearly between friend and potential enemy—even in war time. We must realize that if democracy is to survive we cannot be “neutral” toward various political systems—any more than Jefferson and Monroe were not neutral. And if we are to act intelligently in Asia, on behalf not merely of our erstwhile allies but also of democracy, we must realize the problems of Asiatic nations themselves, the conflicts between democracy and despotism—foreign or native—in every nation and territory on the continent of Asia.

This book is an attempt to make clear the nature of the principal conflicts and problems of Asia. Almost everything in it can be found scattered through the political and economic and social studies of Asiatic and Western scholars and historians and the official records of governments. But to understand these detailed studies—for those who are so fortunate as to have the time and facilities for so doing—it is necessary to understand the fundamental background of each nation and people. Asia is not a unit. It is a geographical expression for a vast area including 1,300,000,000 people, with half a dozen distinct civilizations which are only in our time being drawn together under the combining influences of modern communications and modern culture. In the past—a past which most Westerners have either forgotten or cheerfully assumed was “forever gone”—it was Asiatic imperialism and Asiatic aggression and invasion which battered continually at Europe and in fact conquered vast areas of Europe, from the time of the Scythians and Persians and Phoenician Carthaginians down through the Huns and the Arabs and the Mongols and the Turks almost to our own times.

This book will remind the reader of those times, and point out the nature of the forces which gave us our temporary domination over great areas of Asia. It will point out the forces which have undermined this domination, and the new perspectives opened to Asia and the world by this vast upheaval. These are no longer “far-off” things. They are a part of the world struggle of today—a struggle in the outcome of which our own fate is deeply involved, in which freedom may nobly win or ignobly perish.

We must understand Asia—not as seen by travelers and “six-weeks experts,” nor as seen by religious or national

mystics, nor as presented by "White Man's burden" or "spiritual East" propagandists, but as seen by those of us to whom East and West have become one, who look to the peoples of Asia for cooperation and alliance in a war for freedom and equality against despotism. We must know and understand these peoples in their common lives and in their political background and social organization and bitter economic problems, in their new aspirations toward human equality, in their new emergence as the vital and determining factor in the fate of Asia and ultimately in the fate of the world. Our own fate is bound up with theirs.

Chapter 2.

ASIA OVER EUROPE

FOR THOUSANDS of years, Europe was the pupil of Asia. Our alphabet had its source in Asia; the paper upon which this book is printed is made by a process invented in China; printing itself was invented in China. Most of us believe in religions that have their origin in Asia; some of us are "rationalists," with a skepticism also greatly influenced by Asiatic thought. Less than a thousand years ago, most of Europe was still sunk in the Dark Ages. Four hundred years ago we had made important advances, but were still behind the great civilizations of eastern, southern, and western Asia. And our cultural advances were based directly upon knowledge from Asia, gained largely through the Arabs.

Indeed, down to a few centuries ago, vast areas of Europe were ruled and dominated by Asiatic empires. We need only remember the once powerful Ottoman Empire, the Mongol Empire—of which Russia and China were mere provinces—the Arabs in Spain and Sicily, and before that the Hunnish Empire of Europe.

Asiatic Empire may soon become as great a menace to us today as it was to the Greek world centuries ago. We must regard Asia and Asiatic history with as much seriousness as Herodotus did. We need this for an intelli-

gent perspective on the present world crisis. We need it, also, in order to understand the perspectives of Asiatics who think of their civilizations, religions, and vast empires as potentially more powerful than our own.

From such perspectives, even the magnificent struggle of the Greek freemen against the Persian Empire appears in a different light from that usually given by our European histories. For the basis of Greek civilization, like that of Italy, was Asiatic. In Asia cattle, sheep, and horses were first domesticated, wheat and other grains were first cultivated, copper and bronze were first beaten into tools, ornaments, and weapons. There the phonetic alphabet was invented. The smelting and working of iron was invented in Asia, and our Iron Age began.

Emigrants from Asia Minor and Syria took their culture to Crete and developed there the first high civilization of Europe. Other emigrants from Asia Minor, the Achaeans, learned the alphabet from Asiatic neighbors and took it with them to the Peloponessus, where they made themselves the naval power of the Aegean Sea. European barbarians invaded Greece from the north, and plundered and devastated the Aegean civilization, but a new one was rebuilt upon the ruins, the invaders mixing with the Achaeans and acquiring their culture. Greek trading posts and colonies again spread throughout the Aegean Sea, and in time beyond it—to the Black Sea, and to the islands and coasts of the western Mediterranean.

From Tyre and Sidon, south of Syria, the Phoenicians extended their trade, their colonies, and their maritime empire through the Mediterranean. Their great center at Carthage dominated the sea and carried everywhere their Asiatic merchandise and arts and alphabet. They worked copper mines in Spain; their ships went out into the

Atlantic, coasting far to the north and south.

Other Asiatics, the Etruscans, moved westward from Asia Minor to northern Italy, and there established an empire. They took with them their culture and alphabets, bringing to Italy its first civilization. For a time they shared domination of the western Mediterranean with the more powerful Asiatics at Carthage—the Carthaginian Empire. From the Etruscans the subject Italians learned political organization and culture, religious and official ceremonials, new trades and new weapons. Northern barbarians invaded Italy, giving the death-blow to Etruscan power there. Sicilian Greeks joined the Carthaginians to break the Etruscans' sea-power. The subject Italians gained power at Rome; their leaders became patricians, utilizing Etruscan features throughout their official organization and Etruscan soothsayers in their armies. The Etruscan *fascēs* was taken over by the rulers of Rome; it is the emblem and fetish of Mussolini's ruling class today.

From Asiatic roots grew the Greek and Roman civilizations, and the Roman Empire. European barbarians were learning from the Asiatics. Tens of thousands of Greek and other mercenaries served in the armies of Persia and other Asiatic empires, which for a time extended into Europe north of Greece. It was from Macedonia on this border that Alexander the Great, pupil of the Asiatics and the Greeks, started the great drive of conquest which made him ruler of a vast but short-lived Asiatic Empire, and a God-Emperor on the Asiatic-Egyptian model. He was an Asiatic ruler of European parentage, utilizing the imperial and military techniques of Asia.

The Etruscan-Roman civilization, added to by the Greek alphabet and Greek naval experience and ingenu-

ity, established its domination over the Mediterranean and extended it northward through France to England. The Roman Empire dominated the Western world. It was defeated and overthrown partly by the rebellion of its own subjects, partly by barbarian invasions from northern Europe, but even more by a religion out of Asia which sapped the empire at its very roots, and by the power of a new Asiatic invasion which established the first empire to dominate central Europe—the Empire of Attila the Hun.

Christianity challenged the Etruscan institutions of Rome, denied the divinity of Caesar, and was hostile to the civilization of the pagan Empire. Its most serious rival was another religion out of Asia—Mithraism. But it was the Christian Church which most effectively sapped Roman power, and which ultimately triumphed.

Eastern Europe, north of the Black Sea, was still Asiatic. One Asiatic invasion followed another. Cimmerians and Scythians, Sarmatians and Alans, were followed and conquered by the Huns, who drove further west and invaded the country of the Goths and Vandals. These European barbarians turned to weaker enemies, invaded the Empire, and captured Rome. Attila made himself ruler of Europe, dominating most of the continent and reducing the Eastern Emperor at Constantinople to a tributary. Checked in Gaul, he turned southward into Italy and moved irresistibly on Rome.

The Pope's personal appeal to Attila turned the conqueror from the great capital. The fate of Italy was decided by these two men—one the head of the Church, a religion out of Asia which had gained spiritual ascendancy in the Roman Empire, the other the Asiatic head of a new European Empire which dominated most of the

continent. The Pope's appeal was successful. Attila withdrew his forces, without even levying ransom. But the European barbarians were less civilized than Attila, whose Empire of Europe disintegrated after his death. When the Vandals came, in 455, the Pope could not dissuade them from sacking the great and wealthy city and carting off its treasures. The Roman Empire was dead; Theodoric the Goth made himself king at Rome.

The only survivals of the Empire had their roots in Asia. Constantinople, capital of the Eastern Empire, paid tribute in turn to the Huns, Bulgars, Avars, and other Asiatics to the north of them. Its domains were mainly in Asia. The Imperial City ceased to be European as its Roman aristocracy died out, and Asiatics predominated over Greeks in its devious internal politics. Further west, the only surviving Roman authority was that of the Church. The Pope had taken the title of Pontifex Maximus, the chief sacrificial priest of the Etruscan-Roman Empire. The pagan civilization of Rome, rent by Christian and social upheaval, sank into ever deeper decline.

In eastern and central Europe, the power of the Huns was succeeded by that of other Asiatics—the Bulgars, the Avars, the Khazars, the Magyars (Hungarians). In northern Russia, the Asiatic Finns predominated clear from the Urals to the Baltic, mixing with Slavs and Scandinavians toward the west. New and fiercer Asiatic invaders, the Petchenegs, opened the way for Vikings from the Baltic to establish themselves in western Russia, welcomed by some of the Slav towns as protectors. This was the foundation of historic Russia; the very name of Russia is derived from the Scandinavian "Rothsman" (seafarers) and its Finnish mispronunciation "Ruotsi." The original "Russ" were the fighting bands of these Viking

rulers. Enslaving the Russians whom they had "liberated," they formed alliances with the Petchenegs, the Magyars, and other Asiatics, and ravaged Russia and the Balkans in a united front. This was a thousand years ago.

To the south and southwest, more civilized Asiatic invaders took over most of the Mediterranean and Spain. A new religion—this time a fighting religion—had emerged in Arabia, accepting but claiming to supersede the teachings of Moses and Jesus; Mahomet appeared as the Third Prophet. The Moslem Arabs, with the crusading zeal of their new religion, ended the Byzantine Empire south of Asia Minor, and carried into North Africa and Spain the Moslem religion and a new social and political outlook. In contrast to the older Asiatic Empires, every Moslem was equal before God, was a free man, and could hold property. One man was as good as another, and maybe better; this latter point had to be settled directly and often bloodily, but according to certain rules of religion and chivalry.

The doctrine of human equality appealed mightily to the subject populations of North Africa and Spain; it later affected our own history and traditions. Alien government and taxation and absentee landlordism—institutions which the Vandal rulers had continued from the Romans—were swept aside, together with class and racial distinctions and usury; the last-named was a crime by Moslem law. The Asiatic returned to North Africa and Spain—and dominated them far more completely than the Carthaginians and their slave-drivers had ever done. The Moslem crusaders drove northward into France, but were stopped at Poitiers. The new Asiatic wave receded to Spain.

Europe was still predominantly *Asiatic*. To the east,

Asiatic tribes dominated the continent as far as Hungary. Between them and the Moslems lay the centers of Christian Europe, with its religion out of Asia and its Syrian art and culture. Charlemagne learned from the Moslems, and made his wars Holy Wars. He was crowned by the Pope as Caesar and Augustus, and revived the Roman Empire as Holy. In Spain, the Moslems introduced and developed the highest civilization Europe had yet known, making the country a beacon of light in the Dark Ages of Europe. From Persia and India, China and Greece, the Moslems developed their own distinctive civilization, contributed to by philosophers, scientists, historians and literary men of all races and religions.

The development of a new and higher European civilization started in the universities of Spain—and in those established in North Africa—and included long-forgotten works of Aristotle and other Greek classics, as well as the arts and sciences of Asia. Building on the mathematics of the Persians, Indians, and Greeks, the Arab mathematicians developed algebra (we still use this Arabian word), as well as spherical trigonometry. The Arabian numerals supplanted the cumbrous Roman numerals in European writing.

The universities and growing culture of Spain, supplemented by the influence of the Crusades, shed ever-increasing light into the Dark Ages of Europe. Arab medicine made great advances over that of the Greeks, developed anesthetics and surgery, studied physiology and hygiene, and built up the *materia medica* upon which our own is based. Arab astronomers made new advances, supplemented in course of time by the work of the Mongols in southwestern Asia. But of more importance than theoretical astronomy was the introduction to Europe of the

mariner's compass—which the Arabs may have brought from China—making possible the whole subsequent period of far-flung navigation and discovery of new and unknown worlds.

In chemistry, as in physics, Arab scientists made important advances. In physics they invented the pendulum and produced new works on optics. In chemistry they discovered many new substances, and have passed on to us such Arabic words as "alcohol." For the spreading of knowledge, of prime importance was the introduction of paper and the art of paper-making, which the Arabs brought direct from China, where it had been invented many centuries previously. Paper manufacture was one of the greatest factors in the widening basis of education and knowledge in Europe.

Here, truly, was light from Asia, and it touched the poor and humble even as it did the intellectuals. Mahomet had laid down as a religious law the protection of the poor and the sick, the old and the weak, the widow and the orphan. In Spain, and in Palestine during the Crusades, Europeans saw the "curious" institutions devoted to such purposes. The development of similar institutions in Europe, by the saintly Francis of Assisi and his disciples and successors, was directly inspired by the Moslem. European chivalry also had its debt to the Arabs, for Christian knights participated in the great tournaments in Spain as well as in the wars in Palestine, and learned that there were rules and codes of chivalrous warfare—ideas which remain with us in our conceptions of "civilized" warfare.

The Crusades themselves were a significant example of Asiatic influence over Europe. The Seljuk Turks—Asiatic tribes from northwestern China, who had made

their way for centuries across Asia and in time established their power in Asia Minor—drove the Byzantine Empire completely out of its remaining Asiatic territories and threatened Constantinople itself. The Emperor desperately appealed to Rome for aid against the Infidel. The Crusades followed, with the rallying call of a fighting and crusading religion combating that of the Moslems—who had themselves brought the idea to Europe. The European warriors who invaded Asia Minor and Palestine, and for a time established themselves there, made treaties and alliances and intermarried with the Saracens, and acquired much of the latter's civilization, which they took back into many parts of Europe.

From the Arabs, in Spain and the Mediterranean, European seamen learned the use of the mariner's compass—which originally came, perhaps, from China. This remarkable device opened a whole new era of navigation and of history. The Portuguese, ousting the Moorish rulers from their territories, took over many of their arts. Henry the Navigator's ships sailed out into the Atlantic, and southward along the coast of Africa. Venetian and Genoese ships, also using the mariner's compass, also sailed out into the Atlantic; their ships were chartered and their seamen employed by monarchs and merchants of Spain, England, and France. In 1486 Portuguese navigators rounded the south of Africa. In 1492 a Genoese navigator by name of Columbus crossed the Atlantic and discovered a new continent. Long before this, an English friar named Roger Bacon had followed up Arab chemistry with equally unexpected and momentous results. He discovered gunpowder, which was soon adapted to war purposes on land and sea. Guns and artillery became increasingly useful and effective.

In eastern Europe, the Russian descendants of the Viking barbarians came in contact with Byzantium and the Greek Church, the most purely Asiatic form of the religion out of Asia, and in time accepted it. Priests from Constantinople introduced writing into Russia, and served as clerks and officials. Byzantine laws were translated and made effective, in the Hebraic tradition of punishing sin rather than crime. Writing and records made possible a more integrated State, and the binding tie of the new religion made possible a Christian crusade against a group of Turks who had established themselves north of the Black Sea.

The most powerful of Asiatic invasions swept into eastern Europe in the thirteenth century, with a military system far superior to anything that Europe had yet known. This was no temporary alliance of tribes leaving their Asiatic homeland. It had its base deep in Asia, where the Mongol Empire held sway eastward clear to the Korean peninsula. During the Dark Ages in Europe, and before and after it, a great civilization flourished in China, under an Empire extending over far wider territories and greater populations than anything Europe had ever known. The Mongols from the northern plains were now driving deep into this great Eastern Empire, and establishing their own domination over it. Westward they drove clear across Asia into Europe, made Russia a Mongol province, and defeated the Allied forces of Christian Europe in the Hungarian plain.

It was Mongol superiority in the arts of war and in rapid movement which overwhelmed eastern Europe seven centuries ago. Their cavalry worked with an entirely original system of flags and signals, was able to cover enormous distances with unprecedented swiftness,

and was supplemented by an intelligence system wholly beyond anything in Europe. Venetians served the Mongol intelligence in the west, where the invaders reached the Adriatic. The Venetians increased their wealth and their own power both in the Adriatic and beyond it, and emerged as a leading maritime Power in the Mediterranean.

The Mongols ruled the most extensive and powerful empire in the history of the world. Semi-barbarous Russia, like great and civilized China, were only parts and provinces of this vast Empire, which stretched clear across Asia and eastern Europe, extended its power southward through China and Persia, and ruled an actual majority of the population of the world.

For more than two centuries the Mongol Empire was sovereign in Russia. The Russian state of Muscovy was set up under its domination, as a provincial regime for the collection of taxes and the suppression of rebellion. The Mongols patronized the Greek Church, which expanded its influence and authority in their Russian provinces. The raiding, slave-trading, and armed anarchy of the Vikings and their associates gave way to organized absolutism, with an integrated rule and agricultural exploitation in Russia. The despotic Russian state was a direct product of the Mongol conquest.

Mongol influence upon Europe went far beyond their Russian provinces. Under the Mongol peace, Venetian and other European merchants could travel clear across the vast continent of Asia to China, where Marco Polo served as an Imperial official and took back to semi-civilized Europe his marvelous tales of the wealth, civilization, and immense population of China—received with mocking incredulity in little Venice, though this was

then the richest city and commercial center in Europe. Marco Polo opened the eyes of medieval Italy to a culture and civilization even richer than that of the Arabs—a country of beautiful and populous cities many times greater than any in Europe, where men burned “stones” (coal) to give heat, had such amazing luxuries as silk in incredible abundance, lived as part of a vast and stable Imperial Government ruling territories many times the size and population of feudal Europe, placed literature and reason and a newly developing science above religious dogma, and produced quantities of books by a strange process known as “printing.”

The Mongols are said to have introduced the printing press to eastern Europe. But it was two centuries before Italian and German craftsmen applied this invention in their homelands, giving an enormous stimulus to the spread of culture in Europe. Chinese and Mongol religious tolerance supplemented liberal Arab influence (not orthodox Moslem influence) on European thought. Some Mongol princes in time embraced Islam, but most of them attended Christian, Moslem, and pagan services without discrimination; they patronized the Greek Church in Russia for its political value.

Kublai Khan, indeed, decided to make Christianity a State religion, and sent to Rome for missionaries. This move was fraught with tremendous political possibilities. It would have brought the vast Mongol Empire together with the Holy Roman Empire in Europe, linking the effective Imperial authority of most of Asia and eastern Europe with the spiritual authority of Rome. But the Roman Church was then involved in a bitter conflict between Pope and anti-Pope, and the Great Khan's appeal was virtually ignored. Kublai finally turned to Bud-

dhism; powerful khans in western Asia became Moslems; most of the "Russian" Mongols ultimately joined the Greek Church. Divided, medieval Europe was as despotic as Asia, but it was not ready for world government.

The Mongols might well have dominated Europe by sheer strength and military superiority, had they thought it worth while. They were never really defeated in Europe during their centuries of strength. They went as far as the Hungarian plain and the Adriatic, but stopped there—and after a time withdrew. The forests and mountains beyond the plain were poor terrain for their horses, and the little villages and medieval towns of Europe were hardly worthy of a serious military campaign.

The forests and mountains of western and southern China, far greater than those of Europe, did not deter the Mongols. The great cities and wealth and civilization of China were really worth the cost. The Mongols, in campaigns continuing for decades, made themselves masters of that vast, populous country. They did not consider Europe worthy of such campaigns. Kublai Khan wanted an understanding with Rome, but Europe was not prepared even for this. The real struggle was for China and Persia, centers of the civilized world of that day. They were really *worth* conquering.

Other Asiatics invaded Europe—the Turks from Asia Minor. The Turks were kinsmen of the Mongols, but it was the Mongol drive into Persia and southwestern Asia, where they made the Turks their tributaries, that stopped the Turks for a century. As the Mongol power declined, the Ottoman Turks consolidated and expanded their power in southwestern Asia, crossed into Europe, and extended their dominion westward across the Balkans to the Adriatic, whence the Mongols had withdrawn the

previous century. But the new Mongol conqueror Tamurlane attacked the Ottomans and crushed their power in southwestern Asia; it was half a century before the Turks recovered from the blow, seized Constantinople, and renewed their aggressions in Europe. They extended their Empire as far as Hungary and southern Poland, eastward through Moldavia, southward to Greece and the Mediterranean, and through Syria and Palestine into Egypt. The Black Sea became a Turkish lake; the eastern Mediterranean likewise. Three centuries ago, the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful in Europe.

But Europe was at last gaining power to meet the invader. Gunpowder and artillery, the newly developing sciences and industries, supplementing the developing military weapons, strategy and tactics as Europe continued its almost incessant wars, made this possible. The Turks were beaten off from Vienna, and defeated by the Holy Alliance of Austria, Poland and Venice in fifteen years of continuous war. The days of Asiatic Empire in Europe were numbered.

They should not, however, be forgotten. They are the basis and background of European history. Asiatic Empire dominated the Mediterranean until the rise of Rome. The Romans themselves took over an Asiatic Empire in Italy as well as the Mediterranean and further east; the Roman-Etruscan Empire and its God-Emperor carried on until a new religion out of Asia undermined and supplanted its authority and its pagan civilization, and fiercer invasions from Asia drove the Goths and Vandals against Rome and established an Asiatic Empire of Europe. Other Asiatic invaders swept through North Africa to Spain and Sicily, and dominated the Mediterranean. One Asiatic conqueror followed another in Rus-

sia to the east. One Asiatic conqueror followed another in the Balkans. Not until the end of the seventeenth century could Europe feel secure from Asiatic domination.

But this new security was itself mainly derived from our success in learning from the Arabs and Mongols, supplemented by the binding force of a religion out of Asia and the military crusading zeal of another religion out of Asia. From the very beginning of European history we have learned, for good and for ill, from Asia and the Asiatics. From southwestern Asia have come most of the more civilizing and liberalizing influences in our civilization. From the plains of northern Asia has come more of grim, organized despotism, centralized and ruthless rule, impregnated with the conception of World Empire—the legacy of the Mongols.

The unity gained by religious loyalties, the learning of navigation and other arts and sciences from the Arabs, and the application of these things and their further developments to war, have enabled the little countries of western Europe to expand into and dominate the vast and rich continent of America, to extend their power overseas into Asia, to check the Asiatic invader in Europe, and to open a new era for the world. Among other things, we followed the Asiatic into Asia, and established Western domination over that vast continent and most of its people. Our little European extension of Asia made itself master of Asia—for a time.

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Chapter 3.

EUROPE OVER ASIA

WESTERN DOMINATION of Asia is a comparatively new thing in history. It has been established less than two hundred years. It was made possible by the fact that Europe was building, on its Asiatic cultural foundations, a new scientific civilization of its own, and had moved ahead of Asia in its industrial, military, and governing techniques. It was aided by European conquest of the American continent, with its vast wealth and resources. European domination of our continent ended, but the United States of America emerged as a new great Power, also seeking privileges in Asia, and cooperating more than it disputed with European Powers in the Far East. The continent of Asia, with an actual majority of the population of the earth, was for the first time made subject to Western Empires with superior organization, techniques, and material civilization.

Westerners had no doubt of their right to rule. In 1493, after Columbus' momentous discovery, Rome officially assigned to Spain and Portugal the possession of all parts of the world outside of Europe, and demarcated

the respective areas of the two Powers. Portugal was given the field to the East. Vasco da Gama sailed around Africa to Zanzibar; an Arab pilot steered him across the Indian Ocean to the Indian coast. The Portuguese monarch styled himself "King of Portugal and Lord of the Indies." Da Gama was his "Lord of the Conquest, Navigation, and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India." The Portuguese gained a foothold on the east coast of India, at Goa (where they perpetrated incredible atrocities on the inoffensive heathens), and seized Malacca on the Malay peninsula, the great trading center of southern Asia. Against the Arab ships and merchants who for a thousand years had sailed these seas the Portuguese launched with their new firearms an aggressive campaign against this commerce, seizing or sinking Arabian and other ships and cargoes. Within a century, the Portuguese pirates were masters of the Indian Ocean, carrying on a profitable trade in spices and other commodities—including slaves. They seized ports and poorly defended islands or coastal areas as far east as the China Sea.

The Spaniards sailed west as the Portuguese sailed east. Their main field was the Americas, but they gained a foothold in the Philippine Islands, where there was no central authority of any kind, and conquered and annexed them, converting their six million inhabitants to Christianity. The Spanish monarch acquired the throne of Portugal in 1580, uniting the two vast empires, with the abundant gold of the Americas and the rich trade of the East.

The wealth of America and Asia brought a new alignment in Europe. English pirates, with no respect for aristocratic naval traditions or for Spain, fixed artillery into the gunwhales of ships and plundered the Spanish

vessels carrying American gold to Europe. The Dutch subjects of the Spanish king, developing a commerce and town life which gained much by the new overseas trade, rebelled against the exactions of the Spanish monarch. The British sailors with their new tactics destroyed the Spanish Armada when it moved against England, and enabled the little country successfully to assert its political as well as religious independence. The Dutch were able to do the same.

Dutch and English material ambitions coincided with their Protestant hostility to the rulers of the Catholic Empire. Their ships made expeditions to Asiatic waters on their own, challenging and breaking Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean. In 1600 the British East India Company was formed, followed two years later by the Dutch East India Company. The English supplanted the Portuguese in India; the Dutch did the same—killing most of the English traders—in the East Indies, Ceylon, and the Malay peninsula. During the seventeenth century the Dutch became the principal European Power in Asia and the Indian Ocean; during a period of civil war in China, they added Chinese Formosa to their Empire.

In Japan, a Portuguese and Spanish ascendancy was checked by their mutual rivalries and by British and Dutch counter-influences on the Japanese. The Portuguese four centuries ago introduced firearms into the little islands, which were divided into many feudal principalities recognizing no central authority. The Portuguese taught their manufacture to their Japanese friends, shared commercial profits with them, converted feudal lords of southern Japan and hundreds of thousands of their subjects to Christianity, became advisers and officials in these Christian fiefs, and built up a powerful Fifth

Column in Japan. The new firearms and the supplanting of individual combat by more organized warfare aided the Japanese warrior Oda Nobunaga to expand his power in central Japan. Even more did the Portuguese aid and encourage this rising military leader in his war against the temporal power of the Buddhists in central Japan, where he destroyed 3,000 monasteries and massacred a hundred thousand monks. Christian converts throughout Japan were a splendid source of information for Nobunaga, and for the Jesuits' Christian barons in southern Japan.

Hideyoshi, Nobunaga's brilliant peasant adviser and successor, saw the menace of the Portuguese Fifth Column in Japan, and upon coming to power officially prohibited Christian missionary work and suppressed the profitable slave trade carried on by the Portuguese. The suppression of missionary work was more nominal than real at first, and was followed by a quite unprecedented move—a Japanese invasion of Korea. According to the Jesuits, Hideyoshi's main aim in this was to settle the Christian barons of Kyushu outside of Japan, ending their power in Japan itself. Twenty thousand Christian soldiers participated in this invasion, accompanied by Jesuit missionaries who zealously endeavored to convert the survivors among the decimated Koreans.

Hideyoshi had other aims as well. The success of the Spaniards in conquering the Philippines south of Japan, and the expansion of Spanish and Portuguese maritime power—united at the time—was both a warning and an inspiration. What Spanish and Portuguese ships and forces and Fifth Columns could do, Japanese could also do, if they could keep the Fifth Column working for and not against them. To the south, in Luzon (most

northerly of the Philippines) a number of Chinese as well as Japanese were settled, and made forcible resistance to the Spaniards who had invaded and occupied the country. Spanish forces beat off an attack on Manila, and destroyed or drove to the hills most of the survivors. Hideyoshi, who had already asserted his authority over southern Japan, challenged Spanish claims to Luzon and asserted Japanese sovereignty.

The Spaniards sent envoys nominally accepting vassalage in 1593, the year after the Japanese invasion of Korea started. The Spanish envoys—Franciscan monks who had long tried to enter the Portuguese Jesuits' field in Japan—strongly denounced the Jesuits and warned against them. Though agreeing not to carry on missionary work in Japan, they prosecuted it more vigorously than the Jesuits had been doing; at Nagasaki they seized a church from the Jesuits. A Spanish ship's captain, faced with an order for attachment of his ship and cargo, made the error of trying to frighten the Japanese by asserting the vast power of the Spanish sovereign. Asked to explain this power, he made a further error by saying: "Our kings begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer *religieux*, who induce the people to embrace our religion. When they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our kings have little trouble in accomplishing the rest."

Hideyoshi was not amused. It confirmed his own shrewd suspicions. More serious suppression started. Those professing the alien faith could recant and go free; in this, it was quite unlike the European Inquisition. But those who refused to recant faced death—though foreigners were usually deported. The first twenty-three Christian

martyrs of Japan, in 1597, included the Philippine envoy, Father Bautista. The campaign in Korea was ended the following year.

Dutch and English traders in Japan made it worse for the Spanish and Portuguese. The latter tried to have the newcomers executed as pirates; the Dutch and English warned the Japanese against the Catholics. Will Adams, English pilot of a Dutch ship, told of Spanish intrigues in the British Isles, of "Jesuit invasions" of England and Ireland, of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, of the expulsion of Catholic priests from Protestant countries. The first Protestants in Japan made history.

Adams was employed as adviser by the Shogun (Generalissimo) Iyeyasu, who took power after Hideyoshi's death. Iyeyasu sent a Japanese embassy to the Spanish king and to the Pope, sent investigators to Europe, and authorized Adams to build ocean-going vessels of the newest types for the Japanese Government. A generous charter was offered to English merchants, with trade direct with Yedo (the present Tokyo), but the British made no use of their opportunities. Dutch hostility to the Spaniards increased when their war was renewed in 1621, and the Japanese were further warned against "intrigue." The Japanese in 1624 refused to receive a Philippine embassy, and finally ordered all Spaniards deported—ending diplomatic relations which had continued for thirty-two years. The Dutch themselves, however, in Formosa to the south of Japan, acted with such stupid hostility toward Japanese vessels that the Dutch factory in Japan was closed for four years, and its subsequent activities seriously restricted.

In 1637, when a desperate peasant revolt in southwestern Japan was given leadership and unity by Jap-

anese Christians and took on the aspect of a "Christian uprising," the Dutch willingly cooperated with the Shogun's forces in the siege and bombardment of the rebels, who were wiped out. The Japanese, encouraged by the Dutch, announced that any Portuguese ship coming to Japan would be burned with all its cargo, and all on board would be executed. Japanese construction of sea-going ships was forbidden, and Japanese subjects prohibited from leaving the country. The Dutch were permitted to carry on a limited trade under close restrictions, but the Japanese wanted no further relations with Europe—except to keep informed of current developments in the West, for which the Dutch factory served as a "window." Japan was "closed," and firmly isolationist. The Japanese wanted no more to do with the West and its political and religious conflicts.

In northern Asia, the Russians were expanding eastward to the Pacific. China had thrown off the Mongol yoke in the fourteenth century; the Muscovites with Mongol allies threw off the rule of Tamurlane in the fifteenth century; the vast Mongol Empire had ended—except in southern Asia. Russia and China, long parts of the Mongol Empire, resumed contact as the Russians pressed eastward through Siberia, and Russian envoys came to Peking. A Russian embassy was one of the first to congratulate the Manchu Emperor upon his assumption of the Dragon Throne in Peking in 1648. The Russians reached the Amur River and the Ussuri, but the Manchus drove them from the Amur valley and set the boundary at the watershed to the north of it. The treaty signed at Nerchinsk, in 1689, paved the way for long and peaceful relations between Moscow and Peking. It is the longest-lived treaty in history, unchanged except

for minor alterations and additions for 169 years. It was concluded on a basis of full equality, an unprecedented concession from the Emperor at Peking. A Russian diplomatic and ecclesiastic mission came to Peking, and regular relations continued down to the present century.

In southern Asia, the British and French established themselves along the coast of India, the last survival of the vast Mongol Empire. The Mogul (Mongol) Empire was established in India in 1526, and expanded its domination over most of the country. The Moguls thought in terms of empire, not in terms of the various kingdoms into which India was divided. Their great ruler Akbar aimed at a fuller unity of the populous country and a synthesis between religions. Nehru has referred to him as a forerunner of Indian Nationalism. During the seventeenth century the Empire spread further south, expelling the Portuguese from Hugli and defeating British naval attacks. But this expansion brought new conflicts between Moslems and Hindus. In the older Mogul domains, most of the population had become Moslems, consisting mostly of low-caste Hindus who preferred Moslem equality to caste discrimination. Further south, Moslem expansion brought both political and religious conflict, which had repercussions in the remaining Hindu areas in the north as well. The Hindu Marathas of the southwest were as fiercely intolerant of the Moslems as the latter were of them. The Maratha center was near Bombay, which the British acquired from the Portuguese in 1662. Able to purchase foreign arms, the Marathas asserted themselves as an independent and growing military power. Other Hindu rulers and governors, and the Sikh Brotherhood in the Punjab, also asserted themselves. Foreign traders along the coast sold equipment and arms and

services to all who would buy them—limited only by political considerations.

The English had long had settlements along the Indian coast. They founded Madras in 1639, acquired Bombay, and founded Calcutta in 1690. The French had several settlements, and purchased the town of Pondicherry—which became the leading port on the eastern coast of India. The Europeans fortified and armed their settlements against Indians and against one another, and entered into local treaties and alliances with Indian rulers. The Moguls had never developed naval power; their Imperial center was in the north and away from the sea.

The growing conflicts in India, with foreign traders supplying arms to one group after another, enabled the British East India Company to expand its political power. The Mogul Empire was attacked not only by the Marathas and other Hindu forces from the south, but by Persian and Afghan invasions from the northwest. The French and the British, in the meantime, were training Indian troops in new methods of warfare, using them against other Indian forces, or hiring them out to Indian allies. The French started this business; the British continued it; both expanded their profits and their power. The French gained virtual domination of the eastern part of the peninsula. The British, well financed by the East India Company's investors, expanded their Indian armies and alliances, and after fifteen years of conflict with the French emerged victorious.

The British city of Calcutta was in Bengal, the richest province of the Mogul Empire. In 1757, Clive's British and Indian forces defeated the Nabob's forces at Plassey, and emerged as the most powerful group in India. The

Hindu Marathas had expanded northward to the Punjab, but were crushed by a new Afghan invasion in 1761. The British, timing shrewdly their moves, defeated the Imperial army of Oudh in 1764, ending the resistance of the Moguls. Unlike the Afghan invaders and the defeated Marathas, the British did not withdraw. They now controlled the revenues of Bengal—the main purse-strings of the moribund Empire—and continued to do so. The Mogul Emperor, *Kaisar-i-Hind*, retained his title and his nominal sovereignty, but the British were now the real power in India, dominating an empire many times greater than the British Isles.

The British East India Company, organized as a trading company with royal and aristocratic stockholders, had now expanded into a political government, turning from economic to political means for its enormous profits. The Company's officials, in charge of much of the Mogul Empire's taxation, appropriated great fortunes for themselves and remitted dividends of 100 per cent and more annually to wealthy shareholders "back home." While Indian peasants died in famines sometimes more widespread than previously, the wealth shipped to England strengthened the power of its beneficiaries even as the new interlinking with Asiatic despotism strengthened Tory convictions and encouraged reaction. The East India Company's tea monopoly provoked the "Boston Tea Party" and contributed to the American Revolution, even while the Indian treasure poured into England was promoting the industrial revolution in England itself, a process well summarized by Brooks Adams:

"The influx of Indian treasure, by adding considerably to the nation's cash capital, not only increased its stock of energy, but added much to

its flexibility and the rapidity of its movement. Very soon after Plassey, the Bengal plunder began to arrive in London, and the effect appears to have been instantaneous; for all authorities agree that the 'industrial revolution' began with the year 1770. . . .

"In themselves inventions are passive, . . . waiting for a sufficient store of force to have accumulated to set them working. That store must always take the shape of money, and money not hoarded but in motion. Before the influx of the Indian treasure, and the expansion of credit which followed, no force sufficient for this purpose existed. . . . Possibly since the world began, no investment has ever yielded the profit reaped from the Indian plunder, because for nearly fifty years Great Britain stood without a competitor." *

The great industrial development of England during those years made possible its expansion as a Great Power of unprecedented magnitude. The American Revolution, indeed, prevented the expansion of British to World Empire—as would evidently have been the process during the nineteenth century had it not been for the loss of these colonies. But the British Government in 1784 established more direct control over the East India Company's activities in India, assuring a larger percentage of profit going to shareholders and less of it sticking to the fingers of "enterprising" officials. Cornwallis, who had found the American revolutionists with French assistance too much to handle, was in 1786 sent to India as Governor-General to carry through drastic changes in administration, a

* Excerpts from pp. 313-317 Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, Copyright Alfred C. Knopf, 1943.

simpler matter with two hundred million Indians than it had been in the American colonies.

When the revolutionary spark kindled in America spread to France, and the French Revolution threatened the old order throughout Europe and Latin America, it was the new industries of England which were decisive in the conflict between Legitimacy and Revolution. The little fingers of English children, toiling from sixteen to twenty hours daily in the new factories, defeated the armies of Napoleon and the revolution throughout Europe. While these children were dying in the factories, and the old spinners and weavers were dying of starvation, the effects of the industrial revolution were being deeply felt in India as well. For generations, the fine textiles and other manufactures of India had been sold in increasing quantities to Western countries, but the new English factories destroyed this trade and even brought the introduction of cheap British textiles into India itself. As elsewhere, this process which brought "cheaper goods" to consumers brought terrible calamity to the displaced craftsmen; in India, many millions of these died of starvation.

The enormous plunder of the early years of British domination in India could not continue. As people died, profits declined. The complete extermination of the geese who laid the golden eggs was obviously pointless and dangerous, and new sources of revenue had to be devised. Already, one of these sources was growing—the revenue from opium, raised in India and exported to China. The vice of opium-smoking, acquired by the Chinese from the Dutch during the period of Dutch domination of Formosa, had long since been noted as a public menace by the Chinese Government, which had repeatedly prohib-

ited its import, and had at times executed drug-traffickers. But the loose organization of the archaic empire made official prohibition almost as ineffective as was prohibition in the United States twenty years ago. Foreign ships brought Indian opium into Chinese ports under the noses of Imperial officials and sometimes in corrupt collusion with them.

In 1830, the Manchu Empire was still the greatest and most populous in the world. Its vast territories in China proper, with a population greater than all Europe at the time, were surrounded by "vassal states" or Imperial dominions greater than England or France. The kingdoms of Indo-China, Burma, and Nepal to the south and southwest, like those of Korea and the Luchu islands to the east, paid tribute and acknowledged the sovereignty of the Emperor at Peking, who also included the immense territories of Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet in his dominions. The vast empire had friendly relations with its Russian neighbors to the west, but it had no respect for the little states of western Europe, whose activities in Chinese waters and along the China coast were characterized not merely by opium smuggling but often by mutual warfare and piracy. The Imperial bureaucracy, steeped for two thousand years in Confucian regimentation of thought, had no conception whatever of the European developments which had now made the British navy the most powerful weapon of aggression in the world.

When the Chinese Imperial Commissioner, Lin Tse-shu, seized and destroyed 20,000 chests of opium in British hands—or consigned to British firms—at Canton, the result was the Opium War of a century ago, when the British seized Hongkong and used this as a base for their navy as they moved northward along the China coast,

taking one strategic point after another from the Manchu and Chinese defenders with their archaic weapons, and finally making their way up the Yangtze River and threatening the grain tribute to Peking via the Grand Canal. Peking finally capitulated, agreed to pay for the destroyed opium, ceded Hongkong, and compensated the British for the latter's costs in the war against China. New ports were opened to British traders and smugglers; they were placed out of reach of Chinese law by being granted British consular jurisdiction while in China, the system known as extraterritoriality.

"Freedom of trade" is an excellent-sounding ideal. The most profitable trade involved, however, was that in opium, which now grew by leaps and bounds. The East India Company, with its monopoly of this great enterprise in India itself, made excellent profits by the sale of the drug to British, American, and other shippers for smuggling into China—a business with which the Chinese Government was now unable to interfere. The famous "Yankee clippers" profited greatly from this business, and from the first treaty between China and the United States.

The American Government, in its 1844 treaty with China, pledged itself unconditionally to exclude opium from its trade with China. The Imperial Government, in consideration of this pledge, agreed to grant extraterritorial privileges to the Americans—privileges which had been granted the British in a secret agreement with the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1843, but which had not previously been made open and specific. The result was one in which it is difficult to take pride. American extraterritorial privileges were at once made effective, but the American Government did not enforce the promised prohibition of opium trafficking. The Americans, in fact,

became the principal smugglers of opium into China, in direct violation of American treaty obligations.

Behind this lay something besides the opium smugglers' desire for profits. The American Government's attitude toward China was one which was best expressed through the correspondence of the American Commissioner, Caleb Cushing, with Washington, wherein he set forth for official approval the view that the "heathen" Chinese Government was outside the "law of nations," and not entitled to the respect due a "civilized" nation in regard to observance of treaties. It was expressed more discreetly in the amazing letter dispatched by President Tyler to the Emperor of China, beginning: "I hope your health is good. China is a great empire, extending over a great part of the world. The Chinese are numerous. You have millions and millions of subjects. . . ." This childish letter to the sovereign of the oldest civilization in the world was not intended to be insulting. It simply revealed our Administration's abysmal ignorance and utter contempt for the Chinese mind. The amazed and amused Chinese officials who read the letter never presented it to the Emperor, but formed a curious estimate of the mentality of the American President.

The Chinese, at the time, believed that the influence of Americans and other foreigners would offset British influence in China. As a "diplomatic equivalent" for Hongkong, they gave the Americans trading privileges which allowed them to trade between Chinese coastal ports—a coastal trade such as an independent nation reserves to its own vessels, and an Imperial power carries on in its own colony. The Chinese welcomed American missionary work, and voluntarily gave Americans the right to erect Christian churches at the treaty ports.

The British included, in their 1843 treaty with China, the super-Machiavellian invention known as the "most favored nation" clause: the Chinese Government promised that any "additional privileges or immunities" granted to other countries should be given the British as well. By this ingenious device, every nation thenceforth automatically secured for itself any privilege extorted by some other Power by force or wangled by fraud. Any trick taken by one benefited all, laying the basis for greater cooperation among the Western Powers against China than had previously existed. The American Treaty of 1844, like the French treaty which followed it, contained the "most favored nation" clause. Westerners of all nationalities became a privileged group in China, wholly exempt from Chinese law and taxation, directly interested in seeing new privileges extorted from China by any Western Power, and sometimes combining in joint pressure with this aim in view.

The Opium War had serious repercussions throughout China. The defeat of the Manchu Empire greatly damaged its prestige, and encouraged Chinese revolutionary elements seeking to overthrow it. Though the alien Manchu dynasty was by this time as fully "assimilated" in China as the House of Hanover was in England, the memory of the long and bitter warfare of a century and a half before still continued in southern China, where there were secret societies still devoted to a Ming Restoration and expulsion of the Manchus. There was also a new force—the native Christian sect founded by Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, whose reading of missionary tracts had inspired him to the formation of his "Congregation of the Worshipers of God" on a basis of Christian Communism.

This doctrine was a new expression of the agrarian revolution, which has brought down one dynasty after another in China. Under the Manchu Dynasty, as under the Mings before it, Imperial officials and their descendants gradually acquired more and more of the wealth of the land, while the peasants were steadily reduced to tenantry, famine, and banditry. It was the gathering forces of banditry, rebellion, and agrarian revolution which had brought down the Ming Empire two hundred years previously. The peasants seized the land and opened up a better life for themselves for a time, but the officials of the new Empire renewed the old process, reducing the Chinese peasants to unspeakable misery under the predatory landlord-official class. The new movement of the "God-Worshippers" was comparable in many ways to the great peasant rebellions under Christian leadership in Europe a few centuries previously—the Hussites, the Peasant Revolt in England, the spirit of John Ball, "mad" priest of Kent.

The "God-Worshippers" were joined by increasing numbers of the poor, and in time by capable leaders of rebellion who gave the movement definite political organization and aims. Hung Hsiu-ch'uan became the sovereign of a new empire, the T'ai-ping—the Heavenly Kingdom of Eternal Peace—whose inspired forces (reminiscent of Cromwell's, with their hymns, prayer-meetings, and sermons) swept northward to the Yangtze valley and established their capital at Nanking, which they held for twelve years. Mortgages and title-deeds were destroyed, the land divided among the peasantry, the movable property of the wealthy communized, and chattel slavery abolished. "All should strive," the Taiping Government proclaimed, "to share equally the great happiness bestowed

by the Heavenly Father. . . . All shall eat food, all shall have clothes, money shall be shared, in all things shall there be equality. No man shall be without food and warmth."

The power of the Manchu Dynasty collapsed throughout most of China. Along the coast, rebel forces seized power and for a time dominated the seas. This situation opened the way for foreign activities of a monstrous kind, which the candid historian must set down for the record. The British Navy, obtaining "authority" from the Imperial officials at Canton (which the Manchus succeeded in retaining), swept the rebel authority from the seas, where the British became supreme. All anti-Manchu elements were characterized as "pirates," and one seaport after another was taken from the revolutionists, Chinese puppets being set up by the foreigners.

The opium traffic expanded enormously, and was soon supplemented by traffic in slaves, hundreds of thousands of abducted Chinese being shipped across the Pacific to the American continent, where the survivors of the terrible voyage were sold as slaves. Foreign adventurers went in for piracy and the protection racket, "convoying" Chinese vessels for a price as the alternative to complete plunder. Chinese opium-dealers and kidnappers were set up as "Imperial officials" along the coast. American adventurers took an active and dishonorable part not only in opium trafficking but in racketeering and slave-dealing. Such notorious opium-dealers as Russell and Company were made American consular agents by a Government which was pledged by treaty to prevent opium-trafficking by its nationals.

Americans, indeed, were first to follow the British in actual seizures of Chinese territory. During this period of

upheaval the American flag was raised in Formosa, where an American company ruled the principal port, supported by a detachment of United States Marines. The American Commissioner to China urged Washington formally to annex Formosa, but was told by the Administration that the authority of Congress was necessary and that Congress was not likely to approve. The democratic American system, therefore, acted as a positive brake on the ambitions of our navalists and aggressive "business men" in the Far East, and led to what became a permanent American policy—the "territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire."

This policy was a curious one for a Government established by rebellion against and disruption of the British Empire. It had, however, clear and understandable motivation. American interests in China, debarred by Congressional opposition from territorial seizures, devoted their efforts to preventing Britain or other countries from seizing particular areas for themselves, and to cooperating with these other Powers in extracting new privileges from China and reducing China as a whole to the fullest possible subjection to the Powers jointly. Other Powers must not be permitted to partition China and establish direct rule over various areas. The "territorial integrity" of China must be maintained as a *joint colony* of all the Powers, including the United States.

Congress, indeed, embarrassed American interests in China in more ways than one. It passed a resolution for recognition of the Taiping Government at Nanking, but this was never carried out. The Taipings had not only condemned but actually abolished the traffic in opium, a decree which their control of economic life made wholly feasible. Some Protestant missionaries were friendly to the Taipings, but our opium-dealers along the coast were

bitterly hostile, and it was their policy which triumphed. The American envoy to China, in direct violation of his instructions from Washington, himself joined other foreign envoys in moving successfully for legalization of the opium traffic by the Manchu Imperial regime—finally reduced to complete impotence when the Powers invaded Peking in 1860.

Manchu authority had already disappeared throughout most of the country, but the proud dynasty still refused to serve as foreign puppets until British and French forces blasted their way through to Peking, forcing the Imperial Court to flee to Jehol. Its authority south of the Great Wall was ended, and it was to its powerless representatives at Peking that the foreign Powers dictated their terms, terms dealing with a China where Manchu Imperial authority had virtually ceased to exist and could be re-established only by foreign military intervention.

The terms of the Powers went a long way toward making China a joint colony of the Westerners. The latter had already made their settlements and concessions virtual foreign enclaves under foreign rule, and were building up a new Maritime Customs Administration under joint foreign control. Foreign ships navigated the Yangtze as they would navigate the rivers of their own colonies, defying the Taiping Government at Nanking. But these and other privileges could be made real only by re-establishing the authority of the moribund Manchu regime from which they had been extracted, and the foreign Powers now devoted themselves to this task. An American adventurer, Ward, had already given his services to the Manchu regime at Shanghai, organizing modern military forces against the Taipings. The British and French now

started the training and equipping of Chinese armies, with a nucleus of foreign artillerymen, supported by regular British and French forces as well as gunboats.

It was two years before these forces could make headway against the Taipings, but superior armaments and training, and a strict embargo enforced by the British fleet along the coast, in time began to tell against the religious zeal and heroic resistance of the Taipings. Most of the latter were physically exterminated. Few escaped—one of these few being later a teacher of Dr. Sun Yet-sen, father of the Chinese Republic. The Chinese opium-dealers and crimps who had served the Powers as puppets along the coast formed the nuclei of a revived Imperial regime, which, after a war lasting twenty more years, crushed all organized internal opposition and re-established the "territorial integrity" of the archaic despotism over its crushed and decimated subjects.

The great southern dominions or vassal states of the Empire, however, were seized by Western Powers. Burma, Siam, and Indo-China (all of which have close racial, linguistic, and cultural links with the Chinese) were outside the system of direct Imperial control, their kingdoms having the status of self-governing dominions of the Empire which then stretched southward through these territories to the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam. Their kings acknowledged the supreme sovereignty of the "Son of Heaven" at Peking, received investiture from him, and sent gifts (tribute) symbolizing their vassaldom and allegiance. There were no Imperial Residents, and no Imperial interference except at the request of the dominion governments. Their relations with Peking were essentially similar to the relations of Britain's self-governing dominions with the British monarch. They were united

under the Crown; the Supreme Sovereign reigned, but did not rule.

The British started the first war of aggression against these southern dominions in 1824, when the British Navy obtained a treaty with Burma for increased British penetration and trade. This was a minor beginning. In 1852, during the internal upheaval in China, the British began their second war against Burma, this time seizing the coastal regions of the country. In India, however, the British faced internal upheaval in 1857; stupid disregard for religious taboos among their soldiers caused a widespread mutiny which some Indian princes expanded into a fierce war for the expulsion of the British; the Mogul Empire endeavored to shake off the British yoke, which was what the British "partnership" had become.

But the fighting Sikhs and Gurkhas in the north, and various other Indian states both north and south, supported the British and decided the fate of the revolt, which was put down after frightful atrocities both by rebels and British. The East India Company's forces were quite inadequate, and had to be supplemented by regular British troops, at the expense of British taxpayers. Since the Company could not afford such expenditures, the British Government took over administration in India on behalf of the Company, whose dividends of ten and one-half per cent were made a first charge on Indian revenues. The last descendants of the Moguls were shot by a British officer "escorting" them. In 1877, Queen Victoria took the title which had been born by the Mogul Emperors, "Kaisar-i-Hind."

French aggressions against Peking's southern dominions began in Indo-China, where they seized Saigon and Cochin-China, extracting four million dollars from Chinese

Customs funds in China to pay the necessary expenditures (including compensation to their Spanish aides) of this buccaneering expedition. A couple of years later the French established their "protectorate" over Cambodia, and in 1867 seized three more provinces of Annam. In 1874 they extracted from the King of Annam privileges such as had already been extracted from China, insisted upon Annam's "entire independence" from China, and in 1883 launched a war which established direct French rule. Chinese forces (the upheaval in China was virtually at an end) had aided the Annamese and inflicted one severe defeat upon the French, who retaliated, after the signing of the treaty, by piratical naval attacks along the China coast and demands for tribute of 200,000,000 francs from China—which was not paid.

The British Government in India was most vitally interested in the export of opium. The Government owned the opium raised in Bengal, and collected a transit tax on opium raised in its vassal "native states" and exported mainly to China. In 1871-2 its net revenue from both sources amounted to some £8,000,000—a vital necessity for payment of regular dividends to the Company's influential shareholders, and to prevent India from being too heavy a burden to British taxpayers. China's purchases of opium, forced upon her by the First and Second Opium Wars (the Powers' war against the Taipings and other Chinese rebels is sometimes referred to as the Second Opium War) paid the East India Company's dividends, as well as a considerable part of the Indian Government's expenditures. Without these exports, India would have been a hopelessly burdensome liability to England during the nineteenth century.

The Indian Government, for a time, decisively influ-

enced the British policy toward China. A friendly Anglo-Chinese Convention was negotiated in 1868-9, giving British textile products greatly increased facilities for marketing in China, but providing for additional duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on Indian opium entering the country. The Indian Government, however, blocked ratification of this; opium exporters were more powerful than textile. The British possessed four-fifths of China's foreign trade, and the greatest item in this trade was Indian opium; nearly one-half of the customs dues collected under the British-dictated tariff in China came from this narcotic.

The Chinese Government, as it re-established its authority along the coast, increasingly resisted new foreign encroachments and insisted that the Powers observe the existing treaties and not go beyond the great privileges they already possessed. Trade was increasingly limited to the officially open ports, and smuggling restricted. General Fytche, British Commissioner in Burma, in 1869 emphasized the importance of a "Burma Road" for the export of opium into China overland, and ascribed China's increasing resistance to American interference:

"The derangement of our opium revenue means a most serious crisis in Indian finance, and were American interference to affect our sea-borne opium, the routes through this province would become of the highest Imperial importance. . . . We should be in a position to substitute a western ingress to China for the present sea-board approach."

A British agent was established at Bhamo in northern Burma, arms were supplied to rebels in Yunnan, and a "western ingress" was established for a time. This was

ended when the rebel Panthay regime was crushed by the Chinese, who closed the border. The British demanded the opening of the country to them from Burma and Yunnan northward to Chungking in Szechwan (the present Chinese capital), but the Chinese refused, and no other Power supported the British. All of Burma itself, however, was annexed by the British in 1886.

Western Powers secured in Japan a special position similar to that obtained in China. Japan had been forcibly opened by Commodore Perry, but was actually introduced to modern warfare by the bombardment of Kago-shima by British gunboats. Western Powers obtained extraterritorial privileges in Japan, foreign settlements under foreign administration in Japanese ports, foreign garrisons in these ports and in Tokyo, and a five per cent customs tariff similar to that in China. British and other Western warships cruised in Japanese waters, "punished" Japanese cities, and intervened in internal conflicts, while Western merchantmen carried on coastal trade along the shores of Japan. The British agent Satow, known as the "Lawrence of Japan," was the prime mover in the Japanese "Restoration," aiming to end the power of the too-independent Shogun and to secure increased foreign privileges by promoting war and a "friendly" Imperial regime. It was Britain and the United States who decided the outcome of the civil war of 1867-8, which abolished the Shogunate, established Imperial rule, and ended the short-lived Republic of Hokkaido. Japan, like China, was reduced to the status of a semi-colony of the Powers jointly, under an archaic Imperial regime which owed its re-establishment mainly to foreign collaboration.

In the meantime, Russia was expanding its power into central Asia, conquering one Asiatic kingdom and khan-

ate after another. In China it followed a policy of "peaceful penetration," maintaining friendly relations with Peking, and was influential in the agreement reached between the Western Powers and the Manchu regime in 1860. As compensation, the "honest broker" received from China the great coastal area which subsequently became the Russian Maritime Province, coming down to the border of Korea and including the port where the city of Vladivostok grew up.

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, European Powers dominated vast areas of Asia. Britain and Russia were the major Powers, with their respective spheres of aggression growing ever closer as the Czarist Empire expanded southward toward the domains of the British *Kaisar-i-Hind*, and asserted itself as a rival to British leadership in China. Holland, France, and Spain had island and continental empires in southeastern Asia. The Powers jointly held vast China and little Japan in semi-colonial subjection.

It was a new era, proudly proclaimed by Kipling in his paean to the "White Man's Burden." The Burden was an unusual one—for the White Man. It consisted of his new domination over other races and people, the "lesser breeds without the law." The great center of this domination was Asia, which contained the majority of the human race.

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JAPAN—COLONY TO EMPIRE

Chapter 4.

LAND OF THE BUSHI

SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION Japanese live in their native islands. These islands lie off the coast of Asia, much as Britain lies off the coast of Europe. The population of the British Isles is 45,000,000, and is almost stationary. The population of Japan proper is 30,000,000 greater, and is increasing at a rate of a million a year. The British Isles cover some 121,000 square miles. The Japanese islands cover 148,000 square miles.

But Japan has expanded. Fifty years ago, Japan's aggressive militarists seized Korea (with a present population of 25,000,000) and various lesser territories. The Empire thus numbers some 110,000,000 subjects. Beyond this is Manchuria—a puppet state, not formally a part of the Empire, with a population of 45,000,000; this vast territory covers 500,000 square miles, larger than France and pre-war Germany taken together. The Japanese Empire and Manchukuo together cover some 765,000 square miles, with a population of 155,000,000 subjects—twenty million more than the United States. This does not include the enormous areas of China under Japanese oc-

cupation, or the great conquered colonies further south.

The old geography books and atlases used by Japanese children did not show Japan side by side with other countries. Japan was shown, and other countries were shown; but it was not considered conducive to national morale to show these islands side by side with their vast Asiatic neighbors—China with its 4,000,000 square miles, twenty-seven times the size of Japan, or Russia with its 8,500,000 square miles, fifty-seven times the size of Japan. By European standards, Japan was pretty big. By the standards of Asiatic Empire, it was a midget.

This was not shown to Japanese school children. Instead, they were taught the "greatness" of Japan, and of its Sacred Emperor. But behind the Emperor, as the more intelligent learned when they grew up, were the military men who usually ran things. These were the *Bushi*—the warriors. The word *Bushi* itself was no longer used to any extent, but it was known by the expression *Bushi-do*, the way of the warrior. This was the way of Japan.

It is the way of Japan today. The army rules Japan, rules its overseas empire, rules Manchukuo, and wields dominion over vast areas of China and southeastern Asia and the southwest Pacific. Under the domination of the *Bushi*, and their native allies or "collaborators," are 15,000,000 Filipinos, 29,000,000 Indo-Chinese, 6,000,000 Malaysians, 16,000,000 Burmese. There are more than 70,000,000 Indonesians—Javanese, Sumatrans, and others—in what were long the Dutch East Indies, covering 685,000 square miles and stretching from east to west in a great line comparable in length to the United States from coast to coast. There are 160,000,000 Chinese in what are termed Japanese-occupied territories south of the Great Wall.

The Far Eastern territories now dominated by the Bushi comprise lands and seas greater than all Europe and the Mediterranean, with a vast population, subject either directly to the *Bushi* or to their "collaborators," of some 470,000,000. The Empire is still a little smaller than the British Empire and Dominions, which have 500,000,000 subjects, but the *Bushi* are still "consolidating," and moving ahead in China. If they can dominate China, which is their aim, they will dominate almost the entire Far East, with a population of more than 750,000,000. This is half again the population of Europe, more than five times the population of the United States, almost one-third of the population of the entire world.

A "new order" is being established in those vast areas today, in areas never in all history brought under a single rule. In the name of this "new order" millions of Chinese have been killed and hundreds of thousands of Japanese as well. In its name the Japanese army at Nanking in 1937 perpetrated the most wholesale atrocities since Western armies sacked Peking and butchered its people in 1900. In its name ruin and devastation has been spread over Asia. In the name of this "new order" the Japanese people themselves are facing the most grim privations, while the *Bushi* and their agents carry on with systematic ruthlessness and barbarity against their enemies in invaded countries as well as in Japan itself.

Some deny it is "order" at all. Some say it is chaos. But the aim of the determined, ruthless men who carry it forward is indeed "order." They want an "ordered" society, ordered by themselves. The Bushi have shown the kind of "order" they mean in Japan itself, in Korea, in Manchuria, and in occupied countries and territories farther south. Their "order" is one of absolute authority,

with the military masters in complete control not only of political life but of economic organization, not only of economic life but of education and instruction, not only of formal education but of religion and of thought as a whole.

The *Bushi* aim at one thing—power. They know that power to be real must be economic as well as political, but they are not restricted by any totalitarian “ideal.” They will deal with anyone who will deal with them on “satisfactory” terms. In Japan, the *Bushi* rule through the figure-head Emperor, center and symbol of Imperial rule, in whose name they issue Imperial decrees having the force of law. “I am the State,” said the Grand Monarch of France less than two hundred years ago. That is the principle of Grand Monarchy in Japan, but it is not the Emperor that says it. The *Bushi* say it for him. At the time of the “Restoration” in Japan, seventy-five years ago, the incumbent Emperor was loyal to the Tokugawa clans who had long ruled Japan, and was not inclined to take orders from the newly powerful western clans of Japan. He suddenly “died,” and the western clansmen set a child on the throne. Even the Emperor is obliged to obey the *Bushi*.

General Tojo, Prime Minister, War Minister and Home Minister of Japan, dominates the government, speaks for the army and directs the Imperial police forces throughout the country. His threefold role in the Cabinet makes him look like a grimmer and graver replica of Mussolini in the Italian Cabinet. He represents, indeed, dictatorial power. But he wields this power as the army's man—one of the present “Big Three” of the army. He, like the others, is only a part of the top rank of the army hierarchy. His dictatorship is less than two years old. He

will be removed and replaced when his military colleagues so decide. He holds power on their behalf, as did Minami and Araki and Ugaki and others before him. He exercises no dictatorship over them.

There is a dictator in Manchukuo, the Japanese-conquered northeastern provinces of China. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces and their native auxiliaries in those great territories, comparable in extent to Hitler's dominions in central Europe. He is ambassador to the Manchu Emperor, nominal sovereign of this great area. The Japanese "advisers" to the Manchu Emperor, and to the Chinese ministers of the puppet Cabinet, obey the Commander's orders. The Manchu sovereign may affix his Imperial seal to the orders. He is a puppet, more completely a puppet than is the Emperor at Tokyo, though recognizing the latter as his superior among the army's dependent monarchs. A Chinese editor some years ago referred to the Manchu Emperor as "the puppet of a puppet." On demand of the Japanese, the Chinese Government sentenced him to a prison term.

The Japanese military dictator in Manchuria, head of of the army and of the puppet government and of the military police, is only a part of the army hierarchy. He rules on behalf of the army. He will be removed—kicked upstairs or downstairs as the circumstances and his own merits suggest—when his colleagues so decide. The Army may give direct orders from Tokyo to some of his Japanese associates in the political and economic domination of Manchukuo—as well as orders to him. He has learned, as every Japanese officer and soldier learns, the basic principle of strong authority: "Only he should attempt to command who has learned to obey." The idea is not peculiar to Japan.

In Manchuria, the *Bushi* set the Manchu ex-Emperor on the throne. At Shanghai, they made a deal with Wang Ching-wei, who thirty-two years ago attempted to assassinate the Manchu Regent. The *Bushi* are "tolerant" about such matters. In Japan itself, the Imperial Government executed a dozen Japanese at that same time, involved in a simultaneous plot against the life of the Japanese Emperor. But that was in Japan. In general, the *Bushi* disapprove of regicide; but they disposed without ceremony of a stubborn Japanese sovereign seventy-five years ago, and murdered a stubborn Queen of Korea forty-eight years ago—at the very time that the American and British Governments decided that a "highly civilized" government like Japan should no longer be subject to extra-territorial privileges, but should have the sovereign right to deal with our citizens in Japanese courts.

In the Philippines, the *Bushi* have made a deal with Aguinaldo, the famed military leader of the Filipino revolution and the short-lived Philippines Republic which was put down at the beginning of the present century. In general, the *Bushi* disapprove of republican and representative governments. But theirs is not the fanaticism which would sacrifice Imperial interests to political sympathies—as with the Western Tories who aided and assisted Hitler and Mussolini against the Spanish Republic and gave Germany and Italy a firm foothold in the peninsula. If Aguinaldo will deal with the *Bushi*, they will deal with Aguinaldo. But there must be no challenge to the supremacy of the Japanese Army and Navy in these seas and islands.

Everywhere there is the same ultimate goal—power. The precise patterns differ in various countries; the *Bushi* are opportunists in such things. They aim at empire for

themselves, but they will cooperate with Burmese and Indonesian and other revolutionists and anti-Imperialists who will cooperate with them. For forty years, indeed, the *Bushi* showed other characteristics, and cooperated with Western Empires against their Asiatic colonials. But those days are over. The *Bushi* are now in business for themselves.

They are opportunistic in the religious field as they are in the political. They do not expect other peoples to take their own national religion of Emperor-worship seriously. By their occupation of the Philippines they became a Catholic power, and dispatched an envoy to the Pope at Rome. In Burma their Buddhist priests worked with their Burmese counterparts—and similarly in China, cooperating with Nanking's "internal peace" movement. Japanese Christians have established contacts with native Christians in China and elsewhere. There is a Moham-medan mosque at Tokyo, and Moslem contacts which have been of some use in Java. Japanese militarists have a deep sympathy with Hinduism and the caste system. For more than a thousand years the Samurai were themselves a hereditary order corresponding to the warrior caste of India, whence the idea of hereditary castes (and out-castes) came to Japan. And every militarist can appreciate the worship of Kali, whether or not he does formal obeisance to the dread Goddess of Murder.

However opportunistic the *Bushi* may be outside of Japan itself, there is no toleration in the Japanese islands. This is the base and center of their power, and everything must be subordinated to their needs. The national religion of Emperor-worship is a purely synthetic creed which was invented for political purposes following the "Restoration." Eighty years ago, most Japanese actually did not

know that such a person as the Sovereign of Heaven existed. They knew their feudal overlords, and perhaps the name of the Shogun—at what is now Tokyo.

But the Restorationists of 1868, as they welded the hundreds of feudal principalities of the Japanese islands into a nation, devised the Imperial religion of Emperor-worship as a center of national religion and loyalty. Every schoolboy is taught it, and makes obeisance at Imperial shrines. Every man in the army and in the government must do the same. The Emperor is "God Incarnate." (This expression was learned from the Christians.) Many Japanese actually believe it. In the Army, it is a faith which must not be questioned or argued. "We believe it," said one candid Imperialist, "though we know it is not true."

The foreigner is not expected to believe it, any more than the Jews in their tribal days expected foreigners to accept the God of the Chosen People. But Japanese must at least pretend to. Outside of this, he may be a Buddhist or Christian or pagan or Moslem or anything else, but he must sometimes do obeisance at Imperial shrines. To the Japanese scholar, it has its amusing aspects, since every educated person knows that the very title of the Emperor (Tenno = T'ien Hwang) is Chinese, that the very name of the national religion (Shinto = Shen Tao) is Chinese, that the very name of Japan (Nippon = Japan) is Chinese; the Dynasty itself is probably of Chinese origin.* But these are not matters for public discussion. Japanese statesmen have been killed by fanatics for pushing aside

* The word "Bushido" is a recent compound of purely Chinese words: "Wu-shih" (Warrior) and "Tao" (Way). The pretended code of Bushido was invented just forty years ago by the Japanese publicist Nitobe; it is modeled on European chivalry.

a curtain to peer curiously into the interior of an Imperial shrine.

In the vast areas of the Far East occupied or dominated by the Imperial Army, the visitor soon learns that this is the real power. In Japan itself, he is honored on arrival by a receptionist from General Tojo—a policeman. He may be only on a ship stopping at a Japanese port, with no intention of leaving the boat and going on shore, but General Tojo's receptionists are there to get a full explanation from every passenger. I myself was honored with special attention when the President boat on which I was traveling touched Kobe on its way to the United States in mid-1941. But my case was somewhat unusual. I had been deported from Japan in 1922—from this same port of Kobe. Perhaps I would be accused of returning, though I was very anxious to stay on board ship, in the circumstances.

My examination, and the search of my cabin and my belongings, and the difficulty with which I dissuaded the inspector from confiscating some of my "dangerous" books, were indications of the thoroughness of Tojo's receptionists. But one of the most fundamental characteristics of the Japanese came to light even in this police inspector. Cross-examined regarding my previous activities and my deportation, I ascribed the latter as largely due to the arrogance of the Kobe Chief of Police, and recounted a conversation with him—a petty police bureaucrat of the most offensive type—in which I had won what subsequently turned out to be an extremely Pyrrhic victory. The inspector's face retained its official gravity, but his eyes twinkled—as I had hoped—and when he left he actually permitted me to keep the books he had set aside for official confiscation. I had touched a chord to be found

in most Japanese: they often dislike their superiors, especially when the latter are arrogant and overbearing.

Many foreign journalists in Japan have touched this personal chord among their Japanese colleagues, few of whom are friends of police despotism. A foreigner having an argument arising out of his own arrogance may fare badly, but a Japanese-speaking foreigner scolding an arrogant Japanese policeman will have the sympathy of the crowd. In that same city of Kobe, twenty years previously, I had caught a couple of plainclothes men shadowing me, and bluntly demanded to know what they wanted. Japanese detectives are not popular with the common people (*inu* = dog, is their popular appellation), and hesitate to show their identification when they have no cause to make an arrest. So I bluntly charged them with following me in order to rob me, and I grew more vehement as I went on. When they asked me to come into a side street away from the crowd, so they could explain, I said this proved they wanted to rob me, and I appealed to the crowd which had gathered. Most of them understood the situation, sympathized with me, and grinned appreciatively as I finally told the "robbers" to clear out and not let me see them again—which they did.

Dislike and hostility to superiors exists not only among the ordinary civilians, but, inevitably, in the army itself. American journalists in Shanghai and elsewhere have noted some of the amazing incidents between soldiers off duty and their officers. In battle, the Japanese soldier is loyal and obedient, though there have been times when whole regiments have mutinied against impossible tasks, and have had to be replaced by fresh soldiers led into battle by colonels and even generals. But when the Japanese soldier is off duty, and fortified by a couple of

drinks, he is given a wide berth by his officers. A "tough" soldier, off duty and with a couple of drinks under his belt, is no friend of officers. They ascribe their daily hardships, and their long duty in an alien country away from their homes and families, to these same officers. For the Army is not the servant of the Japanese people. The Japanese people are the subjects of the Army chiefs—and every Japanese above the moron stage is aware of it.

Visitors to Japan in war time may see the cheering groups of patriots who escort new conscripts around the streets in motor trucks, and take them to the railway station when they depart to fight for the Emperor. But those who know the Japanese somewhat better also know the quiet family gatherings which celebrate with cheer and thanksgiving when a husband or father or son is rejected by the Army.

The first time I saw Japanese military forces in action, they were acting against the Japanese people. It was in Tokyo, in the summer of 1918. War prosperity was bringing enormous profits to Japanese manufacturers and merchants, and rising prices were bringing ever more serious distress to Japan's underpaid workers. Demands for cheaper rice, demands made on the profiteering rice merchants, who were faced with the choice of selling at the prices of the previous year or having their stocks thrown out and destroyed, resulted not in immediate government rationing and price control, but in police action against the rioters. Crowds gathered, resisting the police. The Army was called in, and its ruthlessness aroused the people to fury. And so, in those hectic days of August, 1918, I saw Japanese soldiers shooting into Japanese crowds who were armed with little more than stones and bamboo pikes.

For days there was virtual civil war in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe, and other Japanese cities—war which soon spread to mining centers where embittered and desperate men got hold of explosives and used them with deadly effect against their uniformed enemies. Hundreds were killed and thousands wounded before the people were dragooned into submission. Tens of thousands were in prison. Scores of these were executed. Thousands were sentenced to terms in prison.

I saw bloodshed again in Japan in Kobe in 1922, when police charged with drawn swords into a procession of striking shipyard workers—peaceful and quite unarmed. When the one-sided “battle” was over, a score of men lay dead or critically wounded on the ground. The workers never had a chance: courage and numbers are inadequate weapons against swords, bullets, and bayonets.

But there was wholesale butchery at Tokyo the following year—official massacres of peaceful persons, Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. The terrible earthquake and fire gave the *Bushi* and their policemen an unprecedented opportunity, under the absolute rule of emergency martial law, to murder everyone they considered worth killing. They imprisoned, and murdered in prison, a score of courageous Japanese labor and popular leaders, including a woman and an American boy. Armed gangs of blood-thirsty “vigilantes” roamed the streets, instigated by official propaganda, and butchered no fewer than three thousand Koreans and a thousand Chinese. The Koreans were suspected of “disloyalty.” The Chinese were murdered by mistake—or on general principles.

Even for the ordinary, humble, non-political Japanese subject there was little consideration. Thousands of “commoners” from the congested working-class and slum dis-

tricts of Tokyo, fleeing from the on-rushing flames, found their path blocked by the wide-spreading walls of the great Imperial palace, with its spacious, well-watered grounds free from fire and danger. Trapped by the fire on three sides, they pleaded desperately for admittance into the palace grounds; it was refused. Those in back, pressed by the flames, forced ahead those in front. The great gates were barred; the powerful bars dropped into place. And there, within a few yards of safety and within sight of the idiot Emperor Taisho, had he cared to look, three thousand of his helpless subjects were burned to death.

To understand our Japanese enemy today we must understand this deep and bitter conflict between the military despotism and the people. Japanese militarism is not only the enemy of all free peoples everywhere, it is primarily the enemy of the Japanese people. It is they who supply the cannon-fodder, the food and the revenues to the *Bushi*. It is they who pay the bill. And they know it.

The struggle between the despotism and the people marks the entire course of Japanese history for the past half-century. The condition of Japan today cannot be understood without realizing this fact. The unprovoked military invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was at the same time an act of violent aggression against a neighbor and a counter-revolution against the growing forces of popular government in Japan itself. The people of Japan during the 1920's were making progress against the military power which plundered and choked them. They obtained in 1925 a law which extended voting rights to virtually the entire adult male population. In 1929, a government came into power based upon parliament—itsself chosen by this universal manhood suffrage. It was the first time in

Japanese history that such a government had been formed.

It blocked the Army's attempts at new campaigns in China; it tried to limit military and naval expenditures; it authorized the London Naval Treaty despite the bitter opposition of the *Bushi*. Its courageous Premier, "Lion" Hamaguchi, was assassinated by a patriomaniac agent of the *Bushi*, but the government carried on. The Army ordered its men into Manchuria in flat defiance of the civilian government at Tokyo. It was there that the murder-machine established its absolute power, with no troublesome parliament to deal with.

From this great base in Manchuria the Army was able to exert pressure upon Japan itself, while its furious anti-Chinese agitation diverted many simple-minded Japanese from politics to patriomania. From this the Army proceeded, with roused war-feeling, to assassinate every Japanese statesman who stood in its way, and established fully the dictatorial power of the *Bushi* in Japan. The people were propagandized, militarized, and crushed. The civilian Premier of the government which succeeded Hamaguchi's was assassinated, and from 1932 onward only high-ranking militarists—or high-ranking bureaucrats or aristocrats prepared to take orders from them—headed the governments of Japan.

Millions of electors turned from the impotent "old" parties to the rapidly expanding Social Masses Party (a democratic Socialist party), and in 1936 the Army intervened—with specific orders to Reservists, accompanied by widespread police activity—to keep this party of peace and democracy from gaining a hundred seats and the balance of power in Parliament. In February, the Army by a violent *Putsch* at Tokyo assassinated most of its outstanding moderate opponents among Japanese statesmen,

and moved toward the more direct exercise of power. They had already, in company with reactionary bureaucrats and aristocrats, outlawed the long-held constitutional theory that the Emperor was an organ of the State, and set it up that he was not merely the holder but the divine possessor of governing rights.

In the seven years since February, 1936, the "Showa Restoration" has been fulfilled in Japan. The Japanese Parliament, which in 1930 was asserting itself as the true center of government, was reorganized and finally reduced to a nonentity, with free elections ended as completely as in other totalitarian states. The Army consolidated its dominant control over the state, the sole focus of which is the Emperor. The only limitations to the Army's power are the Navy—a puissant corporation with which the Army must still reckon—and a group of civilian aristocrats and bureaucrats, some of whom are associated with the Court. There is still rivalry among the power-holding groups within the State. But the State itself is absolute and dictatorial, and the Army is today as powerful in Japan as was the Tokugawa clan a century ago.

The Japanese Army is now dominant over vast areas of the Far East, territories many times greater than Japan itself. The Japanese people are reduced to a level of human misery such as they have not known for generations. Every expansion of empire has meant an increase of burdens on the common people. The Japanese standard of living, which began to decline during the mid-1920's, sank ever more disastrously from the time of the invasion of Manchuria, following which ¥200,000,000 yearly was spent on Japanese forces there and on military-industrial "investment" in the conquered territories. Japanese peasants and workers, already in competition with lower-paid

Koreans, were now brought into direct competition with the still more wretched Chinese proletariat. Japanese mills and factories were established in China, employing Chinese workers at half the wage of Japanese.

The 1937 invasion of China brought even more serious hardships. Year after year, as more and more men were called to the front and more and more food was taken from the civilian population, food and other rationing became ever more limited. When I visited Japan in 1941, the gaunt, drawn faces of the stevedores and the other persons along the wharves told their own story. The people were hungry. They could not live on "glory."

A Japanese business woman said to me: "Yes, we are now a Great Power, with a great army and navy and colonies and an overseas empire. But taxes are always higher. Prices are always higher. It is we who pay the bill."

The expansion of Japanese empire has meant steadily increasing misery and poverty in Japan, a hopeless decline in Japanese living standards to the level of the most wretched of their Asiatic neighbors. It is glory for the *Bushi*. It is degradation and hunger for the common people.

Chapter 5.

UNITS OF EMPIRE

TO THE military masters of Japan, their people are units of a powerful fighting organization which is to serve as the instrument of vast empire. To the ordinary observer in Japan, however, most Japanese are unimpressive in such a role.

In ordinary times, one of the first things to impress the American visitor, after he or she gets through the official Cerberus at the gates, is the miniature nature of things. The people are small, the houses are low, their railway trains at first remind one of the little trains for children at seaside resorts in America. The qualities of aggressiveness and pugnacity are nowhere in evidence in Japan in time of peace. People are friendly and courteous. One can live for many years in Japan and never see a street fight. On the rare occasions when two young boys come to blows, they are immediately separated by passers-by, and given a kindly lecture on the virtues of peace and forbearance. If their dispute is subject to arbitration, it is arbitrated then and there. Crowds do not stand around grinning and watching, or encouraging the youngsters.

The desire for peaceful settlements among themselves, and the dislike of violent measures, is one of the factors making for submission of the "commoners" to their

masters. But there are limits to their patience. And when these limits are reached, and crowds gather in a popular uprising, the police face a most serious task. In any widespread mob uprising it is necessary to call in regular troops, since the police soon find themselves helpless. There are pitched battles, in which many are killed and wounded. The traditional weapon of Japanese commoners—as traditional as the Irish shillaleh—is a sharp bamboo pike, its point hardened by fire. It is a deadly weapon.

Violence is the method of the rulers, not of the commoners. Scores of leading statesmen have been assassinated in recent years, but these have been by the militarists, by Fascist elements closely associated with them, or by patriomaniac societies under their direct patronage. Government by assassination and “purges” is not peculiar to Japan. It is a convenient method of disposing of opposition which it is difficult to reach by law.

Under this government by assassination, the life of the common people goes on. Visitors are at times amazed at the patience and forbearance of Japanese parents. One may live for years in Japan and never see a parent strike a child—unless one lives in the squalid quarters of the poorer workers, where women who work side by side with their men during the day may lose patience with a crying child by night. Nothing touches the heart of a Japanese middle-class woman more than to see a wretched, hard-pressed mother strike her own child.

Such features of Japanese life have deeply impressed many missionaries and other foreigners who have lived for years among the people, and have been in many Japanese homes. Such foreigners, usually quite innocent of politics or the nature of militarism, are often incapable of believing stories of Japanese atrocities abroad—even

such stories as are tragically well authenticated. Between missionaries in Japan and their colleagues in China there is often actual distrust. The China missionaries have sometimes seen Japanese atrocities close at hand. The Japan missionaries declare with absolute conviction and sincerity that such things are enemy propaganda. The gentle and courteous people among whom they live "cannot" be guilty of such crimes.

But the two groups are speaking about different things. One is speaking about the ordinary, cheerful, friendly Japanese at home, regarding whom it is quite correct to say that not one in a hundred is capable of deliberate murder, rape, and torture. The other is speaking about the same Japanese, transformed by months or years of physical and psychological "toughening," by lectures on patriotism and national destiny and national crisis, by training in hatred and hostility to other peoples, by weeks or months or years of actual military duty under fire, into a "common" replica of the *Bushi*. The worst atrocities have not been by troops out of control. They have been by troops acting under orders.

Such were the horrors at Nanking, when the Chinese capital was taken by the Japanese forces in December, 1937. The Japanese militarists were confident that the Chinese were licked. They were determined to give them a final lesson. The official instructions to the Japanese forces were in exactly the same spirit as the instructions given by the late Kaiser William of Germany to his marines in 1900, dispatching these forces to participate in the crushing of China and the rape of the magnificent Chinese capital at Peking:

"You must know, my men, that you are about

to meet a crafty, well-armed, cruel foe. Meet him, and beat him! Give no quarter! Take no prisoners! Kill him, when he falls into your hands! Even as, a thousand years ago, the Huns under their King Attila made such a name for themselves as still resounds in terror through legend and fable, so may the name of Germany resound through Chinese history a thousand years from now, and may you so conduct yourselves that no Chinaman will ever so much as dare look at a German!"

For more than a thousand years, ninety per cent of the Japanese people never had a sword in their hands. The carrying of arms was the exclusive right of the samurai—the hereditary military caste. Only after the Restoration did the newly dominant group of samurai turn to military training of the common people for the crushing of their samurai rivals. Conscription was established in Japan, and military expansion and modernization went ahead as rapidly as the limited resources of Japan would permit. This was what was known as the modernization of Japan, which proceeded under our enthusiastic patronage for half a century. The bloody traditions of the samurai were extended down to the peasantry—with our cordial approval. This was what President Theodore Roosevelt—warm friend and spokesman for *Bushido*—and other friends of the "Big Stick" policy referred to as progress.

Scarcity of resources was a serious problem for the Japanese. They had all necessary resources for their own simple lives—rice, fish, and other foodstuffs, building materials, wood and coal for fuel, clothing materials. But for war they needed iron and steel, and machinery both for destruction and for creating the means of destruction. This meant the building up of an export trade, and the

Government devoted itself to creating this—with tea, silk, and various handicraft industries, later with manufactures of many kinds, the most important being textiles. Income from these new industries not only made possible expansion of the military machine, but permitted a rising standard of living for the Japanese people themselves, which was supplemented by the spread of education through the new government schools. It also made possible a steady and rapid increase in population, which the Government encouraged in every possible way.

Japan's resources have not diminished; but her population has grown. The *Bushi* are flatly hostile to limitation of population, except by war. Increasing numbers of Japanese were learning and using modern methods of birth control during the 1920's. The promising "Resources and Population Commission" of non-political experts, appointed by the parliamentary government headed by Premier Hamaguchi, in 1930 brought in a long list of reports and recommendations including a specific proposal for Government education in birth control, with clinics of the kind which existed in Holland. But the *Bushi* flatly vetoed this. They destroyed civilian government and took power themselves before it could be put into effect. In time, they suppressed the groups favoring birth control as "subversive." The humane and gifted Baroness Ishimoto, leader of the movement, was arrested as a dangerous thinker.

Japan's population problem has become a real one. But its presentation by Japanese Government propagandists has been distorted of its real nature. It is not a natural expansion—except in a crude physiological sense. It is an expansion deliberately promoted by the Japanese militarists for their own aims. To the *Bushi*, the only popu-

lation problem is the problem of getting as much cannon-fodder as they need for their grandiose ambitions. But simultaneously, their propagandists present to well-meaning and gullible Westerners the argument that Japan must expand because her population is expanding.

One outlet for increasing population would be emigration overseas. This, undoubtedly, would solve part of the population problem. But the solution is not such as the *Bushi* would like. Most Japanese emigrate for good. Few come to America to "make a pile" and return. They settle and remain, despite the prejudice and hostility they often encounter, glad to escape forever from the exploitation and oppression of the *Bushi* and the police, the tax-gatherer and the landlord. If the way were open, most of the peasants and workers would emigrate to freer lands, leaving the *Bushi* and their associates to fight their own battles. But this would hardly suit the *Bushi*.

Nothing could better illustrate the superficiality of Japanese nationalism—so far as most of the common people are concerned—than the willingness with which the commoners depart from their "sacred" homeland to more profane shores where they can earn a decent living and their children can become free citizens of a free commonwealth. In the United States, they assimilate as rapidly as white prejudice will permit them—and despite the existence of Japanese schools to instruct them in the vicious religion of Emperor-worship and in anti-democratic beliefs.

For the long arm of the *Bushi* reached into the United States itself, endeavoring to retain control of the thought of these emigrants and their children. With the cooperation of the American Government, the Japanese Imperial Government financed and patronized Japanese schools

for Imperial purposes in this country, to make native-born Americans into Japanese. With the full knowledge of the American Government, Japanese militarist associations were not only organized in this country but were permitted to bring pressure and propaganda upon Japanese-Americans. Democratic Americans of Japanese ancestry protested, but the American Government continued to cooperate with the *Bushi* and the Emperor-worshippers until that fateful December of 1941. Then the action of the American Government in closing down the Japanese schools showed clearly their knowledge of the official nature of these propaganda institutions.

Japanese emigration seldom means any actual dislike of Japan. Most Japanese are as deeply attached to their homeland as anyone, and shed silent tears as their ships move out from its green hills and deep blue waters. It is not from the country, but from its poverty and exploitation and oppression that they flee. I have met Japanese in exile who were almost "anti-Japanese," who referred with sardonic humor to their old homeland as "Onigashima"—the "island of the devils" in a Japanese children's story. But these are politicals—men embittered by police persecution, imprisonment, and torture. They are not all "commoners." I have heard the bitter jest "Onigashima" from the lips of a retired naval officer—a man who in his twenty years of dutiful service to the Emperor acquired a deep and abiding hatred of war, and who upon his retirement on pension devoted his life and his pension to pacifist propaganda which took him into prison and finally into exile. There are strange men among the *Bushi*.

The foreign visitor sees the green hills, the blue waters, and the beautiful cone of Mount Fuji. The tourist bureaus have told of beautiful Japan, and they have no need

to exaggerate. Japan is a country of evergreen hills and deep valleys, crystal-clear lakes and down-pouring mountain streams and waterfalls, deep blue inland waters dotted with myriads of little islands and fading in the distance into the bluest sky in the world. The little straw-thatched cottages in the country, the tile-roofed bungalows in the cities, enhance the picture.

In any time except war time, the ordinary visitor climbs the hills and wanders over the countryside without hindrance or hostility—excepting for the officious police, whose duty it is to check up on outsiders, especially in the fortified zones near the coast. The ordinary peasant greets a passing stranger with the simple courtesy of the Chinese peasant or of many American country people. In busy seasons, the wanderer sees the blue-clad men and women stooped over in the water and mud of the rice-fields, toiling quietly and patiently at their back-breaking tasks.

If he is an American, he may think of the inefficiency of such methods. If he is one of the superficial "economists" who are ignorant of agriculture, he may comment on the backwardness of Japanese agriculture. But the statistics of rice production tell a striking story. The Japanese farmer obtains more rice from an acre of land than does any other farmer in the world. Machine production would save labor, but it would not produce more rice per acre; it would produce less. The Japanese farmer produces as much as thirty bushels of rice per acre—sometimes forty bushels or more. Machine farming, as on our rice farms in Louisiana and elsewhere, does well if it produces half this amount per acre.

Similarly with the other Japanese crops—wheat and barley, sweet potatoes and other vegetables; intensive farming is most effective. The Japanese farmer's poverty

is not due to his technical backwardness. It is due partly to the fact that few of them have sufficient land. The expansion of population which has been promoted by the Imperial Government for the last seventy years has outstripped the arable land. Farms have been divided and subdivided until most farmers have less than two acres of land to till. Many have less than an acre.

Such tiny farms would be considered insufficient even for a wretched subsistence in the United States. But Japanese farmers on these little patches produce an adequacy of food for themselves, and even a margin for sale. Their deep and increasing poverty is due to the fact that most of their produce is taken away from them by the landlord or the tax-gatherer. More than one-fourth of Japan's farmers own no land at all; they are sharecroppers, turning over half their crop to the landlord. Of the peasant proprietors, most of these own so little land that they must supplement their tiny holdings by renting some from a landlord. To him they give half the crop from his land. To the tax-gatherer they give more than one-third of the crop from their own land—aside from war-time requisitions, when even the horse or cow of the farmer may be taken for His Majesty's army. The farmer is poor, being despoiled of the food he produces.

Imperial expansion has worsened his condition, so that millions of farmers now live on the margin of actual starvation, and a crop shortage or failure results in local famines when thousands die of hunger. The effect of Imperial expansion is felt not only by the heavy burdens of taxes and requisitions, but by the increasing competition of Korean and Chinese farmers. In Korea, the Japanese Government "solved" the problem of Japan's increasing rice requirements by irrigation and the promo-

tion of rice-growing by Koreans—rice mostly shipped to Japan, the Koreans themselves eating cheap millet, an inferior grain. The increasing quantities of cheap Korean rice on the Japanese market during the 1920's lowered the price of the Japanese farmer's produce—and this has continued year after year.

There have been, at times, bitter conflicts between Japanese tenants and landlords, with tenants' unions calling rent strikes and insisting on reductions. But in recent years these have been rare. Landowners are themselves between the anvil of declining prices and the hammer of increasing taxes. The Government already takes more than half of their income. The smaller landowners often wish to take the land from the tenants, and cultivate it themselves. The tenants desperately resist, their very lives at stake as they face absolute destitution.

An important factor in their increasing destitution and misery has been their declining income from silk production. The Imperial Government, in its long-term economic planning of the early decades, promoted and encouraged silk production for export. In time, hundreds of thousands of farm families took this up. It became a most important subsidiary occupation. It is a most toilsome one—during the feeding period the voracious silk-worms must be fed day and night; the girls and women who tend them must go for weeks with only occasional snatches of sleep. But it meant additional income and better standards—including at least one good silk dress for every girl and woman.* The wealthy Mitsui interests, who did the

* Every Japanese woman is supposed to have at least one silk kimono for dress occasions. The girl-infant gets her bright kimono with deep tucks in the shoulders and skirt—let out year after year until she grows up and becomes a bride, when she gets her second silk kimono; this is expected to last for the rest of her life. The well-to-do, of course, have scores or hundreds of kimonos.

exporting, added hundreds of millions to their vast fortunes. The Imperial Government took its liberal "cut."

But the development of artificial silk during the 1920's brought a serious decline in silk prices. The economic crisis in the United States (the greatest purchaser of Japanese silk, which was the main Japanese export) in 1929 knocked the bottom out of the market. Japanese girls and women now had to compete with machines. In better times, they would have abandoned the work. But the increasing burdens of Imperial expansion and population pressure now made this impossible. To hundreds of thousands of families, silk production meant the difference between subsistence and starvation. Competing with the machines, they produced two or even three times as much as previously; for their bitter labor they received less than they had received before.

Against the political and economic forces driving them ever deeper into wretchedness and destitution, Japanese farmers have in recent years developed one widespread constructive organization—the cooperative system. This has not been their only weapon. But the effectiveness of the newly organized tenants' unions in gaining concessions ceased during the 1920's—for reasons already set forth. Political action by farmers' parties, or by combination with political labor—which in the 1930's with the expansion of the Social Masses Party was becoming an ever-greater force—was ended when parliament was ended. Their only weapon of economic self-defense became the cooperative union.

Mutual credit societies are familiar in Japan, but the more efficient methods of European cooperatives in time gained far greater importance and scope. A Central Union of Cooperative Societies was formed as early as 1905, and

in 1923 the cooperatives established their own Central Bank. Japanese banking is State-controlled—center of the vast economic dominion of the Imperial Government—but the cooperators' friends in Parliament pushed through a law authorizing this new bank and giving it official status in the State banking system. The next year, the Central Union joined the International Cooperative Alliance.

Through the ever wider organization of mutual credit societies, Japanese farmers increasingly freed themselves from the grip of the moneylender and usurer. During the past fifteen years, many credit societies began to function as marketing societies as well—selling their produce to the cities without benefit of middlemen—and also to purchase cooperatively their artificial fertilizer and other agricultural requirements. On the eve of war there were 15,000 cooperative societies in Japan, more than 10,000 of which handled not only credit but marketing and purchasing. Credit cooperatives expanded into "all-purpose" village cooperatives, in an actual majority of the villages of Japan. More than seven million Japanese are members of cooperative societies. Half the families of Japan have a member in a cooperative. Among the peasants, three-fourths of the farming families are associated with cooperatives.

Most farmers today buy their fertilizer and other requirements through their cooperative, and sell their produce through one. In the most urgent individual need, they borrow from it without usurious interest. Only Denmark has developed a rural economy more fully cooperative than that of Japan. But in Japan, as in Denmark, there are some things which purely economic cooperation cannot do. It cannot save its members from the

crushing burdens of the militarists—the *Bushi* in Japan, the Nazis in Denmark—their taxes, their requisitions, their price changes. And it cannot in Japan free its tenant farmer members from the burden of landlordism which takes from them more than half their produce for subsequent division with the Imperial Government.

For almost seven years, Japan has been at war. It is this war which has given the militarists their opportunity to establish their full domination of the Government, to bring economic life and popular education over more fully into their hands, to end civil liberties and virtually to end parliament itself. War is the opportunity of dictatorial elements everywhere. The dictatorial power of the Japanese Army has grown with every year of war.

Even before that fateful month of July, 1937, when Japanese forces moved to "chastise the outrageous Chinese" in the Peking area, the most bloody-minded of the *Bushi* had by means of assassinations and purges and pressure established their virtual ascendancy in Japan. But parliament, though no longer a partner in government, was still very much alive. Five months before the war with China began, the Minister of War was so bombarded with hostile criticism and attacks in Parliament that he lost his temper and walked out in a fury, violently cursing the "monkey circus." During the next months, with the Army demanding ever greater appropriations and ever greater control over economic life, criticism grew ever more pointed and hostile. One writer after another warned against war and the preparations for war. Rising prices brought a wave of strikes.

But the war which was started by the Japanese forces in the Peking area, and its rapid spread to nation-wide dimensions, radically altered the situation. Official reports

had it that the Chinese had treacherously attacked the Japanese. Many were skeptical, but the widening of the war to the Shanghai area—where for weeks the Chinese had great numerical superiority—left little time for criticism or doubts. China is a country twenty-seven times the size of Japan. Her vast population—estimated as high as 500,000,000 and conservatively at 450,000,000—is more than six times as great as Japan's. She had the open encouragement of powerful Soviet Russia (with an air fleet far superior to Japan's), and the operations of the Chinese Red Army—the best guerrilla forces in the world—in cooperation with her “regular” army. She had financial support and diplomatic encouragement from other Western Powers whose interests in China were threatened by Japanese aggression. Had these Powers given greater support to the Chinese, the Japanese faced complete defeat and expulsion from China.

For a time the situation was critical. Had the American Government applied the Neutrality Act, together with other Powers, and refused to supply the Japanese with the materials of war, the *Bushi's* situation would have been most perilous. But this was not done, and the Imperial armies pressed slowly but steadily ahead. After heavy losses, they gained possession of the Shanghai area, and finally drove the Chinese Government from Nanking, where the Army ordered the frightful atrocities of December, 1937, in the thought that the war was over.

But the war was not over. The Chinese Government, with increasing support from Western Powers, carried on in the interior. Japanese anxieties increased. For years, responsible Japanese had pointed out that Japan could never conquer China outright. The Japanese policy had been one of gradual aggression, moving into one area after

another as conditions made it possible. The militarists in July, 1937, had figured on a "local" war which would give them firm control of North China. They had not figured on a nation-wide war, with the Chinese as well as the Japanese receiving supplies from abroad.

Year after year the war went on. Ever longer grew the casualty lists. Ever more serious became the shortage of food, of manufactured goods, of housing materials. Gasoline was monopolized by the Army, and "pleasure driving" prohibited. Iron railings were torn down for metal. Food was rationed, as well as other necessities. Every month, ships carried new conscripts to fight in the limitless mountains and plains of China. Every month, they returned with sick and wounded soldiers—and with little boxes containing the ashes of other soldiers. The Army was in the saddle. There must be no two opinions now. For years the militarists had shouted of national crisis. Now they had it—and they made the most of it.

The present military dictatorship of Japan is a war dictatorship. It is a dictatorship in a country which has been at war for five and a half years, and which has subordinated everything else to the requirements of this war. Since December, 1941, Japan has been at war not only with China but also with the two greatest naval powers of the world—the United States and Great Britain. So long as this continues, so long as the Japanese people feel that only their Army and Navy and air forces stand between them and the deadly horror of subjection to foreign Powers, most Japanese will continue to bear their burdens patiently if not willingly. They look at India—and prefer their own masters.

Chapter 6.

FROM COLONY TO EMPIRE

THE JAPANESE people have already had a taste of subjection to Western Powers. Less than half a century ago, well within the memory of elderly Japanese, Japan was virtually a joint colony of Western Powers. Down almost to the end of the nineteenth century, Western Powers had their own settlements in Japanese territory, under Western jurisdiction. They intermittently maintained garrisons at key points, and their navies entered Japanese waters at will. For many years, they maintained garrisons in the Imperial capital at Tokyo itself, as well as at treaty ports. Westerners in Japan were completely above Japanese law and Japanese courts, and subject only to their own authorities.

Western Powers controlled Japan's tariffs, which had been decided by the Powers on behalf of their own interests—the "Open Door" in Japan, enforced by means of gunboats, and confirmed by treaty. The present war aim of reducing Japan to subjection, as taught by the U. S. Army's school for officers at Richmond (officers who are to command territories to be occupied by our forces), and strikingly indicated in articles in *Fortune* and other publications, envisages something similar to the situation of half a century ago.

Western Powers were the decisive elements in the "Restoration" in 1868—part of their program for domination of Japan as well as China. It is a remarkable history, though few are familiar with it. The current fiction is that the "Restoration" was the result of a patriotic Japanese upsurge of loyalty to the Emperor, in opposition to the "encroachment of the military classes on the sovereignty of the Court." This is pure fiction, written years after the event. The official reports of American ministers to Japan at the time make it clear that "no principle whatever" was involved, and that it was basically a clash between rival Japanese military groups one of which had the active support of Great Britain, and subsequently of other Western Powers. The moving spirit and chief adviser of the rebels who overthrew the feudal Government of the Tokugawas was Ernest Satow, of the British Legation, whose remarkable memoirs are most revealing. It was Satow who recommended to the rebels the "Restoration" of the Emperor. It was Satow's superior, British Minister Harry Parkes, who actually ordered the hesitant rebels out of Osaka—whence they proceeded to the "Emperor's capital" at Kyoto, which they seized.

The power of the militarists was old, and strongly entrenched. For more than a thousand years, the feudal rulers had robbed the common people of Japan. There had been many conflicts among the feudal lords, and bloody upheavals and rebellions at times, but down to the nineteenth century the domination of the two-sworded men—the samurai—had seldom been seriously challenged. Hindu influence, brought in with Buddhism more than a thousand years before, had greatly strengthened their position by the conception of hereditary caste. The samurai were a caste—the Japanese equivalent of

the warrior *varna* of India, but recognizing no superior excepting their own feudal overlords, the most powerful of their caste.

Dominant among the clans were the Tokugawas, whose generalissimo (Shogun) held such central power as existed in the Japanese islands. Japan was divided into some two hundred feudal principalities, large and small, each a little totalitarian state under samurai rulers. It was the feudal power of the Tokugawa Shogun which was overthrown by the clans of western Japan in 1867-9—most powerful of these western clans being Choshu and Satsuma. It was fear of complete foreign subjection which induced the reigning Shogun, a remarkably patriotic man, to abdicate, it being clear that a protracted civil war would be calamitous to the little country, but that the western clansmen would stop at nothing to gain their ends.

This, indeed, was soon evidenced. The western clansmen, on the suggestion of their British adviser, took the "Sovereign of Heaven" (then a political nonentity with a glorious Chinese title) out of his feudal seclusion at Kyoto and set him up as Emperor, center and symbol of a newly centralized rule—European Grand Monarchy in the form of old Chinese monarchy. The current titleholder, related to the Tokugawas and loyal to them, was not cooperative. He suddenly "died," and the clansmen set a child on the throne, which they moved to the old feudal capital at Tokyo. This was the "Restoration." It started with the murder of an Emperor.

Some of the powerful Tokugawa clansmen were determined to resist, but they were faced by a foreign blockade on arms, initiated by the British Government under the formula of non-intervention and followed by the other

Powers. British and other vessels supplied arms to the rebel clans of western Japan. The Tokugawas in the north set up another Imperial prince, and for a time there were two Emperors in Japan—each the creature of military forces which for a time fought fiercely for supremacy. But “non-intervention” against the Tokugawa Government with which the Powers had concluded their first treaties was decisive, and the well-supplied western clansmen gained the day.

The Tokugawas, retiring from the central island of Japan, established themselves in the big northern island of Hokkaido—far beyond the areas where the foreign Powers had established themselves and were exercising such decisive influence. The Tokugawas had most of their fleet, and apparent security. Radical elements asserted themselves, and a “Republic of Hokkaido” was proclaimed, and showed increasing signs of permanence. To the Powers, however, there could be no question of neutrality and non-intervention as between an empire and a republic.

The Americans reached agreement with the British for the territorial integrity of Japan, and gave the Japanese Imperialists (who were now established at the Shogun’s old capital at Tokyo, with the puppet Emperor in the Shogun’s palace) a new ironclad for their use. This vessel had been built in the United States on order of the Tokugawas and paid for by them, but on its arrival at Yokohama was detained by the American authorities and held by them—part of the tragic farce of non-intervention. Two years later, it was presented to the enemies of the Tokugawas for destruction of its rightful owners. American and British ships carried Imperial troops and equipment northward, and the new ironclad successfully dis-

posed of the Republic's wooden fleet. The "Restoration" was triumphant. The territorial integrity of the new Empire was secure.

The same Powers which reduced Japan to semi-colonial status promoted the "Restoration" and national unification. It was part of the working out of the principles of territorial integrity and the "Open Door." The "Open Door" for British and other foreign goods had already been imposed upon Japan, with a maximum five per cent customs tariff similar to that imposed upon China. But these privileges—and others which had been secured from the Shogun's government—were of limited value so long as Japan was divided into hundreds of feudal principalities, separated by feudal barriers and each able to impose its own taxes on goods entering its territory. In the interests of foreign trade, these internal barriers had to be broken down.

Also in the interest of this, as well as of the other special privileges which Western Powers had obtained in Japan, it was necessary to have a single responsible head who could be held to account. This was expressed by the principle of territorial integrity of Japan. There must be but one head—to be slapped, or even chopped off, if necessary. The Western Powers could not operate continually against two hundred feudal principalities of Japan, bringing one or the other into line. It most decidedly would not pay.

It was ten years before the Imperial regime was secure. After the defeat of the Tokugawas there was rivalry and finally civil war between the "modernizing" clansmen—establishing the new combination of European grand monarchy and Chinese absolutism—and the powerful clansman Saigo of Satsuma, who aimed to become a new

Shogun replacing the Tokugawas. Many samurai from many clans flocked to his standard, as the "Innovators" after pensioning them had reduced this pension to a pittance, and had finally deprived them of their ancient privilege of carrying swords—the last refuge of the fighting man of Japan.

The end of the feudal system made this "disarmament" imperative. These sworded swashbucklers had been the terror of the common people; upon whom they could use their weapons at will; it was their custom to try out a new sword on some helpless beggar by the roadside. But a centralized Imperial Government with universal authority was impossible so long as this privileged caste continued to exist, with its deadly swords and its homicidal rights; these were abolished. While steadily reducing the "outside" samurai's pensions, the "reforming" samurai of the Imperial regime, with foreign military advisers and officers, drilled and armed a conscript army of peasants, inspired by bitter hatred of the samurai and trained with modern equipment. It was this army which defeated Saigo and his hard-bit samurai forces in 1877. The military caste system was blotted out in blood.

Feudal and caste divisions were thus ended, feudal serfs had mostly become small farm-owners, the samurai had lost their ancient privilege of bearing arms and using them promiscuously on the commoners. The two hundred totalitarian principalities of feudal Japan had been brought together not only by political organization but by a new Imperial finance and banking system, internal freedom of trade and communication, new railroads, and a new conception of unity under the Emperor. The once rich and powerful Buddhist Church was plundered and for a time suppressed—as ruthlessly as other churches have

been by more recent totalitarian regimes. Confiscated temples and shrines were turned to a newly invented national religion of Emperor-worship, teaching the divinity of the Emperor. The Buddhist Church was in time permitted to resume, and recovered many of its temples, in subordination to the new Imperial religion.

These developments opened the way to political advance. Western ideas of political freedom and representative government had entered the country. Clansmen and ex-samurai outside the new oligarchy, and a steadily increasing number of educated commoners, began forcibly to demand a parliament. This was something which the bureaucrats did not want, but when democratic demands began to grow into mob uprisings and bomb-throwing the Imperial Government finally agreed to a constitution and a parliament. The German constitution was taken as a model for the Japanese, which was put into force in 1890.

Japan was still semi-colonial, and the privileged position of foreigners was keenly felt and increasingly resented. Foreign ships, which sometimes introduced epidemics from the Asiatic mainland, at times refused even in serious emergencies to obey Japanese quarantine regulations in Japanese ports. Foreign garrisons were maintained in the capital and the principal ports until the Powers were satisfied that the Imperial Government would fully protect their interests and enforce their privileges in Japan. British and other foreign naval vessels, which for a decade dominated the Inland Sea and Japan's coastal waters, continued to call intermittently at Japanese ports as a "reminder." Foreign settlements were maintained in the main ports, under foreign administration and protection. There and elsewhere, Westerners

were above and beyond Japanese law, and paid no taxes except by agreement of their own Governments. "China coast" adventurers operated in the settlements without fear of Japanese courts. As in China, there was some brutality toward ricksha-men and other coolies, but in Japan foreigners soon learned that they indulged in such pastimes at their own risk. A new phrase became current in Japan: "White arrogance."

During these years, there was some cooperation between Japan and China against the Powers. Despite foreign protests, a mutual assistance pact was concluded between the Japanese and Chinese Governments in 1871, and for twenty years they strengthened somewhat their position against Western Powers. They were unable, however, to gain any actual revision of the unequal treaties in operation. This was the situation when the Japanese constitution went into effect in 1890, and the educated minority of the people elected their first Parliament.

Almost from the beginning there was conflict between Parliament and the bureaucracy. The Imperial Government was now devoting increasing sums to naval expansion—British armament firms having successfully sold both the Chinese and Japanese Governments on the necessity of this. Parliament flatly opposed. From demanding reduction of taxes and military-naval expenditures Parliament went on to demand actual control over Government. Similarly it demanded that the Imperial Government take a firmer attitude toward the privileged Powers, and put an end to the semi-colonial position of Japan. The coupling of demands was significant. Parliament demanded popular control against the privileges of both the Imperial bureaucracy and of the foreign Powers in Japan.

Parliament and bureaucracy had reached an impasse, and the powers of the Throne itself, center of the new Imperial order, were increasingly endangered by 1894. In this situation, an agreement was reached between the British and Japanese Governments. Britain and Russia had long been rivals in Asia, and the Russians were now building a railway clear across Siberia to their new port at Vladivostok, which would give them a most powerful position in the Far East. The British had already intervened to prevent the Russians establishing themselves in Korea and its adjoining islands, and had approached the Chinese Government for an alliance against Russia. The Chinese declined the latter offer, however, and at the end 1893 Britain turned to Japan.

The Japanese were by no means prepared for war with Russia. But they were confident of their ability to seize Korea and relieve the British of their "protectorate" there, and to defeat the archaic and backward Chinese forces. The civil bureaucrats of Japan, who had carried out the reforms of the reconstruction period, were not anxious for war, but this seemed the only alternative to surrendering power to Parliament. War would rally patriotic feeling to the side of the Government, and solve the immediate political crisis. The British Government, anxious to have Japan as an ally against both Russia and China, and to break the intermittent cooperation between China and Japan, was prepared to abandon its extraterritorial privileges and its settlements in Japan.

The Japanese, under guise of cooperation with China, moved into Korea. The British Government, in July, 1894, signed the new treaty agreeing to abandon extraterritorial and associated privileges in Japan. In the wave of enthusiasm which followed in Japan, the militarists

struck at Korea, a dominion of the Chinese Empire, and treacherously attacked Chinese and Korean troops there, rapidly expanding military operations to Manchuria. The first decisive successes of the Japanese troops were hailed by the London *Times* with significant rejoicing. By these victories, said the great British organ, the Japanese have fully established their claim to recognition as a "civilized Power." Month after month, the Japanese forces drove further into China, the roll of victories and of Chinese deaths mounting higher and higher, until the Peking Government sued for peace.

It was in this way that the Japanese Government established its claim to "equal treatment." By the treacherous breaking of its Mutual Assistance Pact with Peking, the treacherous attack upon Korean and Chinese forces, the treacherous launching of war before declaring it, and the extermination of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers, the Japanese Imperial Government obtained British recognition as a civilized Power.

The American Government was first to fall in line—despite bitter criticism in Congress of reported Japanese military atrocities. The American Minister had long since reported the grave political crisis in Japan, and informed Washington that unless the Japanese Government were permitted to divert popular hostility from themselves to foreign enemies the whole Imperial order was threatened. The Throne itself, he had emphasized, was in danger, and its collapse would be a calamity. The Administration at Washington, in this situation, sympathized wholly *with the Throne and the bureaucracy, against Parliament*, and agreed that the militarists must have a free hand. With the first decisive Japanese victories, the American Government followed the British lead in abandoning extra-

territorial and associated privileges in Japan. The American authorities in China extended their protection to Japanese spies there, and saw that they returned safely to Japan.

The subsequent treaty between China and Japan gave the Japanese the same privileges—extraterritoriality, etc.—as the Western Powers possessed in China, and had until that time possessed in Japan also. At one stroke, Japan had developed from a semi-colony to an Imperialist Power, cooperating as a partner with other Imperialist Powers in and against China. For a time, indeed, there was a situation rather confusing for those minds which classify nations into oppressed and imperialist. Until the revised treaties actually came into force in Japan, the Japanese were simultaneously oppressed and imperialist. But from a more realistic viewpoint there was no conflict. The Japanese people were oppressed and the Japanese Government was imperialist. They still are.

With the wave of patriotic enthusiasm aroused by the war and the revision of treaties, the Japanese Government was able to gain the support of Parliament for its military budgets, and to reach agreement with some parliamentary leaders for further cooperation. The civil bureaucrats of Japan were not anxious to go further on the dangerous path of imperialism, but the men of war were now gaining a powerful position. As defense against the growing assertiveness of Parliament after the war, they obtained the Imperial regulation which limited the War and Navy ministries to the Army and Navy respectively. In 1901, the Army leader Yamagata pushed through the alliance with Great Britain despite the opposition of the civil bureaucrat, Prince Ito. Military imperialism was firmly in the saddle, and openly allied with

Great Britain. The United States was an unsigned member of the Alliance.

It is important to face these facts squarely. They are facts of historic record. Japan gained release from the "unequal treaties" on the basis of aggression against China and Korea, becoming a partner of Western Powers in this ignoble task. When the new aggressions of Western Powers in China—inspired by Japan's revelation of China's weakness—led to the fierce Boxer Uprising and the attempt to expel the foreigners from China (the same sort of movement as had gripped Japan in the 1860's, and which the Restorationists had shrewdly utilized for their own purposes), the Western Powers in desperation appealed to the Japanese to send troops to cooperate against the Chinese. The Japanese were not enthusiastic, but finally agreed after the British Government offered them full compensation for their services. It was as mercenaries of Western Powers that the Japanese supplied the forces which were decisive in the occupation of Peking and the crushing of the Manchu Empire into subjection in 1900.

The international forces at Peking, the Chinese capital, were now supreme in China, with Japan a member and partner of this Imperialist International. Rivalries among Western Powers, aiming further to expand and strengthen their position in China, opened further opportunities to Japanese Imperialism. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance aimed to protect and expand the special privileges of the contracting Powers both in China and in Korea, and was aimed against Russia as well. It was an alliance for war and aggression, and resulted in the Japanese invasion of independent Korea and the unprovoked attack upon Russian forces in Manchuria in 1904. The Japanese had British and American financial and diplomatic support

against Russia, China, and Korea. America, Britain, and other Powers warned the Chinese to stay neutral, and in no event to participate in this war on China's own territories—the Manchurian homeland of the Dynasty itself. In fact, this warning was against assistance to Russia. The Powers did not intervene against Chinese assistance to Japan, and quietly shelved Russia's protests against it.

It was the American rather than the British Government which saved Japanese Imperialism from utter defeat and collapse in this war. Lord Bertie, shrewd statesman of the British Foreign Office, had recommended conclusion of the treaty with Japanese militarists on the specific basis that Japan and Russia would hold one another in check in the Far East. By the summer of 1905, this astute policy was bearing most remarkable fruit. Japan had seized Korea and had gained a foothold in South Manchuria, but was utterly exhausted both in manpower and other resources. The Russians, who suffered from a great initial disadvantage owing to the long and slow communications over the one-track Trans-Siberian Railway, were assembling a vast army which was destined to drive the now outnumbered and decimated Japanese southward into the sea. Japanese defeat was certain—as certain as was German defeat in the summer of 1918.

The Russians would gain a military victory, but their Imperial absolutism was itself moving toward collapse. Rebellion against the Czarist regime was growing into revolution, and the impotent Czar was making greater and greater concessions to the demands for popular government. He could neither refuse the demands of the people for representative government nor the demands of the militarists in Manchuria to continue a war in which victory was clearly in sight. Both Japanese and

Russian Imperialism seemed doomed to perish on the blood-soaked fields of Manchuria.

It was Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, who saved both Mikado and Czar in that year of 1905. At the urgent and secret appeals of the Japanese Emperor, he moved for peace. With cooperation from Kaiser William of Germany (who was increasingly apprehensive of German repercussions from the growing revolution in Russia), he induced the slow-witted Czar Nicholas to send envoys to discuss peace. At Portsmouth, the Japanese won a most amazing diplomatic victory over Witte and other Russian diplomats, making peace virtually on the basis of the status quo.

Japanese Imperialism was saved. The Czarist regime was still in trouble, but it was now able to concentrate all its forces on suppression of its internal enemies. Within two years, it had withdrawn the more important of its concessions, and reaction was firmly in the saddle. In 1907, it reached an agreement with England and moved troops into Persia for the bloody suppression of the democratic revolution in that country. It had already reached an agreement with the Japanese for division of their respective spheres of aggression in Manchuria, and for co-operation there against outsiders.

The rivalries of Western Powers and the opposition of policies between President Theodore Roosevelt and the British Government had saved the day for Japan's militarists. The aims of Lord Bertie and the British Foreign Office had been frustrated. The Japanese renewed the alliance, but on terms much more advantageous to themselves than the first alliance. They were virtually bankrupt, and in desperate economic straits, but in 1907 they reached an agreement and raised a loan from France—

prelude to an ever fuller understanding with Russia, France's ally. Japanese militarism secured itself by alliances with both Britain and Russia, and a diplomatic entente with France. In 1911 Japan obtained tariff autonomy, ending the half-century of foreign-imposed tariffs and the Open Door in Japan.

The same year that Japan gained "full independence," the Chinese launched their revolution against the Manchu Dynasty—now a puppet of the Powers jointly. Like the parliamentary upheaval in Japan twenty years previously, it was directed both against the native absolutism and the foreign Powers which it served. The Powers reached a joint understanding to finance and support the counter-revolution, choosing the powerful Chinese militarist Yuan Shih-kai as their agent. Japan was a partner in the International Consortium which carried out this financing—the supreme power in China. Japan's Imperial regime was now a full partner of Western Imperialism, both for aggressive expansion and for absolutist reaction in China.

The outbreak of war between the European Powers in 1914 gave the Japanese an unprecedented opportunity in the Far East. Shrewdly dealing with one Power after another, with one Chinese group after another, they gained domination at Peking, in Shantung, in Manchuria, in Outer Mongolia, in Far Eastern Russia. On the outbreak of war, they had declined their British ally's request *not* to come in (the British desiring to maintain the status quo in China), but secretly presented terms to the Germans. Failing to receive a reply, Japan declared war on Germany. Their conduct was in no way guided by the alliance with England. They were now in business for themselves.

The terms they presented to China (the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 were followed by subsequent ones) were for the most part secret, and the new privileges were not to be shared by Western Powers. By skillful bargaining with the distressed Western Allies, the Japanese secured their cooperation and support against the Chinese. The Japanese were no longer working for the White Men. The principal White Empires were working for them.

This came to an end with the end of the European war. Now, however, some Americans were beginning to see a light. While the Japanese militarists were working with us and for us, the American Government and press—with few exceptions—sang paeans of praise to the “modern,” “progressive,” “liberal” Japanese. Fewer than thirty years ago, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt wrote:

“Japan is indeed a wonderful land. Nothing in history has quite paralleled her rise during the last fifty years. Her progress has been remarkable alike in war, in industry, in statesmanship, in science. Her admirals and generals, her statesmen and administrators, have accomplished feats with which only the greatest feats of the picked men of corresponding position in Europe and the two Americas during the same time can be compared—and in order to match in the aggregate these great men of a single island nation, more than one of the countries of the Occident must be drawn on.”

Such comment would seem strange in the United States today. The picture has changed. The Japanese have now gone into business for themselves. And we are not amused.

Chapter 7.

DOWN WITH BUSHIDO!

SITTING ON the bank of a little lake, a Japanese quietly inserted a long knife into the left side of his abdomen, and with a circular motion drew it around to the right, disemboweling himself. It was *hara-kiri*—belly-cutting. He did not live long. On the grass beside him was a note declaring his refusal to join the Imperial Army, his hostility to the militarists and the war, and concluding: "*Ando! Banzai!*" (Ando is the Way of Peace. *Bushido* is the Way of War.)

This was conscientious objection of the most extreme and resolute type. Only the most courageous will kill themselves rather than kill others. The more popular method of avoiding military service in Japan is the purchase of lucky charms supposed to avert the calamity. Though this form of enterprise is frowned upon by the authorities, and is not engaged in by the cooperative societies, it is carried on, largely by village priests. Some men mutilate themselves to avoid service. Sometimes it works—more often than the charms. And relatives and friends gather in a joyous but quiet family celebration:

When actually called up for service, few Japanese refuse. The most distinctive characteristic of the Japanese soldier is his deep desire to avoid death and to return

home alive. The Japanese conscript leaves his homeland with a "thousand-stitches-belt" around him, and charms and talismans similarly intended to bring him back alive and unharmed. He has no positive desire to die for the Emperor. If needs be, he will do so; but he would rather keep on living.

The charms are sometimes a great nuisance on the march. Some peasant soldiers, popular in their village, are loaded down with them. The more intelligent and educated scoff, but they hang on to their "thousand-stitches-belt." Into this belt have gone a thousand stitches from a thousand well-wishers, mostly collected from friendly passers-by on the public street.

There is a current fiction that the Japanese soldier, rushing eagerly to his death, has but one thought and one death-cry: "The Emperor! *Banzai!*" ("*Banzai*" is a Chinese expression—like the Emperor's title—and means "for-ever" or more literally "ten thousand years.") There are some soldiers who do say this. Most of them do not. The Japanese soldier is much more likely to think of his mother or father, or his wife or child. It is the Emperor who sends him to war. It is his own people who are praying for his safe return.

I have known many Japanese pacifists and anti-militarists, radical and conservative, "left" and "right." They include business men and workers, professional people and retired naval officers. Most widespread are the business men who feel the military burden as the most crushing force upon the Japanese people and particularly upon themselves, who would like to see parliamentary government re-established and the power of the militarists wholly ended, who wish to see peaceful international relations both in diplomacy and in trade, but who are not "radical"

in any economic sense. Beyond this are the various labor and Socialist and anarchist and Communist groups, hostile to the military dictatorship from their respective viewpoints.

Many Japanese anarchists are complete pacifists of Tolstoyan type, opposed to official force and violence and to unofficial violence as well. The Japanese word for anarchism, *mu-seifu-shugi* (the no-government principle), carries no necessary connotations of terrorism and violence; such things have for many years been monopolized by the *Bushi* and their agents. At one time there was a considerable anarchist movement in Japan, and an anarcho-syndicalist federation of labor. This has now been suppressed and driven underground, where a movement still exists. Not all anarchists, of course, are pacifists in a "non-resistance" sense; some have been prepared to answer violence with violence, and have attempted to do so at times. But they are emphatically hostile to the Imperial Government's foreign wars.

Japanese Communists have carried this hostility to a point where the non-Communist can hardly consider it pacifism. Some have taken service with the Chinese forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, or of the Chinese Red Army, broadcasting anti-militarist propaganda by radio to the Japanese troops, writing propaganda leaflets for scattering among these troops, and "converting" Japanese soldiers captured by the Chinese. Their radio broadcasts reach not only the troops, but have occasionally reached Tokyo itself. They denounce not only militarism but specifically Japanese militarism, the Imperial regime, and the Japanese plutocracy—the billionaire houses of Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

Most noted of these Japanese Communists working

with the Chinese propaganda section has been the writer Kaji Wataru, a man descended from Satsuma samurai, who was jailed and beaten by Japanese police until he decided to flee "Onigashima" and carry on in China. There he supplemented his other propaganda activities by converting scores of captured Japanese soldiers who were brought together in a Japanese Anti-War League; Japanese and "mixed" dramatic troupes toured the cities and towns, giving anti-*Bushi* plays; half a hundred converts traveled about, talking to new Japanese prisoners and making new conversions. The intense believer in Communism can be happy in such work. Most Japanese, however, do not like to live permanently in the bleak interior of China, away from their homeland and friends and families and necessarily under constant official protection, working for an alien Government. Chinese Communists and cosmopolitans are friendly to them. Chinese militarists usually regard them simply as Japanese traitors.

Popular hostility to militarism and war is not a new thing in Japan. It has a long and deep-rooted tradition. The samurai were never popular among the common people in feudal times. One of the hazards of defeat in feudal wars, indeed, was for the retreating and broken forces to be set upon by groups of peasants armed with pikes, mattocks, knives, and similar weapons—a very ignoble death for the high-caste *Bushi*. The first "popular" war in Japan was that against the samurai die-hards under Saigo of Satsuma in 1877.

The civil bureaucrats who dominated the Imperial Government during the construction period were themselves not enthusiastic about war. It was the Choshu clan, dominating the new army, and the Satsuma clan, dominating the new navy, who held power. But among the

clansmen themselves it was the civil bureaucrats, headed by the Choshu leader, Ito, who actually wielded power. Under his able dictatorship the "new Japan" took form, with a policy of external peace and internal organization and construction. Foreign incidents provoked by Saigo of Satsuma and other militarists were diplomatically settled by Tokyo. It was the political crisis of the early 1890's, and the British Government's offer, which made Ito himself decide on war.

Ito favored peace, but he was determined to maintain the power of his despotic oligarchy, the Satsuma-Choshu Government. From their viewpoint, the war of 1894-5 was a political necessity, diverting popular hostility from domestic to foreign enemies, and ending the most serious foreign encroachments on Japan's sovereignty. But the military leaders among the clansmen gained in power and influence, and in time gained a secure hold on Government by the Imperial regulation which limited the War and Navy ministries to the appointees of the Army and Navy respectively.

These clan corporations, responsible only to the Emperor, thus strengthened their power both against the civil bureaucrats and parliament. No Cabinet could henceforth be formed without agreement with Army and Navy—more especially the former, which held the War Ministry. The triumph of the Army was their alliance with Great Britain in 1902. Ito opposed this alliance for aggressive war, but the military leader Yamagata favored it and was successful in pressing it through. It was the decisive point in the Army's rise to supreme power.

It was, indeed, the main bulwark of Marshal Yamagata and his *Bushi*, at home and abroad. For twenty years—the period of the Anglo-Japanese alliance—this power

continued. So powerful did Yamagata become, strengthened by his foreign military alliances, that Japanese critics called him "O Goshō Sama"—an old term for the Shogun who had ruled in pre-Restoration days. Marshal—finally Prince—Yamagata made and unmade the Cabinets of Japan, and chose brides for the Imperial princes. The "Yamagata Shogunate" came to an end when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ended, at the end of 1921, at the Washington Conference. Yamagata's power was broken. He died a few months later.

In the meantime, there was bitter opposition in Japan to the burdens of militarism and war. In the war of aggression against Russia and Korea, in 1904-5, this took open form during the war itself, an unprecedented thing in Japan in war time, and unusual in any country. Most active and emphatic of the enemies of war were the Japanese Socialists, a group which had been growing during the previous decade, and which was bitterly hostile to the *Bushi* and their imperialist ventures. They had contacts with their anti-militarist friends in Russia; the Japanese Socialist Katayama shook hands with the Russian Plekhanoff at the International Socialist Congress. Despite imprisonment and suppression, they carried on.

There were mutinies in the Army. The heavy casualties at Port Arthur resulted in repeated mutinies, soldiers refusing to go into action on hills already littered with their dead. Repeatedly whole regiments had to be moved elsewhere and fresh ones brought in. Colonels and even generals had personally to lead their soldiers into battle. The treacherous surrender of Port Arthur by the Russian commanders (for which the latter were court-martialed) saved the Japanese military for a time, but there were increasing troubles in Japan itself. By the summer of 1905

the Government was facing determined opposition of whole villages whose headmen refused further "requisitions" of crops or cattle or man-power. There was actual famine in parts of the country. Rebellion and mutiny was growing with economic collapse. The Army was stalemated in central Manchuria, while the Russians were gathering forces for an irresistible southern drive.

Defeat would have meant the complete discrediting of the militarists, and the end of Sat-Cho dictatorship in Japan. The forces of popular democracy which were increasingly asserting themselves in Russia were also strong in Japan, and parliamentary government seemed destined to supplant Imperial absolutism in both countries. But this was not to be. The "peace-making" intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt saved the *Bushi* from utter defeat and destruction. It also saved the Czarist regime.

American and British bankers had financed the Japanese militarists, and now collected heavy tribute. Japan's crushing taxation—"war taxes" continued into peace time—was for years insufficient to meet these foreign obligations. The military-Imperial regime, though now nominally independent of Western Powers, was actually reduced to a collector of tribute from the Japanese people for its foreign patrons and creditors. The only material profits from the Russo-Japanese War went to these creditors, and to munitions manufacturers. In the meantime, the American Red Cross collected and spent tens of millions for the relief of famine in Japan.

Militarism was utterly discredited. For the militarists the war was a "victory," but for the people it was a terrible calamity. The militarists strengthened their position by an entente and finally an alliance with Czarist Russia, but the continued distress in Japan brought a

steady increase of revolutionary activity. Terroristic police measures provoked a terroristic response, and there was a plot to assassinate the Emperor, center and symbol of the whole Imperial regime of the militarists. The plot was exposed, and a dozen revolutionists executed.

By 1911, the militarists were preparing for a new war. The American Government under President Taft was determined to secure a foothold for American investments in Manchuria—which the Russians and Japanese had made their exclusive preserve. The Japanese and Russians strongly objected, and prepared for war. The British Government revised the alliance with Japan so that England would not be absolutely obligated to join Japan in war against the United States, but might remain neutral. The Japanese militarists were confident of their ability to seize the Philippines and expel the United States from the Far East. But the Japanese people objected.

With political preparations for war under way, there was an uprising in Tokyo. Determined crowds picketed Government offices and Parliament, beat up the *Bushi's* agents, and battled with the police in the streets. They had the quiet support of the saner members of the bureaucracy itself. They refused to be plunged into another war over Manchuria, and actually forced the Government to alter its plans. It was the anti-war elements in Japan itself which prevented war against the United States and our expulsion from the Far East in 1912.

This amazing popular veto on war and the war-promoters asserted itself again a year later, when the Government's sinister political moves showed its renewal of war preparations. Tokyo again acted. The militarists again quieted down. The first World War brought them new opportunities: war without serious risks, while the Euro-

pean Powers were fighting among themselves. Shrewdly playing one Power against another, Chinese groups against one another, and the Allies against the Chinese, the Japanese were able greatly to expand their power in the Far East with little serious fighting.

The first big-scale dispatch of troops was to North Manchuria and Far Eastern Russia in 1918. The Japanese Imperial regime had lost its ally—the Russian Imperial regime, which had collapsed early in 1917—but had gained new friends. It was the American Government (under pressure from its British and French allies) which issued the clarion call for international intervention in Russia—ostensibly to rescue the Czechs in Siberia, but actually to keep them there and to destroy the Russian Revolution. The British and French aim, it soon became clear, was to re-establish the Czarist regime. It was a strange sight: the American President taking the official lead, and dispatching American troops to revive a regime which had for years been the allies of Japanese Imperialism against the United States.

From the very beginning, there were Japanese protests against this undeclared war. A few weeks after the dispatch of troops started, indeed, there was a widespread uprising in Japan. This was not political, but primarily economic—the rice riots and strike battles of 1918. But their spread throughout the country, and their bitterness and intensity, revealed as nothing else could the complete lack of popular sympathy for the military Government and its enterprises. According to the theories of the militarists and their Western friends, the Japanese people should have been engaging in an orgy of ebullient patriotism and a grand campaign of flag-waving and hara-kiri. Instead, they fought the police and the troops.

The entire bureaucracy was thoroughly frightened by the extent and fury of the first proletarian uprising. The oligarchy at once dismissed the reactionary Government of Marshal Terauchi, and for the first time in Japanese history asked an untitled Japanese politician (Hara, a civilian of humble origin and leader of the Seiyukai) to form a Cabinet. The Government bloodily suppressed the uprising, and executed or imprisoned thousands of rioters, but it took steps to regulate the price of rice, permitted labor openly to organize and strike, and even to agitate for political rights. It made other liberal gestures, including an extension of the suffrage to include a much greater number of voters.

With the end of the European war, the prestige of the militarists was undermined by setback after setback abroad, and the loss of the vast continental areas over which they had gained domination during the war in the West. They lost their control of the Chinese Government at Peking, their domination of Outer Mongolia, their military control of Shantung. They lost this last at the Washington Conference in 1921-2, after losing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance through American and Canadian pressure on England. This final loss was a most serious blow to the militarists. Yamagata's great power had started with the alliance, and ended with it. The last of the Shoguns died two months after the Great Alliance died, a double death which marked the end of an era.

The militarists were now unable to resist popular pressure for withdrawal of troops from Siberia. There had been repeated and long-continued opposition in Parliament to this occupation of Far Eastern Russia. Yukio Ozaki, the courageous parliamentary leader and spokesman of Japanese democracy, had been most caustic and

bitter regarding the Japanese invasion of Russia, and had been disciplined for suggesting that the Japanese oligarchy had more in common with dictatorship than with any form of democracy. Japanese troops had been stationed in Russian territories since 1918, and had watched with envy the departure of American, Canadian, and Czech soldiers, leaving them to carry on the "war for democracy" with the aid of Russian bandits.

Many Japanese soldiers and even officers were "red-dened" by their experiences and by the propaganda which reached them. Many were appalled and disgusted at the bloodthirsty ferocity of the White Russian bandits (the *Bushi's* proteges) toward their Russian fellow-countrymen. Japanese soldiers suffered severely through the fierce Russian winters, many freezing to death on sentry duty or being killed by Russian guerrillas. There were minor mutinies; Japanese soldiers returning home increased the growing hostility to the occupation. The costs of the military adventure were steadily mounting: 700,000,000 yen, an enormous sum in those days. Demands for withdrawal of troops began to be made by public bodies ranging from Chambers of Commerce to Trade Union Councils—unprecedented interference in foreign affairs. These growing forces of popular opposition among soldiers and people, and the weakening of the militarists' position and prestige all along the line, actually forced the latter to evacuate most of Far Eastern Russia. It was the first time in history that such forces were so effective in Japan.*

* I have seen statements that "American pressure" was applied which forced the Japanese militarists to withdraw from Far Eastern Russia. I have been unable to find any evidence whatever for such statements.

The Army was seriously weakened by the loss of its foreign allies. The Navy, however, had reached agreement with other Powers at the Washington Conference, where the four-Power Naval Treaty, the four-Power financial Consortium, and the Nine-Power Treaty envisaged joint domination by the navies and bankers of America, Japan, England and France over the Far East. Japan's navalists came to the fore, and Admirals headed the next two Governments of Japan. But in 1924 there came a serious setback to this group of Powers which were the dominant elements in the joint Diplomatic Body at Peking, which had for years asserted the authority of a Super-State there and refused to permit the Chinese Government to establish official relations with Moscow. The British Labor Government, itself establishing relations with Moscow, weakened this joint front against the Soviet Government. On May 31, 1924, a treaty was finally concluded between Peking and Moscow. It was a most emphatic setback for the Powers' policy in China, and for their Japanese associates. The aristocratic Government of Kiyoura was at once dismissed, and a civilian leader was asked to form a Cabinet.

This was a civilian Government, responsible to Parliament. The militarists and their foreign friends had been discredited. The Army and Navy still had virtual independence of the civilian Government, but they dared make no aggressive move without strong foreign allies. The Kato Government, with Shidehara as Foreign Minister, carried on a policy of peace and non-aggression in direct opposition to militarism and Imperial aggression. It worked for the popular *Ando*, the Way of Peace—and against *Bushido*, the Way of the Warrior. One of its first acts was to negotiate with Soviet Russia a treaty of peace

and friendship, despite the disapproval of Western Powers. Northern Saghalien, still held by the Japanese Navy, it restored to Russia. It maintained friendly relations with China, despite some dangerous moves by the Army. It was a policy which combined peace with business. They wanted both—and Japanese economic life benefited. While the Chinese were boycotting British goods and shipping and the British colony of Hongkong, the Japanese increased their exports to China and there was an actual revival of prosperity. The Government budget of 1927 was the largest on record, but almost three-fourths of it went to civilian purposes; the militarists received only 27 per cent of it, a serious decline for them.

These were the years of the Nationalist upheaval in China, and the triumphal march of the Kuomintang forces northward from Canton to the Yangtze valley under militant anti-Imperialist leadership. The Japanese Government made no move to check it, and refused to participate in the large-scale dispatches of British and other Western troops to Shanghai to oppose the Nationalists. No sounder policy toward China has ever been voiced than that expressed by Foreign Minister Shidehara, in his report to the Diet in January, 1927.

Japan, he declared frankly, had the utmost sympathy with China's aspirations for national freedom. The friendship of centuries, and the real economic interests of the Japanese people in peaceful trade and commerce with their Asiatic neighbors, alike called for such sympathy. There must be no outside compulsion upon China. Tokyo had prohibited the supply of arms to China, and the lending of money for civil war in China—non-intervention which was real and not fictitious. China must determine her own internal policy, choose her own Govern-

ment and institutions. She had a long and unique history and national life, and no foreign people could impose upon China their own political or social institutions against her will. The Chinese would not long acquiesce in foreign intervention, nor submit to foreign dictation. China was at liberty to choose any institutions she pleased.

It seems a far cry to that report of sixteen years ago. But it was the statement of Japan's civilian spokesmen, speaking for a people who opposed militarism, imperialism, and aggression against one's neighbors. This peace policy continued even when certain Nationalist troops at Nanking launched murderous attacks upon foreign consulates and foreign nationals there. The Japanese refused to participate in the bombardment of Nanking by British and American gunboats, but sent ashore an unarmed landing party which escorted Japanese nationals out of the city. The Japanese Government participated in the Powers' joint demand that the Nationalist Government at Wuhan punish the responsible commanders and make complete reparation for losses of life and property, but refused to participate in forcible action against China.

The last meant crisis. The Powers considered the Chinese reply to their note of April 11, 1917, unsatisfactory. The British Government proposed joint intervention against Wuhan, and the occupation of strategic points in the Yangtze valley. The French and Italians agreed. It was the refusal of the Shidehara Government in Japan, and the Coolidge Government at Washington, which blocked the move. But the Japanese militarists now moved. The civilian Government was in office, but not in power. It was Shidehara's last act as Foreign Minister. On April 18 the Cabinet was dismissed.

The militarists were back in direct control, again with the backing of Western Powers determined on a "strong" policy in China. Head of their Government was General Tanaka, leader of the aggressive militarists. For more than two years, this Government carried on a policy of forcible intervention and aggression in China—in which it did not stand alone. It dispatched troops to the interior of Shantung, without protest from the Western Powers; shot down thousands of Chinese civilians as well as soldiers at Tsinan-fu, and established direct military domination of the Shantung Railway. The Japanese ordered Marshal Chang Tso-lin, head of the Chinese Government at Peking, to return to his "homeland" in Manchuria. When he refused, they dispatched troops to Tientsin, with field guns and airplanes. Under increasing Japanese pressure, he finally left the capital for Mukden. There he was murdered by the Japanese, his train being blown up as it entered his old capital.

During these bloody months of unprovoked aggression and undeclared war in China, the Powers made no protest. Instead, there was one of the most amazingly cynical gestures on record. While Japanese troops were butchering Chinese soldiers and civilians in Shantung and ordering the "Grand Marshal" of China to leave his capital—to be murdered—Secretary of State Kellogg cheerfully presented to the Japanese his proposal for a pact renouncing war among the Powers. The Tanaka Government informed Washington of its cordial agreement—and continued its butcheries. No "reservations" seemed necessary, in the circumstances. The Japanese Army was carrying on undeclared war in China, and its troops were preparing for forcible action at Tientsin in concert with other Powers, on May 26, when *Japan adhered to the pact.*

China had not yet been invited to do so by her "friends."

There is a document, the "Tanaka Memorial," which presents in glaring light the *Bushi's* aggressive ambitions. There is much doubt as to its authenticity, but there can be no doubt whatever that most of it represents the real ambitions of the military Imperialists of Japan which are evidenced by the facts of their own history. One little item, however, must be added. It was the Tanaka Government, at its most murderous period, which the American Government approached for signature of a "Pact to Renounce War," while making no demand whatever that the Tanaka regime discontinue its war in China. If the Japanese army's activities in China in May, 1928, were not an undeclared war, there is no such thing.

In fact, the Tanaka Government at the time had an actual diplomatic alliance with the British Government, and was actively cooperating with London and Paris in China. It worked together with the British and French Governments in notes to the Chinese Government concerning the Customs Administration and revenues, the Salt Administration, the foreign control of these Chinese revenues, and other matters concerning mutual Imperial privileges in China. The British Government on November 28, 1928, in response to repeated demands in Parliament, officially acknowledged the existence of a diplomatic alliance with the Tanaka Government. The British supported Japan's free hand in Manchuria, agreed to the repayment of certain Japanese subsidies to Chinese political agents out of Chinese customs revenues, and agreed to take no action in China without preliminary discussion and agreement with the Japanese.

With regard to Washington, it must be noted that as soon as Marshal Chang Tso-lin had been expelled from

Peking and murdered, we moved with almost indecent haste to recognize the Nanking Government of General Chiang Kai-shek as a National Government of China, and worked to centralize customs authority and to bring customs revenues to Nanking. That story belongs in the history of China more than that of Japan. But the event which broke the power of the Tanaka murder-bund was the ousting of the British Tories by British labor in May, 1929, depriving the Japanese militarists of their most influential foreign friends and diplomatic allies. They were now playing a lone hand in China, and could not possibly carry on.

It was the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, who had for years been friendly to the Japanese in China, which particularly aroused critics of the Tanaka regime. Press and Parliament increasingly demanded an accounting, and the fall of the British Conservative Government brought a political crisis. The murder of Chang was the immediate issue over which Tanaka resigned. Parliament again took control of the Government and devoted itself as vigorously to peace and retrenchment as the Army had devoted itself to war and aggression.

The new Government was the most popular Japan had ever possessed. The civilian Government of 1924-7 had pushed through a bill for manhood suffrage in Japan, for which there had long been agitation, but which the oligarchy had bitterly opposed. Virtually every Japanese man over twenty-five could now vote, and Parliament was for the first time chosen in this way. The civilian Hama-guchi took office supported by the strongest party in Parliament. For two years the militarists were checked. The civilian Government worked industriously to cut down taxation, to reduce military and naval expenditures,

and to encroach upon the independent power of the Army and Navy in Japan.

The Government of Premier Hamaguchi was a beacon of light to all who opposed militarism and aggression and sought international peace. It sought a rational and peaceful solution of every issue with China, to settle by businesslike negotiations the competition between Japanese and Chinese railways in Manchuria, to make important concessions paving the way for the abandonment of extraterritorial privileges in China, to undermine the entire basis of Japanese military aggression in Manchuria. The Japanese militarists utilized the million Korean emigrants in Manchuria as spearheads of military aggression. The Hamaguchi Government sought recognition of their right to become naturalized as Chinese, which was what most of them desired. The Japanese militarists ruled Korea as a conquered province. The Hamaguchi Government brought in a bill for the development of self-government in Korea and the establishment of representative government and "Home Rule."

For two years there was tense struggle between the people's Government and the *Bushi*. The Imperialists were grimly determined to permit no liquidation of the Japanese Empire, and succeeded in blocking one forward move after another. But the civilian Government succeeded in blocking the *Bushi's* moves in China for two years. When Shantung again became the center of a Chinese civil war, in 1930, Hamaguchi completely reversed Tanaka's policy of ruthless aggression and violent intervention. No troops were sent, and no pressure brought on any Chinese group. Tokyo worked steadily and successfully for improved diplomatic and trade relations with China, as well as with Russia and the League of

Nations. It politely declined a proposal from Western Powers to intervene in North Manchuria in 1929; the Army was too discredited to take advantage of this opportunity for new aggressions with foreign allies.

To the London Naval Conference in 1930 Premier Hamaguchi sent a civilian as chief délégué. The Navy Minister accompanied him as adviser. During the latter's absence from Tokyo, the civilian Premier himself took over the Navy Ministry—a thing without precedent in Japanese history, and clearly envisaging the end of the Navy's autonomy. Limitations were agreed upon, despite the hostility of the Naval Staff and the Supreme Military Council. The civilian Government pushed the treaty through, refusing even to discuss it with the aristocratic Privy Council. Delegate Wakatsuki, returning from London, was greeted with tremendous popular ovations. Crowds packed the streets to welcome in triumph a civilian leader who was checking the insatiable demands and the bloody power of the militarists.

Thus the civilian leaders of Japan, representing the Japanese Parliament and the mass of the Japanese people, were received. But a professional patriot working for the militarists sent Wakatsuki a dagger—indicating that he should commit hara-kiri for his "treason." And another patriot working for the *Bushi* assassinated Premier Hamaguchi—the untitled civilian who had dared to challenge the power of the militarists.

That was only twelve short years ago. Some day there may be lasting peace in the Far East. If this dream is to come true, it will be on the basis of peaceful diplomatic settlements of all issues between nations, the elimination of Army and Navy chiefs from any shadow of political control, the strictest limitation of armaments by inter-

national agreement, the establishment and realization of representative government by the people, the extension of this and home rule to all subject peoples, the right of peoples to change their citizenship and allegiance from one country to another, the complete renunciation of self-seeking interference in the internal affairs of one's neighbors, and equal cooperation of all in a world-wide League or Federation of Nations.

These things are basic. There can be no permanent peace without them. If and when we get around to them, we may erect a monument to the memory of a Japanese premier by name of Yuko Hamaguchi, nicknamed "The Lion," who was murdered trying to make them come true.

Chapter 8.

BIG BUSINESS, POLITICS AND PEACE

JAPAN'S BIG BUSINESS is really *big*. Five billionaire houses control most of the wealth of Japan—more wealth than is held by all the rest of the Japanese population together. That wealth is subject to the increasing economic controls of the Imperial Government. The great houses of Mitsui and Mitsubishi rank first among these economic empires. Mitsui is a trading firm which has expanded into one line of industry after another. It was Mitsui which made the vast profits from silk exports. Mitsui has been outstanding in cotton textiles, rayon, mining, paper, cement, engineering, coal and other items—including a hundred million or so in shipping, though this last is more in the Mitsubishi line.

Mitsubishi has made the greatest fortune from the expansion of Japan's merchant marine since the "opening" of Japan. It handles about three-eighths of all Japanese shipping, an even higher proportion of marine and fire insurance, almost one-fourth of warehousing, and almost half of Japan's wheat—as well as ten per cent of Japan's trust business, five per cent of all banking in the country, and various industries including glass, beer, sugar.

These are not paper figures. Japan is a highly indus-

trialized country, despite its shortage of industrial raw materials. During the early 1930's, when ever-deepening depression was throwing millions out of employment in the West, Japan's rapidly growing textile industries were taking a greater and greater share of the markets of Asia, taking them largely at the expense of Manchester. The Sino-Japanese war in 1937 came as a boon not only to American exporters of war materials, but to British exporters of textiles and other manufactures for Asiatic and African markets.

The "Big Three" of Japanese business are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo—the latter having a billion or so in warehousing, trust business, wires and cables, and some smaller items. The great firms of Yasuda and Okura, however, are not to be sneezed at—except by the Army. The ten-year "war baby," Aikawa, is also worth mentioning, if a corporation capitalized at 450,000,000 yen (\$140,000,000) is worthy of mention. But Aikawa's field is mainly Manchuria, is closely linked with the Army, and does more in the way of war profiteering, despite the Army's economic controls, than the older firms.

The great plutocratic corporations of Mitsui and Mitsubishi are not friendly to war. Their export and shipping enterprises were largely dependent upon the maintenance of peace and friendly relations everywhere. Japanese Big Business was the backbone and strength of the peace-promoting civilian governments of Japan from 1924 to 1927, and from 1929 to 1931. Their interest in continued peace was the interest of the mass of the civilian population as well. Their opposition to Army rule, to militarism, and to increased taxes was an opposition felt by most Japanese civilians, and was in their interest both economically and politically.

But this situation was a weakness as well as a strength. Japanese agree in referring to the period of these parliamentary governments as the "Golden Age of Constitutional Government in Japan." But Japanese also refer to them in economic terms at times. The designation "Mitsui Government" or "Mitsubishi Government" may endear them to their counterparts abroad, but it has little appeal for the vast, poverty-stricken, exploited masses of the Japanese people. To them the Army was a burden, but not the only burden. The plutocracies of Japan took as much from the people as did the Army—sometimes much more.

The manufacture of munitions for profit, and the promotion of armament and war at home and abroad in order to expand sales, has not been an outstanding enterprise in Japan. Generations ago, the Imperial Government established and ran its own arsenals and established its own Imperial steel plant, instead of paying tribute to private munitions manufacturers in Japan. The contrasts between the economic and political backgrounds of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States were dramatically apparent at the London Naval Conference of 1930. The preceding conference had been a failure—largely because of the intrigues of American armament manufacturers for greater "defense" requirements. But the exposé of Shearer's pernicious activities on behalf of his employers in collusion with some of our navalists, and the raising of the question in Congress, induced the American Government in 1929 to issue a hurried call for a new naval conference, which was held the next year.

American, British and Japanese navalists were, of course, all Big Navy men. But our own ambitious navalists were now embarrassed by the revelations of connections

with the least defensible form of Big Business. In Britain, the Labor Government had to deal with England's Big Business and Big Navy men, and wanted to check them individually and jointly. The Japanese parliamentary government represented Big Business, but was as much opposed to the ambitious navalists as was British labor. These things made possible an agreement. The 1930 Naval Conference was successful—so far as these three Powers were concerned (France and Italy were quite unable to agree with one another.)

The strong desire of Japan's civilian Government, backed by Japanese Big Business, to reach an understanding for naval limitation, despite the hostility of Japan's politically powerful Big Navy men, prevented the conference from being a complete fiasco and turned it into a hopeful success. The subsequent declaration of Mr. Wakatsuki, heading the Japanese delegation, sounds like a voice from another world:

"A great and unprecedented thing has been accomplished in that, for the first time in human history, all important fighting vessels have been placed under restriction. What was sown in Washington has been reaped in London. . . . The present Treaty will prove to be a historic and lasting monument on the path of peace and human progress."

So, indeed, it seemed, and so it might have been. The next necessary move was military limitation, and Japanese parliament, people, and Big Business looked eagerly forward to it. Arms limitation was the most widely and enthusiastically discussed political topic in Japan in the spring of 1931. To the Japanese it had far more signifi-

cance than to most Westerners. For to Japan it meant not only economy, but another direct blow at the political power of the Army—a matter of the greatest importance. Most Japanese believed that the principal Western Powers favored the following up of naval limitations with serious limitation of land forces.

The Army also took the matter seriously, from a completely contrary viewpoint. The Navy's autonomy had already been successfully challenged, and the Army was clearly next in order. The *Bushi* were bitterly determined to prevent this. The next important political break in China, the split between the majority Kuomintang and General Chiang Kai-shek in May, gave the Army its opportunity to play one Chinese group off against another. The *Bushi* started their preparations for a Chinese war which would rally Japanese patriomania to their side and divert popular hostility from themselves to the foreign enemy. But they made no overt act until the fall of the British Labor Government, and the return of their Tory friends to a dominating influence, assured them that Britain would make no very serious effort to stop them.

The first treacherous blows were struck in Manchuria without approval of the civilian government. Foreign Minister Shidehara vetoed the dispatch of troops from Korea to Manchuria, and was coolly ignored by War Minister Minami. Bitter criticism of the military continued in the Japanese press until it became clear that the Western Powers would make no move whatever to stop the *Bushi* in Manchuria. The Powers could have stopped the Japanese militarists in their tracks—and did not do so. It would have completely discredited the militarists in Japan, and have meant a fatal decline in their power.

Furthermore, it would have greatly encouraged the Chinese in their "rights recovery" movement against Japanese privileges in Manchuria. Had this been successful, it would inevitably have been turned against Western Powers as well. It was understandable that Secretary of State Stimson, in a note to Japan on November 5, 1931, assured the Japanese of our warm sympathy in their "attempt to secure respect" for their "treaty rights in Manchuria."

The real opposition to the militarists was in Japan itself; its most powerful center was Japanese Big Business, which still sought directly and through sane statesmen to reach an understanding with America and the League of Nations which would prevent the militarists from making Manchuria a separate preserve under their direct rule. The political assassinations in Japan in 1932 were specifically directed against these Big Business men and statesmen dealing with the American and League representatives; the United States-League Commission of Enquiry not only investigated, but secretly endeavored to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement between Japan and Western Powers. Japan's last commoner Premier, Inukai, was assassinated precisely because of this.

Big Business and civilian government was "out." The Army had established itself in Manchuria, where it was in direct political as well as military control. The puppet regime of Manchukuo was set up by the Army direct. The Kwantung Army (the Japanese Army in Manchuria) became the dominant force in Japan. It was not a separate army; it was simply the main base of the Japanese Army—a territory where it reigned supreme, hampered by no Parliament or Big Business. The Army would now accept no Japanese Premier except a military or naval man, or,

on occasion, a high-ranking aristocrat or bureaucrat acceptable to themselves. It was not, however, clan government, as in the days of Yamagata. The liberalization of Army regulations, and development of the merit system, had brought into positions of command a number of men who were of peasant stock, with an outlook contrasting markedly with that of the old clansmen.

The clansmen of the "Reconstruction" period had often had close relations with Big Business; many personal deals were made over the disposal of the Government-promoted industries of those years to private enterprise; almost all the "reconstruction" leaders made good-sized personal fortunes. But many of the new Army leaders came from bitterly impoverished villages which had felt keenly the contrast between their wretchedness and the fabulous wealth of the Mitsuis and Mitsubishiis. Hundreds of thousands of village families, by incessant toil, had made both ends meet by silk production. The House of Mitsui bought the silk, shipped it abroad, and made immense profits. The economic crash in the United States in 1929 knocked the bottom out of silk prices. Mitsui made less profits. The peasant had less food. It was not exactly the same—from the peasant's viewpoint.

Army officers might easily abandon the peasant's viewpoint, but the struggle over arms limitation strengthened their feeling of opposition to Big Business, which they saw as trying to starve the Army just as it was starving the peasantry. This feeling was strengthened by Communist and other Marxist influences in Japan during the 1920's, with their emphasis on *capitalist* exploitation and their contempt for "parliamentarianism" and "bourgeois democracy." With such things the peasant-turned-officer could sympathize, and often did. The internationalism of

Socialist theory was alien to him, but the idea of a dictatorial "Socialism in one country" was quite understandable. The adoption of this plan in Soviet Russia, Japan's next-door neighbor, in 1928 aroused increasing interest in Japan. At the same time, the Communist International in its "third period" gave specific instructions to all Communist Parties to end all compromises with democratic Socialists, to denounce the latter as Social Fascists, and to follow a clear-cut line of opposition to these and similar reformist and democratic elements.

A "State Socialist" Party was in fact started as early as 1918 by one Takabatake, a Marxist with whom I was acquainted in Tokyo. He pointed out with considerable logic that if Socialism could be achieved by dictatorship there was no point in wasting energy and lives trying to set up a new one. Japan was already ruled by a dictatorial oligarchy, and it was pointless to work for bourgeois democracy if this was an outmoded political and social form, as asserted by the Communists. Further, Takabatake declared that internationalism was spurious, particularly pointing to the American democracy as an example of the most extreme discrimination and prejudice against Asiatics as well as Negroes.

Takabatake's little group disappeared in time, but his ideas were taken up by men and groups with more popular phraseology and wider appeal. Few Americans are aware of the effect in Japan of the anti-Asiatic laws in California, of the Asiatic Exclusion Act in 1924, of the American Supreme Court's revoking of the citizenship granted by Act of Congress to Asiatics who had fought in the American Army during the first World War, and of the enormous interest charged by American (and British) banks on the loans required for urgent relief and reha-

bilitation of the stricken people of Tokyo and Yokohama after the great earthquake and fire in 1923. Every one of these moves came as a blow to democratic elements in Japan. Every one of them strengthened Japanese nationalism as well as racial consciousness. The men struggling for universal suffrage and parliamentary government were increasingly faced with the contemptuous jeer: "Ah, you like democracy—same as America!"

The Supreme Court's decision in fact coincided with the attitude of Japanese reactionaries. Our Supreme Court considered Japanese and other Asiatics "unfit" for democratic citizenship. Japanese Tories agreed with this completely, and bitterly resisted the efforts of Japanese commoners to gain democratic rights and genuine citizenship. The fact that Japanese served in the "war for democracy" a few years previously no more entitled him to democratic citizenship in Japan than it did in the United States. It was a curious meeting of minds. The Supreme Court's decision gave aid and comfort to all anti-democratic elements in Japan.

The memory of Japan's semi-colonial subjection to Western Powers, including the United States, was revived by these American moves, and by the "anti-Imperialist" agitation which was gaining strength in China at the time. The State of California by its land laws had excluded Japanese and other Asiatics from any economic status higher than laborers working for white men, thus creating a "permanent proletariat." The Supreme Court's decision barred this proletariat from citizenship rights. The Exclusion Act of 1924, like the Supreme Court's decision and the California laws, was directed against Japanese just as against the "oppressed peoples" of India, China, and other Asiatic colonies and semi-colonies.

These things made a notable contribution to social "theory" in Japan. In the pseudo-Marxist formulation, the United States appeared as the monopolist of the richest areas of the Western world, excluding Japanese and other Asiatics and reducing them to "proletarians," oppressing and exploiting them by denying them access to natural resources, and reducing those already there to slave status, while investing capital in the Far East to exploit Asiatic labor. The Marxist theory of class struggle between proletarian and capitalist had already been expanded by Lenin to cover conflicts between "Imperialist" and "oppressed" peoples. In Japan, it was worked into a conflict between capitalist and proletarian nations.

This theory was not confined to a few crackpots. It seemed to offer a formula for the situation in which the Japanese people found themselves. The concept of racial superiority was itself alien to the Japanese mind, the Japanese themselves being a comparatively recent racial mixture of various stocks, ranging from the white aborigines in the North to Negrito aborigines in the South of Japan. It was easy to regard America and Britain as capitalist Powers, in contrast to proletarian Japan, and with a bitter class struggle between the two. America and Britain were "haves." Japan was a "have-not."

Worship of the God-Emperor would seem to be a strange center for these pseudo-Marxist theories drawn from Western ideologies. In fact, it became a very real center. The Emperor is the focus of Japanese nationalism, and the Imperial religion of Emperor-worship is a powerful binding tie. Most of the earlier clansmen were quite cynical about the whole business. Not everyone can believe his own inventions. But strange things happen to men. The Emperor Meiji, who ruled from 1868 to 1912,

in his latter years began to believe in his own divinity. At the time of the anarchist plot against his life in 1910, he remarked to a statesman close to him, in perplexed seriousness: "But how can they kill me? Don't they know I am a god?" The statesman in question passed on the remark to a colleague with the sympathetic comment: "You know, the old fellow really thinks he *is* God!" *

Some of the clansmen had given the Emperor Meiji the devotion they would have given their old feudal lord, and a chivalrous Admiral and his wife followed him into death with loyal suicide. But some of the new Army officers went further than this. The peasants knew nothing of the recent background of the Imperial cult, which they had learned as children. And theirs was not the quiet skepticism of the educated man: many of them took the God-Emperor business quite literally and seriously. The growing nationalism of Japan, its developing race consciousness and its consciousness of a "proletarian nation" contributed to the importance of the Throne as the national center. On the other hand, the Imperial religion itself strengthened this national consciousness. It was not necessary for the *Bushi* of today to resurrect and recreate a tribal religion as Ludendorff and other Nazis did in Germany. Japan's "Restorationists" had done much the same thing a half-century previously. The new *Bushi* carried on their work. Their slogan was a "Showa Restoration."

The actual position of the Throne has altered somewhat. The change of recent years is best described by using the words of Yukio Ozaki, the "grand old man" of Japanese democracy, who was elected a member of every

* The Emperor Meiji, it happens, died the next year.

Parliament during its existence and was the most courageous and able critic of the oligarchy. Ozaki described the Throne as a bastion behind which the military clansmen took refuge, shooting at Parliament and the people from its security. "Their bullets," said Ozaki, "are Imperial decrees." The new *Bushi* used the Throne similarly, but there is a difference. First of all, they have virtually killed the Parliament "graciously granted" by the Emperor in 1889 and "liquidated" by the Army a half century later. Secondly, they do their own shooting—"direct action" instead of Imperial decrees. Thirdly, they are no longer centered mainly in Japan, but have their most powerful bases on the Asiatic continent.

In those vast areas dominated by the Japanese military forces, orders are issued in the name of the Imperial Japanese Army or the Imperial Japanese Navy. The *Bushi* make arrangements and treaties. Tokyo agrees. The *Bushi* demand more money for their activities abroad. Tokyo tightens the screws a little more, the people have less food, and the funds are supplied. In theory, the status of the Emperor has been raised. The long held constitutional theory that he was an organ of the State has been condemned by the *Bushi*, all books setting this forth have been burned, and it has been officially declared that the Emperor is himself the State. But this has raised the Emperor only in relation to the common people, and against the long held aim of democratic leaders in Parliament to make this representative body the real center of Government. The Emperor is wholly the creature of the militarists and their reactionary associates.

Furthermore, the *Bushi* now have other creatures, such as the Manchu Emperor Kang Teh (*nee* Henry Pu-Yi) with the titles and trappings of sovereignty. In relation to

the great and expanding power of the Japanese Army, on the continent of Asia and in Japan itself, the status of the Emperor at Tokyo has become lower, not higher. He is the State, but the Army rules through and for him, and sometimes ignores him. His promotion from "Organ of the State" to "State" has been a vast serio-comedy worthy of Gilbert and Sullivan. He has been kicked upstairs.

The Japanese Government now controls economic life. The great corporations still exist, but Government control has extended over supplies and output, electric power and prices, organization and distribution, capital and profits and interest. Big Business is working for the Government, and the major portion of its profits is taken by the Army. The Army, indeed, takes most of Japan's national income today—far more than Big Business ever did. The Imperial Government has become far the Biggest Business Japan has ever known. It exploits the common people of Japan, workers, farmers, small producers and others, at every step, with direct economic exploitation, thoroughgoing taxation, and every other known device. It is the most bitter exploitation the Japanese people have known since the feudal period ended.

Some term it "State Socialism." But it is certainly not public ownership, for the public has no control. Parliament, the outstanding representative of the public, has been almost liquidated. The State is not a public organization, but a private one. Nominally, it belongs to the Emperor. Actually, it is a vast private corporation in which the Army exercises dominant control. It does not even make the official pretense of representing the people. In adhering to the Kellogg Pact, with the phrase "in the name of their respective peoples," the Imperial Govern-

ment made a specific disclaimer on this: It adhered in the name of the Emperor, not in the name of the Japanese people.

And so with the control of economic life, the suppression of all democratic rights and civil liberties, and the extension of Japanese rule abroad. The Japanese oligarchy, through its dictatorial economic control, exploits the common people in the name of the Emperor, which means for the Japanese Army. From the blood, sweat, and tears of the workers and peasants and soldiers of Japan the *Bushi* are building a vast continental and maritime empire where they expect to rule and exploit the commoners even as they rule and exploit those of Japan today. It is for this that the people of Japan are starving.

Chapter 9.

OUR JAPANESE ENEMIES

JAPANESE MILITARISM must be destroyed. This is a task of the war. And this is a task of the peace. The evil power of military dictatorship and absolutist tyranny must be broken once and for all. The future not only of eastern Asia, but of all Asia depends upon it. And the future of Asia means ultimately our own future.

Asia and the southwest Pacific contain 1,300,000,000 inhabitants—ten times our own numbers, and an actual majority of the human race. Any single Power that dominates these vast areas will stand directly in line for domination of the world.

The destruction of Japanese militarism is not merely a military problem. It is a political problem of the first magnitude. It means a complete reversal of our entire historic policy toward Japan and toward China as well. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war did not mean a break in our *fundamental* policy in the Far East. We are at war with Japan—but we have not gotten around to a war against Japanese militarism, and the serious realization that this must be ended wholly and completely. The American planes which bombed Tokyo

last year avoided the Imperial Palace—the “sacred” precincts of the God-Emperor, who in his figurehead self constitutes the Japanese State with which we are at war, and is the focus and center of Japanese military absolutism.

What do we want of Japan? Let us ask ourselves this, sanely and seriously. Do we want Japan to be isolationist, to leave her neighbors alone and not meddle in their affairs? This is an excellent idea in many ways. It was Japan's policy for two hundred and fifty years. We forcibly tore her out of seclusion, forcibly intervened to aid a new Imperial regime which would serve our interests, maintain the “Open Door,” and protect our investments. Does our Government hope to return to this halcyon period when Japan was a joint colony of the Western Powers? Are we going to start this business all over again? How long would it be before one of the United Nations made a deal with the Japanese against China or Russia—as the British did half a century ago?

Do we want Japan to withdraw her troops altogether from territories outside of Japan, and pursue a policy of peace and friendship with her neighbors? It is a swell idea. There can be no peace in Asia until Japan and other countries adopt this policy. But Japan actually followed this policy for more than a thousand years. In fifteen centuries of history, down to the latter part of the nineteenth century, there was only one Japanese war of aggression against China—the invasion of Korea toward the close of the sixteenth century. It is an undisputable historic fact that no two neighboring Powers of the Western world ever maintained peaceful relations for any comparable period of time. There is not a century of European history since the fall of the Roman Empire which

has not been drenched with much blood again and again.

These are facts. Assertions that Japan and China are "natural enemies" are propagandist fictions. Repeated wars—declared and undeclared—between Japan and her continental neighbors belong to the modern period only. They were made possible by specifically modern developments.

First of these, in point of time, was the expansion of Western Empires in Asia, and the desire to reduce China, the one powerful Asiatic Empire which maintained itself a century ago, to complete subjection to our Empires. A serious obstacle to this was the friendly relationship between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. The American Government demanded formal assurances from Japan that it was not concluding an alliance with China in 1871. Such an alliance would permanently have blocked Western expansion in the Far East. In fact, such co-operation as did eventuate did block this expansion for a quarter of a century.

Then came the armaments firms, which in the 1880's and early 1890's successfully "sold" both China and Japan on the idea of modern navies and national glory. Without a modern navy, large-scale, Japanese aggression against China was physically impossible. Western armaments firms and Western naval advisers equipped and built up both the Japanese and Chinese navies for war against one another, from which Western munitions manufacturers profited handsomely.

Then came new rivalries of Western Powers, with the extension of Russian railway connections to the Far East. The British Government, seeking an ally against Russia and failing in China, agreed to "free" Japan from extra-territoriality on the basis of Japanese cooperation with

Britain in and against China. When the demonstration of China's weakness opened the way for new Western aggressions and the beginning of partition of China, and the Chinese "Boxers" arose in a fierce revolt against the Powers, the British and American Governments *begged* the Japanese to send troops into China to establish the joint domination of the Powers at Peking. The subsequent Anglo-Japanese Alliance was specifically a British alliance with Japanese militarists—continuing for twenty years.

Japanese militarism was built up and promoted by Western Powers as an ally against China—or against other Powers. In periods of isolation, the civilian "peace" Governments of Kato, Wakatsuki, and Hamaguchi came into office and almost into power. But Western friends of the Japanese militarists still permitted them a "free hand" against China. In 1932 the *Bushi* refused to serve joint interests in China, and established their direct rule in Manchukuo. But even this was not a serious issue from the Western viewpoint—until at the end of 1934 the Japanese established their oil monopoly in Manchuria, slamming the "Open Door" on the fingers of Standard Oil. Even after that, and even after the Japanese launched their new war of aggression against China, the Western Powers and particularly the United States continued to supply the Japanese with all the materials for war against the Chinese people. This continued until the Japanese in the summer of 1941 moved southward into French Indo-China—into the preserves of Western Powers. Then—and not until then—did we stop war materials to Japan.

We did not go to war with Japan over her aggressions in China; we actively supported Japanese militarism in most of these aggressions. It was the southward drive

which opened the new era. Japanese militarists had the choice between submission to our demands and striking out at their old patrons. And they chose the latter course—as everyone familiar with Japan knew they would.

If we are to destroy Japanese militarism—as we must, if there is to be freedom in Asia—we must abandon imperial ambitions in Asia. Japanese militarism was for half a century an ally of Western Powers against the Chinese. If we are determined to destroy Japanese militarism, we can do it. But it means that the people now suffering under the iron heel of the *Bushi* will be *free*—the Koreans and Chinese and other subject peoples, including the Japanese themselves. Western Imperialism *needs* Japanese militarism as its ally in and against China—if Imperialism and investments there are to be secure. It is out of the question for American troops to be sent to China every time some Chinese nationalist, war lord, or democratic group interferes with our “rights,” or seems to be getting too strong.

This problem is already being solved—but in a way which our Imperialists cannot yet believe or accept. The Japanese, faced with continued Chinese resistance in one form or another, at last agreed to abandon their extraterritorial rights and concessions in China—in exchange for a declaration of war by the Nanking “puppet” regime against the United States and Great Britain. With this declaration of war, the Nanking regime disposed of our extraterritorial privileges, just as was done with German privileges when Peking agreed to join the Allies in war against Germany in 1917. American and British properties are being taken over as enemy property. Faced with this *de facto* situation in Shanghai and other main centers of trade and investment, we finally agreed to relinquish

most of our special privileges—by treaty with the Chungking regime which we recognize as the Government of China.

We shall not recover our privileges. The ousting of the present Fascist regime at Nanking by other Chinese forces—whether those of General Chiang or some other leader—would not mean that these Chinese would give us back our investments and our privileges. If they can expel the Japanese and their Nanking “collaborators,” they can keep us out as well. And we need not hope that the Japanese militarists will be beaten into renewed cooperation with us against the Chinese. Those days are over.

If our Imperialists hope to recover any element of domination of the China coast, they will have to look elsewhere than Japan for their cannon-fodder. The days are past when Secretary of State Stimson could write—as he wrote about the Shanghai war of 1932: “The Japanese were anxious to withdraw their troops and get free of an embarrassing situation. Several of the governments with large commercial interests in Shanghai were pressing vigorously to have this accomplished as soon as possible. . . . It seemed to me now, however, that these details could wait.”

The Japanese will no longer land or maintain or withdraw troops from China at the behest of the American Government. That was demonstrated clearly and for all time on December 7, 1941. Rather than work for us again, they will make almost any kind of deal with the Chinese—or the Russians.

There is no *racial* conflict between Japanese and Chinese. An amazing amount of nonsense has been written about the superiority complex of the Japanese. Some of

the statements are true regarding some Japanese, at some times. But even such truths ignore completely the lack of any traditional racialism.

Conceptions of racial superiority—in Germany, in the United States, in India, in Japan—are one of the most vicious and dangerous beliefs with which we have to deal today. If we are ever to have a peaceful world, such conceptions must be rooted out everywhere. Anyone who does not know how widespread the concept of white superiority is in the United States, and how deeply this concept enters not only into our social relations but into our politics and foreign relations, hasn't had much experience. Some of the most violent attacks upon Japan's truly vicious nationalism and "racialism" have been made by men who resented it mainly because it was *Japanese*. It is very easy to see the absurdities of someone else's pretensions of superiority.

The Japanese are racially the most hybrid people on earth. The aborigines of Japan were largely Negrito and largely White—the hairy Ainu; several thousand "pure" Ainu still carry on their simple primitive life on reservations in the North. Invasions of Koreans and Formosans and Malayans and Indonesians and Chinese and others conquered and mingled with the natives. The hybrid Japanese emerged. They never at any time stratified along racial lines. Some Japanese are outwardly almost pure Ainu. Some are predominantly Negrito. The present Emperor is distinctly Negroid in appearance; traveling incognito, he would have considerable difficulty in getting a drink in some Southern States.

The Japanese got their civilization direct from the Chinese. Thousands of Chinese immigrated to Japan, working as officials and clerks for illiterate tribal chiefs,

or teaching Chinese to their children. Tens of thousands of Koreans came in also—largely as craftsmen. These foreigners were welcomed. In time, they were assimilated. Chinese officials made comfortable fortunes; those were the days before cash registers. Chinese became “Japanese”; there was no bar. From the most powerful of these “official” clans of *Chinese* origin is descended the Japanese Emperor. The Imperial regime was purely an importation from China, based wholly upon the Chinese model, established in the year 645 A. D.

Never in any century down to the present did Japanese have any conception of being “superiors.” For fifteen centuries they looked up to the Chinese as their teachers. During most of the past century they have looked more to the West. It was from Westerners, and in Western countries, that they discovered the doctrine of racial superiority. Some of this they learned from the conduct of some white men in Japan, but the worst forms of this passed with the passing of extraterritoriality and associated privileges. It was the California land laws, and the Asiatic Exclusion Act, which for the first time brought it home to the Japanese that the civilized Western peoples whom they had chosen as their models thought in terms of racial and color superiority. Even those Japanese, Chinese and other Asiatics who had emigrated to the United States, and adopted most fully American ways and American culture, were treated as “inferior” here because of their skin-color and eye-form. And not only they, but even their American-born descendants, generation after generation, were subject to similar discrimination.

Cultured Chinese felt this as keenly as Japanese. The first and worst discrimination, indeed, was against Chinese. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese Revolution,

pointed out that in some respects (such as the hairiness of Westerners) the Whites actually represented a somewhat lower human type than the yellow peoples. Other men carried this further. By the 1930's, some Japanese and other Asiatics were evolving absurd theories of racial superiority which matched our own. Those who have gotten beyond such things can realize their basic falsity, in any "race" or people. But an American who thinks himself a member of a completely superior White race feels baffled fury when he finds an Asiatic who thinks *he* is superior.

The Japanese propaganda slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" reveals how deeply our racial concepts have affected the Japanese. "Asia" is a European word. The Chinese and Japanese have absolutely no equivalent for it, and have taken it over bodily. Never at any previous time did they have any conception of the Asiatic continent as a geographical or racial unit, or of the many and varied peoples of that vast area as a distinct group. It was our American legislation against Asiatics, grouping the scores of peoples of eastern and central and southern Asia and the southwest Pacific, with their many races and religions and cultures, into one category, "inferiors" fit neither for immigration nor naturalization, which first made them think of themselves as "Asiatics."

Let us concentrate on the real Japanese enemy—militarism. A generation ago we were singing hymns of praise to the modern, "progressive" Japanese for having become a modern military Power with our assistance and support. We have been proud of this. Such sane and intelligent men as ex-Ambassador Grew even today write about it as if we were doing a favor to the Japanese people in building up Japan as a military Power. Even today,

some men in high places can see no further than the building up of new military Powers in the Far East. Some hope to do this with China.

Great Powers are not built up for purposes of peace. They do not achieve greatness by the ways of peace. Modern battleships are not built in order to provide opportunities for young men to join the Navy and see the world. They are built up for purposes of war. Men who promote such progress are not seeking peace. They are seeking war; they believe in war; most of them believe that war is "inherent in human nature." Such men have no basic quarrel with Japanese militarism; they object to it only because it is now directed against us.

What shall we do—those of us who truly want peace? How shall we proceed in Japan? With whom can we deal? What shall we do if we want Japan not as an ally or agent for war, but as an ally and agent for peace? What shall we do if we want the Japanese people as friends in an organized world made safe for democracy and for the rights of man? What shall we do if we want them as allies in a war for freedom from want, freedom from fear—a war against war itself?

If we want this, we must realize that our entire period of building up Japanese militarism and Imperialism was an evil thing. We must look back upon our long cooperation with Japanese militarism and Imperialism in and against China and other neighbors as a shameful thing. We must give our sympathy and our support to those elements in Japan which suffer from and oppose this vicious militarism. Such elements twice showed signs of achieving real power in Japan—in 1893, and again from 1929 to 1931. We betrayed them on each occasion by giving the *Bushi* a free hand.

The democratic opposition in Japan has now been silenced—murdered, jailed, driven underground, or passive through fear. We cannot put them into office simply by saying: "We will deal only with them." But we can encourage them by declaring our peace terms, by making it clear and specific that we are determined to end Japanese militarism, and that we appreciate and will co-operate with the common people of Japan in their desire to earn a decent living by legitimate labor and trade and legitimate investment at home and abroad. The alternative to militarism is peaceful economy and international relations.

When we make the Japanese common people the object of propaganda of hatred, we play into the hands of the Japanese militarists. Every savage diatribe by race-conscious Americans against the Japanese *people* is picked up and broadcasted throughout Japan—evidence that we aim at the destruction of the people, and that their only alternative is to fight to the finish. They may do it. If they believe that the only alternative is a dictatorship of White Men in Japan, with the Japanese reduced to the status of colonial helots, they will fight indefinitely.

When the time comes for peace—as it must some time—we must make our peace with three groups. We must have the signature of the Army leaders—if we permit the Army to survive. We must have the seal of the Emperor—nominally the Japanese State itself. And we must have the signature of a civilian Premier responsible to the Japanese Parliament, re-established on the basis of the Electoral Law of 1925, which is the only body which any democratic government can possibly recognize as the voice of the Japanese citizen. The Japanese Imperial Government, by its own official statement, is not at all

qualified to speak in the name of the Japanese people.

We must not make the calamitous mistake we made in Germany in 1919. We must not make a parliamentary government the collector of tribute and indemnities for us. This would damn parliamentary government in Japan as completely as it did in Germany; it would appear as the agent of foreign Powers in the exploitation of their own country. If we are going to demand indemnities, we must make the Army responsible for them. If the Army quits, we have no demands on the people for the Army's crimes. We need them as neighbors in an organized world of peace and freedom.

For more than a generation, Japanese democratic elements in Japan have hoped for a military setback, or a severe diplomatic setback, which would utterly discredit the military oligarchy. During the 1920's there were sufficient setbacks to give the civilian elements hope, and parliamentary government seemed to be gaining power. But when the militarists drove into Manchuria, we let them go ahead. And civilian government was ended. There was still hope, despite the ever-expanding power of the Army over Japanese life. But then came the war with China.

Few Americans realize exactly what the war with China meant to the Japanese people. It was a war of aggression on the part of Japan, but it was against a country many times the size of Japan. Responsible Japanese had repeatedly said and written that Japan could never conquer China, and most informed Japanese believed this to be true. They were critical of the first Japanese aggressions in North China, but when this expanded into a nationwide war, and Government and press and radio informed them that this "expansion" had been done by the Chinese

and that the Chinese were financed and advised by Western Powers, the conflict took on a different aspect. It soon ceased to be an "incident," and became a deadly war in which Japan faced actual defeat.

Defeat by China alone would not have been so serious. It would, indeed, have been an excellent thing in the eyes of many Japanese. But the backing given by Western Powers to the Chinese—a matter continually and repeatedly harped upon by the Japanese press—was an issue of deadly gravity. It is a fact that the Chinese armies were at first served by German advisers, and later by Russians. And in 1939, when Hitler made his deal with Stalin, the Japanese realized the full peril of the situation. They were isolated, involved in a war of which no man could see the end, and the air fleets and armies of Soviet Russia might at any time swoop down upon them.

Few Americans realize the mortal fear in which Japan held Russia at that time. In the conflict at Changkufeng on the Russian-Korean border in 1938 the Japanese had been given a sample of Russian military and air power, and had accepted Russian demands. China could not really attack Japan itself, but the Russians could. Tokyo was within easy flying distance of the Russian Maritime Province. And the Soviet air fleet was far superior to the Japanese in every respect. Tokyo and Osaka and other Japanese cities could have been bombed repeatedly, without possibility of effective reply. Russia's great cities and industrial cities are far inland—far beyond the reach of Japanese planes even if these planes had been able to compete with the Russians, which they were not.

This was a prospect which no Japanese excepting the Communists and their fellow-travelers could possibly welcome. The Japanese authorities had done their utmost to

crush and suppress the Communists, but there was still an underground movement. And the vicious brutality of the police created as many Communists as it destroyed. (Some Japanese members of parliament were disciplined for saying this.) A Russian attack on Japan would have been made in concert with Moscow's small but determined "fifth column" there—with Japan's cities and industrial centers and their tinder-box houses going up in smoke and flame.

To Communists and fellow-travelers in every country it may have seemed a glorious prospect. But the Japanese democratic elements, bitterly as they hated the *Bushi* and their oppressions and atrocities, could no more welcome Moscow's bombing planes and native fifth columnists than could the people of Finland at the end of 1939.

When the Japanese Government in December, 1941, attacked and declared war on us, there was a mood of utter desperation among the Japanese people. They were now at war not only with China, but with the United States and Great Britain. They knew the tremendous potential power of America, and feared it.

If our enemy is Japanese militarism, we must fight it hard. If our enemy is the despotic Japanese State, we must fight it. And it must be no phony war, to be followed by new Imperialist deals. We must smash and discredit Japanese militarism so that it will not be able to raise its head again.

When we restrict and end the power of the Japanese Army for aggression and expansion, and give every country and every people security within its own borders, we shall have achieved our major task. For the *Bushi* of Japan—the enemies of the common people of Japan and every other country within their reach—will have lost the

very basis of their power. We do not have to tell the Japanese people about the crushing burdens of militarism. They know it far better than we have ever known it. We do not have to tell the Japanese people about the crimes of the *Bushi*. They know these crimes themselves; they have suffered from them in the army and the jails and the starving villages. We do have to tell them—and convince them—that we are determined to destroy this evil power and all that it means, and to establish an order of things which will permit the Japanese like every other Asiatic people to live and work in freedom and security, without fear of *Bushi* or White or Communist domination.

We may tell them, indeed, that we are devoted to the same tasks as was the last civilian Government of Japan—twelve years ago. We need not mix Big Business in it. Government economic controls have probably come to stay, in Japan as elsewhere. But these economic controls should aim at production for use, not production for war. They should be for the purposes of the people, not for the purposes of the Army. They should be controlled by the people's representatives, not by the militarists and their puppet Emperor. This is for Japan's own re-established parliament to handle.

Some Americans will ask: "Are not the Japanese people guilty of supporting the militarists?" They are, indeed, guilty. But it was we ourselves who built up the power of these militarists—kept on building it right up to that fatal year of 1941. We did it consistently and deliberately. We continued it for more than half a century. It was American fuel oil which took Japan's bombing planes to Pearl Harbor.

Chapter 10.

KOREA, A PEOPLE BETRAYED

CHO-SEN, "Land of Morning Calm," is the old Chinese and the Japanese name for Korea.* For centuries it was a most fitting name. A land of rare beauty of mountain, valley, and sea, its simple, industrious people lived for centuries insulated from the wars and conflicts of the outside world. Korea was a "hermit kingdom," even more completely isolated than was Japan, save for Korea's position as a self-governing Dominion of the Manchu Empire.

This mountainous peninsula, jutting out southeastward from the Asiatic mainland toward the islands of Japan, covers some 85,000 square miles—somewhat less than the area of Yugoslavia, or England and Scotland combined. It is about the size of Honshu, the principal Japanese island, which covers three-fifths of Japan proper. The Korean population—the "Chosen people," as they have been somewhat ambiguously termed—number some 25,000,000, several millions more than the number of Poles in Europe. For the past thirty-five years Korea has

* The modern Chinese pronunciation is "Ch'ao-Hsien." The word "Korea" is an adaptation from the name of the conquering tribes—Kaori or Kaoli—who from their old center in Manchuria invaded and conquered Korea many centuries ago, adopting in time the native language. Many Korean nationalists resent the name "Chosen" because it is now used by their Japanese masters.

been under direct Japanese rule—following several years of precarious independence resting upon promises from various Powers, including the United States. Like Poland, its fate in modern times has been encirclement by Powers more populous and powerful than Korea could ever be.

Down to 1894, Korea remained a dominion of the great empire of the Manchus. The Manchus were the last rulers of "T'ien Hsia" (All Under Heaven), the "Universal Empire." We usually term this the "Chinese Empire," but this is not a Chinese expression. The title of the Supreme Sovereign, Son of Heaven, implied universal dominion. For two thousand years this was not mere vainglory. The "Universal Empire" of the East during most of that period comprised the most populous, wealthy, and civilized peoples of the world. During the many centuries of the Dark Ages in Europe, the "Universal Empire" of the Tang Dynasty was the greatest political unit and the highest civilization anywhere in the world. Under the Mongols, the "Universal Empire" stretched far into Europe, as well as into southwestern Asia. From the Dnieper and the Black Sea eastward across Asia to the Sea of Japan, and from the Arctic southward to the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf, there was one "Universal Empire," acknowledging a common rule over an actual majority of the population of the world—with the populous and wealthy civilization of China as its great center.

Most easterly of the dominions of the vast empire was Korea. Attacks were launched upon Japan by sea, but failed on both occasions. Japan, like central and western Europe, always remained outside the vast Empire. Japanese rulers at times gave nominal vassalage to the Supreme Sovereign in China. The original title of the Japanese Emperor, fifteen centuries ago, seems to have

been "Governor-General" on behalf of the Chinese "Son of Heaven." Some five centuries ago, during the Ming Dynasty which succeeded the Mongols, the military ruler of Japan—the Ashikaga Generalissimo—tendered vassalage to the Ming Emperor and received investiture as sovereign of Japan. But these things never involved any actual rule from the continent. Japan remained independent. Korea was the most easterly extension of the Empire.

Korea, like Japan, is a country of great beauty—green-clad mountains and clear mountain streams, with cultivation in the valleys and on the few level stretches which may be called plains. In Korea, this beautiful background is a setting for intense exploitation of a peasant population (more predominantly peasant than in Japan). Outside of agricultural land and water-power, the natural resources are not great. The peasants live at an even lower economic level than that of their Japanese fellow-subjects.

There are certain relationships between the Korean and Japanese peoples which go far back beyond the recent period of Japanese domination. The Korean language is definitely related to the Japanese—a somewhat doubtful honor shared only by the Luchu islanders to the south of Japan (between Japan and Formosa). Korean "types" are quite common in Japan—are, in fact, one of the two principal Japanese physical types, so that there are many Japanese and Koreans who are physically indistinguishable from one another. Koreans were among the early invaders of Japan, some two thousand years ago. Korean artisans and craftsmen emigrated to the Japanese islands in considerable numbers during the early centuries of the Christian era. It was from Korean priests that the Japanese first learned of the Indian religion of Buddhism—which in time became almost universal in Japan. Koreans

were the seniors of the Japanese in civilization—largely acquired from China—and for centuries were (like the Chinese) their teachers.

The observant Western visitor to Korea, if he gets in (the Japanese police are far more cautious about permitting Westerners to enter Korea than to enter Japan itself), will note marked differences as well as certain similarities. The native Korean dress, with the loose trousers and long loose jacket of the men, is wholly different from the Japanese kimono. If one is interested in history, he will discover that the "Korean" dress is that of the Ming period in China, four centuries ago; the "Japanese" kimono came from China during the T'ang dynasty, more than a thousand years ago. There are more tall Koreans than Japanese, so that the average height is greater; the bronze skin is characteristic; there are many of the broad-faced Mongol types—and some strikingly Western types, including many fair-skinned women of a distinctly European type of beauty.

Korea is a province of the Japanese Army. For many years, no governor of Korea could be appointed except an Army appointee—though for a time the Army had to compromise with the Navy on this. It was the Army which occupied Korea in 1904, with a friendly agreement that this was only a "military expediency" in the war against Russia. The Army remained. Bordering Korea is Chinese Manchuria to the west, the Russian Maritime Province to the north. Korea needed "defense." On this pretext, the Japanese Army was able after some years of pressure to get new divisions for Korean duty—and, in time, more and more divisions. The Japanese Army in Korea was the main base of Japanese power in Manchuria; again and again it invaded Manchurian territory to hunt down

Korean "rebels"; from Korea in 1931 the divisions were sent to "mop up" in Manchuria—despite the protests and "veto" of Foreign Minister Shidehara.

Korea was also of importance in eking out Japan's food supply. The Japanese Government in Korea built dams and carried out irrigation works which brought considerable areas of virgin land under cultivation—cultivation of rice, for export to Japan. The Russo-Japanese War, when Japan's food supplies ran short, was a bitter lesson to the militarists, who were determined this should not happen in another war. So the means of food-production were expanded in Korea, and population growth encouraged there as in Japan itself. The Japanese were to be both food-producers and cannon-fodder. The Koreans were to be mere food-producers; they were not taken into the Japanese Army—except for a few who have been taken in during the present war.

The Koreans already lived at a lower standard than the Japanese. Most Japanese regularly ate rice. Only a minority of Koreans could afford this, most of the peasants subsisting mainly on such cheap and inferior grains as millet and kaoliang. During the 1920's, Korean rice production reached the stage when it brought "over-abundance" into the Japanese market—abundance of rice produced cheaper than Japanese peasants with their somewhat higher standards could grow it. The price declined; Japanese peasants were brought into direct competition with Koreans. For the Army, it was a notable success. For the Japanese peasants, it was an economic disaster; their living standards have declined almost to the level of the Korean.

Japanese investors—with or without Government partnership—also did well in Korea. There was little real

colonization; farmers do not voluntarily emigrate to countries where they must compete directly with people on a lower standard. But Japanese "land developers" made out well, Japanese moneylenders made profits similar to those of their Korean counterparts, and Japanese industrialists established cotton mills and other enterprises where they employed Koreans at wages about two-thirds the average for Japanese. There was Korean emigration to Japan, and many Koreans worked as fishermen, as casual laborers, or in other occupations—in competition with Japanese. The Japanese people gained nothing from the Korean occupation; they lost. To the burdens of economic competition were added the burdens of increased taxes to maintain Japanese military forces in Korea. The conquered country did not pay for the Japanese Army of occupation; Japanese taxpayers paid. Korean taxes, heavy as they were, did not cover the expenses of the Government of Korea and its "projects." Year after year, remittances had to be made to Korea from the Japanese budget.

The Korean people were subjected to an iron rule far different from the loose despotism they had known under their own rulers. Japanese dominated not only political but economic life; Korean firms had to accept Japanese "partners." There was security, of a sort: the security of regimented despotism. Beneath it the common people toiled and hungered and suffered. Export trade was promoted by the Japanese, new occupations were developed, but most of the profits were taken by the Japanese Government or Japanese companies—and the balance taken up by the population increase fostered by the Japanese rulers. There was much more of modern medicine and hospitals—which saved lives but meant greater population pressure. There was far more widespread public education

—but the Japanese promoted their own language, and worked persistently to restrict the Korean language and the sense of Korean nationality and national culture. Further, these schools were much less universal than in Japan. Virtually every Japanese child, for the past generation, has received at least an elementary education, enough to enable him or her to read a newspaper, as well as military orders. In Korea, even today a majority of the population is illiterate, though the proportion is declining.

One of the worst crimes against the common people of Korea has been the greatly increased traffic in women and girls. This was not wholly new, in Korea itself. But Japanese exporters working with Korean producers made it a big business. Korean peasants, ground down by the burden of taxes, usury, or land-rent (to Japanese or Korean landlords), were often compelled to sell a daughter for a five-year period—most of the proceeds usually going to the tax-gatherer, usurer, or landlord. Tens of thousands of girls were shipped overseas, to brothels all along the China coast and southward into the colonies of Western powers. This evil traffic, it should be added, was carried on with Japanese as well as Korean "commodities." Japanese like Korean peasants were often forced to do the same thing, for the same reasons. With the worsening of economic conditions in Japan during the 1920's and 1930's, the export increased. But Korean girls were cheaper, and their greater ignorance made them more helpless in the hands of their exploiters.

So certain Koreans had economic opportunities of a sort. Besides the female slave traffic, there was the traffic in narcotics, a lucrative business, especially in China, where Korean dope-dealers cooperated with Japanese of

the same category, or worked as salesmen or leg-men for them. But even among these debased men, many Koreans still disliked and detested Japanese rule. Korea was not Japan. The Japanese rulers were alien. And though there has been some "assimilation," and acceptance of their fate, most Koreans even today dislike Japanese rule and desire to govern themselves.

Many Koreans have cooperated with Japanese revolutionists against the military-Imperial despotism. Some have been executed for attempting to assassinate the Emperor. One of these, Boku Retsu, was convicted jointly with his Japanese wife; their sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. A Korean assassinated Prince Ito—long Governor-General of Korea—at Harbin many years ago. It was a Korean who threw the bomb that destroyed Admiral Nomura's eye—and killed a couple of his colleagues—at Shanghai in 1932, when this doughty friend of American Imperialism was fighting the Imperialist Powers' war against Tsai Ting-kai and the 19th Route Army.

Less spectacular has been the work of Koreans who have worked quietly and legally for a greater share in Government under Japanese domination, hoping to achieve by progressive pressure something akin to Korean self-government. With this aim, many progressive Japanese are fully in sympathy. The civilian Government of Japan, thirteen years ago, in fact prepared a bill for ultimate Korean Home Rule, starting with the granting of suffrage to increasing numbers of Koreans, election of local officials, and expanding this to the stage of a representative assembly and self-government for the Korean people. But the Japanese Army and their reactionary friends were bitterly opposed to this. Since they violently

terminated civilian cabinets by their assassination of the last "commoner" Premier, Inukai, in 1932, there has been no more talk of it. The Army is not in business to preside over the liquidation of the Japanese Empire.

In Korea, as in Japan, the wretchedness of the villages has been alleviated to some extent by the formation of cooperative societies. Japanese cooperators gave excellent service in this work, and there is now a wide network of mutual credit associations in Korea, relieving millions of Korean peasants from the grip of the usurer. But in Korea, as in Japan, this cannot release the peasants from the grip of the tax-gatherer and the landlord. This is another task—a far more serious one. . . .

There is a remarkable degree of Christian influence in Korea. Christian missionaries there—largely American—for the most part sympathized with the Korean people against their Japanese rulers. Korean nationalists derived many ideas from these Western sources. Further, Christianity offered a counter-appeal against the Imperial faith of the Japanese Emperor-worshippers. For many years, American missionaries had special consideration in Korea, and were somewhat safer than their Korean converts. During the terrible butcheries carried out by the Japanese Army following nationalist demonstrations in Korea in 1919—where the Army killed more people than it had killed in Japan itself during the uprising of 1918—some Koreans took refuge in Christian churches. More than one church was burned by the Japanese, together with its helpless Korean inhabitants.

But the official role of the American Government, in regard to Korea, is one in which it is difficult to take pride. Down to sixty years ago, no Western nation possessed treaty relations with Korea. For centuries it had

been a "Hermit Kingdom," isolated from the outside world as completely as Japan except for its links with the Great Empire—then dominated by the Manchus at Peking. Korea was not a province but a Dominion of the Empire. The Korean king ruled as a vassal of Peking, accepting investiture from the Emperor and sending gifts as tribute, but there was no Imperial official in Korea itself. Ordinary Chinese were as ruthlessly excluded from Korea—being killed if found in the mountainous forests on the Korean side—as any other foreigners. Both the Imperial and Korean Governments were desirous of maintaining this Dominion status.

It was clear, however, that Korea could not indefinitely remain isolationist. The Chinese statesman Li Hung-chang, feeling that far-off America was the least dangerous of the Powers, facilitated the signing of a treaty between Korea and the United States sixty years ago. But the American Government, from the very beginning, ignored Korea's status as a Dominion, insisted on treating with it as an independent State, and encouraged the Korean Government to establish close relations with "outside" Powers—ignoring the protests of the Imperial Government at Peking. This policy was the opening wedge for Japan in Korea, which similarly encouraged Korean "independence." In 1884, Japanese militarists and secret agents plotted their first successful coup in Seoul, capital of Korea, seizing the Korean sovereign and issuing orders in his name *a la Japonais*. Chinese forces crushed the plotters and liberated the king; Tokyo disavowed responsibility for the coup.

For the next ten years, the American Government actively encouraged Korean "independence"—from the Manchu Empire. The British moved ships to a Korean

island near the coast, and kept them there until Peking withdrew its forces from Seoul and agreed to permit the Japanese (like the Chinese) to dispatch troops to Korea in case of emergency. This privilege gave the Japanese their starting-point in 1894, when they launched—with the agreement of the British and American Governments—their treacherous war against China, heart of the Manchu Empire. The Japanese supplied arms to a fifth column of theirs in a rebellion in southern Korea, creating the necessary "emergency." Japanese troops were dispatched to Korea, and their numbers steadily increased despite Chinese protests; Japanese diplomats vigorously engaged in "friendly proposals" to Peking.

On July 16, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. The following day, a military and naval conference in the presence of the Emperor at Tokyo decided upon final details of operations. On July 23, Japanese military forces seized the Korean royal palace—much as they had seized the Japanese royal palace at Kyoto 27 years previously—and proclaimed the king's 80-year-old father as "Regent." The British and American Governments, which eight years previously had actively intervened to prevent the Peking Government from doing precisely the same thing, did not now interfere. The puppet Regent—now senile—signed a "declaration of war" against Peking, and "called upon" the Japanese to expel the Chinese. The Japanese promptly responded to this call from a foreign "sovereign," launching treacherous attacks upon the Chinese forces in Korea—already much outnumbered. A few days later, they declared war.

In a few months, it was clear that the well-equipped, well-disciplined Japanese forces were decisively superior to the Chinese armies. On November 22, the American

Government showed its warm sympathy by following the British lead with a revised treaty recognizing the Japanese as virtually "equals" of Western Imperialists—though the treaty was held up for a time by heated discussion in the Senate of the wholesale massacre of surrendered Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur; some Senators even denounced the killers as "bloodthirsty savages."

In the subsequent treaty with China, the Japanese utilized the American formula in specifying Korea's independence. It was a somewhat restricted independence, with Japanese troops in Korea and General Miura as Japanese Minister at Seoul. The Korean Queen, a capable and ambitious woman, worked steadily to make her independence real—from the Japanese. General Miura ordered her killed. Japanese troops on October 8, 1895, attacked the palace, overcame her bodyguard, and guarded the entrances while a group of Japanese assassins (hired gangsters, not soldiers) went inside and found the Queen, slashed and hacked her with swords, wrapped her (still living) in a bed-cover, and burned her alive—the most horrible and cruel murder of any sovereign of modern times.*

* General Miura and forty-seven other Japanese were brought before a Japanese court charged with murder, but the court dismissed the entire group because of insufficient evidence as to which particular representative of Bushido had actually caused the Queen's death. There was a striking contrast in the verdict of another Japanese court, in 1911, which sentenced twelve Japanese civilians to death and twelve more to long terms of imprisonment, for connection with an abortive conspiracy against the life of the Japanese Emperor; not more than seven of those executed were actually conspirators.

The murder of the Korean Queen and the curious sense of "legality" and "justice" demonstrated by the Japanese court, did not interfere with the going into effect of the new treaties recognizing the Japanese militarists as "equals," and turning over our nationals in Japan to their courts. These treaties were purely a political move, unrelated to "justice" or "legality."

The Korean king, after lying low for many months, escaped to the Russian Legation, and with their friendly cooperation proceeded to upset the puppet regime established by the Japanese. The Korean puppet Premier and one of his Ministers were lynched by a Korean mob. In April 1898 the Japanese agreed to recognize "the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea," and to abstain from interference in Korea's internal affairs; the Russians agreed similarly, and withdrew the last of their advisers.

Korea thus became independent, with guarantees from four Powers. The American Government, the original enthusiast for Korean independence, had by its first treaty with the little kingdom promised its good offices in case any third Power should "deal unjustly" with Korea. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in February, 1902, specifically pledged itself to the "independence and territorial integrity" of Korea. Russia and France pledged themselves to the same principle. All Powers were avowedly in agreement, and the Russian Government approached the American Government to participate in a joint guarantee—"collective security" for Korea. The American Government refused; other Powers similarly.

In this situation, the Russians followed an appeasement policy when Japan in 1903 started making the demands which were a prelude to the war of the following year. The Russians agreed to Japanese control and administration of communications in Korea, to Japanese civil advisers in Korea, to recognize "Japan's preponderating influence in Korea" and Japan's "right" to send troops into the peninsula "to suppress disorder." Such concessions meant the end of Korea's short-lived independence. Russia, however, was determined to appease Japan—at the

expense of Korea, despite the formal pledges of previous years and the fact that the secret Russo-Chinese Alliance of 1896 had pledged both Russia and China to the defense of Korea against "any aggression directed by Japan" against the kingdom.

With negotiations continuing, the Japanese began to assume their new position of power in Korea, sent Japanese forces into the peninsula, and from there launched their treacherous attack upon the Russian forces in Manchuria. To the Korean Government, the Japanese Government pledged itself "in a spirit of firm friendship, to ensure the safety and repose" of the Korean Imperial House, guaranteed the "independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire," and even bound themselves to extend protection "in case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by aggression of a third Power or internal disturbances." With such clear and explicit guarantees, the Korean Government agreed to "place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvement in administration."

The Japanese, walking softly, gained virtual control of the main branches of Korean administration, with an American agent of Tokyo as adviser on foreign matters. But with this control achieved, the liberality and moderation of the early months—when the Japanese troops by their purchases of food at good prices and their employment of Korean laborers at Japanese wages had gained considerable popularity as the carriers of war prosperity—rapidly diminished. The Japanese continued to walk softly with Korean officials, maintaining, protecting, or reinstating the worst and most corrupt and subservient

of them. But the Japanese seized for "war purposes" great stretches of Korean land. When delegations of the Korean people tried to protest to the Korean Home Minister, they were met by Japanese policemen and forcibly dispersed.

The American treaty with Korea provided that: "If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with their government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the same, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." Before the end of 1904 it was clear that the Japanese were dealing with the Koreans unjustly and oppressively, but the American adviser of the Korean Foreign Office was able to prevent any formal appeal. Informal appeals were however made—both by responsible Koreans and by American business men and missionaries in Korea—to the American Minister, who reported fully to Washington. He discovered that the American Government had no intention whatever of exercising its good offices on behalf of the Koreans, or in any other way of observing the obligations of the American-Korean treaty. A real friend to Koreans, our Minister was *persona non grata* to the Japanese authorities. He was summarily recalled, to the shocked surprise and intense indignation of the American community in Korea, as well as of the Koreans themselves.

The next move of the American Government was a positive one. President Theodore Roosevelt in June, 1905, after appealing to the Russian Czar (on the secret and desperate appeal of the Japanese Emperor) to make peace with Japan, sent William Howard Taft, Secretary of War, to Tokyo to conclude a secret treaty. By this pact, the American President specifically approved "the estab-

lishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea." The Japanese Government declared that "Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines." The "maintenance of general peace" on this basis in the Far East, declared this secret pact of July 29, 1905, was to be realized by a "good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Great Britain, which have common interests. . . ." President Roosevelt pledged that "whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations."

With this influential support, the Japanese obtained agreement from both the British and the Russians to their domination over Korea. The end of the war brought no moderation of "war measures" by the Japanese there. The Korean sovereign, who had with Oriental naivete maintained his trust in the Great Powers who had "guaranteed" Korea's independence, and had special faith in the specific American pledge of "good offices," now sent a trusted American representative to Washington to call attention to the unjust manner in which Japan was dealing with Korea.

On November 15, the Japanese demanded that Korean foreign relations be placed entirely in the hands of Japan—a flat violation of Japan's pledges of the previous year. The Korean Emperor refused. Japanese threats, cajolery, and proffered bribes failed to sway most Cabinet Ministers, despite their long acceptance of Japanese advice. When a Cabinet meeting was finally opened, under Japanese pressure, in the palace, the place was surrounded by Japanese troops carrying out military maneuvers, as they

had been doing for days. The brutal and cruel murder of the Korean Queen and her closest associates was vividly recalled. The foreign ministers at Seoul for two days watched the proceedings, without a single gesture of help, counsel, or even friendship to the Korean Government to which they were accredited.

The acting Prime Minister, leaving the room to consult with the Korean Emperor, was seized by the Japanese, thrown into a side room, and threatened with death. Terror increased among the remaining Ministers when he failed to return; a whisper was circulated that he had been killed, and the same fate awaited all who refused the Japanese demands. Terror and treason finally brought acquiescence to the demands, but the Korean Emperor—who refused to attend the conference—did not agree. The Japanese dispatched messengers to the custodian of the Imperial seal, who took the seal from him by force and attached it to the new “treaty.”

Extracted under direct and immediate duress, force, and violence, and lacking the consent of the Korean Emperor, the “treaty” had only such force as the Powers cared to give it. The American Government was the first to approve. On the very first intimation from Japan it withdrew its Minister from Korea. Instructions were given on November 24, six days after the Korean Emperor’s seal had been forcibly seized and attached to the Japanese document, to close the American Legation at Seoul. The Korean Emperor’s special envoy had already reached Washington, but the President of the United States refused to see him. Instead, President Roosevelt gave his hurried order to close the Seoul Legation. This was the President’s reply to the appeal to America’s treaty pledge.

A second special envoy followed—this time a Korean—who informed the American State Department on December 11, on behalf of the Korean Emperor, that the protocol of November 17 had not been agreed to by him, and that his seal had been affixed under duress. Secretary Root, President Roosevelt's *alter ego*, replied that he was unable to take any official cognizance of this information. Korean independence was as broken as our promises.

The Koreans finally rebelled—but far too late. The Japanese were now a military power in which their American patrons took great pride, and our little brown “protégés” put down the Korean patriots and people in every uprising. Long before the end of the war with Russia, the Japanese Army's camp-followers were traveling about in Korea in samurai style, armed with knives or swords, and—in the words of a British resident in Korea—“taking what they wished and doing what they pleased.” Ordinary roughs and criminals followed, and “went through the country like a plague. If they wanted a thing, they took it. If they fancied a house, they turned the resident out. They beat, they outraged, they murdered. . . . Koreans were flogged to death for offences that did not deserve a sixpenny fine. They were shot for mere awkwardness.” Japanese drug-peddlers traveled through the interior of Korea selling morphia to the natives, their high-power salesmanship being most successful in the northwest—where there was a real wave of morphia-mania.

Such was Japanese rule—at the point of our most enthusiastic support, encouragement, patronage, and financial and diplomatic backing of Japanese militarism and Imperialism. Today, our long partnership with Japanese militarism and piracy in Asia has been forcibly ended.

If our Government is determined that this break shall be permanent, we must take a stand on Korea. We once promised the Koreans our friendly services, and encouraged them in a desire for independence. We betrayed them, and delivered them bound hand and foot into the hands of the enemy. This is our record.

We must now do something to redeem ourselves—if we can. We can do something to make good our broken promises and to give reality and conviction to the pledges of the Atlantic Charter and the declaration of the United Nations. The Korean people must be free. Not only do the mass of the Korean people desire self-government. Liberal and democratic Japanese also desire that Korea should have self-government. If we fail to pledge specifically the full right of democratic self-government to the people of Korea, it will mean that we are determined to maintain Imperialism and Imperial domination despite our lofty phrases and pretensions. It will mean that we are prepared to permit the black record of Korea's betrayal to stand—a warning to all Asiatic peoples who hope for American friendship in their deliverance.

Korea is prepared for democratic institutions. Korean civilization is older than that of Japan; it possesses neither caste nor Emperor-worship. Popular education is much less widespread than in Japan—but this is owing to the Japanese Government's failure to extend universal education in Korea. A Korean Republic or Commonwealth today, like our own Republic at the time of its foundation, would probably be for a time a "Government by gentlemen"—until the spread of popular education and the understanding of political rights and power should bring fully popular Government. It is not for us to impose a Constitution—we who in this country officially consider

Koreans, like other Asiatics, unfit for the rights of free citizens. Such things must be decided by the Korean people themselves.

When we recognize this fundamental principle that the Korean people are entitled to the Rights of Man, to human freedom and human equality, and that both our broken pledges and our responsibilities as a democratic nation obligate us to aid the Korean people in their rightful aspirations, we can turn to "difficulties."

First comes the matter of national sovereignty—complete independence. How can an unmilitary nation of 25,000,000 people maintain its independence between far greater Powers? Mutual guarantees are not enough. The Japanese and British Governments by the Anglo Japanese Alliance in 1902 pledged themselves specifically to "the independence and territorial integrity of Korea," as well as of China. Japan broke the pledge, and promptly concluded with the British Government a new alliance leaving out all mention of Korea's independence. Our own assurances were similarly well kept. In a world of Power politics, and shameful deals behind closed doors, such "assurances" and "guarantees" are only temporary things, likely to end when the existing alignment of Powers is upset. England, Japan, Russia, and the United States have all betrayed Korea.

The only real and permanent hope for Korea, as for other nations and peoples, lies in a world organization which will supersede Power politics and Imperial rivalries, and devote itself to the maintenance and preservation of peace and the rational solution of problems and disputes arising in our newly integrated world. Such a League must have the armed forces necessary to preserve peace in case of emergency. No country must have suffi-

cient armed forces to enable it to invade any of its neighbors. And there must nowhere be private production of armaments; the private munitions manufacturer and war-promoter must be wholly and completely eliminated from the world.

It would be stupid and senseless to try to build up Korea as a military nation—as was done with Poland and other European states a generation ago. It would be doing no service, indeed, to the Korean people themselves. It would be an inevitable prelude to new wars; that is what national armaments are for. Freedom for Korea must mean security both from foreign aggressors and from militarization by her "friends." There must be no Balkanization of eastern Asia paralleling the Balkanization of Europe in 1919, laying the groundwork for new wars.

The Koreans are fully capable of building up what police forces are necessary in their own country, and of contributing their full share to the military forces which will be necessary for a real international authority. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans are already trained fighters. Tens of thousands have carried on in guerrilla groups, often in cooperation with Chinese. Tens of thousands have seen military service in Chinese armies, fighting the common enemy. There can be no reasonable doubt of their ability to fight. But a country of 25,000,000 cannot possibly hold its own in war against a neighbor with 75,000,000, or one with 175,000,000 or one with 450,000,000. Korea can be free only as part of a free world.

What have we to gain by supporting democratic self-government for Korea? Everything that can possibly matter to a democracy. Representative government and civil liberty cannot survive in a world dominated by slave

states and force-founded empires. We need allies for democracy, for the war and for the peace. And we need, if any Asiatic peoples are to trust and believe us, to cleanse our record—so far as we can do so today—of the long-standing shame of our betrayal of Korea. Let us write a new and different page, one in which we and our descendants, and all lovers of liberty and justice, can take pride.

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CHINA—EMPIRE TO COLONY

I. The North

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Chapter 11.

MANCHUKUO, THE PUPPET EMPIRE

MANCHURIA, the great northeastern area of China known to Chinese as the Three Eastern Provinces, is now the home of the "Manchu Empire." It is also the home of the Kwantung Army, the most powerful part of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Army rules direct; its responsible head is the Commander-in-Chief, who is simultaneously Ambassador to the "Manchu Empire." The nominal head of the Empire is the one-time boy-Emperor of China, Henry Pu-Yi, now signing the Army's orders as Emperor Kang Teh—"Exalted Virtue."

The Emperor is Manchu. His Cabinet is composed of Chinese, but has occasionally included a Japanese of Chinese ancestry, or a Manchu. The real work is done by Japanese advisers; the chief adviser is responsible to the Japanese Generalissimo-Ambassador. There is no Navy, Big Business, parliament, or influential aristocracy to interfere with direct Army rule. It is all very Tokugawa, the Generalissimo giving orders and the Emperor signing any that are presented to him. It is, in fact, the Army's ideal. They achieved it in Manchukuo a few years earlier than in Japan itself.

It is not exactly a small country, this puppet Empire. It extends further west than what used to be called Manchuria, and covers more than 500,000 square miles—almost the size of France, Italy, and 1934 Germany taken together, one-sixth the size of the United States. Much of it is remarkably similar to our Northwestern States, from Iowa and Minnesota westward through Nebraska and the Dakotas. An American visitor entering Manchuria, whether from Peking and Tientsin (as I first entered it, or from Korea, is at once struck by its amazingly "American" topography—broad fields covered with northern grains, or with grass for grazing; clear streams, often lined with leafy northern trees; rolling country with hills rising to the west—and to the east beyond the big central plain; many stone houses (where there is stone to be had), built sturdily against the bitter northern winters which cover the country with deep snow for four or five months of the year. At the railway station, the food-sellers bring food (in ordinary times) of a kind and an abundance rare at Chinese or Korean stations: whole roast chickens, ducks, and hams; fruit in season—especially splendid melons and apples. There is little sign of the terrible overcrowding characteristic of most of China—and of Korea and Japan. It is a rich country, as rich as our own Northwest. The people are poor, not because they are crowded, but simply because they are robbed.

There are some 45,000,000 people in this puppet Empire. Ninety per cent of them are Chinese, but there are more than a million Koreans and almost a million Japanese, as well as half a million Mongols—mostly to the West. If the visitor cares to continue the illusion that he is in the American Northwest, he may imagine these tall, sturdy, light-skinned northern Chinese as the counter-

parts of some of our own Finns, with the similar "Mongolian eye" and straight hair—except that there are virtually no blonds among the Chinese. There are few Manchurian Chinese who could be mistaken for a Korean or Japanese.

The Kwantung Army, which directly rules Manchuria and virtually rules Japan, dominates both political and economic life. The "Manchu" Imperial Government operates the great basic industries—excepting only agriculture. Coal mines and petroleum refining, electric power—generation, transmission, and supply—iron mining and iron and steel production, railways and airways, telephones and telegraphs, banking and insurance, manufacture of automobiles, explosives, and opium (a deadly trio), are all directly run and operated by the State. There are State farms, but most of the land is still privately owned; the Government merely tells farmers what crops they must raise, lays down the prices for them, and controls the export crops so that the major profits remain in Government hands. Gold mines, forests, and other natural resources are under State control, but the Government's own enterprises are supplemented by private ones operating under license. In all industrial enterprises, of every kind, the Government has full control and veto power over initial establishment, operation, prices, and production—or non-production.

If one wants to be technical, he will find that there is a certain division between the Manchu and the Japanese Emperor's domains. The longest-held Japanese territory is the tip of the Liaotung peninsula—the Kwantung leased territory—which has since 1905 been under direct rule from Tokyo. With the establishment of direct Japanese military authority throughout Manchuria, this ad-

ministrative division became rather pointless—except for one striking consideration. To incorporate the Kwantung territory with Manchukuo in the puppet Manchu Empire would be to take it from the nominal sovereignty of the Tokyo Emperor and transfer it to the nominal sovereignty of the Manchu Emperor. The Army hasn't quite gotten around to this yet—though there have been some curious reports at times. So the Kwantung territory remains technically separate from the Manchu Empire; its Governor-General is a subordinate of the Japanese Generalissimo—who for some years held this post himself. More than a million of Manchuria's 45,000,000 live in this "leased" territory.

A similar anachronism is the South Manchuria Railway—a Japanese Imperial Government enterprise including 50% private capital; the Emperor Hirohito is himself reported to be an investor. This railway dominates Manchuria's land communications; besides its own lines, it operates the Manchu State lines as well. It also owns coal mines and other enterprises; it still mines coal, but the Army's "Manchu" regime markets it and pockets the profits. Its great subsidiaries—steel, electrical industries, chemical industries, etc.—have mostly been lopped off and "reorganized" by the same regime. But the Kwantung Army does not yet control the S.M.R. direct; pressure must travel via Tokyo.

Such divisions, however, are technical. The dominant fact is that of a great State-controlled and largely State-owned economy, in the hands of the Japanese Army ruling direct—either through the local puppet Emperor at Changchun or the more "sacred" puppet Emperor at Tokyo. It is a remarkable example of modern feudalism. There is real unity of political and economic domination.

The Japanese Army today, like the feudal chieftains of Japan a century ago and of Europe two centuries ago, controls both political and economic life, with no private property except such as they permit. The "radical" officers of Japan's invading army, a decade ago, declared with fierce determination that the conquered territory would not be turned over to Japanese capitalists for exploitation. They have kept their word. It is being exploited by the Army chiefs, in true feudal style—and with modern industrial techniques.

They have, as yet, not established direct feudal tenure on the land as a whole. State farms have been started, and will probably expand if and when Japanese industry can be converted to peace-time production, and tanks are beaten or melted into tractors. These State farms are mostly in Northern Manchuria, where population is sparser and there are great areas where most of the farming is done by share-croppers or laborers. In South Manchuria, much of which has been settled by Chinese farmers for two thousand years, there is greater density of population, smaller farms, and many small owners, tenants, and owner-tenants as elsewhere in China—and in Korea and Japan. By taxes, land-rent, price control, and export market control, the peasants are successfully mulcted of most of their produce. In North Manchuria the great landlords, State or private, have customarily provided their tenants with seeds, tools, cattle, and other requirements, and taken 70 per cent of the crop; the other 30 per cent the peasants are permitted to retain. It's a rich country. . . .

The Kwantung Army, however, has exploited Japan far more thoroughly than it has exploited Manchuria as yet. Since it seized this territory a decade ago, the Army has

called on Japan for a sum never less than 200,000,000 yen yearly for itself, and for similar sums for "construction." These latter have been for railway lines, steel and other industrial plants, electric power plants, etc. Their purpose is primarily military—railways to bind together this vast area, and to permit rapid troop movements to any point; steel and munitions plants for military needs—and for the railways. There has been a steady drain from Japan to Manchuria during the past eleven years. Manchuria has imported from Japan both goods and treasure (or bonds) far in excess of her exports. The bonds—Government or private—are supposed to pay not only interest but dividends some day; but this is speculative. The actual economic fact is that Japanese taxpayers and the Japanese economic system has been ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. To talk about "Japan" exploiting Manchuria is nonsense, quite unrelated to economic facts. The Kwantung Army exploits both Manchuria and Japan.

Manchuria offers no economic relief for Japan. Projects for Japanese colonization have run up against the fact that colonists must compete with Chinese peasants living at a standard definitely below that of the Japanese, and in a cold, hard climate and country which has few attractions to ordinary Japanese. Some Japanese skilled labor is employed on the railways and in various industrial enterprises, but ordinary labor is almost wholly Chinese, this being far cheaper. Japanese opium-peddlers, traffickers in women, petty gangsters and thieves, and such creatures have done well in Manchuria, but of legitimate economic relief there is none. In the growing industries, indeed, the employment of Chinese labor at wage-rates half that in Japan is a most serious blow at Japanese

labor. For the last few years, war economy has obscured this somewhat, but the end of the war will bring its full significance home to Japanese labor, which will find itself in direct competition with the cheapest labor in the world.

For the past eleven years, Manchuria has been the main center of the gangs of assassins, proteges of the militarists, who have murdered one Japanese political or business leader after another. The Kwantung Army has given not only refuge but political position to Japanese criminals, as well as Russian. Most notorious of the Japanese murderers in official positions is Captain Amakasu, sentenced many years ago to a long prison term for the murder of Sakae Osugi and his wife Noye Ito (Amakasu also murdered an American boy of Japanese ancestry), at the time of the Tokyo earthquake in 1923. A decade ago, after his release from prison, he was made Chief of Police in Changchun (Hsinking), capital of the "Manchu Empire." He subsequently became Secretary-General of the official Concordia Society, devoted to the promotion of the Confucian virtues of obedience and filial piety in the form of "Wang Tao"—the Kingly Way—and to "resist the possession of people's minds by capitalist philosophy or communist principles." In Harbin the Japanese utilized a whole gang of Russian criminals as police, who supplemented their official income by kidnapping well-to-do residents (particularly Jews) and holding them for ransom, murdering them in case of failure. When a French citizen (the gifted musician Simon Kaspé, of Jewish descent) was kidnapped a few years ago, the French Consulate had to hire its own detectives, kidnap one of the criminals whom the police had refused to hold, extract a confession from him, and themselves round up the kidnappers—whereupon the Russian police inter-

vened, permitting the three gang leaders to walk out of the house unmolested—and to murder the pianist who had caused them such annoyance, and whom they had already viciously mutilated. Such is the "Kingly Way."

It is not the first time that a military power with its base in Manchuria has extended its domination over vast areas of the Far East. For more than a thousand years, Manchuria has been the homeland of one conquering people after another. Though a considerable area of the south was long settled by the Chinese—native or immigrant—the country to the north, east, and west was populated by various tribes, some of which have left deep traces on history. In what is now eastern Manchuria rose the power of the Kaoli or Kaori, who brought various tribes under their control and established—with Chinese "techniques"—an empire which conquered and included Korea and gave that country its old dynasty and its name. A thousand years ago, the Khitans (Cathayans) built up an empire in western Manchuria and expanded it century by century southward and westward. They established a capital at Peking, and compelled the Sung Dynasty further south to pay heavy tribute. In the twelfth century they were succeeded by another tribal power from Manchuria—the Ch'ins—who in turn established themselves at Peking, and similarly levied tribute on the Chinese Sung Dynasty further south. All the great area now known as North China was long known as "Cathay"—the name which Marco Polo took back to Europe with him—and the name ("Kitai") by which the Russians still know China. For three centuries the Cathayans and Ch'ins were the dominant power of the great Eastern World.

The Ch'ins were crushed by the Mongols, from the western border of Manchuria. With the decline of the

Mongol Empire, the Chinese Mings seized power in China and extended it to and beyond northern Manchuria. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, a new power was rising in the northeast—the Manchus, who had long been vassals of the Ming Dynasty. By gaining the cooperation of Chinese frontiersmen and rebels against the Ming Dynasty, and drawing in Mongol tribesmen as well, the Manchus established an empire in Manchuria and extended it into Korea. When China was torn to pieces by rebellion and revolution, and rebel forces marched into Peking and the last Ming Emperor committed suicide, the Manchus in cooperation with Chinese forces seized Peking and established their own power there. For three centuries they ruled Manchuria; from 1648 to 1912 they ruled China as well. But, like other conquerors, they were assimilated by the more numerous and more civilized people. Manchu is now virtually a dead language, spoken only by a few remnant tribes in eastern and northeastern Manchuria—and by the “Emperor” and a few classical scholars.

When the Japanese Army fought its way from Korea into Manchuria in 1894, establishing its position as a “civilized people” and recognition as such by Western Powers, it revealed itself as the coming ruler of the Eastern World. It forced Peking to surrender completely the great Kwantung peninsula (not merely its tip, the little Liaotung peninsula), for formal Japanese annexation. It also seized the Chinese fort and port of Weihaiwei, in Shantung, opposite Port Arthur, thus dominating completely the Gulf of Chihli—the entrance to Tientsin and Peking. In this powerful position, dominating the Manchurian homeland of the Dynasty and the maritime approaches to Tientsin and Peking, the Manchus were at

their mercy. The Japanese could not conquer China, but they defeated the already moribund Dynasty which still dominated China. And they had friendly relations and close cooperation with the British Empire, then the Great Power of southern Asia and the leading Power in China itself, as well as with the United States, both of which gave diplomatic support and encouragement to the Japanese in their invasion of China.

Chinese appeals to the Powers were fruitless—excepting the appeal to Russia, which gained the support of its ally France and friendly Germany in an ultimatum to Japan to clear out of southern Manchuria. The Japanese, perforce, agreed. A secret alliance was concluded between the Chinese (Manchu) and Russian Governments, the first outward sign of which was construction of the Russian (Chinese Eastern) railway across North Manchuria to connect the Trans-Siberian line with Vladivostok. From their Chinese allies the Russians obtained a lease on the Liaotung peninsula (tip of the Kwantung peninsula), greatly strengthened the fortifications there (Port Arthur), developed a modern harbor and port both for commerce and for joint use by the Russian and Chinese navies, and extended the Russian railway southward to this port—Dairen. Russia, instead of Japan, now appeared as the new Power in the Far East. And behind Russia were the vast natural and human resources of its great Eurasiatic Empire, and the finances of France, which operated both directly and through Russian and other European agencies for contracts for new railways both in southern and northern China.

It was this situation which led to the moves for partition of China toward the close of the nineteenth century. The Germans seized the Chinese port and naval center at

Tsingtao, in southern Shantung, and established their economic control over that province by railway and other contracts. The British Government, no longer dominant at Peking but determined to maintain and strengthen its position in South China, moved for partition. They were prepared to leave the Russians in Manchuria and Peking, but the British should be able to strengthen their hold by political domination of the Yangtze valley and the Canton area; the Germans could have Shantung and its hinterland. The Germans demurred at this proposal from Joseph Chamberlain, considering the suggested partition quite unequal. They tentatively cooperated, however, and a whole series of new demands by the Powers and new concessions by the Peking Government heralded the break-up of the Empire. The American Government's "Open Door" notes, in 1899, were based upon such a break-up. They were addressed to the Powers direct, asking that they maintain free commercial opportunities and the old low tariff in the areas over which they were extending their respective dominations. The Chinese Government was ignored.

These new aggressions by Western Powers led directly to the fierce "Boxer" upheaval, in which Chinese mobs and armies led by fanatics and encouraged by some outstanding Manchu leaders threw down the gage of battle to the "barbarians." The Powers succeeded in adjusting their differences sufficiently to launch an Allied expeditionary force against Peking, and to occupy and ravish that great city, massacring 100,000 of its civilian population. It was Russian troops, however, that occupied the railway lines in Manchuria. England and Germany, supported by the United States, emerged as the dominant Powers at Peking, and an Anglo-German Entente was

concluded. The Russians consolidated their domination of Manchuria. Nominally, they were still China's secret allies, but Peking was under the influence of Powers hostile to Russia. Allied troops occupied Peking and the railway to Tientsin and the sea, and eastward to the Great Wall which separates the Imperial province from Manchuria at Shanhaikwan; beyond that, however, it was Russian troops which "policed" the railways. The Imperial Government at Peking had its old contacts with Manchuria, but direct British influence was definitely excluded from that great territory.

This was the situation which led to the Russo-Japanese war. Few Americans realize the tremendous importance of this war and its outcome. Domination of Manchuria by any aggressive Power prepared the way for domination of the Far East. The Russo-Japanese treaty signed at Portsmouth in 1905 was in many ways the most momentous treaty of the present century. It gave the Japanese their firm foothold on the continent of Asia—in Korea and South Manchuria—which they subsequently expanded to the domination of all Manchuria. From there they struck southward into North China, the struggle for which led directly to the "all-out" war against China and to the "southward drive" by which the *Bushi* made themselves masters of southeastern Asia. In creating the Portsmouth Treaty, and securing for the Japanese their foothold on the Asiatic continent, the influence of the American President was decisive. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt made world history.

From the beginning, the United States was an unsigned member of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the beginning of 1904, while the Russians were "appeasing" the Japanese by agreeing to their domination of Korea—which

the Japanese needed in order to *attack* Russian Manchuria—Japan's "neutral" friends prepared to support her diplomatically; the Japanese had already secretly advised them of their preparations for attack, and the necessity of China's remaining neutral. On February 8, when the Japanese launched their treacherous attack on the Russians at Port Arthur, the American Government (at the secret suggestion of the Kaiser) moved for the "neutrality of China." On February 12th, the Chinese Government under joint foreign pressure proclaimed its neutrality—in the war for domination of the Imperial Dynasty's homeland. China was to take no official part in the conflict, and to have no say in the final settlement. Manchuria was simply spoil of war between foreign Powers. The American move was wholly on behalf of Japan, and against both China and Russia.

The Japanese forces for months moved steadily ahead against the Russians, by sheer weight of superior numbers, artillery and other equipment, as well as general preparation and capable generalship, but as the Russians increased their defense forces—slowly, via the one-track trans-Siberian Railway—the Japanese advance slowed down. By the summer of 1904 the Japanese were prepared to talk peace, on the basis of a "free hand" in Korea and the return of Port Arthur to China. Peace terms were more specifically formulated in October. The Russians, however, refused to talk; they were through with "appeasement" of their treacherous neighbors.

The great Russian fortress at Port Arthur, however, had been separated from the main Russian forces in mid-Manchuria. With the armaments of that time, the fortress was virtually impregnable. But on December 15, 1904, the brave commander of the Russian defenses, Kondratenko,

was killed with seven other officers by a Japanese shell. Two Baltic Germans, Generals Stoessel and Fock, obtained command, destroyed the center of the Russian defense, shifted soldiers from important points, and surrendered to the Japanese. (They were subsequently court-martialed, but not shot. The Czarist regime did not shoot its treacherous officers, only its rebellious subjects.)

This remarkable victory, with the capture of enormous supplies of food and ammunition, enabled the Japanese to shift troops northward and to defeat the Russian forces south of Mukden; that city was taken on March 10. It was the last important victory of the Japanese land forces in Manchuria. The Japanese knew this before the battle was over, and on March 8 informed President Theodore Roosevelt, the militarists' one real friend among Western rulers, that "the time had come when the war should cease." But Roosevelt's first overtures to the Russians were unsuccessful, and the Japanese had to carry on.

Roosevelt was determined that "we cannot permit Japan to be robbed a second time of the fruits of her victory." Alone among Western "statesmen," he encouraged the Japanese to make new demands at the expense of China. As late as December, the Japanese had stated their desire to see Port Arthur returned to China, but a few weeks later (after the surrender of the fortress) Roosevelt told the Japanese Minister that in his opinion "the Japanese had earned Port Arthur and had a right to keep it." The Japanese had also declared their desire to see Manchuria "restored to China," but Roosevelt in this same conversation told the Japanese Minister that such restoration should be "under the guidance of the Powers"—i. e., Japan and her associates, including the United States.*

* See Tyler Dennett: "Theodore Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War."

Control of the Manchurian railways was central to the whole problem; Russian ownership and military domination of the railways was the basis of its powerful position in Manchuria. The Japanese were prepared to place these railways under international or Chinese control. In March, 1905, after the Japanese victory at Mukden, the Chinese Government proposed that the railway lines be transferred to *China*—which by its treaty with Russia was a partner, and had ultimate reversionary rights—with an international guarantee for its protection, and for any "payment that might be necessary either to Russia or to Japan." Such an arrangement, as the American Minister at Peking pointed out, "would interpose a most formidable barrier, impassable in the future to Russia and Japan alike."

Such Chinese control, and an international guarantee, was quite indispensable if Manchuria was to be restored to China. The maintenance of foreign railways with special railway zones controlled by foreign garrisons was quite incompatible with Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. The Japanese, however, with Roosevelt's support, now put forward a proposal that Russian railway rights be transferred to themselves—not to China. Roosevelt's suggestion that Manchuria should be "restored" to China "under guidance of the Powers," was given form by the Japanese in a demand that Russia evacuate Manchuria, relinquishing all special privileges or concessions there. The Japanese, who would thus be in complete control, would restore Manchuria to China "subject to the guarantee of reform and improved administration." The Japanese Army, of course, would tell the Chinese just what they meant by this—as they were already doing to the Koreans in Korea.

The American President, ignoring the Chinese proposal—which was favored not only by the American Minister at Peking, but by the British and other Governments—encouraged the Japanese to assert their own domination in Manchuria. This domination would be far more thorough than that of the Russians, who had almost completely abstained from interference with the Chinese civil administration in Manchuria. It would be, indeed, far more thorough than that provided for by the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1895. And there could be no question of the Japanese “alone.” They were wholly and completely dependent upon American and British bankers for support.

Certain American interests, indeed, hoped to profit direct from Japanese control of Manchurian railways. The American railway magnate, Harriman, expected to invest capital and gain a half-interest in these railways as taken over by the Japanese. As Roosevelt inveigled the Czar into sending delegates to Portsmouth, and sent War Secretary Taft to Tokyo to conclude the President’s “alliance” with Japan, Harriman quietly negotiated with the Japanese an agreement for his own partnership with the Japanese Government in the railway areas occupied by the Japanese—subsequently named the South Manchuria Railway. British and other European capital was to be excluded as thoroughly as Chinese control.

The Japanese “agreed.” They were desperately in need of American support—until the Portsmouth Treaty. Harriman obtained his contract, and departed triumphantly for home. American capital saw a great and brilliant future for it in Manchuria, resting upon Japanese bayonets and Chinese subjection. But the Portsmouth Treaty was signed and ratified. And Harriman arrived in San Fran-

cisco to find a telegram from Tokyo awaiting him. The Japanese Government, "in the new situation," was unable to fulfil the agreement!

The double-crossing of Harriman was followed by the Japanese negotiating a treaty with China confirming the new status quo. The Chinese were forced to agree that the South Manchurian section of the Russo-Chinese railway—which was the actual legal status of the line—be transferred to Japan, ignoring China's interests. Japanese garrisons and Japanese administration were maintained along the line, and along new railways which had been or were being built. Further north in Manchuria, the Russians maintained a similar system of garrisons and administrative control along the railway. Manchuria had passed from Russian occupation to Russo-Japanese occupation. The two dominant Powers soon reached an understanding concerning their respective spheres, and for cooperation to exclude other Powers from Manchuria. British bankers, who had loaned the Japanese the funds which enabled them to dispense with Harriman in 1905, soon found there was to be no British investment in Chinese lines in Manchuria. Russia and Japan jointly opposed.

Harriman did not like being double-crossed. Roosevelt, friend of *Bushido*, would do nothing about it, and before he left office the Root-Takahira agreement was concluded confirming the new status quo. But when President Taft took office in 1909, the American Government approached other Powers for a joint loan to Peking to acquire the Manchurian railways. It was essentially similar to the Chinese proposal of March, 1905, for the neutralization and international financing of the Manchurian railways—which Roosevelt had turned down on behalf of the

Japanese. But the Taft administration's move came four years too late. The Japanese and Russians jointly opposed; the French supported them. An alternative proposal, for Anglo-American cooperation in the building of a railway northward through western Manchuria, was similarly vetoed. Harriman's dream of a round-the-world railway came to nothing. The American dollar was not Almighty.

For ten years, Manchuria was the center of increasing Russo-Japanese cooperation. The two Powers cooperated against any extension of American or British capital into this area, and their 1907 Entente was revised and expanded into a formal alliance. When the American Government finally turned to Peking, forced themselves into a four-Power Consortium (England, Germany, France, and the United States) to monopolize Chinese railway and other investments, and tried to extend into Manchuria via a loan to Peking, Russia and Japan formed an alliance, and prepared for war. The Russians wished to simplify matters by annexing North Manchuria immediately, while the Japanese annexed South Manchuria. The Japanese, however, wished to postpone this. They annexed Korea; Russia established its protectorate over Outer Mongolia. The Japanese extended westward into Inner Mongolia, and challenged the British and the Consortium by securing railway contracts in central China—despite their lack of capital.

The European War in 1914, occupying the major energies of Russia as of other European Powers, gave the Japanese dominance in Manchuria—as elsewhere in China. From the Peking Government, the Japanese in 1915 obtained among other things (by the Twenty-one Demands) the extension for 99 years of their leases on

the South Manchuria Railways and the Kwantung Territory, Japanese priority in loans for new railroads in South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, the exclusive right of securing loans on taxes in that area, Japanese priority in giving "advice" and "instruction" to the Chinese authorities in South Manchuria, and the right to lease land in South Manchuria.

When American advice encouraged Yuan Shih-kai, the military dictator whom the Powers financed to destroy parliamentary government in China, to end the Republic altogether and restore the monarchy with himself as Emperor, the Japanese in Manchuria countered by supporting the Manchu Prince Su as claimant to the throne, and training a Chinese army for him in the Liaotung leased territory, until Yuan abdicated as Emperor and was overthrown by the anti-monarchist elements in China.

In 1916, the Japanese made their secret alliance with Russia into a full-fledged military and naval agreement, directed more specifically than previously against the United States—or any other Power which endeavored to interfere with the "rights and interests" of Japan and Russia not only in Manchuria, but in China as a whole. In 1917, however, the Czarist Government collapsed. The next November, the Bolsheviki seized power publicly, announced and repudiated the Czarist Government's secret treaties and alliances, and launched its own policy in the East. The Russo-Japanese Alliance was ended. A new day was dawning for Manchuria and for the whole Far East.

■

Chapter 12.

SAGA OF CHANG TSO-LIN

WHILE JAPANESE militarists were thinking of conquest and glory, and American statesmen were thinking about investments in China, Chang Tso-lin was thinking about Chang Tso-lin. He was an illiterate bandit of peasant origin, but he was one of the shrewdest men in Manchuria. Born about 1878—the same year as Joseph Stalin—he had left his village home as a lad and joined a group of bandits in northern Manchuria. It was a wild frontier country, with as many trappers and hunters as farmers. Most of the Manchu and Tungus tribesmen were still hunters or herdsmen, but agriculture was spreading. Manchu and Mongol chieftains would rent land to Chinese immigrants from further south, who would settle, increase, and multiply. Some simply “squatted,” but they did so at their own risk. There was no “homestead act,” and they were let alone only until some Imperial official discovered their existence. When this happened, it developed that the land was “legally” his, and they were called on to pay rent as well as taxes.

On the wild border, administration was as absent as on our own frontier at the time. Imperial officials, however, had ingenious ways of collecting taxes. The most capable bandit was commissioned as tax-collector, and turned over

to the Imperial Commissioner a part of his takings. It was a country of opportunity and rugged individualism. Any boy of courage and initiative might become a bandit, and in time obtain official recognition. When work was slack on the farms, young men would slip away to hi-jack some traveling merchant, or some far-off village.

Chang Tso-lin was a born leader. His friends spoke of his honesty, sincerity, and magnanimity. His enemies spoke of his treachery, ruthlessness, and rapacity. But he was a capable little man, good on a horse and quick with a rifle or pistol, and gained increasing loyalty. Before he was thirty, 5,000 *hunghutze* ("red beards"—mounted bandits) acknowledged his leadership. During the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria, he and other bandit leaders gave valuable service to the Japanese as intelligence men, with their ramifications and connections throughout the country. According to Chang, he had better financial offers from the Russians, but turned them down, telling his followers that "China and Japan belonged to the same race," and "in helping Japan to fight Russia he was only doing the right thing."

Following Japanese recognition came Chinese. There is a Chinese story about this to the effect that the real Chang Tso-lin was apprehensive of treachery when he was officially summoned by the Imperial Government, and commissioned his aide—another Chang—to present himself in his stead. There was, however, no treachery, and Chang was officially appointed a *shou-pei* (battalion commander). The man who made the dangerous mission retained the title; the "original" Chang Tso-lin carried on as Chang Ching-hui—who finally became puppet Premier of Manchukuo. I do not vouch for the story; but many Chinese believe it.

When the Chinese Revolution broke out, in 1911, the Imperial officials in Manchuria had to appeal to Chang Tso-lin and other bandits and ex-bandits to keep out the Revolution. When Yuan Shih-kai, on American urging, attempted in 1915 to make himself Emperor, Chang obtained from him the appointment as Military Governor of Fengtien province, most southerly and populous of the three provinces of old Manchuria, and confirmed the appointment by his own forces. Expanding his bandit armies, he began to play politics at Peking, and in the little war in July 1920 gained a partnership in the new regime there. Manchurian taxes were increased—and collected; Chang knew all the tricks about collecting. He built an arsenal at Mukden, and bought increased quantities of arms from foreign gun-runners; some came from the Allied stores at Vladivostok, sold by their Japanese "protectors."

Manchuria was still under foreign domination. When the Bolshevik revolution came in November, 1917, the Russian soldiers and railway workers along the Russian line in North Manchuria seized the railway administration from the Czarist officials. The foreign consuls at Harbin, the railway center, ordered the Chinese officials to clear out the revolutionary workers and soldiers, deport them, and re-establish the Czarist administration; the order was obediently carried out by Chinese troops. The Japanese negotiated with their Chinese military stooges at Peking a secret agreement for cooperation in the "protection" (i. e., violation) of the Russo-Chinese frontier. When President Wilson in August, 1918, issued his call for world intervention against the Russian Revolution (this was not his wording of it), 30,000 Japanese troops occupied North Manchuria—many times more

than the Russians had had since 1905 and better equipped.

The Soviet Government announced the relinquishment of all special privileges and administrative rights formerly possessed by the Czarist regime in China, including the Russian railway zone in North Manchuria, and offered the Chinese a share in profits as well as management of the big Russian railway itself. The Powers, however, refused to *permit* the Chinese to accept this. The American Government, still pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of railway investment in Manchuria, saw its opportunity to barge in on the Chinese Eastern Railway. While Japanese forces policed the line, an "Allied" Railway Board, predominantly American, tried to exercise technical control of the railway. At the Washington Conference, in 1922, the American Government worked for financial control of the Russian line by the new four-Power Consortium promoted by President Wilson, including the United States, Japan, England, and France.

At Peking—since 1901, and even more after 1912—the Diplomatic Corps was the supreme authority. Jointly, the Powers refused to permit the Chinese Government there even to negotiate with Soviet envoys following the Russian Revolution. Down to September, 1920, the Peking Government was abjectly obedient to the Powers, even continuing to pay the huge Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity to the Czarist Minister there, three years after the autocracy he represented had disappeared. But when Chang Tso-lin and his associates chased the old gang out of Peking, there was "disobedience." The new regime received and negotiated with a mission from Moscow, reached an understanding, accepted formal relinquishment of Russia's special privileges in China, withdrew recognition from the Czarist Minister, and refused

further to finance that gentleman. With regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Russians agreed to relinquish all political claims, and to share profits and control with the Chinese.

The American Minister at Peking approached other Powers for joint foreign seizure of the administrations and courts in the Russian concessions in China, and along the Chinese Eastern Railway, to prevent their rendition to the Chinese. A curious "reorganization" of the China branch of the Russo-Asiatic Bank (which had financed the Chinese Eastern Railway, and which had been nationalized by the Soviet Government) was effected under French protection. With this reorganized bank the new Peking Government signed an agreement; the old Czarist administration of the railway carried on, but the Chinese for the first time got a share of its big profits. Czarist officials continued to carry on, under foreign protection, in the Russian concessions and the settlements. The Powers refused to recognize Chinese recognition of Moscow, or to permit the Soviet envoy to occupy the Russian Legation at Peking.

The Washington Conference, the next year, saw the assertion of American leadership in the Far East. This Conference, it is important to understand, greatly strengthened Japan's position in Manchuria. The privileges which Japan had gained through the Twenty-One Demands were accepted and confirmed—most important being the extension of the Railway and Kwantung leases, "priority" in loans, "advice," etc., in South Manchuria, and the right of the Japanese to maintain troops in Chinese territory without treaty provision. This latter was of greatest importance, particularly—at the time—in Manchuria.

Japanese troops, then in occupation both of Japanese and Russian railway lines in Manchuria, had no treaty of any kind with China entitling them to maintain troops there. The secret treaty negotiated with Peking in 1918 for "defense of the frontier" was no longer in effect, and formal "intervention" against Soviet Russia had been ended by the Western Powers. At the end of 1905, when the Chinese Government had perforce agreed to the transfer of the South Manchuria Railway from Russian to Japanese control, it had refused to agree to the maintenance of Japanese troops along the line. The Japanese garrisons remained with no agreement or treaty right of any kind, so far as China was concerned.

The Japanese had agreed, however, "in the event of Russia's agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, . . . to take similar steps." At the time of the Washington Conference, the Russian railway guards had been withdrawn from the Chinese Eastern Railway for three years. The Chinese delegation at Washington brought up the matter of foreign forces on Chinese territory without treaty right—concentrating mainly on the Japanese, whose forces greatly outnumbered all other foreign forces at the time. It was the American Government, in a resolution prepared by Secretary Hughes himself, which brought forth a formula which *for the first time* openly approved the maintenance of foreign troops in China without treaty right.

Hughes ignored the vital question of China's sovereign rights, and asserted that the vital question was whether such "adequate protection for life and property" existed as would warrant Japan in withdrawing her troops and police from China. Rejecting flatly the representations of

the Chinese delegation, he brought forward his resolution asserting that it was "to protect the lives and property of foreigners lawfully in China" that the Powers had "from time to time stationed armed forces" in China, some of these being maintained without the authority of any treaty or agreement. Thus, the Japanese settled down in permanent occupation of South Manchuria—until such time as the Japanese militarists themselves decided that conditions "warranted" their withdrawal.

They were also in occupation of North Manchuria, still the intended field for American financial expansion. The Japanese, in joining the four-Power Financial Consortium promoted by the United States, had agreed to share some of their exclusive financial privileges in South Manchuria (with, however, some secret exceptions), and had been confirmed in possession of the railway and leased area, and military domination of the "zone." The American Government, however, sought joint foreign domination of North Manchuria through *joint* control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. An "international finance committee" was proposed, to exercise general financial control over the railway and employ and control the police force within the railway zone. The American-led Consortium would supplant Czarist Russia in North Manchuria. This complete domination of Manchuria by the Consortium, working in close conjunction with the Japanese partner—which was to supply troops as required—would be more powerful than any previous domination.

The Chinese delegation, however, flatly rejected the American program. The disobedience manifested by the Chinese at Peking the previous year was now manifested in Washington itself. Behind China's opposition was the growing power of the Soviet Government—the rightful

owner of the railway. The Japanese, isolated by the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, were prepared to follow the American lead, but were not enthusiastic about American capital in North Manchuria. The whole scheme had to be abandoned.

Chang Tso-lin was moving ahead. He had secured a share in Chinese Eastern Railway revenues; the Peking delegation to Washington had blocked the American attempt to establish Consortium domination of the railway. The Conference, however, had established a more united front of the Powers, and encouraged Chinese elements hostile to Chang. Wu Pei-fu, Central China warlord, moved against Peking. Chang Ching-hui (referred to above) made no serious resistance; his troops fled, and he moved to a foreign concession at Tientsin. The Peking commander turned over to Wu, and Chang's ex-bandit hordes were driven back to Manchuria. There, Chang Tso-lin issued a "Declaration of Independence." He did not accept the authority of Peking, and took no responsibility for its acts.

In Manchuria, he set about modernizing his army. He had been old-fashioned on the subject, considering that his hard-boiled bandits were superior to any of the more regimented soldiers south of the Wall. The brief war in 1922, however, had taught him differently. He now employed Japanese military advisers, as well as some trained Chinese officers, to drill and regiment his forces. He increased the number of Russian soldiers—remnants of the monarchist and White-bandit armies of the intervention—in his ranks; many of these were already trained men. He was still working with the Japanese; they were the *de facto* Power in Manchuria, thanks to their well-equipped troops in occupation. And he now had regular

revenues from the Chinese Eastern Railway to finance him.

The new Peking Government in time became disobedient to the Diplomatic Body, and in 1924 asserted its diplomatic independence by negotiating a full treaty with the Soviet Government, which had just obtained full recognition from the new Labor Government in England and the new Fascist Government in Italy. Chang Tso-lin announced that he could not recognize this treaty in his independent territory, and Moscow would have to deal with him direct. It did; a separate treaty was negotiated at Mukden, Chang's capital. Soviet officials ousted Czarist officials from the railway, and entered into partnership with Chinese officials in the management and profits of the line.

The Russians, now re-established at Peking, promptly showed themselves fully equal to the old-timers in intrigues with Chinese warlords. Feng Yu-hsiang, whose troops were stationed at Peking, became their protege, deserted his overlord Wu Pei-fu, and reached an agreement with Chang Tso-lin when the latter's forces moved south of the wall. Chang did not trust his new ally; neither did anyone else. Chang's distrust was confirmed when Kuo Sung-lin, of Chang's best (and modern) generals), rebelled and marched his troops against Mukden, secretly supported by Feng Yu-hsiang and the Russians. The Japanese military, however, intervened to defend Mukden. This was decisive; Kuo was crushed, and Christmas 1925 saw the heads of the rebel general and his Christian wife decorating the walls of Mukden. Chang was again ruler of Manchuria, subject only to his Japanese patrons. The following spring, he moved against Peking. The anti-Soviet Powers, hostile to Feng Yu-hsiang, gave Chang effective cooperation. He dispatched his little

Fengtien fleet against the Taku forts, below Tientsin. When the forts defended themselves, the Powers demanded the Chinese cease interference with "freedom of navigation"; on March 16 they issued an ultimatum to Peking. Feng, perforce, yielded; Chang entered the old capital as ruler. Feng left for Moscow.

The old bandit was now ruler of North China. His follower Chang Tsung-chang moved troops southward, and himself took over the province of Shantung. This Chang was a remarkable figure. An illiterate bandit like his master, he was as superior physically as he was inferior mentally. He was a giant, six foot six in height, and claimed he could lick any man in his army bare-handed. His passions were as gargantuan as his physique. While Chang Tso-lin divided his pleasures among half a dozen wives, Tsung-chang divided his favors among a harem of half a hundred women—including Japanese and Russian—carrying them about with him in a special train. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese Revolution, was famous for his "Three People's Principles." Chang Tsung-chang, contemptuously anti-intellectual, announced his "Three Don't Knows," saying he did not know how much money he had, how many soldiers he commanded, or how many concubines he kept. He was actually telling the truth.

Chang Tso-lin was now the most powerful man in China. On December 1, 1926, he made himself Commander-in-Chief of the northern armies; his forces dominated the country southward to Nanking and Shanghai. Six months later he took the title of Grand Marshal, heading a formal military dictatorship. But already—to to the consternation of the Powers which had supported and recognized him—he was beginning to move against their privileges, asserting that his Government and Army,

and not the associated Powers, were the rightful rulers of China.

He had started this with the Russians. On January 22, 1925, his Fengtien Government had forbidden foreign vessels to navigate the inland waters of the Three Eastern Provinces. These foreign vessels were mostly Russian (on the Sungari, which is navigable far above Harbin), and there was no serious protest. Ships belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway lay idle for eighteen months, and the Fengtien officials seized them at the end of August, 1926. A Soviet ship in the Yangtze was seized and scuttled by Fengtien forces, and a number of Russians on board were taken as prisoners to Peking.

In such moves, Chang Tso-lin had the warm approval of the anti-Soviet Powers. Chang was playing their game. Foreign vessels other than Russian continued to navigate the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers without official interference. But Chang now began to move against other Powers than Russia. In November, 1926, his regime started the abolition of "unequal treaties," beginning with little Belgium. The Belgian treaty was abrogated, extraterritorial privileges for Belgians abolished, and the Belgian Concession at Tientsin taken over by the Chinese. For a generation, the British Administration of the Chinese Customs had "picked" (in association with other Powers), their Chinese superiors, granting or withholding funds and making and unmaking Governments. Commander-in-Chief Chang announced his intention of collecting customs surtaxes—conditionally promised at Washington, but repeatedly postponed. When the British Inspector-General refused to obey Chang's order, he was summarily dismissed, and replaced by a more amenable Briton. The Powers protested without result. Chang got his surtaxes. The

Customs Administration was under him, not over him; the old order of things was reversed.

In Manchuria, Chang's officials took over the earnings of the British-financed Peking-Mukden Railway, transferred the funds from the British bank at Tientsin to a Chinese bank at Mukden, suspended monthly repayments of a heavily watered "loan," repudiated obligations on southern railways secured on the lines' surplus earnings. Surplus earnings of the Manchurian line belonged in Manchuria—more specifically, to the Fengtien Government.

The anti-Soviet Powers encouraged Chang to a new move at Peking, arranging for his officers to enter the previously sacrosanct Diplomatic Quarter in Peking, ransack the Soviet Embassy, and seize various papers and documents. These papers (supplemented by some lurid forgeries) showed something of Soviet activities in China—which was what the Powers wanted for their anti-Soviet propaganda drive at the moment. In this as other things, however, Chang was drawing certain conclusions. He was curious about the private papers of some of the other legations at Peking, and had a growing desire for further searches. The unlettered bandit could hardly realize that while ransacking the Russian Embassy was quite in order, ransacking the British Legation (for instance) would be a monstrous crime against diplomatic immunity and the law of nations.

Chang was now asserting himself, and groveling to no one. To his Japanese and French backers—his "friends to the end"—he proposed that they evidence their friendship by abandoning extraterritoriality and other special privileges in China. Their friendship ended. In November, Peking abrogated the treaty with Spain, abolished Spanish

special privileges in China, and prepared for a new treaty on a basis of equality. With the British, an agreement was reached renditing to China the British Concession at Tientsin—on a similar basis to the Concession at Hankow, taken over by the Kuomintang Government there (utilizing mob pressure) the previous winter.

In Manchuria itself, his Government started construction of an all-Chinese railway system, devoting some of the surplus earnings of the Peking-Mukden line to this. A line was opened northward from Chinchow through western Manchuria—the line American capital had been bidding for twenty years previously; Japanese protests against competition with the South Manchuria Railway were rejected. Another Chinese line was built to the east of the South Manchuria Railway, northeastward from Mukden.

The Japanese again appealed to their American banker friends for support. These bankers were prepared to loan \$40,000,000 to the S.M.R. for extensions; the Japanese in turn would make a loan to Chang for further preferential rights. The Peking Government strongly objected, declaring that the proposed loan would constitute a great provocation to the Chinese Government, which opposed the construction of certain lines wanted by the S.M.R. The Government formally protested. The Americans had to withdraw. Manchurian railway construction went steadily ahead, in Chinese hands, toward the creation of an all-Chinese system which would leave the Japanese high and dry—and exclude other Powers altogether. Chang Tso-lin, ex-protege and "puppet," was now determined to be master in his own house.

On March 5, 1928, Chang appointed a Customs Tariff Autonomy Commission, to prepare for effective fiscal

independence at the beginning of 1929 with or without foreign authorization. A Japanese protest was ignored. His army was now the most powerful in China, and controlled far more territory than any of the warlords associated with the Kuomintang to the south. The new Customs funds would enable him to extend his power southward to the Yangtze again (his forces had been driven from Shanghai and Nanking in March, 1927), and further expand his forces. He would be the master of a new Far Eastern Power, sovereign and independent—words which had seemed so innocuous at the Washington Conference a few years previously.

When the Nationalist generals—Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, and their associates—launched their expedition against Peking in April, 1928, Chang was confident. His troops held Shantung in overwhelming strength, midway between Peking and Nanking. The Japanese Government, however, on April 20 dispatched troops to occupy the Shantung Railway in the rear of the Peking Government's most southern forces, and cutting their communications. They were forced to retire. General Chiang Kai-shek, following his troops to Tsinan, negotiated personally with the Japanese there, who declared a "neutral" zone on either side of the Shantung Railway, from which Chinese forces were excluded. The province was thus rendered useless to Fengtien; its soldiers could not even move, except on foot or horse, through the mountain roads and paths.

On the Peking-Hankow Railway, further west, Fengtien also had a preponderance of strength, but was hard pressed as Nationalist forces freed from Shantung by the Japanese intervention joined other Chinese forces there. On May 14, the Japanese extracted from Chang Tso-lin

their first concession for a long, long time—a long-desired contract for an important strategic railway clear across Manchuria from Korea—under threat that if not granted “Chang would never return to Mukden alive.” Four days later, they ordered him to return to Mukden at once. The old warlord courageously refused. The Japanese blocked his reinforcements, interfering with movements of rolling stock in Manchuria, and landed forces at Tientsin—cooperating with other Powers at this point, lying directly between Peking and Manchuria. On May 28, the Japanese threatened “effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order”—i. e., occupation of cities and railways in Manchuria as in Shantung. Premier Tanaka announced that his Government would prevent “defeated troops or those in pursuit of them” from entering Manchuria—i. e., the Fengtien forces would not be permitted to return to their old base.

These moves were decisive. On May 31 the Fengtien troops on the Peking-Hankow line retired. Chang Tso-lin left Peking on June 2 for his old capital at Mukden. Entering the city, passing under the South Manchuria Railway—a point “guarded” only by Japanese soldiers (“protecting life and property,” according to Secretary Hughes)—his train was wrecked by a terrific explosion; Chang was killed. The Japanese threat was fulfilled—even after Chang had yielded to it; their “appropriate effective steps” were taken. Chang was dead. Yang Yuting, Marshal Chang’s Chief of Staff, became military leader in Manchuria under the Japanese. His forces cooperated with the “Nationalists” in the final suppression of Chang Tsung-chang’s hard-bit forces east of Tientsin—which took another three months—and with the Japanese.

Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, played his hand cautiously. Chinese report has it that Yang Yu-ting aimed to assassinate the "Young Marshal," and that the latter returned to Mukden in the disguise of a common soldier. Certain it is that he re-established himself there with some of his father's old bandit comrades, reached an understanding with General Chiang Kai-shek (who, after the murder of Chang Tso-lin, we had promptly recognized as the Government of China), and—ignoring Japanese protests—announced his adherence to the Nanking Government.

Many years later, his long-secret papers revealed that he had privately discussed matters with the Japanese "liberal bureaucrat" Tokonami, who was hostile to the crude butcher policy of the Japanese Army, and who had given him the low-down on his father's death and on Yang Yu-ting's plans for a coup which would make him undisputed Chinese leader in Manchuria. On January 10, 1929, the Young Marshal invited Yang Yu-ting and his closest associate to a mah-jong party, received them smilingly, and excused himself for a moment. Four soldiers walked in and shot them to death. Chang was his father's son.

Chapter 13.

CHINA, JAPAN AND STIMSON

CHANG HSUEH-LIANG moved cautiously. He did not court his father's sudden end. The Fengtien regime had received a grave setback, reduced in one catastrophic month from the recognized Government of China to a local Manchurian regime, while the American Government, followed by other Powers, promptly recognized General Chiang's Government in far-off Nanking as the National Government of China. Peking ceased to be—to foreign Powers, which decided things—the capital of China. The British Inspector-General of Customs, who had taken orders from Marshal Chang, was removed to Nanking and then ousted in favor of the Customs Commissioner at Shanghai. The Customs surtaxes which Fengtien officials had levied in Manchuria, Shantung, and elsewhere were now transferred to the Kuomintang Government at Nanking, which announced a new tariff schedule including these various surtaxes, turned over to Nanking by the British-dominated Customs Administration. The national Customs revenues jumped from \$133,000,000 to \$244,000,000—and went to Nanking. It was understandable that on December 29, nine days after England and six days after France followed the American lead and signed the new tariff treaty with Nanking, Chang Hsueh-liang

declared his allegiance to Nanking. It was not only the recognized Government of China, but received more financial support from the Powers than any Chinese Government since Yuan Shih-kai.

The Nanking Government's severance of relations with the Soviet Government has been one of the factors of its popularity with the anti-Soviet Powers. Chang Hsueh-liang, with the Chinese Eastern Railway running through North Manchuria, still had Soviet consulates and trade agents in his territory. He turned from his father's dangerous policy of opposing the Japanese to a more promising policy—the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was taken over by his officials in July, 1929, together with the telephone and telegraph systems and trade agencies. Soviet railway officials, consular officials, and hundreds of railway employees were arrested. The Soviet Government tried to negotiate, but failed. It severed diplomatic and commercial relations, and recalled consular and trade representatives. Chang was pleased. The Nanking Government enthusiastically approved his act.

The American Government, most decidedly anti-Soviet of all the Powers, gave both open and secret encouragement. Secretary of State Stimson appealed through the French Government to Moscow, asking the Soviet Government to adhere to the Briand-Kellogg Pact against war—i. e., to let the Chinese keep the Russian railway. His action was especially interesting in view of the circumstances under which the Pact had been adhered to by Japan the previous year, with Japanese troops in occupation of the Chinese railway in Shantung and carrying out military operations against Chinese forces. His approach to Moscow via Paris called forth an astonished and sarcastic response from the Soviet Government, not-

ing that the American Government did not officially recognize the existence of the Soviet Government but "deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel." Moscow further pointed out that as negotiations were already under way (the Germans having tried to bring the Chinese and Russians together) the American approach "cannot but be considered unjustifiable pressure on the negotiations."

The American Government, seeking joint foreign intervention, got support from France and lukewarm cooperation from the Labor Government of England. The Japanese, however, declined to intervene, maintaining strict neutrality. Lacking the Hoover-Stimson hatred of the Soviet regime, they saw Chang's move as part of the campaign started by his father against foreign interests in Manchuria. The North Manchurian railways today would mean the South Manchuria Railway tomorrow. The Shidehara Government, indeed, was opposed to military intervention in general. In Manchuria, the Japanese lines refused to carry Chinese troops and munitions; they were neutral.

For five months Chang's officials held the railway. The Soviet Government, in response to a friendly appeal from France direct, had agreed to comply with the anti-War Pact, and negotiated fruitlessly for months. The Nanking Government launched a newspaper campaign, in an unprecedented strain of patriotic emotion, for the Chinese conquest of Siberia and "revenge" for China's "past wrongs" at Russian hands. Nanking was prepared to carry on to the last Fengtien soldier. But Moscow finally, on November 17, sent 3,000 troops over the border into Manchuria. The Chinese troops fled in panic, and Mukden agreed to re-establish the status quo on the rail-

way and settle things by direct negotiations. A last desperate effort by Secretary Stimson to organize international intervention against Moscow failed as completely as his first attempt. The Russians were not vindictive; the Chinese continued to share both management and profits in the railway.

Chang went rapidly ahead with the railway construction begun by his father. New lines were completed both east and west of the South Manchuria Railway, and connecting with the Peking-Mukden Railway. Chinese railway rates were reduced below Japanese, through-traffic arrangements made for all parts of the Chinese system, freight routed to the Chinese port at Newchang—competing directly with the great Japanese port, Dairen; work was started on a great new Chinese port. Trade boomed during 1930, but there was a decline in the freight carried to Dairen by the Japanese railway.

The Fengtien regime had a control of railways, of banking, and of foreign trade which brought it great revenues. Through the growth of exports of soya beans, Manchuria had a highly favorable trade balance, and bean production was directly responsible for a great influx of Chinese immigrants from south of the Wall, particularly during the 1920's. There were great tracts of uncultivated land at that time. Fengtien officials claimed ownership of all of them—as soon as anyone settled, or wanted to settle—except such as were held by Mongol tribes, whose chiefs sometimes became big landlords but often were expropriated. It was a loose feudalism, the Fengtien officials possessing both political and economic domination. There were estates of 100,000 acres and more—meaning, usually, that a powerful local official simply claimed ownership of an entire area. The simplest system

was to let the immigrant farmer earn a plot of land by cultivating another plot for the landlord, who thus obtained both labor and crops without cost to himself. If he were also an official, he could levy taxes on the farmer's own crops. If he were also a merchant, he could buy up these crops for the market.

Export marketing, however, was developed as a Government enterprise. The Fengtien regime went into the banking business for itself, and its banks bought the beans from the farmers, paying for them with its Government paper, routed them on Government railways to the seaports, and sold them abroad for good foreign currency. Some would have called the economic set-up "Socialist," except that the Government itself was privately owned. The enormous profits from the bean business were largely returned by the officials themselves, who often deposited the foreign currencies to their own credit—and issued more Government paper to buy more beans. The paper the farmer got for his beans in the fall was worth considerably less when he tried to buy goods with it in the spring. Government paper fell to ten per cent, five per cent, two per cent of its face value. I recall my amazement in Mukden, on changing an American \$10 bill, to receive in exchange an enormous roll of greenbacks—more than \$2,000 in *fengpiao* (Fengtien notes).

Some of the techniques of State-controlled economy the Chinese learned direct from the Soviet Russians, with whom they were active partners, from 1924 onward, in the Chinese Eastern Railway and its subsidiary enterprises. Chang Hsueh-liang spent more than \$100,000,000 yearly building his military forces—land, air, and naval—building railways, building the finest arsenal in China, producing everything from rifles and hand-grenades to

field guns and heavy shells, and finally starting with tanks, motor trucks, and automobiles in 1931. He built up an army of 250,000 trained soldiers. At the same time, he and his officials built up personal fortunes of hundreds of millions, out of rents, revenues, and the "bean racket," as the State marketing was termed. Each year the peasants produced more and more; each year they received less and less.

In 1930, Chang Hsueh-liang returned to Peking, whence he and his father had been ousted two years previously. He did not return, however, to proclaim a new National Government of China as his father would have done. The framework of such a Government was already there. The northern Kuomintang warlords, Generals Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, had broken with Chiang Kai-shek and established a new Government at Peking in the spring of 1930; Wang Ching-wei, as "Party leader," had joined it. The Government held out against Nanking for several months, despite Nanking's great Customs revenues, support and recognition from all the Powers, the services of German military advisers, and an unimpeded supply of foreign arms, including American planes. Chang made no move for months—until Nanking's advantages began to tell against the independent northern regime. Then he intervened; Peking could not fight the new enemy in its rear, and capitulated to him. Fengtien was again in Peking.

Chang, however, lacked the determination to act in defiance of the Powers who were unitedly supporting Chiang Kai-shek. He was offered support if not vassalage by Feng and Yen, whose Government he could have taken over himself. The diplomatic missions and legations of the Powers were still at Peking; they had not moved,

having little faith in the permanence of the Nanking regime. Chang would have been more powerful than his father, with Feng and Yen on his side, no serious rivals anywhere in North China, and Nanking ever more seriously involved in war with the growing forces of the Chinese Red Army further south. A combined northern drive on Nanking could have taken that city, as well as Shanghai. Fengtien would have returned to its domination of four years previously, south to the Yangtze and Shanghai, but far more integrated, organized and powerful than previously, while the South was more hopelessly divided. To its already large revenues it would have added the \$250,000,000 being turned over to the "recognized" Government at Nanking.

Chang, however, was a Nationalist. He was not a shrewd bandit like his father, whose "nationalism" of his last years was directly identified with the personal power of Chang Tso-lin. Chang Hsueh-liang was probably as ignorant as Chang Tsung-chang had been of the figures of his vast fortune, the number of his concubines, and the exact total of his soldiers. But he never said so. His semi-modern education and his soft life had separated him from his father's illiterate but loyal comrades of the road. He looked up to the "educated," accepted Sun Yat Sen's doctrines with the simple faith of a schoolboy, and listened more readily to southern or Australian advisers, or to Nanking official envoys or a British envoy, than to the hard-bit men who had built up the Fengtien Power. And so, with all North China again in his hands, he dissolved the Peking Government and accepted with innocent pleasure Chiang Kai-shek's award of the title, "Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces of China."

Chang strengthened himself—as he fatuously thought—by a military alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, and moved “permanently” to Peking with its roses and raptures. Through train service was inaugurated from Peking clear to Tsitsihar on the Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria—realizing a Harriman plan of twenty years previously, except that Chang owned it instead of Morgan and Harriman. The Japanese Government awarded him the first-class Order of Merit, with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun. The Japanese also approached the Feng-tien officials for a railway conference, to end the “rate war” by a friendly agreement between the Chinese and Japanese lines; preparatory negotiations started.

The Kuomintang—Nationalist Party—of which Chang was now a high-ranking member, gave him warm encouragement in actions against Japan in Manchuria. The Party organs opened a great campaign with specific reference to Manchuria, demanding the recovery of lost sovereign rights, the abolition of unequal treaties, and the evil of Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria. Kuomintang schoolbooks were introduced into Manchurian schools. Southern Kuomintang men entered Manchuria to promote or participate in anti-Japanese organizations and agitation. Pressure was brought on Chinese landlords to raise rents on Japanese and Koreans, and to refuse renewals or new leases. Kuomintang Party headquarters were established in the provincial capitals of Manchuria, with branch organizations elsewhere. Three hundred delegates assembled at a five-day conference called by the People's Foreign Policy Association at Mukden, which seriously discussed the liquidation of the Japanese position in Manchuria and the recovery of the South Manchurian Railway—the original lease on which had expired

years before, but was now held under the 99-year lease extracted by the Twenty-one Demands and confirmed by the Washington Conference. Chang continued to expand his arsenal and his army. The Sino-Japanese railway negotiations continued, compiling information and agreeing to nothing. In June, a newly-appointed head of the South Manchurian Railway dismissed the chief contact man with the Chinese; the negotiations were suspended.

Chang Hsueh-liang was confident. He was carrying on the campaign for "rights recovery," with every justification from the viewpoint of China's sovereign rights. He had the support and encouragement of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, and Chiang had the support of the Western Powers and their advisers. There was a jarring note from Wang Yung-pao, China's veteran Minister to Tokyo, but Chang did not like jarring notes. In July, Wang became fully aware of the Japanese militarists' intention of resuming forcible action in Manchuria, disregarding the civilian Government in Tokyo. Wang secretly informed Nanking, emphasizing the critical importance of retaining Chinese control over Manchuria and pleading for abandonment of deliberate provocation and "revolutionary" diplomacy, which was playing directly into the hands of the Japanese Army. He was recalled on July 13, being replaced by General Chiang's personal envoy. Not for another month did Chang respond to Wang's anxious warnings, try to reach a direct agreement with Tokyo, and send his own envoy to the Japanese capital.

Chang had his army. It was no match for the Japanese as yet, but it could make the invasion a very costly one. Japanese garrisons along the railway—where they had no treaty right whatever—could have been ordered to evacu-

ate, or wiped out at the first false move. The great arsenal and steel works at Mukden could have been held for a time, and later destroyed. Fengtien's little air force, and the funds in Mukden banks, could have been saved, at least in part. Destruction of the railways would have faced the Japanese with a long and bitter campaign, and inevitably have brought foreign intervention.

Chang approached his trusted Kuomintang "comrade," Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He was given urgent and friendly warning to avoid any forcible resistance or incidents. There was the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact against War. World opinion could be appealed to if China's case was not sullied by the use of force. At the beginning of September Chang issued categorical instructions to his forces not to resist any Japanese attack, or respond to provocation.

Japanese forces moved into important points without interference, and on the night of September 18 seized Mukden and other cities in the vicinity of the South Manchurian Railway, wiping out or dispersing any Chinese forces or Chinese policemen in their way. "Non-resistance" did not save the Chinese soldiers. Several hundred, surprised in their barracks near Mukden, were butchered without mercy. I saw a dozen dead policemen in a station-house in the city, shot dead by uniformed criminals too powerful for them to handle. A thousand miles of Chinese territory had been invaded, Chinese cities and towns occupied both along the Japanese railway and along some of the Chinese railways near it. It was war—undeclared war of the most vicious and unprovoked type.

The United States Minister to China informed Secretary Stimson of the situation on September 22, stating

that it was "an aggressive act by Japan" which was evidently long-planned, and carefully and systematically put into effect. The Japanese military operations, he was convinced, "must fall within any definition of war." The act of aggression had been deliberately accomplished in "utter and cynical disregard" of Japan's obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928, for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

The Nanking Government, on September 21, appealed to the League of Nations "to take immediate steps to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations, to re-establish the *status quo ante*, and to determine the amount and character of such reparations as might be found due to the Republic of China." England and other Western Powers were seriously concerned, but for effective action it was necessary to have the cooperation of the United States, which was not a member of the League of Nations. On September 21, the British Secretary-General of the League communicated with Secretary Stimson, "to sound out" (said Mr. Stimson) "our attitude and views particularly as to whether we thought the Kellogg-Briand Pact was involved."

But our State Department announced publicly, through the press, that, "the reports from China do not offer grounds for noting any violation of the Kellogg Pact!" Secretary Stimson advised the League Secretary that "it would be wise to avoid action which might excite nationalistic feeling in Japan in support of the military and against Shidehara." * This attitude was identical with the Japanese, whose delegates at Geneva similarly warned the League Council to keep its hands off, since

* *Far Eastern Crisis*. By Henry L. Stimson. Harper and Brothers, 1936. P. 42.

premature intervention in the circumstances would only have the deplorable result of needlessly exciting Japanese public opinion, which is already over-excited, and thus impede the peaceful settlement of the situation."

The League Powers followed their first cable to Washington with another. "Late in the evening," wrote Mr. Stimson, "came a cable reporting that the League was contemplating sending to Manchuria an investigating commission appointed by itself; that Japan objected but that the investigation would probably be made anyhow, if necessary under Chinese authority as the local sovereign of Manchuria. They wished to know whether we would join with an American member serving on such a commission." Mr. Stimson was in no hurry to reply, but the following morning, "while I was considering the cable, it was reinforced by a message conveyed through our Minister to Switzerland over the telephone telling me of the proposal to send such a committee of investigation," and further suggesting "that if we would permit an American representative to join in the discussions of these proposals at the table of the Council of the League or on its special committee . . . the effect would be dramatic and beneficial." *

Secretary Stimson flatly opposed: "I deprecated the proposal of sending by the League at that time an investigating commission to Manchuria *over and against the objection of Japan.*" (Stimson's italics.) He declined the League's invitations, and suggested that the "most effective line of cooperation . . . would be for the American Government, through the diplomatic channels, to support the League in urging a settlement by the two countries

*Same, pp. 42-3.

themselves by direct negotiations.”** Direct negotiations, with the Japanese Army in effective occupation of South Manchuria—including the Manchurian capital—was precisely what the Japanese wanted. Widespread patriotic opposition in China, however, made such a course impossible.

The Kwantung Army, after its first tremendous stroke, watchfully waited to see the reaction of the Powers. It had immediately transferred its headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden, settling down there for a permanent stay. The civilian Cabinet at Tokyo tried to block “further serious developments”; the War Minister was to issue such instructions. But the Army Chief of Staff wired Commander Honjo to wipe out the Fengtien Army. The Cabinet rejected War Minister Minami’s proposal for dispatch of troops from Korea; the Army dispatched them at once, curtly explaining that this was “quite within the rights of the military authorities.” The civilian Government tried to send envoys to the Kwantung Army, for some kind of understanding between it and the Foreign Office; this was vetoed by the War Office and the General Staff.

With no effective action from other Powers, the civilian Government was powerless to check the militarists in Manchuria. The Powers could have stopped the latter by determined action—but the American Government flatly refused to cooperate with the League in any such action. Secretary Stimson considered, it appears, that the Japanese Government had “for ten years given an exceptional record of good citizenship in the life of the international

**Same, pp. 43-4.

world.”* (Including, presumably, the Japanese invasion of Shantung, the butcheries at Tsinan-fu and elsewhere, and the murder of Chang Tso-lin.)

With the American Government's non-cooperative attitude made clear, the League Council decided to search for “measures which will permit the *two* nations to proceed with the withdrawal of their *respective* troops”—though without stating to what country the Chinese troops were to be withdrawn. The British Government—despite some Tory sympathies with Japan—saw all too clearly the dangerous potentialities of the Japanese moves, not only as against British interests in China but as a blow at the whole Far Eastern order. In regard to India, any act which strengthened Oriental at the expense of Western prestige was a direct blow at British supremacy. The British were anxious to block the Japanese moves. They were even more anxious, however, that the Japanese should not succeed against British opposition. Faced with the American Government's non-cooperation, British policy perforce turned to minimizing the importance of Western opposition to Japan, and devised “formulas” to show that they were “impartially” on the winning side—that of the Japanese militarists with their American friends. Following Washington's declaration for direct negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese, the British perforce came out for the same policy.

On September 30, the League Council adopted a resolution requesting the Japanese to withdraw their troops “into the railway zone” (their base of operations) “in proportion as the safety of the lives of Japanese nationals is effectively assured.” There was no reference to the safety of Chinese nationals—thousands of whom had been

* Same. p. 36.

killed by the Japanese. The resolution recognized the right of the Japanese Army to take action against "Chinese soldiers and brigands" who might forcibly resist them; no corresponding right was recognized for the Chinese Army in relation to Japanese soldiers. The President of the League Council (Lerroux) noted the sinister nature of the one-sided "right," and declared that "protection of the lives and property of nationals abroad . . . must be subordinated to respect for the fundamental rights of states." Such remarks were as offensive to the Japanese militarists as to Mr. Stimson, and Senor Lerroux was removed from his rightful headship of the Council.

Thus, the Council gave the Kwantung Army a green light. On October 3, the Army announced it would no longer deal with Chang Hsueh-liang's regime. On October 5 the American Government, satisfied with the League's action, announced that it "will endeavor to reinforce what the League does"—i. e., *not interfere* with the Japanese militarists. The League, however, made another effort. M. Briand, co-author of the Pact of Paris, became President of the League Council, and on October 16 invited the American Government to participate in the work of the League Council, specifically pointing out the obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the fact that "foremost among the signatories of the Pact appear the United States of America." Thus approached, Stimson found it difficult to refuse, and authorized the American Consul at Geneva to accept as the American representative.

During October, the Japanese Army carried its invasion further. On the 24th, with the invaders approaching the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Tsitsihar, the Western Powers of the League called upon the Japanese Gov-

ernment "to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council," November 16. It was a three-weeks ultimatum. Backed by the united strength of the Western Powers, it could not fail to be effective—if the American Government gave the cooperation promised in its pledge to "endeavor to reinforce what the League does."

The American Government, however, immediately disassociated itself from any united action against Japan. Stimson ordered the American representative to retire "from his temporary seat at the table of the Council," and announced that his Government reserved "complete independence of judgment at each step." The Japanese Army, thus able to thumb its nose at the League, continued to move ahead. When M. Briand, President of the Council, called on the Japanese for a statement of their purposes, they politely evaded. Mr. Stimson assured Japan of the American Government's sympathy in their "attempt to secure respect for their treaty rights in Manchuria," and noted that while "a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of southern Manchuria and has, temporarily at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in this region," it was a matter on which "my Government neither attributes motives nor passes judgment, but desires solely to point out the fact."

Secretary Stimson protected the Japanese militarists not only from the League, but also from the American press, to which he fed stories of precisely the type desired by the Japanese militarists, and endeavored to restrain widespread public criticism of their aggressions. He subse-

quently wrote of this, to defend himself, as follows:

"Soon after the original outbreak of September 18th at Mukden I had held a conference at my home at Woodley with the chiefs of the various press associations and the heads of the Washington bureaus of the most important dailies, in which I had outlined to them the background of the Manchurian situation. . . . Thereafter on various occasions I had supplemented my regular press conferences at the Department with similar special meetings of these senior Washington journalists. Their responses throughout this period to my appeal for patience and self-control on the part of our press has been admirable. They had as a whole kept the press from becoming inflamed and had endeavored to protect me."*

Thus, with the Japanese militarists occupying a powerful base which would make them the Great Power of the Far East, and strengthen them so that they could ultimately seize the Philippines and strike murderous blows at us at Pearl Harbor, Secretary Stimson "kept the press from becoming inflamed." But the State Department could not wholly control the press; many editors had ideas of right and wrong, and of international law and decency, which Washington did not yet have power to suppress, and which could not be forever distorted by an official campaign of pro-Japanese propaganda, misinformation, and mendacious half-truths:

"With the repeated acts of defiance of world public opinion on the part of the Japanese army,

* Same, p. 72.

and the failure of the Japanese Government to make good its assurances, popular criticism throughout the country had been rising. Through the press the growth of this American feeling became very manifest to us at the Department. It was clear that the American people were following the proceedings both here and at Geneva with great interest. It was also clear that they were growing puzzled and angry at the silence of their own government in the face of the defiant attitude of the Japanese army.”*

Thus, press criticism finally forced the Department of State to make a gesture of opposition to Japan. Congressmen were getting restive, and in fact obliged the Administration to supply them with its diplomatic correspondence on the subject a couple of months later. On November 19 Stimson had regretfully to inform the Japanese envoy that they could not carry on their secret exchanges much longer: “I reminded him that I had gone so far . . . as to urge our own press not to publish any matter which would inflame American opinion against Japan, but that now in the interest of the position of my own government I must reserve full liberty of action to make public the whole matter.”**

When the Japanese Army, a few days later, started to move on Chinchow in southwestern Manchuria—a “pincer movement” from Mukden and Tientsin—Stimson felt obliged to say something. On November 27, for the first time, he made public Japan’s “assurances” (three days previously) “that there would be no movement of Japanese troops in the direction of Chinchow,” and informed

* Same, pp. 72-3.

** Same, p. 74.

Tokyo that he was unable to understand, in view of these assurances, the reports of Japanese troop movements.

There was a striking response. The Japanese Army was immediately recalled to Mukden, some of the younger officers in tears at being robbed of their Chinese prey. There they waited for days, while Stimson quietly assured the Japanese that he had no intention of taking action. One undiplomatic statement from Washington, suggesting that they were prepared to cooperate with the League Powers against Japan's further aggressions, sent the Kwantung Army running back to its base. Had the move been made two months before, in cooperation with the League, the Japanese would similarly have withdrawn. They had no choice. League sanctions against Japan, supported by the United States and backed by united naval forces four times Japan's, could not possibly have been resisted. That was in 1931.

At the end of December, the Japanese moved on Chinchow again. The State Department now made no undiplomatic objections. On January 7, 1932, Mr. Stimson communicated his "Non-Recognition" statement to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, beginning:

"With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed."

This was true. Mr. Stimson had done more than any other Western statesman to make it true. The Fengtien Power was ended. Manchuria with its riches was now the spoil of the Kwantung Army, the great base of a vast and bloody new Empire of the East.

Chapter 14.

THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

MANCHURIA is a large country, by European standards. But it occupies less than one-eighth of the vast territories shown on the map as China. The Republic of China, as it is still termed, covers more than 4,000,000 square miles. Among the countries of the world, only Soviet Russia covers a greater contiguous area. China is larger than all Europe taken together, larger than the United States of America. Our forty-eight states could be dropped right into China, and a million square miles of Chinese territory would be outside our borders. From east to west, we would about fit, in approximately the same latitudes. But to the north we would have to extend as far as Hudson Bay, and to the south as far as Yucatan, to equal the immensity of China.

In people, as in area, China approximates all Europe taken together, its population being estimated as high as 500,000,000, almost one-fourth of the world. More than nine-tenths of its people are Chinese, speaking one or another Chinese dialect. These dialects differ among themselves as widely as do the Aryan languages of Europe, but over a great part of the country—from Manchuria in

the northeast through North China to the Yangtze, and westward into Szechwan and into the southwestern province of Yunnan—the dialects are almost as closely related as are the various local dialects of England. In the provinces of the southeastern coast—from Shanghai to Canton—and its hinterland, the northerner will be as unintelligible to the common illiterate people as a German in Italy. And along this coast there are half a dozen groups of dialects which are mutually unintelligible to one another. No man alive really speaks all the hundreds of dialects of China, not to speak of the non-Chinese languages of the natives of the southwest, and of Tibet and Sinkiang and Mongolia.

But the traveler from Manchuria will have no language difficulties in North China. It is the same country, the same tall, sturdy people. Many, indeed, do not look so sturdy. There are ever greater evidences of destitution, of starvation, of beggary. Child and adult beggars are everywhere, but these are not the poorest. The poorest cannot beg; they are shoved off the streets by the "professionals" organized for the protection of their wretched subsistence against amateur competition; so the poorest die. A benevolent society exists in every considerable city, picking up the dead bodies every morning and giving them as decent burial as they can. Often the fierce, savage street dogs get there first. A struggle for survival. . . .

Other sights the traveler will find more attractive—especially if he visits Peking, that most magnificent of cities. Here he will find marvelous parks and gardens, temples and palaces and artificial lakes created by the Emperors who ruled here a thousand years. Prior to the Chinese revolution, thirty-one years ago, these glories were for the enjoyment only of their Imperial masters and their

well-fed servants. Since then, many of them have been open to the public—that is, for such of the public as could pay admission. And the canny Chinese or the foreigner who knows the ropes can often find a way.

When I lived at Yenching University, outside of Peking, near the flowering marble ruins of the sublime Yuen Ming Yuen (Summer Palace) deliberately destroyed by the British forces at Peking in 1860, I did not pay a dollar to enter the newer Summer Palace further west—for which the Empress Dowager paid \$50,000,000, appropriating it from the funds gouged from her subjects for a new Navy. I wandered around outside the far-spreading walls, by little paths hardly used except by the local peasants and workers, until I found a broken-down part of the wall and climbed in. Some workers were repairing the wall; I gave them friendly greeting as I passed them, and they responded cheerily. It wasn't their business if I didn't have a ticket; they were masons, not ticket-collectors.

There may never be another Peking. For that great city in its heyday was the capital not only of China with its three or four hundred million inhabitants, but of great territories stretching far beyond China itself. For centuries, the Emperor was sovereign of the civilized world—and supreme sovereign of great border territories as well. Korea, and what is now the Russian Maritime Province; Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet (each covering more than a million square miles); Nepal and Burma; Siam and the states now grouped together as Indo-China—all, a century and a half ago, acknowledged the supreme authority of the Son of Heaven at Peking. From all these countries came tribute—sometimes real, sometimes nominal. All these outer countries built temples and palaces

or pagodas at Peking, in their own distinctive style. Beyond these dominions, other peoples took pride in erecting their own structures in the Capital of the Eastern World. There is a Russian church at Peking; the original was built two and a half centuries ago, when the enlightened Manchu Emperor signed a treaty recognizing the Russian Czar (whose forces had just been beaten by the Manchus) as his own equal. The Summer Palace which the British destroyed eighty-three years ago was a magic glorification of the palace at Versailles—the most beautiful architectural creation of the Western World—built under direction of a European architect, supplemented by the greatest artists, architects, and gardeners of Asia.

The Emperors are gone. The last of them abdicated thirty-one years ago, but was permitted to retain the Imperial palaces, where he continued to live in royal state until 1924—when General Feng Yu-hsiang and his People's Army decided to end the ex-Emperor's anomalous privileges, despite the strong protests and representations of the monarchist Powers. The ex-Emperor, aided by his English tutor, escaped to the Legation Quarter in Peking—a fortified area, garrisoned by foreign troops, in the heart of the Chinese capital—and from there to the foreign concessions at Tientsin. Thence he was taken by Colonel Doihara, a Japanese master of intrigue, to Mukden in 1931, where he was installed first as "Regent" and then as "Emperor" by the Japanese. At the end of 1935, the Japanese moved to expand the puppet Empire to Peking, and re-establish the Manchu Court in its old capital, but the American Government objected. The Japanese still accepted our vetoes.

Peking is still dominated by Imperial soldiers, but they are now those of Japan. The armies of the new Empire of

the East owe allegiance to the Sovereign of Heaven at Tokyo, not to the Son of Heaven at Peking. Most of the territories formerly acknowledging Peking's supremacy are now dominated by the Japanese, or by Western Powers. The Japanese rule Korea and Manchuria. South of the Great Wall they dominate Peking and Tientsin, the cities and railways of North China southward to the Yangtze, the Yangtze basin from Hankow and Kiukiang eastward to Nanking and Shanghai, southward from Shanghai to Hangchow and Ningpo, and the coast southward to Hongkong, Canton, and French Indo-China. Most of China, geographically speaking, is still independent of Japan. But about half the Chinese people, in terms of population, are subject either to the Japanese or to Chinese collaborators or puppets who are ultimately dependent on the Japanese. The so-called occupied areas of China include the most populous and most industrialized areas of the country. And to the south of China Proper, the Japanese now dominate the old Chinese dominions of Indo-China and Burma, as well as Siam.

To the north and west, the Manchu Emperor's old domains beyond Korea are now the Russian Maritime Province. Outer Mongolia is now under Soviet domination, as is also Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) to the southwest; they are not formally parts of the Soviet Union, however. Tibet is essentially a British protectorate; since 1912 the British have forbidden Chinese troops to enter the country; the most westerly part of Tibet is now included in Kashmir; Nepal is an Indian native state—autonomous, but with British control of foreign relations.

Civil administration at Peking, under Japanese occupation, has been mainly in the hands of Chinese who

held office when the Japanese started their war in 1937. They are elderly, conservative men of affairs, some of them mandarins of the old Imperial school. Chief among them is Wang Keh-min, who is not to be confused with Wang Ching-wei, whom he detests and fears. A visitor who succeeds in meeting Wang Keh-min finds a hard-boiled, resolute man approaching seventy, wearing dark glasses; unless the visitor is told by others, he may not realize that Wang is almost totally blind. He is a southerner—from Hangchow in Chekiang province, south of Shanghai. He was a banker, and for a time President of the Bank of China. In 1917, and again in 1923 and 1924, he was Finance Minister of the Chinese Government at Peking. His emphasis on economic realities and civilian needs did not make him popular with his former Chinese militarist overlords; he is not popular with his present Japanese militarist overlords, but he is too useful to them to be dispensed with.

Unlike most of the Chekiang financial goup, Wang was not closely associated with General Chiang Kai-shek (also a Chekiang man) and the Soongs, but in 1933—after the ousting of Chang Hsueh-liang from Peking—he became director of the Finance Division of the Peiping (Peking) Political Council, and in 1935 a member of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; both of these were autonomous regimes accepting the sovereignty of the National Government at Nanking. When the Japanese ousted the Chinese armies from the Peking-Tientsin area in 1937, Wang and other officials carried on, with the specific understanding that they were not to be a mere front for Japanese officials *a la* Manchukuo. Wang accepted the Presidency of the "Provisional Government" at Peking, set up in December, 1937, by the Japanese, on

these terms; the Japanese had too many other things to worry about to dispense with the services of these competent executives; they even postponed indefinitely the extension of their puppet Manchu Empire to Peking, which they had planned to achieve two years before.

The Japanese have, however, appointed general advisers on political, economic, and military affairs, who have made their influence decisive in matters which the Japanese considered of sufficient importance. These referred mainly to economic relations, in which the Japanese sought a virtual monopoly in important fields in North China. The North China Development Company, set up by the Japanese in November, 1938, aimed to monopolize most forms of big-scale business enterprise; half its capital was supplied by the Japanese Government. Iron mines, communications, transport, harbor works, and other fields were gone into by this great holding company. Chinese companies were not crudely expropriated; but they were forced to "cooperate," contributing their plants and equipment while the Japanese put in some capital and took over management, with majority control of boards. The Chinese usually continued to get half the profits out of their own enterprises. The fact that they got this much was partly due to the influence of the old mandarins at Peking.

The mandarins were less considerate of Western interests. The North China railways had been profitable fields for British and other capitalists, who held some \$150,000,000 of railway debentures. But all railways in this area were placed under the management of the newly created North China Traffic Company, the main stockholder in which was the South Manchurian Railway. Neither the Japanese Army nor the Peking mandarins

showed any consideration for the Western bondholders, who ceased to receive remittances from Chinese lines. Profits passed from Western shareholders and Chinese militarists to the Japanese Army and the South Manchuria Railway. Some new railways were built—previously resisted by the influence of Western investors and the Chinese who cooperated with them. And a considerable number of new motor roads and new bus lines were opened, with Japanese capital, the Japanese taking the profits.

In 1940, the Japanese recognized Wang Ching-wei's regime at Nanking as the National Government of China. It was a mortal threat to Wang Keh-min and his group; the present Nanking regime, like its predecessors, has not hesitated to assassinate its political rivals. But the Peking regime carried on, being renamed the Political Council of North China—a title similar to that of ten years ago. The Japanese Army in North China does not particularly like these mandarins, but they are too good to lose. Furthermore, the Japanese North China Command wants to retain its own autonomy, instead of being subordinated to the Central China Command.

The Japanese Government, by its treaty with the Wang Ching-wei regime at the end of 1940, agreed to withdraw its forces from most of China as soon as peace is restored, but specified that they could station forces in specified areas of North China as well as Inner Mongolia "for the necessary duration," for the avowed purpose of carrying out "defense against communistic activities." The clear implication is of Chinese Communist activities, against which the Wang Ching-wei regime signed an agreement for direct collaboration with Japan. North China and Inner Mongolia, however, border on Soviet-dominated

Outer Mongolia, and the Japanese Army wants to retain direct control of this area for strategic as well as other reasons.

From a purely economic viewpoint, the semi-autonomous setup in North China costs the Japanese much less than does the purely puppet regime in Manchuria. A Japanese adviser for every Chinese official, and tens of thousands of Japanese agents and officials and spotters throughout the country, mean virtually double costs of administration. The Kwantung Army could do it in Manchuria—Japanese taxpayers paying most of the bill. But to do it over the vast areas of North China, with a population more than twice that of Manchuria and living much closer to starvation, is much more difficult, and the Japanese Government has plenty of liabilities elsewhere. Chinese mandarins, however, can live off the country; that is their special competence. Administration in their hands costs the Japanese nothing—except the costs of the Japanese Army itself. And Japanese enterprises, direct or in cooperation with helpless Chinese, bring in direct profits.

Patriotic young Chinese of the modern generation denounce Wang Keh-min as a traitor; his own daughter is one of his accusers. But some conservative Chinese compare him to the Mayor of Brussels, who carried on his civic duties under the German occupation from 1914 to 1918, and was subsequently honored by his own people for his services. Wang's death has been reported. With Mukden, Nanking, and Chungking hostile to him, and the Japanese Army in North China regarding him merely as a "necessary evil," he is not a very good insurance risk. But he or his ghost seems still to be carrying on.

Dr. Tang Erh-ho, an outstanding member of Wang

Keh-min's Cabinet, has cooperated closely with his chief, and declined a Japanese offer of the Premiership. If the visitor is especially interested in cultural and educational affairs, he may visit Chou Tso-jen—for more than twenty years professor of Chinese in Peking National University—one of the great masters of Chinese prose and brother of the most distinguished Chinese novelist of the present generation, the late Lu Hsin. Chou is a relic of the Chinese Republic, a libertarian and a democrat who after the defeat of the Republic centered on literature and philosophy, developed from political skepticism and despair to philosophical anarchism, and is trying to keep Chinese culture and education alive under the alien occupation. His prestige as a scholar and as an educational official enables him to carry on in cooperation with Wang Keh-min, whom he regards as the least of various current evils. Detesting monarchy, militarism, and Party dictatorship, he has no powerful protectors anywhere. But he represents himself as "just a philosopher," sincerely detests war and takes no part in it, and has a Japanese wife. He is still not a good insurance risk.

These older men can still remember Peking in 1900—the Year of Great Tribulation. It was in that year that the Chinese rebellion against ever-increasing foreign aggressions took form in the fierce Boxer movement and spread northward to Tientsin and Peking, with the support of some outstanding Manchu officials.

The Peking Government anxiously warned foreigners to leave, being unable to guarantee their safety. The foreign Powers refused any evacuation, and ordered their nationals to stay in Peking. In regard to the United States, this was a complete reversal of our attitude in 1895, when we had warned our nationals to leave the capital at a

time of threatened danger. But Britain and the United States were the most determined leaders of the 1900 invasion. We desperately begged the Japanese to help us against the Chinese; the British offered to pay all their expenditures and indemnify them against losses. The Japanese finally agreed to send troops, but neither they nor the Russians showed any enthusiasm for the military advance called for by the British and Americans.

Preliminary negotiations between the Chinese and foreign authorities finally made it possible for the foreign forces to reach Tungchow, outside of Peking, virtually without fighting; formal negotiations were to be started.

From Tungchow, however, the foreign forces launched a treacherous night attack on Peking, and took the city, where they relieved the foreign legations, which had been under intermittent attack for some weeks. The furious Chinese attacks had been unsuccessful because of divided opinions in the Imperial Government, some leaders flatly opposing the war against the Powers; China's heavy artillery was in the hands of a Manchu leader who refused to permit its use, and shot any Boxers who approached it.

The Allied invaders then sacked the city, and butchered most of its civilian population—the Allied armies acting under specific instructions; those of the German Emperor have already been quoted. Day after day, week after week, the massacre of the helpless civilians continued; all the regular Chinese armies, and the Boxers, had long since left the city. The wells were choked with the bodies of Chinese women and girls who had ended their lives there after successive rapings by the foreign soldiers. Massacre and rape, robbery and arson made the great city a stinking shambles. The "Chinks" were taught their

lesson: never again to raise their hand against a White Man or a Christian.

The Russians and Japanese saved the Imperial Palace itself from sacking and destruction, to the great indignation of Western looters in uniform. Russia and Japan, with their long relations with neighboring China and its Imperial Government, took a somewhat different attitude than the Governments of Western Europe and the United States. The Japanese were themselves sometimes mistaken for Chinese, and several Japanese and white men were killed before the Japanese were given strict instructions to remain in the quarter allotted to them by the Powers jointly. It was at Peking that the Japanese, for the first time, saw Christian troops in operation against the Chinese civilians.”*

The Japanese did not like it. They looted the Chinese treasury, but they did not butcher and rape wholesale. They did not get around to this until December, 1937, when their troops took Nanking and showed themselves to be fully equal to the white men at Peking in 1900.

The Allies did not evacuate Peking. They remained there. They built a fortified Legation Quarter just outside the Imperial Palace, and maintained regular garrisons there and along the railway to the sea. The Manchu Imperial regime was invited back, and set up at Peking again—despite the bitter protests of democratic and liberal Chinese—under foreign occupation. Chinese troops were excluded. Peking continued to be an occupied city. Down to 1937 it was dominated by the forces of the Powers jointly. Since 1937 it has been dominated by the forces of Japan.

* For an eye-witness account by an Englishman, see Putnam Weale: *Indiscreet Letters from Peking*.

What of the Chinese Republic—the name which China still bears? This came into existence in 1912, when the Manchus abdicated. The Allied Powers in 1901 had set up in Peking the most viciously reactionary group of the Manchus, under the savage old Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, who had been directly responsible for the attack on the foreign legations. The rightful claims of the liberal young Emperor, Kwang Hsu, were ignored. He was a patriot who had striven to modernize and strengthen China by lopping off the privileges of his own ruling class and bureaucracy and introducing elements of representative government. But this would have strengthened China, and China would refuse to accept foreign orders. So the Powers set up a vicious old woman who would take orders; reactionaries are more pliable because they are more dependent, having no popular support. The Emperor returned to Peking as her prisoner, which he remained—an alternative sovereign, to keep the old woman obedient to the Powers. On her own death-bed, she ordered him killed—and she died happy.

The death of the old dictator opened the way to reform. Already, liberalizing pressures had brought a plan for gradual development of representative institutions, and this was now put into practice and speeded up. Provincial governments were elected, which soon began to assert themselves against the Imperial governors, refusing to be simply advisory. The National Assembly met in 1911, and was equally disobedient. And, in the midst of this, the American Government forced the Manchu regime into action which revealed it even more completely as a puppet of foreign Powers—and brought about its overthrow.

It was, again, the old game of railway investments in

China. The Taft Administration, despite its setbacks in Manchuria, refused to believe that the game was up. It had failed to crash the Russo-Japanese sphere in Manchuria; it tried to crash China Proper—its railways dominated by British, German, and French capital. The three latter Powers refused to admit the new partner; Washington brought pressure on Peking—which was not displeased at what it considered a competitor to the other Powers. The upshot was the taking of America into partnership and the formation of a four-Power Consortium to dominate all railway investment in China Proper (i. e., China south of the Great Wall). On their joint demand, the Imperial Government issued an order nationalizing all Chinese railways.

This nationalization was purely on behalf of the Consortium. It meant, in practice, that the various railways in which Chinese capital was interested were to be brought under Peking's control, and Chinese capital forced out on behalf of *foreign* capital. In the far western province of Szechwan, however (the present seat of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Government), the Imperial governor tried to pay off the Chinese investors in a projected railway from Hankow into Szechwan at a mere percentage of their paid-in capital. For official protection and standing, the investors had named him President of the line, with access to funds. He now confessed that he had lost most of the money at mah-jongg. The investors refused to accept the settlement. The provincial assembly supported them, and called out the provincial militia. Imperial forces were ordered to Szechwan from Hankow—and mutinied. The Revolution was on.

The Imperial regime was moribund. A few months saw the spread of the vast revolutionary uprising throughout

most of the country. The Manchus abdicated. The Powers acknowledged the hopelessness of trying longer to maintain the ancient despotism. A Republican Government was proclaimed at Nanking, with the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen as President. The Powers refused to recognize the Republic; from the abdicating Manchu regime they obtained fuller control over the Customs revenues, giving them a strangle-hold over Government finance. They strengthened their military hold on Peking. Yuan Shih-kai, a capable Chinese militarist of the old school, was decided on as the Powers' agent against the Revolution.

Yuan had several recommendations. Besides his military ability, he had been the man who had betrayed the liberal Emperor (who had confided in him) into the hands of the Empress Dowager, and had subsequently betrayed the Empress Dowager on behalf of the foreign Powers during the 1900 invasion. As a man completely ruthless and treacherous, guided only by self-interest and his hatred of all popular or liberal influences, prepared to work and kill for anyone who paid him, he was the prize candidate of the Powers and the Consortium. Faced with the menace of Republican revolution directed not only against the Manchu regime, but against the Imperialist Consortium of which the Manchus had been the servants, the Russians and Japanese got together with the British, Germans, and French in a joint front against the Republic. The Americans were dropped; we had done too much damage already to everyone concerned, including the Chinese.

The new Consortium, from which we were omitted, had as its first task the financing of counter-revolution. For this purpose, it supplied funds to Yuan Shih-kai, who turned over to the Powers control of the Chinese salt

revenues. Yuan, with these foreign funds, was able to build up his military forces, under his own command. The Powers ignored the appeals of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and of the Chinese Parliament, against thus financing the enemies of the Republic.

Dr. Sun, by his patriotic devotion, weakened his own position. It soon became clear that none of the Powers, including the American Government, would recognize the Chinese Republic at Nanking. As the Powers insisted on a Government at Peking dominated by foreign troops, it meant the partition of China, since Yuan and his foreign backers were able to hold North China against the revolutionary forces. Yuan, however, was willing to "compromise," as it was called. He sent an envoy to Nanking, giving assurances of his own loyalty to the Republic, explaining that he could not leave North China, and extending a welcome to the new Parliament to establish itself at Peking; he was eager to serve the Republic.

There were divided councils at Nanking. Few trusted Yuan; but Sun Yat-sen decided that he himself must not stand in the way of a united China. He abdicated the Presidency on behalf of Yuan; Parliament would be the real power anyway, in the republican order of things. Parliament moved to Peking; Yuan accepted the Presidency. The Powers, with their troops in Peking, dealt with and financed Yuan personally, ignoring Parliament and its protests. Yuan assassinated the principal republican leaders in parliament, and overawed others by terror and his military forces. Into one province after another he moved his troops, or financed fellow-militarists to make themselves masters in their own provinces. A second revolution broke out. Yuan and his fellow-militarists, their forces strengthened and expanded by foreign

funds and supplies, crushed it. Yuan was military dictator of China, subject only to the Consortium and the Diplomatic Body—the new Super-State.

Parliament, humbled, was permitted to carry on as an advisory body. Yuan, in name, was only a President. Various bills were referred to Parliament, which was permitted to discuss and even to reject the less important ones. His Cabinet was responsible to him personally, as Chief Executive. It did not have to answer directly to Parliament, which did not control the Executive; it could only criticize, and demand investigations of things already done. Yuan liked the American system—except for the periodical elections. He had an American adviser.

This American adviser was Yuan's great misfortune, and from one viewpoint was China's misfortune as a whole. Adviser Goodnow was a Chinese scholar—a Sino-logue. Like most Sinologues, he was steeped in the ancient lore of China, and his main contacts were with Confusian scholars who bewailed the passing of the good old days of Imperial absolutism and Confucian regimentation of thought. He detested, as did they, the revolutionists and the democrats and the radicals of China. The Republic, he was convinced, was a mistake. China would be far better off as a monarchy.

There were not many Sinologues at Washington, but there were a number of men who were still hopeful of railway and other investments in China. The European war, breaking out in August, 1914, ended the joint front of the Powers in China. Japan declared war on Germany, in order to seize German interests in China and add them to her own—and also to seize German islands in the Pacific. Simultaneously, the Japanese prepared a series of secret demands on Yuan Shih-kai, threatening to support

his political opponents if he refused. The European Allies, deeply involved in the West, gave diplomatic support to the Japanese to keep them on the Allied side. Only the American Government could oppose Japan in China. We did oppose such Japanese demands as infringed upon America's own interests in China; those demands were dropped; the others were yielded to.

With Yuan under Japanese pressure, we were able to increase our influence over him. Adviser Goodnow suggested, to the great pleasure of the old militarist, that the Empire should be restored, with Yuan as Emperor. There was widespread Chinese opposition, even among Yuan's own military and civil supporters, who accepted Yuan as a leader but had no desire to kowtow to him as an Emperor. The British and other Governments, who had some statesmen as well as Sinologues, warned anxiously against it. But Yuan followed Goodnow's advice and enthroned himself as Emperor, in which capacity he issued a great batch of railway concessions for American capitalists throughout China. But his day of Imperial glory, and as agent of American railway investment, was brief. Revolution broke out again, this time supported by many of the militarists themselves, as well as by the Japanese. Yuan's own supporters deserted him in his foolish venture. He abdicated—and died. The Chinese Parliament reasserted itself at Peking against lesser military figures. Our railway concessions were quietly filed away.

At Peking, there was now something of a balance between Parliament and the militarists, and a general authority over most of the country. In 1917, we moved to get China on our side in the war against Germany. When the United States severed diplomatic relations with Ger-

many, we approached the Chinese Government to do the same. It did; the Chinese had no immediate quarrel with Germany, but it would mean one of the Imperialist Powers out of the way. When we tried, however, to get China to declare war on Germany, it was another matter. The Chinese militarists welcomed the idea—on their own terms, which would mean giving them more funds out of the Customs collections, the right to eliminate German privileges and seize German interests in China, and the opportunity to build up their own military forces as Allies. The Chinese parliament opposed, as war conditions and the expansion of military forces would greatly strengthen the militarists.

But the Allies won the Japanese over to the War for Democracy, and the Japanese used their influence to get the Chinese into the war. As parliament was stubborn, it was dismissed—and fled from Peking. The militarists were now supreme. They cheerfully declared war on Germany, since their terms were met. The Japanese reached a number of secret agreements with them, including a military alliance which provided for Japanese officers to command some of the new troops to be organized—ostensibly for war against Germany, actually for war against the Chinese republicans.*

It was a remarkable precedent—getting the Chinese into war in this way. Parliament, the legal Government of China, had fled to Shanghai and Canton. The largest group assembled at this last-named city, where the Republic was again proclaimed. The military puppets at Peking, with the Japanese pulling the wires, declared war on Germany. The legitimate government at Canton

* For an excellent account, see Bertrand Russell: *The Problem of China*.

did not do so—and was not recognized. The next year, the Peking puppet regime again followed the Powers in war—this time against Soviet Russia, which had offered to deal with China on a basis of equality, and against which Chinese troops were sent both at Harbin and, occasionally, across the Russian border.

Thus, the Chinese Republic was brought to an end—for all practical purposes. Repeated attempts were made to revive it, but these were always faced with the opposition of foreign Powers. For a representative Government of China supported by the mass of the Chinese people would be so strong that it would not take orders from foreign Powers. It would not be a government of militarism and war—the Chinese had already had enough of this, and showed it—but would be able to stand firmly on its own feet against foreign encroachments. This also the representative bodies of China had shown, in the very struggle which eventuated in the revolution of 1911. They would work for their people, not for foreign Powers.

Peking ceased to be the capital of China, in any real sense. Canton was a more representative center, but even this had to maintain itself by a military government against the northern militarists. In the interior, provincial militarists increasingly carried on independently, taking orders from no one—excepting, in emergencies, the foreign Powers. Peking was usually dominated by the most powerful local militarist; sometimes when there was a dangerous balance between opposing forces, the Peking government's authority was non-existent outside its own walls and suburbs. Chang Tso-lin was dictator in Manchuria; Wu Pei-fu in Central China; Sun Chuan-fang in the Shanghai area; Tsao Kun in Chihli (in which Peking is situated) itself. But the foreign Powers still

recognized and turned over funds to the successive regimes at Peking as the official Government of China—if their conduct was satisfactory to the foreigners, whose garrisons held the fortified Legation Quarter in the heart of the old capital.

No more remarkable assortment of militarists, bandits, traitors, degenerates, gangsters, and criminals ever existed anywhere, than those whom the foreign Powers began to finance and approve as the government of China. One after another they came in a steady stream, seeking the recognition and revenues to be gained by possession of Peking and service to the foreign Powers. The latter were more easy-going, in a way, than the Manchu rulers. There were no civil service examinations such as there had been under the Imperial regime. There were no Imperial inspectors, no necessity for caution in the exploitation of the common people. If merciless plunder of the peasants led to famine, banditry, and rebellion in some area, the local warlords and officials quietly decamped, to live in opulent ease in some foreign concession. At Peking itself it was only necessary to gain some local power, and to grovel to the foreign Powers as the old officials had groveled to the Son of Heaven.

In 1917-19 it was the Anfu gang, selling all they could of China to the Japanese—then our beloved allies against Germany and against Soviet Russia—in exchange for loans to deposit in foreign banks against the inevitable deluge, or to squander on the imperial debaucheries of Peking. There was the Manchurian bandit, Chang Tso-lin, who cooperated with Wu Pei-fu—a curious survival of the past, who was able to read and write and was handicapped by fugitive ideas of decency and loyalty—to drive out the Anfus. There was Tsao Kun, President in 1923-4, who

made of his Imperial palace a noisome dive devoted to wine and liquor, male and female prostitutes, opium, and gambling, and who left all affairs of state to his male favorite Li Yen-cheng, a pretty bath-house boy. Li himself graduated from "attendant" at Tsao Kun's opium bed to the position of official treasurer, and appointed his friends of the Peking underworld to high office—they amassing fortunes. For a time he seemed to be the most important figure in the regime patronized by foreign Powers as the government of China. He was summarily shot when the peasant General Feng Yu-hsiang seized power in Peking—by betraying Wu Pei-fu. But Feng himself was defeated by direct support given to Chang Tso-lin by the foreign Powers.

Chang, for a time, was the prize protege of the Powers—our illiterate, opium-smoking bandit, who by murder, treachery, and ruthlessness had made himself leader of other bandits and of the reactionaries in Manchuria, had groveled before the Manchus in the latter days of the Empire and before the foreign Powers after its collapse, gave full support to the struggle against the Republic, was saved from destruction by direct Japanese intervention in 1925, and by the grace of the Powers became the Government of China the following year. But Chang became too independent, and was murdered by the Japanese, with considerable foreign approval. The Powers decided to try Shanghai gangsters instead, though some of Chang's old associates had their qualities. Chang Tsung-chang, for instance, by his systematic and complete plunder of the people of Shantung created a famine in which more than a million persons died. Tang Yu-lin (not to be confused with Lin Yutang) reduced the people of Jehol to similar destitution and beggary, and started the

official manufacture of powerful opium derivatives, his well-known red pills.

In various areas, bandits fought or intrigued their way to power and influence. Not all were bad; some ruled leniently, and their burdens were not over-heavy. But such backward and unambitious persons seldom stood out in the history of the period, and none ever gained the approval and support of foreign Powers. For such support, rather peculiar gifts were required.

Not all the militarists were bandits. Some survived from the Empire, and had never been guilty of robbing the well-to-do. But each became an absolute ruler, so far as the native subjects of his respective domains were concerned. He bowed the knee only to the foreign Powers—when they spoke directly, or through their puppet regime at Peking.

A quarter of a century previously, referring to the Imperial bureaucracy, the American Minister to China had noted that "the rulers of China are the least intelligent of her respectable people." The rulers were now the least respectable of her people. Chinese bandits, criminals, and degenerates, the scum of village banditry and the dregs of the capital's underworld, often illiterate and necessarily vicious, were the favored servants, tools and proteges of the foreign Powers, with educated Chinese diplomats and administrators reduced to the role of trying to present a decent front to the outside world. The Powers did not always prefer their criminal proteges; they despised them. But what Chinese of character and self-respect would be the humble servant of foreign Powers—their agent against his own people?

The American Government had taken an important part in the tragic developments which reduced the Em-

pire and the Republic to this depth of subjection and degradation. As rulers of the Philippines, we had joined our policy to that of Great Britain and other Imperial Powers in Asia. Having got our own cut of Empire, we readily accepted the partition of China among other Powers; John Hay's notes of 1899 completely ignored the Chinese Government, and in fact were British-inspired. But this partition roused the Chinese to the fierce Boxer Rebellion. And we, instead of withdrawing our endangered citizens from Peking (as Governments do everywhere at such periods) advised them to stay there—and begged the Japanese and Russians to join us in war against the fanatically patriotic Boxers, in order that the Allied Powers might dominate Peking and dictate to the Government of China.

Our forces participated with others in the terrible atrocities against inoffensive Chinese civilians at Peking in 1900—atrocities inspired by a racial hatred even fiercer than that of the White mobs which years before had massacred and lynched scores of inoffensive Chinese in the United States. And after joining in the looting of the great capital, we participated in the re-establishment of reaction there, setting up the murderous Empress Dowager as our dependent ruler, carrying on under protection and control of foreign troops in the capital of China—with the Emperor-friend of modern progress and enlightenment a helpless prisoner of his old enemy.

In 1904-5, the American Government took the lead in forcing the Imperial Government to remain neutral in a war between foreign invaders of its homeland, in shutting Chinese influence or control out of that great area, and in preserving the predatory Imperial regimes of China's powerful neighbors—Japan and Russia. A few

years later we tried to force American railway investments into China, and obliged the Imperial regime to act as a mere puppet of the Powers in enforcing the demands of the new Railway Consortium—at the expense of Chinese independence and of Chinese business men. It was this new move of Western aggression that provoked the Chinese Revolution. When the Revolution came the Powers conspired to crush it, strengthened their domination of Peking, and financed a Chinese militarist against the Revolution. An American adviser encouraged him to subvert the Republic altogether and re-establish the Empire.

And this stupid and shameful thing, like our military and financial aggressions of previous years, led to ever more tragic results. Yuan Shih-kai had maintained or re-established the old unity of most of the country, but his Imperial Restoration and the widespread uprising which followed it tore China apart, preparing the way for disintegration, chaos, and military anarchy. The Japanese shrewdly supported the revolution against Emperor Yuan, greatly increasing their influence among Chinese leaders. It is a strange story: American advice and encouragement for an Imperial Restoration; Japanese support to a revolution to restore the remains of the Republic.

Where, in this tragic story, are our own fundamental principles of the right of men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the right of men to overthrow governments which are subversive of such ends, the right of men to assume among the peoples of the earth that free and equal status to which they are entitled by every drop of blood shed by their fighting patriots and revolutionists—by the Chinese as by our own revolutionary forefathers?

Chapter 15.

RED CHINA—AND MONGOLIA

JAPANESE MILITARISTS have replaced Chinese militarists as masters of Peking. Under them, the North China Political Council exercises administrative authority, where not interfered with by Japanese forces or by Chinese guerrillas or bandits, over the province of Hopei. North, between Peking and Outer Mongolia, lies the Federation of Autonomous Governments of Mongol Provinces. The Great Wall of China is approximately the dividing line. But scattered throughout North China, particularly in the mountainous provinces of Shansi and Shantung, there are still centers of organized Chinese resistance, and local governments which reject Japan and Peking and Wang Ching-wei. Of the guerrillas, the best organized and most effective are those of the Chinese Communists, now opposed by Japanese, Nanking, and Chungking forces, but maintaining their hold on some areas either direct or through cooperation with friendly Chinese groups.

For the last few years, one could not get into or out of Peking without a pass. High walls surround the city, and one had to enter by the great gates. But the wall can be climbed—if you know about where the sentries are, and are able to avoid them. If you have friends among the

guerrillas in the Western Hills, a few miles west of the city, you may get to them with a guide, and from there make your way westward through the hills into the more organized guerrilla areas in Shansi, and from there cross the Yellow River and reach the organized Soviet areas in the province of Shensi.

Before the war, one could travel northward from Peking by the railway to Kalgan and Inner Mongolia. There, the Japanese in occupation deal with Mongol collaborators as well as Chinese. The area north of the Wall is old Mongol territory, but the Chinese population has for some time exceeded the Mongol. The Chinese are farmers. The Mongols are traditionally herdsmen, though many have now turned to agriculture. The railway runs 600 miles through country which is now mostly farmland; the railway profits are taken by the Japanese Army; they used to be taken by the Chinese Army. Inner Mongolia is autonomous—of the Chinese at Peking. The principal figure here, next to the Japanese commander, is an educated Mongol chieftain, Temchukdongrab, a name the Chinese mercifully abbreviated to Prince Teh. He has been head of the Silingol League of Mongols for some years, and was working for the rights of his people long before he got any Japanese patronage. His main grievance—and that of the Inner Mongols generally—was the steady pressure of poverty-stricken Chinese colonists upon the Mongols' land. Under the Empire, the Mongols had their legal status, but the Chinese war lords of later years ignored Mongol rights and welcomed Chinese colonists, from whom the militarists and officials collected most of the produce in rents and taxes.

The Mongols were pushed further and further back, on the arid land of the Gobi; some stayed, becoming

farmers themselves, working for Chinese overlords. But the land was unfit for regular cultivation. After a few decades of agriculture, the thin topsoil was exhausted and blew away in many areas, creating dust bowls of the kind we are familiar with in the United States. In Inner Mongolia, however, the effects were even more disastrous. Great areas of good grassland were reduced to desert; desperate men turned to banditry, plundering those farmers who were still able to get a living out of the soil. The Mongols, retaining their old tribal organization, were able to assert themselves and restrict banditry in their remaining territories, and along its borders, but they were helpless against the larger Chinese forces.

Such Mongol leaders as Prince Teh tried for many years to reach an equitable understanding with Chinese leaders regarding the Mongol lands, but without success—except for some paper understandings which were calmly ignored by the local war lords. One Mongol representative was assassinated in Peking. When the Japanese made diplomatic overtures to the Mongols, the latter accepted. They had no love whatever for the Chinese. Prince Teh is now Chairman of the Inner Mongolian regime, with a council including both Chinese and Mongols. The Japanese Army is the real power.

The Mongols, once the rulers of the world's greatest empire, are a divided people even in their own homelands. Mongol forces were partners with the Manchus against the Chinese three centuries ago, but the decline of the Manchu Empire and the increase of Chinese influence at Peking resulted in serious infringements upon Mongol autonomy. With Russian assistance and encouragement, the more northerly Mongols broke away from Peking in 1911. The Czarist regime established a pro-

tecrorate. In 1917, Chinese forces marched into Outer Mongolia, but were driven out by White Russians who were subsequently driven out by Red Mongols. The new Mongolian Government had relations only with Moscow—though nominally recognizing Chinese sovereignty. It is a Mongolian Party dictatorship; administration is carried on by Mongols, with Russian advisers. There are Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia, and a formal treaty of alliance. There are close to a million Mongols in that area, the greatest of the remaining Mongol units.

The chieftains of Outer Mongolia have lost their old privileges. The Living Buddha at Urga, the old center of Mongol autonomy and religious authority, is gone, together with the Lama Buddhist hierarchy. The present hierarchy is that of the Mongolian People's Party. It worships not at Urga, but at the Tomb of Lenin. Common ownership of land is an old thing to the Mongols, but when the Soviet Government twelve years ago tried to nationalize the herdsmen's cattle it was a different matter altogether. The great Russian famines of 1932-3 touched Outer Mongolia as well, but in these broad territories widespread rebellion forced modification of the official policy. Mongols were not Russians—and the Japanese were right next door, in Manchuria.

Another half a million Mongols live toward the west of Manchuria. Mongol chieftains cooperate with the Japanese in the puppet Manchu Empire. They have been willing cooperators, threatened as they were by Chinese encroachment on the one side and Red encroachment on the other. Neither the chieftains nor the Buddhist lamas, in Outer or Inner Mongolia, liked the political and other changes in Red territories. Many of the common tribesmen, meeting refugees from Outer Mongolia, are not

sure that they want what the Moscow order offers either.

Inner Mongolia, with its Mongol chieftains and subservient Chinese officials cooperating with the Japanese Army, lies as a wedge between Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Red Armies in Shensi and Shansi. Inner Mongolia is one area where the Japanese Army is desperately anxious to maintain itself, giving the Chinese Kuomintang full cooperation against the Chinese Communists further south. Kuomintang forces, in fact, have for two years been blockading the Chinese Communist center in Shensi; there is no evidence of direct cooperation with the Japanese forces north of the province.

To the west and southwest of Outer Mongolia lies Sinkiang—Chinese Turkestan. It is also, nominally, a part of China, acknowledging Chinese sovereignty. It is also, actually, under Moscow's domination, with no control whatever from the Chinese Government. Outer Mongolia, with the great Gobi plateau ranging from the desert land in the south to the grasslands of the north and west, covers some 600,000 square miles. Sinkiang, a vast depression extending from the mountains of the north to the mighty mountains and the Tibetan plateau to the south, covers some 700,000 square miles. Taken together, the two areas are about the size of British India, i. e., India minus the native states. They are almost the size of European Russia.

Sinkiang, though with much desert country like Outer Mongolia, has more fertile land and rich oases. It is a remarkable medley of tribes. The Chinese here are immigrants and invaders. In Imperial days they were mainly officials, soldiers, and merchants. They make up less than one-quarter of its 4,000,000 population. There is

no Soviet system here. The Soviet Government did not gain control of this territory until 1933, with the aid of Chinese soldiers driven out of Manchuria by the Japanese, and dispensed with the traditional Comintern formula of making the dictatorship a Party one. The Chinese Governor, Sheng Shih-tsai, is a Moscow puppet, but Moscow has also secured its relations with the native Turki and other tribesmen.

Economically, Sinkiang is linked with Soviet Central Asia by a Customs Union (putting it outside the Chinese tariff system), by Soviet economic institutions, advisers, banks, and technicians, and by motor roads connecting with the Turk-Sib Railway. It has rich oil and other natural resources in the southwest. Its fertile agricultural areas are remarkably productive, and are in general not overpopulated. The people are better off than in Soviet territories to the west, or in Chinese territories to the east. The Chinese used to say that even the beggars ride in Turkestan. It is now under Soviet domination.

Sinkiang is separated from China Proper by high mountains, through which passes the ancient Kansu corridor—the only practical overland route. It is along this road, now a motor road, that the caravans of motor trucks brought war materials to China from 1937 to 1941. In centuries past, camel caravans traversed this road. It is the old Silk Road; two thousand years ago, Chinese silk went to Persia, Greece, and Rome by this route. Jewish merchants came to China by this route, and established their communities and synagogues in China. This is the origin of the Chinese Jews; the remains of their last synagogue at Kaifeng was sold to the Moslems a century ago.

The Moslems also entered China by this route, more

than a thousand years ago; they carried on mission work, and expanded instead of dying out. Kansu province is largely Moslem, as well as areas to the east, south, and north. Eighty years ago all northwestern China was under Moslem rule; crushed for a time, the Moslems reasserted themselves with the collapse and disintegration of the Empire, since when they have usually ruled Kansu and adjoining areas. They now perforce work with the Kuo-mintang, despite the Christian beliefs of General Chiang Kai-shek and the Soong family. The Chinese Communists handle them with kid gloves, and have many Moslem adherents and fellow-travelers, even among the mullahs. Chinese Moslems claim 48,000,000 adherents, mostly scattered as minority groups throughout all China. They outnumber Chinese Christians about fifteen to one. With their religious loyalties and organization, they have at times been a strong political force—and may be so again. The Ma family has long dominated the Kansu area. General Pai Chung-hsi, China's outstanding military leader, is a Chinese Mohammedan from the South.

It was along the Kansu corridor that the Turks, who took their name from a mountain here, gathered their forces after their expulsion from Mongolia by stronger tribes, and in the seventh century A.D. moved westward into Sinkiang, and finally across central and southwestern Asia and into Europe as far as the walls of Vienna. Turkish tribes also moved eastward, into China; for centuries, Turkish soldiers were the backbone of the great T'ang Dynasty in China.

The Kansu corridor is now held by Chinese Kuomintang troops, which in company with their Moslem associates separate Sinkiang from the Chinese Communist areas in eastern Kansu and northern Shensi. The Japanese

cannot reach this area from Inner Mongolia; the geographical obstacles are almost insuperable. But if Moscow wishes to crash through, to establish direct overland contact with the Chinese Reds, it can do so.

From Mongolia, as from the Kansu corridor, invading forces have swept down into North China again and again. From Red Mongolia to Red Shensi is some three hundred miles. It is in Shensi that the Chinese Communists, and their tough and capable Red Army, have their main base. The autonomous Red government includes most of Shensi excepting the south, and extends from the Yellow River in the east into the provinces of Kansu and Ninghsia to the west. It covers more than 40,000 square miles, and has a population of four or five millions. During the past two years, some of its border territories to the south have been seized and occupied by General Chiang Kai-shek's blockading forces. Red China, however, still has legal status as an autonomous government, under the Generalissimo's National Government at Chungking.

A Soviet plane can hop from Red Mongolia to Red China in an hour, flying over the western part of Japanese-dominated Inner Mongolia. If the Soviet Government at Moscow ever decides to assist the Chinese Communists toward power in China, it is easily in a position to do so. The Chinese Communists are a real force, with wide popular appeal, and with a strong and well-integrated military and political organization. Though the Chinese Communist Party is a loyal section of the Communist International, and follows instructions laid down by the Comintern at Moscow, their regime is not a Moscow dependency. The Chinese Communists stand on their own feet.

From the marble glories of Peking to the caves of Yen-an, the Communist capital in Shensi, is quite a jump. Most of the people of northern Shensi are cave-dwellers. This is the country of the *huang tu*—yellow earth—land consisting of enormous dust deposits accumulated through countless thousands of years from dust blown down from the Gobi and Ordos deserts to the north. It is light soil, easily eroded by rivers and rains; cart roads soon wear down far below the surface of the earth, and in heavy rains become rushing torrents. But rain is infrequent and inadequate. It is a dry country, which has been getting drier for the last few thousand years. There are few trees, and little wood for building or anything else. The people live in caves, dug into the sides of the great dust cliffs. They have lived that way for thousands of years. These cave-dwellings, with a front and door built into the outer opening, are cool in summer and warm in winter; their ventilation is poor.

Here in these caves, difficult of attack by bombing planes because of the protecting blanket of hundreds of feet of yellow earth, is the Chinese Communist center in China, with its Party headquarters, its border government, its military headquarters, its colleges and universities and schools. Its students are numbered by thousands; those of Peking are numbered by tens of thousands. Yet there is more of a sense of youth in Yen-an than in Peking. The Communist officials are not old mandarins; most of them are middle-aged, several are young; only a few—like the ancient Commissar of Education, Hsu Teh-li—are really old.

It is a poor country, an arid area where the soil brings forth a bare subsistence to the cultivator in good years and less than a subsistence in bad years. Sometimes whole

hillsides are washed away in flood, when it does rain, and the population migrates or starves. It is within the old Chinese famine area—the North China country where uncertain rains or uncertain floods make life most precarious for the farmers so long crowded together on the land and utilizing it to the utmost, and where in ordinary times a million persons die of starvation each year in one region or another.

The Chinese famine area stretches from Shantung westward to Shensi. In the old days, Imperial granaries conserved a part of each year's crop for use in emergencies such as flood or rain failure. But the Imperial Government gave way to the Republic, and the Republic was destroyed by the Powers, and the bandits and militarists and local officials plundered the granaries for their military adventures or their personal profit. They levied taxes which deprived the peasants of any surplus whatever and sometimes took even their seed grain and created new famines. In recent years, during the war with Japan, the Chinese Army adopted the scorched earth policy, burning farms and fields and granaries, cutting dikes and flooding the countryside, so as to make things difficult for the Japanese invaders. It was, indeed, difficult for the Japanese; but what food they needed they got. It was the Chinese peasants who died.

They died by the millions. China relief societies in this country have issued various statements indicating that from twenty to fifty million persons have actually died from hunger during these terrible years. In western Shantung and in northern Honan, in parts of Hopei and in Shansi, along the flooded Yellow River valley, simple, helpless peasants died of hunger. They devoured dogs, rats, the bark and the leaves of trees. Some, driven to

madness and desperation, ate their own dead. Some of these things have happened before; for a quarter of a century there has hardly been a year in which millions have not died of hunger in some parts of North China. But five years of war and deliberate destruction of foods and fields and dikes and granaries have taken more lives than during the entire previous generation.

With famine and cannibalism came epidemics and savage man-hunting. Many sat down to die—after selling daughters or anything else they might have—but some fought for their lives, in desperate gangs to whom flesh had simply become meat. Such things are not peculiar to China. In our own West, within the memory of living men, there has been cannibalism among starving men overtaken by winter in crossing the plains and the Great Divide. There are grim stories of shipwrecked men and castaways. Some men, among every people, will fight for their lives to the very end. But not in the memory of man has there been anything comparable in magnitude to the horrors of scorched China during the past five years. It was not merely scorched; it was seared with the flame of death—death to millions of completely inoffensive, humble, and industrious peasants.

Shensi itself was not invaded, and was not scorched. The Japanese made a couple of attempts to cross the Yellow River from Shansi into Shensi. Some detachments did get across, but few came back; the Japanese commanders postponed the invasion indefinitely. But even without deliberate scorching, there has often been famine in these very provinces of Shensi and Kansu. They are poor provinces at best, and when the armed tax-collectors came to seize their wretched tribute from the peasants they left almost nothing. Millions of persons died of

hunger in these Northwestern provinces between 1927 and 1936.

There is no famine in the Communist-controlled areas today. There is hunger, but not famine. It is a poor country, but no one dies of starvation. Such food as there is, is rationed—among peasants and workers and troops and students. Most of the peasants still till their own soil, but taxes are levied in proportion to ability to pay. This democratic concept of taxation is one of the most remarkable innovations introduced by the Communists.

In old China, as in all other countries prior to the democratic revolution, taxation was tribute, levied in proportion to people's inability to resist. Wealthy officials, and merchants and landlords with official connections, were virtually above taxation. It was the poor who paid. A study by League of Nations experts in a comparatively wealthy province of China, Chekiang, ten years ago, indicated that less than one-fifth of the legal taxes on land were actually being collected. Most of the land, and the best land, belonged to well-to-do landlords who were above taxation. Taxes were paid by the poorest and most helpless, and amounted to more than one-fifth of the value of the crops they produced. The Government's officials collected taxes, and added sufficient to provide comfortably for themselves. The Government also gave police authority to rent-collectors in many areas, who went into the villages to take 40 per cent or more of the crop on behalf of the absentee landlords, who live in their comfortable homes in the cities and towns; the wealthiest live in Shanghai, with modern houses or apartments, automobiles and native and Russian concubines, girl slaves and foreign friends and gambling partners.

Most Chinese Communists do not know that their tax system is basically democratic. Some of their American fellow-travellers, honestly admiring their work, also do not know this. There has been nothing in the policies of the Democratic Powers in China—including the United States—to indicate any friendship for democratic taxation or democratic reforms of any kind. Britain and France were among the leading Powers in financing the counter-revolution against the Chinese Republic. The United States joined other Powers in refusing to recognize the Republic while it was still a Republic. Adviser Frank J. Goodnow was the first to promote its complete subversion, and the restoration of the monarchy.

As regards taxation, Americans in China have been above it. Extraterritorial privileges, which we possessed in China for an entire century, put us completely beyond Chinese law and taxation. Chinese landlords, at least, were legally liable for taxes, though the taxes might not be collected. But we were not even *liable*. Such promises as we made we did not keep, and the Chinese lacked the strength and the legal power to enforce them. We obtained our extraterritorial privileges one hundred years ago by fraud. We obtained these privileges by the specific pledge that we ourselves would prevent Americans from participating in the opium traffic—importing Indian opium into China. We got the treaty, putting us above Chinese law and Chinese courts. We never even passed a law to restrict our opium dealers. Some of them were appointed our consular agents. When the American Congress, ninety years ago, adopted a resolution to recognize the Taiping Christian Government at Nanking as the official Government of China, our representatives in China blocked it. The Taipings fought the opium traffic.

So Americans fought them, combining with and supporting the British and French and the archaic Manchu Empire.

Our privileges put us, in relation to China, in the position of an Imperial Power in relation to its own colony. But it was not our exclusive colony. Other Imperial Powers had the same privileges. The ships of any of us privileged Powers carried on trade along the China coast, and sailed up the Yangtze and other Chinese rivers just as our own ships sail up the Mississippi. During the period of war and chaos of the 1850's and 1860's our ships and other Western ships not only sold opium, but carried on a slave-trade in kidnapped Chinese, shipping tens of thousands of them across the Pacific to Latin America and Cuba. The American Minister to Japan, protecting Peruvian interests, appeared seventy years ago as the most vigorous defender of this slave trade. It was no break with our tradition when we played ball with the Green Gang in Shanghai—a criminal gang engaged in opium-dealing, racketeering, and the traffic in women and girls—from 1927 to 1937.

The Chinese could not tax us. But it was we Westerners who determined some of the most important Chinese Government taxes. We laid down the Chinese tariff—a light levy, nominally five per cent but usually below it—in order that there should be an Open Door into China for our exports. It was not reciprocal; our own tariff has been one of the highest in the world. The central principle of the Open Door policy, in which many Americans have taken a strange pride, was just this control over Chinese tariffs. The central request of John Hay, enunciating his Open Door policy in 1899, was that the Powers dominating China should maintain this jointly dictated

Chinese tariff, and and not add any tariffs or levies in their own special areas. (The Russians, at the time, replied that they considered the Chinese Government had the right to determine its own tariffs.) This Chinese Customs tariff was collected by a Western-dominated Customs Administration from 1860 onward—holding what developed into the principal purse-strings of the Chinese Government.

The most monstrous and evil tax of China is the Salt Tax. Control of this was actually taken over by the principal Powers (excepting the United States) in 1914—security for repayment of the Disorganization Loan to Yuan Shih-kai to destroy the Chinese Republic. Yuan passed on, but the Powers continued to control the salt revenue and to collect from the Chinese people for the subsidy to the enemies of the people. In the concessions and settlements of foreign Powers in China, areas under foreign administration on Chinese soil, we demonstrated our own ideas of taxation. Taxes were mostly collected from house-tenants, falling most heavily on the poorest. Another tax, amounting to about half the tax on rent, was collected from landowners, some Chinese, some foreign, who collected in turn from their tenants. Foreign business men and some privileged Chinese were free from taxation on their profitable industries and commerce. The bulk of the taxes were paid by the Chinese direct, mostly by tenants. Political power was held by the foreign Powers, usually with a Council representing the highest taxpayers and most of the time with no Chinese representation whatever.

Our great principle of the territorial integrity of China has meant, chiefly, the integrity of our joint privileges throughout China. In China, as in Japan, we had to make

one government responsible for maintenance of our privileges, to be levied on in case of infringement. If some regional government or provincial warlord failed to treat us with the respect due an Imperial Power from its Asiatic colonials, we held the so-called central government responsible. Our foreign Customs Administration was long the financial mainstay of our recognized governments of China, and in case of dispute we simply deducted our claims from the Customs revenues. Down to 1912, the principle was called "the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire." It was a strange principle for the United States to maintain. Our own Government was not founded on the principle of the territorial integrity of the British Empire; it was founded on the opposite principle. But fundamental American principles have little to do with our policies toward China. There we have been one of the Imperial Powers, partners in the joint domination of a subject people.

The Chinese Communists have done many things besides adjusting taxation on a democratic basis. They have expropriated many of the larger landlords, dividing the land among the peasants with some increased revenue for the government. They had good democratic precedent for this: we did the same thing with the great royal estates in this country 160 years ago; the French peasants followed our example on a much wider scale a few years later, with the hearty approval of Thomas Jefferson and other American lovers of liberty. But this was not the inspiration of the Chinese Communists. Few of them know we ever did anything of the kind; our ministers and advisers in China have always played a completely different role. Chinese unfamiliar with our domestic history would never believe ours was a democratic faith.

The Chinese Communists have done other things as well. They have promoted cooperative enterprises in all possible fields. They have greatly widened education, and in long-established Communist areas have made it practically universal. This is as radical a break with old China as are their other reforms. Education in China has been a field of private enterprise. The only persons who could get education, except for some mission schools reaching small minorities, were those whose parents or patrons could pay for it. Public education, as a free social service maintained by the government on behalf of the people, is one of the greatest advances made by democratic reform. Our own country achieved it more than a century ago, one of the genuine triumphs of our democracy. But few Chinese know it; we have never supported or even recognized any Chinese government which adopted such democratic measures as socialized education.

The Chinese Communists established themselves as the alternative to ever-increasing human misery and suffering, flowing out of the defeat of the democratic revolution in China and the disintegration of the country into armed anarchy, chaos, and banditry, official and unofficial. To crushed and broken peasants the Red Armies came as deliverers. Where peasant villages still retained some independence and self-reliance, and an organized local militia, the Reds had harder sledding. Fifteen years ago, there were great numbers of these local defense units in North China and elsewhere, some grouped together in wider organizations such as the famous "Red Spears" and other societies. But the warlords with their foreign arms forcibly crushed the peasants and their minute-men. There were few to resist the Red Armies; some of them joined the new forces—a better alternative than the ex-

isting bandit-militarism and bandit-gentry. In some of the poverty-stricken areas of the north and northwest, the Reds were the alternative to chronic famine.

North of China proper, in Mongolia, the Reds were also alternatives to an unspeakably terrible condition. They took power in this great territory twenty-two years ago from the "Mad Baron" Ungern, a sadistic White Russian who proclaimed a new Holy Empire (Buddhist) and who perpetrated fantastic cruelties on Mongols, Jews, Red Russians, and Chinese. He was patronized by the Japanese Army, and had relations with Tibet and with Chang Tso-lin. When the Red Mongols, with Soviet arms, invaded the country from the northern border, and Ungern was forced to flee, he was finally shot by some of his own men. Mongol tribesmen welcomed the Mongol Reds as deliverers.

Such things have been true not only in the Red areas. The Mongols of Inner Mongolia were also faced with terrible alternatives of increasing misery and ultimate extermination before they joined hands with the Japanese. The same was true of the Mongols in western Manchuria. From the very beginning of the Japanese invasion in 1931—long before it, indeed—the invaders have had allies among the Mongols there, men who regarded the Chinese as invaders and plunderers of their territories. Among the Manchurian Chinese, the Japanese met with fierce and prolonged resistance, but there were some areas, as in Jehol province to the west, where the unspeakable bandit Tang Yu-lin had reduced his subjects to starvation, where broken men actually welcomed the Japanese. General Chiang Kai-shek, in his historic meeting with the fallen Chang Hsueh-liang south of Peking in 1933, told him this with brutal frankness; and it was true.

It is also true that the Japanese Army's puppet Empire in Manchuria has been increasingly built up by Chinese immigration from the destitute villages of North China. There was similar migration to Manchuria before the Japanese came in. It has continued; the Japanese have had to establish immigration restrictions to deal with it. There are some things even worse than Japanese military despotism.

Hunger knows no loyalties. Hungry and hopeless and desperate men may turn to any alternative which seems to show a way out. The Japanese know this; so do the Russians; so do the Chinese Communists. And it is partly because of this that in the immense territories of North China, and in the vaster areas beyond the Great Wall in Manchuria and Mongolia and Sinkiang, Japanese and Russians and Chinese Communists are the real Powers in the land. Men will not forever fight for their own misery.

Chapter 16.

RISE OF THE RED REPUBLIC

THE INSPIRATION of the first Chinese Revolution was the American Republic; we betrayed it. The inspiration of the second Chinese revolution was Soviet Russia. It was Moscow that first proclaimed its voluntary relinquishment of its Imperial privileges in China, first made a voluntary treaty with China on a basis of equality, first established relations with forward-looking Chinese and encouraged them to deal with the grave social and economic problems of the common people, first encouraged China to assert itself against Imperialist privileges and the Imperial Powers. In time, the Communist International's revolutionary proclivities gave way to a more calculated program centered on utilizing China as an ally against other Powers, and promoting Chinese Nationalism rather than class conflict. But some Chinese Communists had ideas of their own, centering in the terrible misery of the Chinese masses and devoting themselves to their domestic program. Concentrating on an agrarian revolution in China, the Communists at one time became a powerful force in China. Ten years ago, the Chinese Soviet Republic was rising to ascendancy in great and widening areas of the country.

Our own contribution to the Chinese Communist upheaval was an important but unintentional one. It was

the situation created by the Powers in China, with ever-increasing foreign domination of the country and ever-increasing misery under the warlords whom we patronized, that prepared the way for Moscow's activities and influence. In November, 1917, when the Communists seized power in Russia, the old stability of China under the Emperor and its temporary unity under Yuan Shih-kai's foreign-supported dictatorship had ended. So, also, had the Republic's institutions of popular representation and democratic control. Independent warlords, often bandits, ruled as military dictators in wide areas of China. They and their officials extorted from the crushed peasants far more than the old Imperial bureaucracy had done.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese Revolution, had repeatedly appealed to Western Powers, as well as to Japan—had appealed to them jointly and individually, not to support the counter-revolution. He appealed not only in the name of democratic ideals; he soon learned that this was worse than useless. He appealed to the Japanese in the name of racial solidarity and of economic cooperation. He appealed to Western Powers with plans for the international development of China with foreign capital through a stable and progressive government. He was ignored—or opposed and denounced.

The Canton Government under his Presidency, representing what was left of constitutional and democratic government in China, carried on until the Washington Conference; its delegates cooperated with those of the Peking Government at Versailles, and obtained a portion of Chinese revenues. The American Government, however, refused to invite its delegates to the Washington Conference; Canton was too liberal, too democratic, and

too insistent on China's rights to suit our Imperialists. Non-recognition of Canton, and lack of funds, seriously weakened the Government's position. An invitation from Peking to join in a new national parliament (which turned out to be fraudulent) drew off many of its parliamentary figures. British assistance enabled local war lords to oust Dr. Sun from Canton itself; within a year after the Washington Conference, he was a refugee in Shanghai.

The common people of China, reduced to ever deeper misery and degradation under the warlords, were material for Moscow to work upon. They knew nothing of Moscow's ultimate aims, or its world politics. They knew only that there was a growing and well-financed movement which promised them bread and freedom and equality. Those who were somewhat better informed thought of Soviet Russia as the first Government in the memory of living man which had approached the Chinese people as equals in a world of equals, had voluntarily relinquished its Imperial privileges in China, had evidenced any sympathetic interest in the common people of China and their fate. We might have done these things; we did not.

The men to whom Moscow appealed in China, and who became the outstanding leaders of Communist revolution, were those who had supported the 1912 Revolution and the Republic, and had seen them go down in blood and military despotism and chaos—contributed to at every stage by foreign Powers. They turned to the National Revolution, and to Communism because it seemed to offer real hope. The same Powers which had intervened against the Chinese Revolution had intervened against the Russian Revolution—and had been defeated.

They had been beaten by ruthless totalitarian organization and military strength—which, it seemed, was the only thing the Powers could understand.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in what seemed to be his last extremity at Shanghai, received the Soviet Government's envoy, Yoffe, offering material assistance and the cooperation of the ever-growing Communist organizations. They signed a formal agreement that "China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve unity and attain full national independence," and that "the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China." Moscow, through a reorganized Kuomintang and through the Communists, expanded its influence into a degree of real authority in the new Party Government.

In 1920, a representative of the Communist International had come to Shanghai, equipped with money, energy, and ideas, to organize a Chinese section. In 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was formed. For the first time in history, a foreigner backed by his government was dealing with other Chinese than militarists and mandarins. The next year, on Moscow's initiative and insistence, the Chinese Communists decided to enter the Kuomintang, the center of the Chinese Government headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen at Canton. The Communists, appealing to the bitterly exploited peasants and workers and to China's revolutionary youth, grew rapidly and steadily, aided effectively by Soviet funds and organization. For a time, Dr. Sun rejected any alliance with the Communist Party. Though prepared to cooperate with it at times against common enemies, he opposed the whole concept of Communist dictatorship.

When Dr. Sun, a refugee in Shanghai, accepted Yoffe's offer, it included an alliance with the Chinese Communist

Party and reorganization of the Kuomintang itself along disciplined lines. This agreement between Sun and Yoffe was the beginning of the new period of Nationalist upheaval in China. The Kuomintang was reorganized, with the assistance of Chinese Communists, as a strictly disciplined body for the exercise of one-Party rule. The Communists participated in this rule, officially as members of the Kuomintang and not as members of the Communist Party—an organization which continued to exist and to influence the policies of the Kuomintang, which became a Communist Front organization. The Canton government was re-established, now as a Party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, with the Soviet adviser Borodin as a most powerful figure—particularly after the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen at Peking in 1925. From Soviet Russia came funds, arms, military and political advisers. The Chinese Communists had as their task the economic and political organization of the Chinese peasants and workers whose bitter exploitation by their political and economic masters created a fertile field for revolutionary propaganda, as well as for practical organization for immediate ends.

Mao Tze-tung, organizing the peasants, early began to emerge as a leader. He is a man worthy of special note, as he has greatly influenced Chinese history. He has told his story, in his own words, to Edgar Snow, who wrote it down in his excellent "Red Star Over China." There are other outstanding men, but Mao has been the central figure in Chinese Communist history since 1927. For years he was head of the Chinese Soviet Republic. He is still head of the Chinese Communist Party, and of their autonomous government in Shensi.

Mao's story is largely the story of the Chinese Soviet

Republic. But it is more than this. Great numbers of Chinese have come under the same influences as he did. To know and understand the life of Mao Tze-tung is to understand much of the background of China today, and much of the influence which has directed Chinese revolutionary aspirations toward goals other than those of a representative democracy of the people.

Like most Chinese Communist leaders, and, indeed, like most leaders of Chinese revolutions throughout history, Mao is of the peasantry. He is a shrewd and able man, with a keen mind adept both at Communist theory and revolutionary practice. His strength is his deep knowledge of China, his iron will, his capacity as a man both of thought and of action. His weakness has been his lack of knowledge of foreign countries; he has never been abroad. His strength was the strength of the Chinese Soviet Republic, which for years seemed destined to become the dominant influence in China despite united foreign support to the counter-revolution. His weakness was the weakness of the Chinese Soviet Republic, unable to judge and appraise the motives and the Power politics of Moscow. His history has encompassed most of the history of the Chinese revolution and counter-revolution.

Mao is a native of Hunan in south central China, a province whose men have a reputation for political independence and intransigence, whose women have a reputation for warmth of feeling and love of living. His father was a landowner and merchant, not of the poorest, and Mao received a fair elementary education and a good knowledge of the Confucian Classics. Confucianism, the ancient doctrine of the Superior Man and the virtues of obedience, had for two thousand years been the one official teaching of China. Regimentation of Chinese thought

along Confucian lines was central in the whole Imperial structure, in the old civil service examinations to establish fitness for a job in the Imperial bureaucracy; the Imperial Government was a Confucian State; all other thought was as rigidly suppressed as are opposition doctrines in the totalitarian states of today.

Young Mao became the family scholar, and was able to quote Confucius against his less-educated father at times. But he eagerly joined in the growing ferment of revolutionary thought among the students, and when the great upheaval came in 1911 he volunteered in the revolutionary army to overthrow the Empire. But the Republic gave way to military dictatorship, and democratic China sought anxiously a way out. Hu Shih, the great Chinese democrat and scholar, attracted many of China's youth, and the May Fourth Movement in Peking in 1919 showed a tremendous upsurge of popular and democratic feeling, bringing popular pressure upon the Chinese politicians at Peking and forcing them to abandon for a time their subservience to the foreign Powers at Versailles—then engaged in betraying their Chinese ally and turning over Shantung to the Japanese.

Mao was inspired by Hu Shih for a time, and sought his assistance for the student movement in the south, but it was the Russian Revolution which gave him his chief and permanent inspiration. In Russia, unlike China, one of the revolutionary parties seized and held on to power, and defeated the foreign Powers which—as in China—intervened against the Revolution. Further, the Soviet Government offered to relinquish its Imperial privileges in China; the anti-Soviet Powers forbade China to accept the offer. Mao, like other young men, eagerly sought out Communism and other Marxist literature, studied the

history of the Russian revolution. He was not a mere theorist. He had worked on his father's farm before he went to school; as soon as he could read and write he had been his father's bookkeeper, and gained a grasp of practical things far beyond more prosperous students. Already in 1920, he was participating in the political organization of Chinese workers.

Mao Tze-tung was one of the first members of the Chinese Communist Party. Devoting himself to organizing the peasants, he early began to emphasize the importance of a program of agrarian revolution, freeing the tenant farmers from landlord domination and distributing the big estates among the peasantry. Moscow, which was emphasizing the nationalist side of the revolution, by 1926 saw the development of class conflict as a deadly danger to national unity in Kuomintang China. Ambitious military men and politicians within the Kuomintang, and reactionary warlords who were willing to cooperate with it, were bitterly opposed to agrarian upheaval and the self-assertion of Chinese labor. There was a fundamental class distinction which could not be glossed over by Nationalism and the economic war against Great Britain, which had been launched in 1925 by the Kuomintang and Communists, with widespread support throughout much of China.

Mao's proposals for a radical agrarian program were rejected and suppressed by the Communist Party hierarchy. When organized peasants began taking things into their own hands, and militarists started forcibly to suppress them, Moscow made desperate efforts to maintain friendly relations with conservative elements. The Communist-led peasant unions and labor unions surrendered their arms. Then they were forcibly suppressed. Borodin

and his outstanding Chinese associates left for Moscow. Mao Tze-tung and some others remained in China. Mao himself, instead of "liquidating," went south into his native province, with a little group of determined followers, and began to build up a movement which brought bitter condemnation from the official Party chiefs. He was not acting on Moscow's orders. He was on his own.

It was this movement started by Mao Tze-tung, centering not in the well-garrisoned cities but in the loosely controlled rural areas, that resulted in the amazing growth of the Chinese Soviet Republic year after year. Chinese Soviets were formed, and a practical program worked out which appealed mightily to the exploited tenant farmers of South China. Tax reform, redistribution of the peasants' estates, widespread education and propaganda, the organization of the people in support of the ever-growing Red Armies, brought a real and growing strength which spread down from the hills—the first centers of the little Communist groups—into the valleys and plains of South China. There were no arms and no advisers from Moscow now, such as had gone in such abundance to the Kuomintang a few years previously. The Communists were on their own, building up and expanding an agrarian revolution under Communist leadership. Some contact was maintained with Moscow through a Comintern representative at Shanghai, and occasional funds dribbled through. But the real achievements of the Chinese Communists were their own. By 1930, their well-trained guerilla forces were able to defeat one Kuomintang army after another, supplying themselves with arms from the invading forces. Kiangsi was their greatest center. In this southern province lay the capital of the Chinese Soviet Republic, with its capital at Juichin. Other Com-

munist forces took power and expanded the agrarian revolution in other provinces of south China, of central China, of western China, of northwest China. By 1933 more than 30,000,000 Chinese accepted the authority and leadership of Soviet China; in an increasing number of border areas, guerrilla forces were asserting themselves and preparing the way for organized control.

The real problems and facts of agrarian revolution gave the Chinese Communists a basis for cooperation with democratic forces in China—forces which had never been completely crushed. In 1932, the Chinese Soviet Republic headed by Mao Tze-tung showed its appreciation of the Nationalist appeal by declaring war against Japan, and its appreciation of political realities by emphasizing that to fight this war it was necessary to concentrate on defeating General Chiang Kai-shek, whom it denounced as the agent of foreign Imperialism in China. In 1933, the Communists' growing power brought the first great response from non-Communist forces in China, and an alliance was formed with the 19th Route Army and democratic civilian elements in Fukien.

The movement in Fukien signalized the re-establishment of the Republic of China, with greater and more organized popular support than twenty years previously. The military nucleus in Fukien was the heroic 19th Route Army, commanded by General Tsai Ting-kai, which had bravely resisted the Japanese Army and Navy at Shanghai in 1932—the first time in thirty-two years that Chinese forces had maintained prolonged resistance to foreign aggressors. The 19th Route Army had been transferred to Fukien after its defeat, making the Shanghai-Nanking area safe for Chiang Kai-shek and his collaborator, Wang Ching-wei. In 1933, the Army's leaders reached an agree-

ment with democratic civilian elements for the establishment of a new republican government in Fukien, vowed to the destruction of one-Party government and the establishment of a representative regime. The little Social Democratic Party, the radical Third Party, and other groups joined in. The Chinese Soviet Republic joined it in alliance—preliminary to a closer association. The Chinese Communists had nothing to fear from a democratic system. They were the most widely popular party in the country. A new national government was proclaimed in Fukien—a new Republic of China. The Chinese Red Armies were already a most powerful force in China. Union with the 19th Route Army would give them actual military ascendancy in South China, the beginnings of an air fleet, and contact through Fukien with the outside world. So far the Chinese Communists had been confined to the interior of the country. When they took a seaport or river port they had been driven out by foreign warships; an American gunboat took the lead in shelling them out of Changsha in Hunan province on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek. Now, however, such intervention would meet with diplomatic difficulties. Bombarding Communists was much more easily explained than bombarding Republicans.

At this point, however, came intervention from Moscow. The Chinese Communists trusted Moscow—though they had for years received very little assistance from there—and the Communist International's advisory committee at Shanghai insisted that the Chinese Reds must preserve their revolutionary purity and not combine with the Fukien group. Mao Tze-tung and his associates, determined to maintain the World Revolutionary Front, withdrew from their alliance with Fukien. They soon saw

the results of this tragic blunder. But Moscow's advice was deliberate. It was determined by the interests of Soviet Russia in the Far East.

Moscow, in fact, had at last succeeded in re-establishing relations with the Kuomintang Government at Nanking—after five and a half years' suspension—and also in establishing diplomatic relations with the American Government, which for fifteen years had resolutely ignored the existence of the Soviet Government at Moscow. And these relations with Washington and Nanking were more important to Moscow than was the fate of the Chinese Communists.

In 1927, indeed, Moscow had tried most desperately to retain relations with the Kuomintang regime, even ordering the disarming of the Chinese peasants and workers under Communist leadership. But this attempt had failed. Relations were severed. In 1929, the Chinese tried to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Moscow had to send troops across the border before the attempt was abandoned. But in 1933, as a direct outcome of the Manchurian conflict before the League of Nations, Moscow re-established relations with Nanking, and promised to give no assistance to Nanking's enemies.

Furthermore, Moscow succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with the United States; to our Government also Moscow pledged non-support to revolutionary elements abroad. In China, General Chiang Kai-shek was our man. We had supported him against the 19th Route Army at Shanghai in 1932, and were prepared to do the same thing at Fukien in 1933. Moscow's cooperation with the United States and Nanking called for some very specific things. And Moscow was also working out some plans of its own—in regard to Japan.

Chapter 17.

RED FRONT AGAINST JAPAN

JAPANESE seizure of Manchuria radically changed the face of the Far East. With this great area as its base, the Japanese Army dominated Peking and threatened Red Mongolia and Far Eastern Russia. The Soviet Government had relinquished its political domination of Manchuria, but retained its inherited ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese by 1933 were preparing forcibly to seize this railway, as the Chinese had done in 1929. And the Japanese were a far more serious military force than the Chinese had been.

The Soviet Government had offered the Japanese a Non-Aggression Pact, but Tokyo refused. The idea of a Japanese war against Bolshevism appealed strongly to many Western Tories, and the Japanese Army gained considerable Western support by posing as the bulwark against Bolshevism in eastern Asia, just as Hitler courted support playing the same role in Europe. Soviet Russia was building up her heavy industries and war plants determinedly, with one intensive Five-Year Plan after another, but her military equipment and forces were as yet inadequate to assure her complete triumph in a Far Eastern war. Indeed, the measures taken to finance this industrialization had led to widespread famine in Soviet Russia itself, and bitter discontent. In Outer Mongolia

there were actual rebellions. If Japan was going to strike at Russia, there would never be a more favorable time.

It was in this situation that the American Government recognized the Soviet Government, encouraging the latter in its stand against Japan. This was a notable reversal of policy. When the Chinese had in 1929 seized the Far Eastern Railway, the Hoover Administration and Secretary Stimson had appealed to Soviet Russia to keep the peace and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and had appealed to Japan and other Powers to join in collective opposition to Russia. When the Japanese had in 1931 seized South Manchuria, the same Administration and State Department seemed to have forgotten the 1929 precedent, and did not consider the Kellogg Pact involved. Instead of endeavoring to form a joint front against Japanese aggression, they deliberately sabotaged and blocked the endeavors of European Powers to create such a front.

In 1933, however, when the Soviet Government made public a series of Japanese documents (reportedly obtained through their excellent espionage service), indicating Japanese preparations for forcible seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the new administration under President Roosevelt promptly responded with recognition of the Soviet Government, a move which directly strengthened Moscow and checked the enthusiasm of Japanese militarists for aggression against Soviet Russia and its railway properties. The Soviet Government agreed to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the Japanese to purchase it.

Japan, however, had definitely emerged as a real threat to Soviet Russia in the Far East. Moscow had strengthened its diplomatic position greatly by its establishment of relations with Washington and Nanking, and was moving

further. In Europe, it had concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with France, and was working for admission to the League of Nations, which had tried to resist Japan, and from which the Japanese Government had withdrawn early in the year. Closer and more friendly relations with the United States and the League Powers dictated closer and fuller cooperation with General Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, the Government supported and recognized by the Powers in China.

In this situation, the growing power of the Chinese Communists was a serious embarrassment to Moscow. The Chinese agrarian revolution could not sweep all China in another year or two—unless there was great and effective support from Moscow, which would antagonize all the Powers. Immediate indications were of a war which would last for many years, with the Nanking regime driven more and more into the arms of Japan—which would gain increasing support from Western Tories as the bulwark against Bolshevism in Asia. In South China itself, the expansion of Red China and the link with the 19th Route Army in Fukien was a direct threat to British Imperial interests. If Canton could be brought into Red China, Hongkong might be as desperately beleaguered as it had been seven years previously, when the Chinese had fought a determined economic war against Britain and particularly against its colony at Hongkong. The Red threat to the British sphere in South China was a serious handicap in the Soviet Government's endeavors to establish closer and more friendly relations with the British Government.

On the other hand, Chinese Communist forces might well be a bulwark of strength to Soviet Russia if they were concentrated in the Chinese Northwest, close to

the borders of Soviet territory and under Moscow's direct influence. There they could be an effective weapon against Japan in case of direct attack, or against Nanking, in case of need. All these considerations determined Moscow's advice to the Chinese Communists in 1933 and 1934. It was the first effective move in preparation for the war against Japan. It was a move which made history.

On the insistent advice of the Comintern advisory committee at Shanghai, the Chinese Reds failed to implement their alliance with Fukien, and drew their main forces westward. When the Nanking armies received information of this, they invaded Fukien—a mountainous province, with its rugged hills stretching clear across to the sea. Nanking's infantry would hardly have dared to invade it if it were defended by the combined forces of the 19th Route Army and the Red guerrillas, whose favorite terrain was this mountainous country. With the Reds neutral, Nanking forces marched into Fukien and quickly crushed the 19th Route Army and the new Republican Government; Red guerrillas watched them from the hills to the west; the entire western border of Fukien had long been in Soviet hands. In Fukien, the Nanking forces established their own military regime, effectively blocking the Red Army off from the sea.

Moscow, however, had given the Chinese Red Army for the first time something which they highly valued: a military adviser. For six years, the Red Armies had fought and expanded their power by their own guerrilla tactics, under the capable leadership of Chu Teh and other men long familiar with Chinese military requirements. Now, at last, they had a military adviser from Moscow. Soviet military advisers had directed the Kuo-mintang forces from 1924 to mid-1927, which had made

possible the expansion of the Canton Nationalist power throughout Kwangtung province, which had made successful the great northern expedition from Canton to the Yangtze valley in 1926, establishing Kuomintang rule from Wuhan to Shanghai. The Moscow adviser to Soviet China had served with the German Army during the First World War. He was later a division commander in the Russian Red Army, and had studied at the Red Army Academy. He had no such distinguished reputation as some of the Soviet officers who had directed the Kuomintang forces seven years previously, but he had the full endorsement of Moscow. He was the military representative of the World Revolution.

Comrade Li Teh, from Germany and Moscow, introduced new tactics. Guerrilla warfare, which had enabled the Chinese Red Armies to defeat one powerful Nanking offensive after another, he considered fit only for subordinate tasks. There must be positional warfare. The Chinese Red Army must show its mettle and revolutionary determination by standing up its light-armed soldiers against Nanking's artillery and tanks and bombing planes. The Chinese military council was unanimously opposed. Mao Tze-tung and the Party and its Government in general were apprehensive. But Li Teh was emphatic and insistent, and he represented Moscow.

The Nanking armies, now in possession of coastal Fukien, were able to exercise a much more rigid blockade of Soviet China than they had previously done. Salt supplies were almost completely cut off, with effects which were increasingly felt. In the meantime, General Chiang and his German military advisers were preparing for the biggest offensive they had yet launched. Somehow, Li Teh knew every stage of this planned offensive. This was re-

vealed when Nanking's generals subsequently found some of his writings, accurately interpreting their tactics and their every important move.*

When General Chiang and the Nazi militarists moved half a million well-equipped troops, supplied with all requirements by the funds given Nanking by the British Customs Administration and the American Government's loan of 1933, against the heart of Soviet China, the Chinese Red Army under the insistent advice of its Moscow adviser stood up its light-armed guerrillas to meet the enemy in positional warfare. They were massacred in one hopeless engagement after another, fighting to the end. Sixty thousand Red soldiers, the flower of the Chinese Red Army, were wiped out. They still had wide mountainous areas behind them, but beyond these mountains were the Kuomintang armies in Fukien. The Soviet capital, at Juichin in Kiangsu, was taken from the Red regiments who elected to defend it to the last man—which they did, their dead heaped high in the streets. Tens of thousands of guerrillas remained further to the east and north, in the hills and mountains; some of them continued to carry on for years. But the main base of the Chinese Red Army was lost. Its main forces smashed westward through the Kuomintang lines into Hunan and Kweichow.

This was the beginning of an amazing march in which the Red soldiers covered more than 6,000 miles westward through the mountainous provinces of South China,

* See Edgar Snow, "Red Star Over China," for an excellent reportorial account of these developments, as obtained direct from Mao Tze-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders. His chapter "That Foreign Brain-Trust" is especially valuable. This book also contains the autobiography of Mao Tze-tung—and some other leaders—as told direct to Mr. Snow.

northward through the bleak and terrible mountains and deadly swamps of the Tibetan borderland, northeastward into Kansu and Shensi, in a year and four days. Fewer than 20,000 survivors of the First Front Army fought their way through to Shensi and connected there with the local Red Armies which had established themselves in this arid and poverty-stricken country in 1933. It was a great change from the green and fertile valleys of the South, where famine was almost unknown and hunger was purely the handiwork of man.

"Down with Japan!" rather than "Down with Chiang Kai-shek!" was now the slogan of the Red Armies. Establishing themselves in northern Shensi, and expanding their Soviet territories into Kansu and Ninghsia, they devoted themselves to a determined policy of establishing a United Front with the Moslems and with the anti-Communist armies. In Shensi these were the forces of the local bandit-militarist Yang Hu and the surviving divisions of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who had returned from his exile in Europe to take command of his old Manchurian forces in war against the Chinese Reds. Yang Hu was a shrewd old bandit who heartily desired to see both the Manchurians and the Reds out of his territory. The Northeastern (Manchurian) forces were inspired by a fierce hatred of the Japanese, who had driven them out of their old homeland, and of General Chiang Kai-shek, who they regarded as having sold Manchuria to the Japanese.

On the basis of a united front against Japan, the Chinese Red Armies finally reached agreement with the two opposing forces in Shensi. The Fengtien soldiers wanted to fight their way back to Manchuria; Yang Hu heartily wished they would. The anti-Communist cam-

campaign stopped. General Chiang Kai-shek, with important members of his staff, came to Sian to take personal charge of the campaign against the Reds. The anti-Comintern Pact had just been made public, bringing Japan together with the European Axis. General Chiang announced he did not consider it directed against China.

This was understandable. In China, Nazi military advisers were directing the campaign against the Communists. Nanking's armies were the only ones in the Far East which were carrying out military operations against any section of the Comintern.

The kidnapping of General Chiang at Sian was a momentous event. He arrived to find the city plastered with posters denouncing the Axis and the anti-Comintern Pact, and describing Japan as the enemy and Soviet Russia the true friends of China. When his bodyguard was killed or scattered and he was seized, his death seemed imminent. Chang Hsueh-liang's young officers had sworn that Chiang would not leave Sian alive. The Generalissimo's ambitious rivals at Nanking were already negotiating for the division of power among themselves. In the northwest, the three main forces combined in the establishment of a United anti-Japanese Military Council and a United anti-Japanese Army, dominating the entire northwest and appealing by radio for union with Soviet Russia and war against Japan. Once more, the Chinese Red Army was the powerful center of an independent Front government, cooperating with other forces against the Kuomintang.

At this very point came intervention from Moscow. As soon as Chiang's seizure was reported, Moscow declared that the men responsible were not Communists, whatever they might call themselves. Vigorously acclaim-

ing General Chiang Ki-shek, fiercely denouncing Chang Hsueh-liang, Moscow asserted that the inspiration for the Sian affair came from Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese Imperialists. Whatever group of "Chinese politicians" might be responsible, they were not Communists: "We know who the true Communists are!"

To the Chinese Communists, this was a definite and open threat of excommunication. Chiang must not be touched—whatever scores the Red Army and the Manchurian Army had against him. The Chinese Communist leaders, with caution but with determination, moved to save Chiang—to lead them against the Japanese. They converted the weak-willed Chang Hsueh-liang to their new line. They presented their proposals and offers—through Chang, and directly—to the imprisoned Chiang Kai-shek. They were prepared to accept his leadership completely, to abandon the agrarian revolution, to support the Generalissimo against the Japanese—and against opposition forces. They would become a unit of the National Army under his supreme command, retaining only the autonomy of the northwestern areas already under direct Soviet control.

Chang Hsueh-liang himself flew the Generalissimo away from Sian. Chang did not dare to remain himself, for he knew he might have been killed by his own Manchurian officers, furious at the "betrayal." A Kuomintang Congress two months later confirmed the agreement between the Communists and the Kuomintang. The first product of this was the expulsion of the Manchurian forces from Shensi; the Chinese Red Army cooperated with the Kuomintang in this task.* But the larger product

* See James Bertram, "First Act in China," Viking Press, for an excellent reportorial account of the Sian affair.

was war against Japan. With the Kuomintang-Communist war ended, united China emerged as a real Power in the Far East.

The Japanese struck in the Peking area in July, 1937. Two months later, Chinese Red forces, after a long and valuable rest of almost a year, moved into Shansi province to meet the invaders. Their guerrilla tactics at first proved as effective as they had been against the Chinese armies in the south. They gained control of wide areas of Shansi province, now in cooperation with patriotic fellow-travelers, and with Kuomintang officials in all posts of nominal importance. They moved further east, into Hopei province, and from there into Shantung. Now with Kuomintang backing, they organized the populace for resistance, developed a local economy aimed to supply food-stuffs for the Chinese forces and to end cotton production for export to Japan. Governments with active Communist participation were established in ever wider areas of these northern provinces. Red guerrillas, with ever greater numbers of new recruits, established themselves between Peking and Manchuria, and raided into Manchuria itself. By 1940, the future of North China lay between two forces—the Japanese, with their Chinese mandarin collaborators at Peking, Tientsin, and elsewhere, and the Chinese Nationalist forces, in which the most powerful and best organized group were the Communists.

There was no official expropriation of landlords now. Their land was merely used and its revenues appropriated for the duration. To the landlords it seemed very much like expropriation, but there was no resisting the appeal to patriotism. There was no organization of Soviets. But the Communists organized various youth and guerrilla groups, economic cooperatives, and educational units,

and promoted local elections—elections by acclamation or show of hands, which usually chose Communists and innocent peasant patriots. Taxes were adjusted in a way similar to that of democratic countries and the Soviet areas of China—resting mainly on the well-to-do, lightly on the poor. Millions of peasants of all ages were organized into various popular organs of propaganda and resistance, taught to fight and defend themselves effectively.

In the level plains, the Japanese finally responded to continued guerrilla warfare by terrible punitive expeditions, in which they wiped out whole villages suspected of harboring fighting forces. In the hills they were much less successful; this was the favorite fighting area of the fast-moving guerrillas. But by 1940 it was becoming clear that whoever might win in this war, it would not be the Kuomintang and the landlords. The Kuomintang was still the ruling Party nominally. The landlords still held their titles, nominally, and the moneylenders held promises to pay. But the common people, under revolutionary and patriotic leadership, were developing a will and a capacity for fighting which would take them forever out of Kuomintang and landlord control.

It was this serious fact which led to the breaking off of cooperation between the Kuomintang and Communist forces in 1940. The Communists were steadily expanding their power and influence in North China; the Kuomintang regular forces had been seriously beaten back and weakened in central and southern China. The Japanese might lose; but the Kuomintang and the landlords would not win in North China. Kuomintang attacks on Communist forces began, and there was sabotage of their supplies, and finally a complete military and economic blockade of the Soviet center in northern Shensi.

Mao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party, has learned many things during the past ten years. He no longer seeks dialectical and ideological explanations of Moscow's moves on the stage of world politics. He now interprets them, rationally and intelligently, as determined by Moscow's own interests. But there is one thing which remains basic in his thought: his movement is part of a World Revolution, and Soviet Russia is the center of that Revolution—the Communist Fatherland. He thinks more highly of the Russian Revolution, with its proletarian supporters and its totalitarian set-up, than of his Chinese Revolution, resting mainly on the Chinese peasantry and their desire for land distribution and the product of their labor. He knows that the Chinese movement has been subordinated to the interests of Moscow, but he has accepted this fact; the Soviet Union is the Communist fatherland. The Chinese Reds are still a force in China—thanks to themselves. They may become a powerful force again.

Mao is the outstanding civilian leader of Red China. The outstanding military leader is Chu Teh, now over sixty, son of a wealthy landlord and an active figure in the early struggles for the Chinese Republic. He was an officer in the Yunnan Army at the time of the Revolution, and took part in the fighting to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. When Yuan Shih-kai, at our encouragement, re-established the monarchy, the Yunnanese troops were the first to rebel, with Chu Teh as one of the leading generals of the rebel military leader Tsai Ao. Government, however, was now passing into the hands of the militarists; in Yunnan, Chu was one of the outstanding ones, and for several years devoted himself to the pleasures of power and wealth. This, however, was not his

main interest in life, and in 1922 he paid off his harem and went to Shanghai to participate in the growing new movements—later going to Germany (where he joined the Communist Party), to France, and to Soviet Russia. Returning to China, he gave his fortune to the Party. He was a commander of Kuomintang troops when the break came in 1927. He joined in the Nanchang uprising against the Kuomintang, and in 1928 joined his forces with those of Mao Tze-tung in the brilliant combination which in five years made the Soviet Republic a powerful force in China.

There are scores of these men, and many women, who are worthy of description as distinct individuals. Much of this has been done, excellently, by Edgar Snow. But one thing is common to all of them. However democratic they may be as individuals, however sincere their devotion to economic equality and honest sharing of goods and sacrifices, their political aim and system is absolute control by the Communist Party. From one viewpoint, they have widened and deepened the Chinese revolution, bringing millions of common peasants and many workers to a greater political and social consciousness than they ever possessed, in any period of Chinese history. They have even adopted democratic forms of popular elections—usually by acclamation or a show of hands. But they have no faith in the capacity of the people for governing themselves, without direction and leadership by the Communists.

There is no legal party in Soviet China other than the Communist Party. There is no opposition press; there are no opposition meetings. Voting is either for a Communist or for a non-Party person. All political and military power is completely in the hands of the Communist

Party, whose rule is supported by an Extraordinary Committee with the same functions as in Soviet Russia. In past years, there have been bloody purges and bloody suppression of opposition Communists—as well as other internal opponents. The conception of government by representation and compromise—democratic compromise among various parties and groups, in the interests of the greatest good to the greatest number—is completely alien to the Communist mind.

From the viewpoint of the common people of China, the Communists have in general been good rulers. Their revolution, however, has not been one of a spontaneous popular upheaval throughout China. It has been carried forward by the Chinese Red Armies, working in close cooperation and accepting the authority of the Communist Party, which proceeds to establish its administration and organization in the territories conquered by the Army. The Communists use, at times, democratic tactics. But they are, in the Communists' own expression, tactics. The Communists are still a minority group in China.

Their ultimate allegiance is to Moscow. Moscow was the first and the only Western Power to try to deal with Chinese as equal human beings, to try to deal with Chinese workers and peasants and other commoners as if they were worthy of respect and support. A real democratic revolution in China, or a real democratic revolution in American policy toward Chinese, might draw many sincere Chinese Communists into its compass. But, as things are, the Chinese Communists look up to Moscow, and Moscow can depend upon them to assume whatever role Moscow policy dictates. Their Party is a faithful section of the Communist International.

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CHINA—EMPIRE TO COLONY

II. The South

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Chapter 18.

FREE CHINA

THE FIRST FLAG of the Republic of China was a five-barred flag, its five colors representing Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans. The Chinese population of the Republic outnumbered all the other groups taken together, but all men of the Republic were equal, with the right to representative institutions in their territories and provinces.

The homeland of the Manchus is now dominated by the Japanese Army. The homeland of the Mongols is mainly dominated by Soviet Russia, with the more southerly and easterly Mongols under Japanese domination. Tibet has long ceased to accept any authority from China; it has been brought into the orbit of British power, exercised from India, and Chinese troops have long been forbidden to enter its great territories. The Moslems beyond the Great Wall, in Sinkiang, are under Moscow's domination, linked with Soviet Central Asia.

All these areas, with the single exception of southern Manchuria, are not Chinese. They were parts of the Empire; they were not Chinese in population or language or customs. They have not gained equality or freedom; they have come under the domination of other Empires.

South of the Great Wall is China Proper, with the truly Chinese population, which, also, now makes up the great majority in Manchuria and extends into Inner Mongolia, with smaller numbers in Sinkiang. In China itself there is a division between North and South. It must not be thought of as a Great Wall, or a racial division. It is the same people, speaking the same language. But between North and South there are deep economic differences, creating different conditions of existence and different problems for the common people.

North China is a country of the northern grains, millet and wheat and kaoliang, where a long-settled and long-increasing population has for many centuries occupied all available land in a long period of increasing aridity. This is the "famine area," where the land brings forth a bare subsistence, where landlords have for long centuries been reduced to tilling their own soil, where most land is held by its little peasant proprietors, and where the real enemy is the militarist, of whatever nationality, and the tax-gatherer.

South China, which extends far north of the Yangtze River, is the country where rice can be cultivated, bringing forth larger crops than the northern grains and able to produce two crops a year; in the "deep" south, three crops a year may be cultivated. In South China, as in Manchuria, the people bring forth a full sufficiency of food, and there is a surplus. The surplus is taken not only by the tax-gatherer but by the landlord and usurer. Most of the farmers of South China are tenant farmers, turning over most of their produce to the landlord and usurer who cooperate with the tax-gatherer. There is much greater density of population than in North China, but the soil is even more productive. It was these share-

croppers of South China to whom the Chinese Communists most effectively appealed in their call for the agrarian revolution.

Yenan in Shensi, the present capital of Red China, is roughly five hundred miles north of Chungking, in Szechwan, since 1938 the capital of the Chinese National Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. From Yen-an to the northeast it is some five hundred miles, crossing the Yellow River and the coal-rich mountains of Shansi province—to Peking, the “Northern Capital.”* These are direct, flying distances. By land, one must travel more than a thousand miles through the mountain roads and passes, on either journey. To the east from Shensi, the mountains come to an end along the western border of Hopei province; most of Hopei lies in the North China Plain; Peking is toward the north of this plain, not far from the hills further north and west. If one travels south from Yen-an, one must wind through still steeper and more precipitous mountains than in Shansi, but these in time slope down to the hills and valleys of Szechwan province, through which one finally arrives at Chungking on the Yangtze.

Szechwan province, of which General Chiang is now ruler, covers more than 160,000 square miles and has a population of more than 60 millions.

Chungking is a city founded upon a rock. It is well situated for defense. The city itself is at the juncture of

* The name Peking (properly, Pei-ching or Bay-jing) means “Northern Capital. When the Powers recognized the Nanking regime as the National Government in 1928 (Nanking = “Southern Capital”), Nanking re-named Peking “Peiping,” meaning “Northern Peace”—which may or may not be more accurate. Most natives of Peking resented the change, and did not accept it. The Japanese in 1937 adopted the old name again. Wang Ching-wei may want “Peiping” once more.

the Yangtze and its northern tributary, the Kialing, and is built on a giant rock rising 700 feet above the river. Long rows of steps, thousands of steps, lead up from the river banks. Water is carried up. Food and other goods are carried up. Officials and other gentry are carried up—in sedan chairs, by panting, groaning men. Decent people walk up.

The sedan chair is rarely seen in Peking, except in marriage processions and funerals. The easy-running ricksha, a nineteenth-century invention, is much more common. The sedan chair is the true badge of traditional China. It was one of the many things which created such respect for China among the European aristocracy a couple of centuries ago, and contributed to the conception of China as an "ideal civilization." Here was a refined, cultivated ruling class, with the proletariat reduced to the level of horses and draft animals. The sedan chair was one of the many gifts of Chinese civilization to eighteenth-century Europe. French aristocrats took a great fancy to the sedan chair. It passed out in the blood and terror of the French Revolution. It will pass out in China some day.

Szechwan is protected by powerful natural barriers. There are mountains to the east, mountains to the north, mountains to the south, mountains to the west. Chungking itself lies to the southwest of the province, and Japanese forces have often been within three hundred miles of it from the east. But they have not been able to advance over the mountain barriers to the east of Szechwan, nor fight their way up the gorges of the Yangtze to it. For bombarding purposes, however, Chungking makes an ideal target. If cities could be taken and countries crushed by the use of bombing planes, Chungking would

have capitulated years ago to the invaders; the Japanese have bombed it terribly, again and again, for more than four years. But they have not yet been able to reach it with occupying forces.

Szechwan's natural defenses have long served to maintain its position against invaders. This great, self-sufficient province was first to rise in rebellion against the Manchu Empire in 1911. A few years later, with the end of Yuan Shih-kai and of centralized government, the province became virtually independent. Here, as elsewhere, the land tax and other revenues were appropriated by the provincial rulers; the old rice tribute to Peking ceased. The only revenues taken out of Szechwan were those from the Customs and Salt administrations, under control of the foreign Powers. The only outside authority was that of these Powers.

British and sometimes other gunboats lay in the Yangtze (the British naval commander in this great waterway was long known as the "Admiral of the Yangtze"), and saw to the protection of British and other foreign privileges, and the safety of the revenues for Peking or Nanking. At Wanhsien, east of Chungking, the Chinese Government in 1926 detained a British ship, asking for compensation for some small Chinese vessels overturned—declared to be carrying provincial revenues—and men drowned by the wash from the ship. The British gunboat, after unsuccessfully demanding release of the ship, shelled the city, killing and wounding hundreds of persons.

The British and American gunboats in Szechwan waters have now been taken over by the Chinese government there—by agreement with the foreign governments concerned—though retaining their Western command and predominantly Western personnel. It is a notable change,

significant of the great transformation in the international position of Szechwan, now the seat of the National Government of China recognized by all the United Nations. Only a few years ago, the government of this great interior area was ignored by the Powers, except when it tried to interfere with their privileges, or strategic considerations were involved. Today, with General Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang in control, it is not only recognized but financially supported by the American Government and Great Britain as the National Government of China.

The present Chungking government is much more than a provincial government. Szechwan is its great center and base, but its authority extends far to the east, south, and north. The former provincial warlords were isolationists, devoted to Szechwan for the Szechwanese—which meant themselves. But the power of the present Chungking government and its military forces is far wider. To the south, it extends through the mountains and jungles of Kweichow to Kwangsi and Yunnan, where it meets the Japanese front, still hundreds of miles from the southern border of Szechwan. In these southwestern provinces, the non-Chinese aborigines—Miaos and Lolos and others—outnumber the Chinese population.

Mao Tze-tung, in his years of independence, referred to these tribesmen as subject peoples, crushed and exploited by Chinese Imperialism as represented by the Kuomintang. Some of these tribesmen, however, have themselves emerged as rulers. General Lung Yen, ruler of Yunnan, is a tribesman. There is no social or racial bar. For thousands of years it has been the rule that when a barbarian adopted Chinese civilization he was to be accepted as a Chinese.

The Japanese are seeking to work with these tribesmen of the southwest as they have worked with the Mongols more than a thousand miles to the north. It remains to be seen if they will succeed; the Chinese Communists did not have very much success, except in securing their neutrality at times, though this also would be very useful to the Japanese. There are more than twenty millions of these non-Chinese tribesmen there, and in southern and western Szechwan. They are far more numerous than are the Poles or Spaniards in Europe, but they have no unity among themselves. They are of all races—some are distinctly Negroid—and speak many different languages.

To the east, military forces owing allegiance to the Chungking Government dominate most of the mountainous provinces south of the Yangtze—the areas which ten years ago were the main strongholds of the Chinese Communists. Japanese-dominated areas include the lower Yangtze valley, the coast, Shanghai and Canton and some of the hinterland; most of South China is still in Chinese hands. North of the Yangtze the Japanese have penetrated much further, especially in the great plains which stretch for 600 miles from Peking to Nanking, and separate mountainous Shantung from the mountainous back country. Much of Hupeh on the middle Yangtze is still under Chinese forces responsible to Chungking, defending the approaches to Szechwan; Chinese forces extend much further east, but do not dominate the more easterly provinces. During the past year, since the cutting of the Burma Road into southwestern China, the lack of foreign supplies of modern munitions has been severely felt; military offensives by Chungking's forces against strong and well-equipped enemy forces have become physically impossible. In the mountains, however, Chinese defense

forces can hold out as long as they are determined to do so. It is a physical impossibility for Japanese forces to occupy these immense areas, and to conquer all China.

In the capital at Chungking, the most serious crisis is economic. The government has plenty of money, but there is a shortage of goods. Plenty of money and shortage of goods means high prices. These, in Szechwan, reach fantastic levels. The government has issued great quantities of paper money, backed by the United States Treasury. Our \$500,000,000 subsidy of a year ago was an enormous sum, in Chinese terms; it was greater than the entire internal revenue and expenditure of the Chinese government for the previous five years. Expressed in Chinese paper, and accompanied by a cutting off of foreign imports, it has meant the jumping of prices to fifteen or twenty times their previous level. This has been felt most in regard to imported goods, but it has affected the entire price level. Workers' wages were increased many times over, but they could not keep up with the rice merchants and other profiteers with their bounding prices. The peasants got good prices for their rice—they thought; it was only when they went to buy goods that they discovered how little the money was actually worth.

Bankers, official and unofficial, merchants, and industrialists have made fortunes. Official measures were taken for control of rice prices, but the merchants themselves had strong official connections. With money abundant and foreign goods scarce, there has been a great increase in the import of goods from Shanghai and other areas under Japanese domination. Some of these goods are of Japanese manufacture; others are made in China, in the occupied areas, nearly all by Chinese, Japanese, or mixed Sino-Japanese concerns. Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Finance

Minister, in his report for 1942 revealed that such imports were already in the neighborhood of a billion Chinese dollars yearly. Increasing quantities of goods made in Japan, or in occupied areas of China, are now on sale and being eagerly consumed in Chungking and elsewhere in the interior.

A special government department is officially responsible for the prevention of smuggling. What this means, in effect, is a considerable degree of government control of trade. The official names of departments do not always indicate their precise functions. The Opium Suppression Bureau, in the heyday of General Chiang Kai-shek's regime at Nanking, was actually a government opium monopoly, bringing in revenues of more than \$100,000,000 yearly; its suppressive activities were directed against bootleggers, many of whom were executed. Today, the Bureau for the Suppression of Smuggling regulates and supervises a steadily expanding trade, through brokers, with Chinese merchants in Shanghai and Nanking, in Tientsin and Peking, in Canton and Hongkong. Unofficial smugglers may be severely dealt with, or if they are good enough, given employment. It is an old Chinese custom.

Cotton piece goods are most voluminous of the imports. In 1941, official records from two war zones alone showed such imports as amounting to \$180,000,000. Salt imports were more than \$120,000,000—though there are great salt wells in Szechwan also, producing excellent revenue for the government. Dyestuffs, mostly of Japanese or German manufacture, also amounted to over \$120,000,000; but German supplies ceased with the cutting of transportation, and the imports are now Japanese and Chinese. Medicines, communication materials, radio and electrical

equipment, mostly made in Japan, total tens of millions yearly. Rubber tires were brought in for a while; these ceased for a time, but as the Japanese have expanded their rubber production in Java they are again obtainable in the marketing areas in occupied China. There may soon be no tire shortage in China—for those who can pay for tires. Gasoline has also been brought in, as well as crude and lubricating oils, alcohol, wool, wheat flour and other cereals, and a great variety of hardware and other miscellaneous items. Iron and steel imports are limited; the Japanese have no great surplus beyond their own military and industrial requirements. But imports in 1941 amounted to some \$300,000, and with the continuing Chinese demand are likely to grow.

At present the Japanese and their Chinese and Burmese collaborators are imposing a blockade upon such goods as may be utilized for war purposes. Along the eastern fronts in North China, with the earth scorched and the populace famishing, food for the soldiers must be brought in from further in the interior and must be guarded carefully. The soldiers must protect both themselves and their supplies; food-hunters are no respecters of uniforms. Tens of millions of peasants and townsmen have migrated further into the interior, away from the scorched territories—helpless, starving people who must sometimes be fed. The interior provinces have more mouths to feed, and less food to do it with.

Most of the interior areas raise sufficient food for their own purposes, but this has been affected by the increased population and the requirements of the Army. Transportation is slow and inadequate through this great mountainous country. There are almost no railway lines. Human transport eats a considerable part of the food it

carries. Motor transport is inadequate, and is limited by the shortage of motor roads and the present Japanese blockade on rubber tires and gasoline. On the front in Yunnan, the Chinese forces have a bare sufficiency of rice, but greens and other supplementary foods are lacking. Quinine is lacking—in malarial areas which the Chinese have never been able to colonize because they could not survive as the acclimatized natives do. At the front, the Japanese have sat quiet for the greater part of a year, dosed with quinine, carefully fed, protected by mosquito nets, watching the Chinese troops sicken and die from malaria, fever, dysentery. Not one sick Chinese soldier in ten ever reaches a hospital. Life is cheap. As they die, they are replaced by new conscripts.

"Time" magazine, on February 8, 1943, told of the Yunnan front:

"The Chinese fronts still hold. But the soldiers who hold them have changed. China's heroes are sick. For every man who lies on a reed pallet with battle wounds, ten lie ill of disease. For every man who tosses with dysentery, pneumonia or malaria in a hospital, four others suffer, unattended, in bivouac or trench. At the root of all this aching misery is a malnutrition so vast that no one dares try to cope with it. The fevers of China creep into bodies which exist day after day on 24 oz. of rice. From this rice the heroes of China have to draw their fats, vitamins and carbohydrates. . . .

"The Chinese fronts are quiet. The Jap is not attacking, but the Chinese now do not have the strength, or even the will, to rise up out of their slit trenches and march. . . . The Chinese fronts have gone lean and inglorious. Once there was terror, urgency, bombardment, earth to scorch

and an enemy to hate. Now there is only hunger."*

Some Chinese have made great fortunes out of the war. Last year's subsidy of \$500,000,000 was not the first. The United States Treasury has been the financial mainstay of the Chinese Government ever since hostilities began at Peking in July, 1937. At first we financed them by the purchases of silver at enormously inflated prices—a form of subsidy which we started in regard to the Chinese late in 1935, suspended a year later, and renewed in mid-1937. When silver supplies ran low, we started our open and outright subsidies. How much of these funds were spent on actual war expenditures, and how much was deposited in private accounts, we may never know—unless we demand and obtain an accounting. All we do know is that Chinese deposits in the United States have greatly increased, and that last year's enormous subsidy was many times in excess of the Chinese Government's total annual expenditures. Some people have gotten rich beyond their dreams. Some distinguished Chinese will settle in the United States, ranking with some of our wealthiest families, and with the added prestige of having fought with patriotic devotion for a noble cause. But it will not be the common peasants and soldiers of China. The Asiatic Exclusion Act takes care of them.

At home, these peasants work as they have always worked—for the landlord, moneylender, and tax-gatherer. Most of the best land of South China and Szechwan is in the hands of well-to-do landlords, and is cultivated by share-croppers who would envy the conditions of most of our own share-croppers. Many Chinese tenant farmers

* Time, Feb. 8, 1943, p. 26.

have an acre or so of their own, but this is too small to support them when the tax-collector has taken his fourth or fifth of the crop. In most of the provinces, the great increase in taxation has been in the form of supplementary taxes, which have developed greatly during the past fifteen years. The original land tax was supplemented by the National Salvation tax, and the Red-Hot Patriotism tax, and the Education tax (spent in the cities and towns), and the anti-Communist tax, and the Cooperation tax, and taxes with many other ingenious and pleasant names. Since 1937 the Anti-Japanese tax and the War tax and the Save-the-Country tax and other taxes have become widespread, if not exactly popular. Dr. Lin Yutang has described taxes on pigs—the main livestock of Chinese farmers—from birth, possession, and death through to ham preparation, sale, and consumption. In war-time, however, there has been outright requisition as well. Swine are scarce in the rural districts today.

The Chinese officials in Szechwan have in the past applied advance taxation rather than supplementary taxes. As they disposed of the ordinary land tax, they collected advance taxes for the coming year—and, perhaps, for the year after that. Most of the peasants of Szechwan have now paid their taxes almost to the end of the present century. When the various emergencies end—they have been continuous for the last quarter of a century—the peasants will be legally free from land tax for generations to come. But none of them really anticipates this idyllic future; they will go on paying three or four years' taxes every year—plus military requisitions and patriotic levies as required—until they die.

Besides the militarists, tax-gatherers, landlords and scorchers of the earth, there are the usurers and slave-

traders. A Chinese sociologist, in a splendid study of a Chinese village, has set forth in clear and simple terms the operations of the moneylender:

"A person who finds himself unable to pay land tax . . . and is not prepared to spend the whole winter in prison, has to borrow money. The usurer's door is open to him." Seven dollars (before the enormous inflation of the war period) might tide him over this bad period, and keep him out of the verminous and disease-ridden jails with their starvation and brutality. But the moneylender charges about 65 per cent per month, and makes the loan fall due at a time when the farmer is almost certain to be unable to pay it. Seven dollars borrowed in October is repayable by about thirty dollars the following April, when the farmer needs what little he has for his spring sowing. Unless the farmer has had some amazing wind-fall,* he is unable to pay, so the moneylender extends the loan to the following October. By that time, payment of forty-eight dollars is required by the usurer. "If the debtor is still unable to clear up his debt, no prolongation of the term will be allowed. The debtor must settle by handing the legal title of his land to the creditor. . . . From then on, he is no longer a debtor but a permanent tenant. Instead of paying interest, he will pay an annual rent."**

Occasionally, a farmer succeeds in borrowing money on land to which he really does not have title, or the value of which is not up to the magnitude of the loan and its accumulated interest. Then the moneylender is in

* Readers of "The Good Earth" will recall that Wang Lung's windfall came through the looting of a rich man's house by the poor in time of civil war.

** "Peasant Life in China," Fei Hsiao-tung, published and copyright by E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., New York.

difficulties; it is one of his professional risks. All he can do in such cases is to send his gang to seize all the farmer's personal belongings, to beat and kick the farmer and his wife, and to destroy everything—house, tools, and meager furniture—not worth taking. Sometimes, however, the farmer has a daughter, and she is acceptable as collateral. The moneylender may seize her in payment, renting her out as a factory worker, servant, or prostitute. His loan may bring in an income of several hundred dollars in five years, after which the girl is free, if she is still alive.

The value of girls, however, has greatly declined. There is a superabundance of them in the famine areas. Starving parents face terrible alternatives, in selling a daughter to a slave-trader. The sale may save the life both of the parent and of the daughter. In every famine area, slave-traders do a flourishing business. The girls are sold to the brothels in the cities and towns, and bring in great profits for their owners. The more fortunate ones may become concubines; some become household slaves, their treatment depending upon their masters; most join the ranks of the broken, diseased, unspeakably miserable and degraded women who move from the brothel to the street, and from the street to the gutter. It is a great and profitable business. There are more than 10,000,000 female slaves in what is known as Free China.*

* Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, it should be noted, has more than once issued decrees abolishing slavery.

Chapter 19.

PEOPLE'S ARMY AND PEOPLE

SINCE 1937, the Chinese peasant has had an opportunity to fight for Free China. In battle he is as courageous as any soldier anywhere. But before they enlist or are drafted, many of the peasants do not understand the importance of the war and are reluctant to serve. Everywhere in Free China there is military conscription. Where there have been actual Japanese bombings or other Japanese destruction, the young people usually go obediently enough. In general, the conscripts accept military duty without opposition. Conscientious objection, of course, is not recognized. The soldier, during his training period, may be no worse off than at home, and may find the change of surroundings interesting. Sent to the front, he rarely thinks of disobedience to his officers.

In battle, he is far more likely to meet death than is any soldier in the world, because of the shortage of medical services. Any wound, even a scratch, is likely to mean death from gangrene. In time of retreat, the soldier is on his own. The splendid reporter and correspondent, Jack Belden, has told how empty military trucks tear through the squads of retreating soldiers, with drivers

and officers forcibly pushing off soldiers who try to climb on.

Wounded men lie in the fields, day after day and week after week, until they die. Those who can walk tramp steadily ahead, seeking any place where there is reported to be a medical station, till their steps grow weaker and weaker, and they lie down to await death. At the beginning of the war, there were almost no medical services. In the Shanghai area, public-spirited Chinese physicians rallied to the task of medical relief, but their volunteer services were far from adequate and the tens of thousands of wounded piled up in the surrounding areas. As the war moved away from Shanghai, however, there was almost no medical service. In the fields, by the roadsides, in the railway stations, thousands of soldiers lay helpless, suffering, patiently hoping that relief might come, or that death might come.

A handful of physicians, Chinese and foreign, have done splendid work, but they have always been short of funds. The great majority of soldier deaths have been from gangrene, as a result of wounds which to an American or Japanese soldier would have meant at most a period of hospitalization. Some funds and physicians have come from the United States, but there has never been anything adequate for even ten per cent of the wounded in time of fighting.

Medical services for soldiers are a comparatively new thing in China. They are limited in China today as they were in Europe a century ago. If soldiers die, new ones can be trained.

The Chinese Red Armies are careful about their manpower. The Red medical service is the best among China's forces, despite its continued shortage of medicines and

other supplies. Red guerrillas are not mere semi-skilled cannon-fodder, standing up to fight and be shot on the Chinese militarist theory that if one Japanese is killed for ten Chinese it is a Chinese victory. The Red guerrillas are trained, capable men, taught to take care of themselves in all kinds of fighting, and to take more lives than they lose. The Red medical service is sufficiently supplied with semi-trained nurses, male and female; but the shortage of medical and surgical supplies is most serious.

Whatever the shortage of medical services in the regular Chinese army, there has been an abundance of propaganda services. Students are organized into dramatic troupes, singing groups, etc., which travel around the country presenting patriotic plays and singing patriotic songs for the edification of soldiers and villagers. Most of them are enthusiastic patriots in this work. But they do not, it must be remembered, join the Army. Some have tried to volunteer, but they are excluded. The Chinese Army is a "coolie" army, except for the trained officers. The students, the educated classes, as they are termed, are needed to build up the country, to use the Chinese Government's own expression.

Some patriotic young people have made their way into the Soviet districts, and many joined the Red guerrillas when this was possible. But generally the students do not serve actively. When a sincere and patriotic teacher in Szechwan started a campaign for medical service near the front, he obtained from thousands of students about a hundred volunteers. Of these, less than a dozen showed up when called upon. Such service near the front, in fact, is not encouraged by the Government. The great exception is with the Chinese Red Army.

For young men of the gentry to join the Army—except, more recently, as officers or airmen—is opposed to all Chinese tradition, and is not encouraged by the Kuomintang Government. It is also vetoed by parents. The patriotic activity assigned to students is to cheer while the conscripted peasants patiently trudge off to war.

Chinese village life has been unforgettably described in Pearl Buck's novel, "The Good Earth." This book is fact presented as fiction. It pictures the life lived by the great majority of the common people of interior China, the China described by Dr. Lin Yutang with deep sympathy and terrible truth: "A China in the midst of pangs and throes of labor, a China facing the collapse of an empire and a civilization, a China of living millions of toiling humanity, with a desire to work and to live, struggling against floods and famines and bandit-soldiers and a bandit-gentry, and living in a state of chaos without meaning, turmoil without direction, unrest without change, verbiage without conviction, action without purpose, and misery without hope."*

Ninety per cent of the Chinese people are illiterate. Among the peasants of the vast interior, not one in twenty can read a newspaper; among their women, not one in fifty. There has been a mass education movement which has reached a greater number than previously—perhaps five or ten per cent of the total. But this is a most elementary education which permits people to read only such things as are written specially for them, in the thousand characters or less which they can learn through this volunteer movement. Chinese writing, it must be remembered, has a different and usually complicated character

* Lin Yutang, "My Country and My People."

for every word. How much can one read with a knowledge of a thousand words?

The language can be written in an alphabet. A Chinese alphabet was devised many years ago. Our own alphabet has also been used. Missionaries have translated the Bible into local dialects throughout most of China, using our own alphabet. In the early days of the Republic, there was considerable teaching of the Chinese alphabet. It is practical. The complicated Chinese characters are not an actual necessity. This is shown by the use of Chinese shorthand.

Liberal and democratic Chinese have long worked for reform and democratization of Chinese literature and writing, to open it to the masses. Dr. Hu Shih was one of the leaders in substituting the use of the spoken language for the old classical language used for two thousand years in "good literature." Dr. Lin Yutang worked industriously in promoting the simplification of many of the more common characters. But opposition has been strong and bitter to all such reforms—and most of all to the use of an alphabet which anyone can learn in a few weeks. Education is a vested interest.

The man who can read and write has a tremendous advantage over one who cannot even read a tax or rent receipt or a written contract, and who must pay a professional letter-writer to write a letter for him. The gentry of China have an obvious interest in keeping the common peasant ignorant and illiterate. Officials may demand a personal fee for writing out a report which a peasant cannot write for himself. The tax-gatherer and rent-collector and moneylender writes whatever he pleases on papers or receipts he gives the illiterate peasant. In case of dispute, the man who can write is right.

Education is a private enterprise. There is very little free schooling except by the mass education movement and by some of the mission schools, and all such work combined reaches but a small minority of the population. In many areas, such public schools as have been opened regulate their school periods and vacation periods so that the school is in session during the periods of heavy work on the farms, when the poorer children must work at home and cannot attend. It prevents overcrowding, and keeps the poor in their place. The limited number of educated persons greatly raises their value in the labor market, cutting down competition. In politics as in economics, the educated person has tremendous advantages over the uneducated. And the complicated old hieroglyphic writing takes many years to learn. Most persons who have learned it and profit by their knowledge have no desire to see it superseded by a simple system which would put the common man on a level with themselves by a few weeks' study.*

Beneath all the privilege and exploitation and extortion of China, official and private, there is a deep sense of democratic equality among the common peasants themselves. Government officials, landlords, moneylenders and merchants rarely live in the villages; they live in the cities and towns, coming or sending to the villages only to collect tribute. The local village government is carried

* One argument used by educated Chinese in defense of hieroglyphics is that they mean the same thing in any dialect, since they represent meaning and not sound. (Like our own numerals: 1, 2, 5, 68, etc., which have the same meaning in every language but which may be pronounced differently.) But this is an argument for officialdom, not for the common man. The common man needs to learn to write his own spoken language or dialect, whatever it may be, just as the various people of Europe today write in their own language. This can be done with an alphabetical system, and has been done.

on by the villagers themselves, with one of themselves as headman for official relations with the outside government. In most interior villages there are no police or courts; the villages do their own policing and apply their own customary laws in ordinary cases. Some villagers are poorer than others, but there is seldom much difference in general food and living standards within the same village. Their *de facto* governments, formed by themselves, are usually equitable and democratic except when there are some wealthy landlords or other gentry living in the same village.

But above this there is the official, *de jure* Government—the Government of soldiers and officials and tax-gatherers and rent-collectors with police powers. Representatives of this outside Government, centered in the towns and cities, come into the villages at harvest time, to collect taxes for the official revenues and rent for the landlords. They may also come at other times, to conscript labor or soldiers for Government work, or to make additional requisitions of foodstuffs, or to track down some rebel or take drastic action against peasants who have not paid their full rent or taxes, or—in war time—to order the peasants to evacuate, to burn all crops and all foodstuffs, to cut dikes and flood the fields, to scorch the earth till men cannot live upon it.

The peasants outnumber their officials and rent-collectors many times over, but the *de jure* Government has arms—modern, foreign-made arms. It was this which gave the military dictatorships patronized by the Powers such wide powers and possibilities of absolute rule over the common people. In the old days, pikes and clubs and swords counted for something. They count for much less against modern rifles, machine-guns and hand-grenades.

It is the village democracy of China which furnishes such a real and sure basis for democratic Government in China. The illiteracy of the peasant does not prevent his being a highly skilled and competent farmer and perhaps a silk-maker or handicraftsman. It does not prevent him from running successfully the affairs of his own village. In his technical knowledge, and his understanding of everyday affairs which immediately concern him, he is a much better educated man than the book-educated children of the city gentry, who are usually far more ignorant of villages and farming than is the ordinary city American.

But these book-educated gentry, spending most of their long school life in the memorizing of thousands of hieroglyphics, actually look down upon the capable farmers and fishermen and craftsmen who feed and clothe them. In politics, where the book-educated men monopolize all offices, there is a calm and superior conviction that they are going to educate the Chinese peasants up to their own level. Their conception of superiority is not a new thing; it is a very old thing. In traditional China, education meant book-learning. That is what it means, in general, today. Only the modern and genuinely educated man really thinks of the peasant and craftsman as also educated.

The cities and towns are not merely centers of exploitation of the peasantry. They also have their part in economic life. Here are the handicraftsmen, and such factories as exist. Here are produced manufactured goods for sale to the peasantry as well as to others. For thousands of years, the craftsmen, business men and workmen in the cities have carried on with their own guilds—the Woodworkers' Guild, the Bankers' Guild, the Wheel-

barrow Guild, and similar organizations—whose internal organization is determined by their own members and not ruled by the Imperial Government or its official successors. Public functions, when they were not taken care of by families, were taken care of by guilds or similar bodies. The Government's officials were not interested in regulating commerce or banking, or policing or cleaning the streets, or supplying education or other public services. Their sole function was to collect taxes and to maintain the Government's authority against anyone who refused to pay, or who otherwise disturbed the Government's peace.

It was the self-reliance and practical experience of the guildsmen in the cities, like that of the farmers in the countryside, which made the revolution for representative government so hopeful in China. The elected governments, in cities and towns and provinces, consisted largely of men who were experienced in public affairs—far more experienced than the tax-extorting Government officials. For the few years they were permitted to function, they gave an excellent record of intelligence and responsibility. A Government on such a basis would have been a strong, self-reliant, and independent Government. And because of this, it would cease taking orders from foreign Powers. It demonstrated that in 1911. So the Powers moved to crush it.

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Chapter 20

THE SOONG DYNASTY

THE CHINESE National Government at Chungking is headed by Chiang Kai-shek. General Chiang is Chairman of the Supreme National Defense Council, which has absolute power over party, political, and military affairs. He is also Tsung-Tsai, or Director-General, of the Kuomintang, the National People's Party, now commonly known as the Nationalist Party, which monopolizes all political and administrative power. He is also Chief Executive of the civilian government under the Kuomintang. Likewise, he is Chairman of the Joint Board of Government Banks, through which pass the American and other foreign subsidies upon which his government is dependent. In time of emergency the Generalissimo does not have to wait for the Party or its government organs to take action; he may issue emergency mandates having the full force of law, to cope with any and all matters—military, Party, or political.*

* See a Chinese Government publication, "China After Five Years of War," for fuller details of this. This authoritative book was prepared under the auspices of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, and put out here by the Chinese News Service, Inc. (an agency of the Chinese Government).

"Fortune" magazine, in a first-hand account of Kuomintang China in April, 1941, described it as "bossed by a dictator, guided by a clique, controlled by a party." It went on to note, truthfully: "Probably no chief of state in the world, whether temporary like Churchill or with a pretense of permanence like Hitler, has a hold on his country as does Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Every decision affecting China's future is taken by him. China's news is made by him. China has a wonderfully elaborate machinery of government . . . but Chiang embraces and is all."

The Supreme National Defense Council, heading the Chinese National Army, is General Chiang's highest organ of rule. Its actual membership is not known to the general public. The Generalissimo himself decides membership; generals are invited in or out without the public knowing too much of the internal alliances, conflicts, and balances involved—though it gets around, by what newspapermen in China term "bamboo wireless." General Ho Yin-ching, the Generalissimo's right-hand military man and Minister of War, is most permanent of its members. General Hu Tsung-nan, whom some regard as Chiang's best general, is another regular. But the Generalissimo has invited Chinese Red Army representatives at times, and General Hu's hatred of the Communists is emphatic and open. General Pai Chung-hsi, most brilliant of Chinese generals in modern warfare and outstanding leader of Chinese troops during the present war, has also been a member at times.

General Pai is more than a Chiang Kai-shek general. He has played a notable role in Chinese history. He and his associate General Li Tsung-jen for many years ruled efficiently and well the great southern province of Kwang-

si—long known as the best provincial government in China, resting on a local militia and with neither extortion nor starvation. Pai Chung-hsi is a Chinese Moham-medan. He has been much less dependent than General Chiang on foreign military advisers.

It was Pai and his Kwangsi forces which gave the Generalissimo his main military support at Nanking in 1927-1928. These forces were spread from Canton to Nanking and Hankow; they were among the first to enter Peking in 1928. It was against their far-flung power that the Generalissimo first struck with his new army in 1929. The Kwangsi leaders retreated to their own province, which they had to recapture from Chiang's military allies; they remained there, independent and self-sufficient, intermittently demanding that the Nanking Government adopt a firmer policy toward Japanese and other foreign aggressions, and extending their cooperation to Canton further east in every move to assert its independence of Nanking. When war with Japan came, in 1937, Pai Chung-hsi was the first Chinese military commander (excepting for the Chinese Reds in Shansi) to distinguish himself in the field. It was Pai who directed the Chinese forces at their notable victory at Taierchwang in Shantung in 1938. He was the great hero of China. Joyful and cheering crowds sang and shouted through the streets of Hankow, the provisional capital, and other cities.

General Pai's weaknesses are that he is not a shrewd politician, not a successful broker in politics or anything else, not a Christian convert, not one who plays up to foreign Powers or is especially devoted to protecting foreign privileges. Also, he is not treacherous. But he is a brilliant military man and capable administrator, from whom much may be heard some day. In the

meantime, he is the most competent leader of Chinese defense forces against Japan, and has at times been a member of the Supreme National Defense Council.

The purse-strings of the Defense Council and its military men are held by the Generalissimo in company with two other members of the Soong family, T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung, the first-named at Washington, the second at Chungking.

Dr. Soong, brother of Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek (Soong Mei-ling), is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of China—the foreign exchange bank in the State banking system—and likewise a member of the Joint Board of Four Government Banks, and also Foreign Minister of the Kuomintang Government, with headquarters at Washington, D. C. Through his hands pass the great subsidies from the United States Treasury to the Chungking Government. Understandably, he is Chungking's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Kung, husband of Soong Ai-ling (sister of T. V. Soong and Mrs. Chiang), is the Generalissimo's Minister of Finance, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) headed by the Generalissimo, Governor of the Central Bank of China, and member of the Joint Board of Four Government Banks. The Central Bank of China has an absolute monopoly on the issue of banknotes; it is the center of the State banking system. Three of the four members of the Joint Bank Board are members of the Soong Dynasty; the Generalissimo is Chairman.

The Kuomintang, under Director-General Chiang, monopolizes all political and administrative power. The Central Executive Committee of the Party elects the State Council, the chairman of which is the titular head of the National Government, which is simply an organ of the

Kuomintang. The Party is above the National Government, and has some organs independent of it. Official publicity and censorship is under its direct control. A number of Party members are resident abroad, and visit China only for Party conferences; some are active in many unofficial capacities abroad, constituting a kind of Chinese International.

The National Government, under the Kuomintang, is the administrative organ, and is divided into five Yuan or Departments: Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control. Under these are various ministries, commissions, etc. The Executive Yuan comprises virtually the Cabinet, under Chief Executive Chiang as Chairman. The Judicial Yuan is independent of the Executive, but not of the Party. The Legislative Yuan similarly. In pre-war years, the general principles of all laws were first decided by the Political Committee of the Kuomintang, then passed on to the Legislative Yuan for action. The Political Committee's functions have now been taken over by the Supreme National Defense Council.

The Generalissimo's economic controls are exercised through the National General Mobilization Council. The Mobilization Council, run by a Standing Committee of three, is directly responsible to the Supreme National Defense Council headed by the Generalissimo. It includes among its functions general supervision of the Government's economic activities. There are sections dealing with food, finance, wages, commodities, transportation, trade, cooperatives, etc., with liaison officials in other government organs dealing with such matters.

The Generalissimo's "Gestapo," the Blue Shirts, is another powerful organization outside of Party control. Chinese do not like to talk about it; they prefer to change

the subject. The head of the Blue Shirts (*Lan-Ssu*) has also been head of the secret police. An excellent article on this terrorist organization appeared in "Asia" magazine several years ago, written by a capable American correspondent, Wilbur Burton, largely on the basis of information obtained from the late Hu Han-min, for years a leader of the Kuomintang. A Kuomintang Government official in New York demanded that "Asia" repudiate the article, and publish a statement impugning the reliability of its correspondent; "Asia" complied. Officially, the Blue Shirts do not exist. In fact, they have played an important role in the Generalissimo's power—against rival military and political figures, against rival Kuomintang men, and against Reds.

They have worked both in Chinese territory and in the foreign concessions. One of their notable exploits, ten years ago, was the murder of Dr. Yang Chien, Secretary of the Academia Sinica and energetic head of the Chinese League for Civil Rights. The League, with the support of the fine old democrat and scholar Tsai Yuan-pei—who had been closely associated with Dr. Sun Yat-sen—had for a few weeks obtained a large amount of publicity in the Chinese press about thousands of political prisoners in Kuomintang prisons. Dr. Hu Shih was head of the League in Peking; Mrs. Sun Yat-sen actively cooperated with it in Shanghai; a few Westerners (including the present writer) were members. Its work was brought to an abrupt end when Dr. Yang was shot dead in the street in the French Concession of Shanghai, near the splendid scientific institution, the Academia Sinica, which he had served so well.

This murder was a grim warning to all concerned. The Chinese press abruptly ceased publishing the League's

reports; its membership and meetings rapidly dwindled. The French police arrested the murderers, but after secret exchanges with the Kuomintang government released them, letting it be known that they could not take action against them.

There is no Bill of Rights in Kuomintang China, no judiciary independent of the Party, no jury system, no popular representation in government, no written constitution defining and limiting the powers of the government. One of the Kuomintang's organizations, officially advertised as a representative national assembly, is known as the People's Political Council. It has come into existence during the war with Japan. The first Council, assembled in 1938, was all appointed by the Kuomintang direct. The second Council, assembled in 1941, included among its 240 members 102 provincial representatives. The third Council, last year, included 164 provincial representatives.

The provincial assemblies doing the choosing, it should be added, have been set up by the Kuomintang during the war; *all* their members have been appointed by the Generalissimo's Executive Yuan, from among persons nominated jointly by the Kuomintang's provincial Party offices and provincial governments. Such provincial assemblies have been set up in eighteen of the twenty-eight provinces of China, excluding those which are wholly or largely occupied by Japanese forces. Their representatives make up a majority of the People's Political Council. The largest proportion of its members are Kuomintang officials.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, ruler at Chungking, is a remarkable character. Hard, shrewd, almost humorless, he is capable of a studied urbanity and courtesy.

Now in his fifty-seventh year, he carries his age as lightly as do most Chinese above the over-burdened proletariat. His military studies were in Japan, and he acquired the Japanese military man's sense of personal fitness. His tall, trim body is a contrast to the softness of some of his pudgy political generals. He is abstemious. He neither drinks nor smokes, and his handsome semi-foreign homes are not palaces.

He is no mystic: he is a Chinese, and trusts to reason and not to intuition. He is no fanatic; ideas are things to be used, not to be victimized by. He has seen and utilized Nationalism as a powerful uniting force, but he has not dealt in extremes of tribalism and racial persecution such as have made the Nazi name hated throughout the world. He does not even hate the Japanese—as Japanese. He knows Japanese militarists, has dealt with them shrewdly at times, and does not trust them. There are, in fact, some Chinese of part-Japanese parentage in official positions.

Chiang has never written a book, except purely political works for definite political purposes, "ghosted" by others. He is not an intellectual; he is a politician. But he has studied Confucianism, Marxism, Leninism, Communism, Nationalism, Fascism, Christianity, Nazism, and has taken note of them in theory and practice. His only trips outside of China, so far, have been to Japan, Russia, and India. But he is far more sophisticated and intelligent, in many ways, than some of our own Government leaders. He has seen the Soviet system in practice in Russia, as well as in China. He has seen the workings of the Japanese Army and the Imperial system and Parliament in Japan (where, during his military studies, he met Dr. Sun Yat-sen). He knows what an obstacle a self-

assertive representative Parliament or Congress can be at times. He knows, also, what our Government's attitude toward such institutions in Asia has been in the past; it agrees with his own. He knows the Shanghai stock market and the Shanghai opium gangs, American business men and missionaries, German and Russian and American and other military men, Chinese bankers and anarchists and militarists. He has cooperated with anyone who seemed useful to him, for as long as it seemed worth while.

His Confucian heritage sticks close to him, but he uses Marxist phraseology at times and can dig out a Bible text on occasion. For political reasons, he detests and restricts the realistic work of modern Chinese historians in describing China's historic past, and refers in public statements to the glorious deeds of the Golden Age Emperors Yao and Shun and Yu; the Chinese people should look to great and wise rulers for guidance. Modern Chinese historians consider these Emperors and their Golden Age as wholly mythical; the prehistoric period assigned to them was actually the Stone Age in China. Chiang defines democracy as a product of capitalism—which is not Confucian but Marxian jargon. At Sian in 1936, when Chiang's captor, Chang Hsueh-liang, was pouring out to him his new-found faith in anti-Imperialism (*a la* Chang's new Communist friends), the prisoner said to him in weary disgust: "I learned all that thirteen years ago. I can recite it better than you. Stop it!"

Chiang's Christianity, like his marriage, has been of great political value to him. Protestant missionaries have been his most influential friends in the United States. Chiang's conversion to Christianity followed his marriage to Soong Mei-ling in 1928. The Soong Dynasty has been

a Christian Dynasty (Methodist), a curious thing in a country where not one per cent of the people are Christians, and most of this one per cent are Catholics. The Catholic and Protestant churches, it may be added, have completely different names in Chinese, and many Chinese think of them as different religions. The Catholic faith, which reached China in the sixteenth century, is *T'ien-ju Chiao*, the religion of the Lord of Heaven. The Protestant faith, which entered China during the nineteenth century, is *Chi-tu Chiao* or *Ya-su Chiao*—the religion of Christ, or of Jesus. Differences between the Catholic and Protestant churches in China are not only doctrinal; they are also political, and extend to international affairs. Both, however, are the faiths of small minorities in China.

In 1927, in Chiang's pre-Christian days, troops under his General Cheng Ch'ien committed unspeakable outrages upon foreigners, including American and other missionary women, at Nanking. It was a political move, under orders, designed to provoke international intervention against the Chinese National Government at Hankow, from which Chiang was then breaking loose. The Nanking Government subsequently formed by Chiang acknowledged responsibility, though asserting that Communists were the actual perpetrators, and paid compensation. American missionaries have told me in recent years, in sincere defense of Chiang: "Ah, but that was before he became a Christian!"

Chiang has impressed our Christian missionaries, since his conversion, as deeply as he impressed Moscow's Communist missionaries at Canton a few years previously. He is said to be an ardent Bible student, to pray daily, to say grace before all meals. A missionary, George Shepherd, has been one of Chiang's close advisers and best publicity

men, and for years gave him the warmest encouragement in his war of extermination against the Chinese Reds. Even the China Mission Year Book was finally converted to Chiang Kai-shek. In its 1934-5 edition it had its last honest article on opium in China, written by the late Garfield Huang, a sincere Christian and head of the Anti-Opium Society at Shanghai. This article pointed out the nature and the finances of the Generalissimo's Opium Monopoly, and its workings. But in the following edition of the same Year Book, the corresponding article was written by a Kuomintang official, and blandly reported that the Opium Monopoly was actually engaged in *suppressing* the opium traffic!

In connection with religion, however, it must be understood that the ordinary educated Chinese is skeptical and tolerant. Conversion to a religion, or the shedding of an accepted religion, is not a matter of violent argument among people. The polite Chinese exchange on the subject of religion is found amusing by some Westerners:

"What is your honorable religion?"

"Ah, my black superstition is Buddhism" (or Taoism, or Mohammedanism, or Christianity). The Chinese does not blatantly assert it; he smilingly acknowledges it: everyone has his weakness. Our missionaries, it should be added, dislike this. Christians are advised not to reply in the conventional way.

The one basic Chinese religion is ancestor-worship. Every adherent of the ancient native faith has his ancestral shrine. His parents, after passing from this life, continue their personal interest and supervision of his welfare and his conduct. Sincere Christians and Mohammedans abandon this worship of ancestors. Chiang Kai-shek has not done so. Of all the religious and social faiths which have

passed through his shrewd mind, ancestor-worship is probably the only one which is deep and permanent. And there is logic in his faith. For if anyone is worthy of worship and reverence by Chiang Kai-shek, it must be the ancestors of Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang's marriage to Soong Mei-ling was one of the great achievements of his career. This was the foundation of what is known as the Soong Dynasty. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in his latter days, became enamored of the attractive and intelligent Soong Ching-ling, the elder sister of Mei-ling. The father of these girls was known as Charlie Soong. He had immigrated to the United States in 1879, when he was a boy, had worked his way through school here, became a Methodist, returned to China as a beneficiary of Christian mission work, and did well as a publisher and salesman of Bibles. His children—three girls and three boys—were educated in mission schools and American colleges.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen had had wives and girl friends before; the Chinese (contrary to some American legends) are not prudish or puritanical about such things. He had had a son, Sun Fo, by a former wife. Sun Fo is still head of the Legislative Yuan of the Kuomintang Government; ancestry counts in China. Every Chinese with position, power, or wealth is supposed to look after his relatives, whether direct or indirect; Soong Ching-ling's enterprising brother, Tsu-ven—better known as T. V. Soong—was made President of the Central Bank at Canton in 1924, in the Government set up there by Sun Yat-sen in his latter days with the powerful aid of Moscow.

The next year, T. V. became Finance Minister. His businesslike methods, aided by his American education, his business background in China, his Soviet advisers at

Canton, enormously increased the Canton Government's revenues—partly by added taxation, but also by careful checking on local officials. In the old days, officials collected as much as the traffic would bear from the peasants, and remitted as little as they could to higher officials; the difference was their income, and some of them did extremely well.

The Canton Government, however, demanded and obtained stricter accounting, put local officials on livable salaries, and increased its revenues several times over. T. V. took his cut; and Chinese generally felt he had it coming to him. The moderate family fortune was greatly increased, and the Soongs became an important business element in the International Settlement at Shanghai, with excellent connections with foreign and Chinese bankers, industrialists, and other people who counted. They also had high prestige in Kuomintang circles, owing to their association with the late Sun Yat-sen, who had died in 1925 at Peking, while trying to carry through a deal with Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin which would have made him President at the Northern Capital and considerably altered the history of the period.

Chiang's marriage into this now wealthy and important family, with its American connections, was a marriage of state. More than \$50,000 was spent on the great event. And Chiang had married an attractive and capable companion. Soong Mei-ling is still a beautiful woman, bearing lightly her 45 years—as Americans have now noted.

Chiang is himself of a merchant family of Fengwha, near Ningpo in Chekiang province. From Ningpo come many servants to Shanghai; many work in foreign households. Chinese newspaper men sometimes refer to Chiang, ironically, as the Ningpo Napoleon. He gained his first

military knowledge and military experience in Japan, where he studied; Japanese is the only foreign language he speaks easily and fluently, though he can get along in English or Russian in case of need. His concepts of severe military discipline he first gained in Japan. His Japanese military training stood him in good stead during the Chinese Revolution in 1911-2, where he worked under the Chinese revolutionary leader General Chen Chi-mei, at Shanghai. The anti-Manchu forces were largely recruited from among the hard-bit gangsters of Shanghai, with whom Chiang made his first contacts—which were to be of great value in later years.

With the subsequent defeat of the Revolution, Chiang drifted into various occupations in Shanghai, and for a time was a petty broker on the Stock Exchange. His handling of other people's money, however, was not always successful for them, and after a period of exchange fluctuations in Shanghai he found himself in most serious difficulties. Remembering his old revolutionary comrades, he appealed to Chang Ching-chiang, an old friend and associate of Sun Yat-sen who had done well in business, and who got Chiang out of his mess, settling with some of the claimants and shipping off the ex-broker to Canton with a recommendation to Dr. Sun. Chiang, it should be added, had married Chang's daughter—his second marriage.

This was the beginning of Chiang's real career. At the beginning of 1923, Sun Yat-sen had signed his agreement with Soviet envoy Joffe, and a few months later was back in his old political center at Canton. There he received Chiang Kai-shek, and sent the young officer to Moscow, where Chiang studied Red Army methods and the Soviet system. He was there for six months, observing the Army

(still in Trotsky's hands) as a base for power, its relations to the ruling Party, the strength of the dictatorship, the importance of thoroughgoing propaganda and thought control. He saw Moscow's ambitions in China, which he shrewdly appraised as power politics and ultimate domination; he was no innocent. But he was outwardly most friendly and receptive, learned the Marxist-Leninist jargon, and most favorably impressed his Communist hosts and mentors. He returned to Canton as the favorite protégé of Borodin—the Soviet envoy and adviser—and of the military advisers sent by Moscow.

When the Whampoa Military Academy was established at Canton with Russian funds, Chiang was made director. Dr. Sun had died. Borodin was the most powerful figure in the Canton government. When the Right-Left conflict in the outwardly unified Kuomintang brought the assassination of Chiang's Leftist political director at Whampoa, Borodin consummated a deal by which he got the responsible persons out of town. Chiang Kai-shek became commander of the Canton Army. Wang Ching-wei was head of the Party, the Government, and the Military Council. Communist political agents—open and secret—in Army, Party, and Government worked carefully, under Borodin's instructions. Chiang proudly declared, at the Kuomintang Congress: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union, with the world revolution, is actually an alliance with all the revolutionary parties which are fighting in common against the world imperialists to carry through the world revolution."

The immediate target was the British Empire, Moscow's great obstacle and enemy in Asia, most influential but most vulnerable of the dominant Powers in China. British police, sailors, or soldiers in May and June, 1925,

fired on Chinese Nationalist demonstrators at Shanghai, Hankow, and Canton, killed more than seventy, wounded twice the number. A fierce wave of protest and anti-British feeling rose up throughout China, comparable to that which followed the Japanese attacks near Peking in July, 1937. An economic war was launched against the British throughout China, with a boycott of British goods and services, strikes against British industries and steamship lines, and general strikes by Chinese business men and workers against British Concessions and the British-dominated International Settlement at Shanghai.

Center of this movement was the Kuomintang, with its Communist associates and its wide ramifications in business, student, and labor circles. At Canton, center of the Kuomintang Government, a general economic war against British Hongkong was begun. The organized Hongkong workers emigrated to Canton, where they were provided for, leaving Hongkong prostrate. Demands called for changes in the Hongkong administration which would virtually end British Imperial authority there. The Colony settled down for a long siege, idle but resolute. There would be no liquidation of the Empire.

The outrages were real. I was a witness of what happened in Shanghai, where I saw a score of Chinese youths lying in pools of blood before the Louza Police Station on Nanking Road. The British regarded all the incidents as deliberately provoked and maneuvered. The original incident at Shanghai started with a strike at a Japanese factory and the shooting of a Chinese by a Japanese guard. But the strike against the Japanese was soon dropped; and the Japanese did excellently out of the boycott of British goods. The firing at Shameen (Canton) had been done by British and French troops. But the boycott

was directed wholly against the British—most determinedly against British Hongkong.

In the concentration against Great Britain in China, the British saw the Red hand of Moscow. But moral indignation did not come well from the British. In 1917, the Allies had intrigued with Chinese militarists to the extent of ending the last remnants of parliamentary government at Peking, in order to get the Chinese into war against Germany. A year later, the same Allied Powers had gotten the Chinese into war against Soviet Russia. Moscow was now turning the tables, and getting the Chinese into an economic war against the British. The Chinese had most serious grievances—against *all* the Imperial Powers. The basic grievance was the presence of foreign troops on Chinese soil, with no treaty right whatever—despite Secretary Hughes' endorsement at the Washington Conference. The foreign armed forces which committed the outrages of 1925 were, in effect, forces of armed invasion and occupation of Chinese territory. The deliberate provocation of incidents, and the concentration on "Down with *British* Imperialism!" was seen by the British as part of Moscow's game. But foreign troops in China were part of a much older game—one which had brought China to a measure of actual subjection to foreign Powers.

Chiang, head of the Canton Army and the Whampoa Academy, was a central figure in the economic war against Britain; he repeatedly denounced Chinese "traitors" who cooperated with the British. By the British, and by his foreign and Chinese enemies, he was denounced as a puppet and stooge of Moscow. And then, in March, 1926, he did what Chang Tso-lin did at Peking a year later—and what every Chinese leader does when he feels strong

enough. He demonstrated that he was working for himself, and was not a stooge if he could help it. On the night of March 20, 1926, with Borodin absent from Canton, he put all the Soviet advisers under house arrest, put the Communist military inspectors and Canton-Hongkong strike committeemen into prison, took the seals of political authority from Wang Ching-wei, and made himself military master of Canton. Borodin returned to Canton to find himself still adviser, and go-between for funds from Moscow. But General Chiang was boss.

The economic war against Hongkong was brought to a close. Chiang launched the northern expedition to the Yangtze, with Soviet funds, Soviet arms, and Soviet military advisers, with Kuomintang and Communist fifth columns effectively preparing the way en route. But Chiang himself, taking the central route with his Soviet adviser General Galens, was somehow delayed. Borodin got to Hankow long before him; the Nationalist Government was removed from Canton to Hankow, where it was reorganized along committee lines with the Communist finger everywhere; Chiang was reduced to one of several members of a Military Council. He would accept control—or else.

It was in this situation that Chiang turned over to the British camp, reaching an understanding with them at Shanghai. The Nanking outrages of March, 1927, which particularly singled out the foreign Consulates and their officials, were definitely designed to discredit the Kuomintang Government at Wuhan (Wuchang-Hankow), and provide a pretext for foreign intervention. The immediate effect was the bombardment of Nanking by British and American warships. (The Japanese refused

to participate.) Joint demands were made on Wuhan by the Powers. Chiang proclaimed a new National Government at Nanking, looking to Britain, France, and other Powers for support.

Britain, France and we had already sent more than 25,000 troops to Shanghai, and other Powers lesser numbers, occupying the International Settlement and French Concession as well as wholly Chinese territory outside the Settlement. Thirty foreign warships rode at anchor in the Whangpoo River off Shanghai; more were operating in the Yangtze River itself. The British reached agreement with the French and Italian Governments for joint military and naval intervention against Wuhan.

The Japanese and American Governments, however, refused to participate; and without them, the move was doomed to failure. The Japanese Government formally objected to the British Customs Administration collecting surtaxes for the benefit of Chiang Kai-shek. The Nanking Government was a mere local regime with British and French support, with British and French cooperation in the massacre of Communists and Communist-led workers in Shanghai, and with "Green Gang" cooperation both in these massacres and in the raising of funds.

Chiang Kai-shek had come in contact with the "Green Gang" during the 1912 Revolution. It had gained wealth and power by the bootlegging of opium, by the traffic in women and girls, by kidnapping, and by racketeering. For years it was headed by Tu Yueh-sheng (now in Chungking), an illiterate but shrewd counterpart of Chang Tso-lin. Another leader, known as Pock-Marked Hwang, was a chief of detectives of the French Concession police in Shanghai; local French officials used to retire from service with comfortable fortunes. The "Green Gang" effectively

cooperated in the bloody drive against the Red labor unions, and shook down well-to-do Chinese at Shanghai for enormous sums for the Nanking regime. Since Nanking was engaged in a war against Communism, a kidnapped business man had to show his loyalty to the cause by shelling out generously—the sums running into six figures—before he was released. Some \$50,000,000 was obtained in this and other ways.

At Wuhan, Kuomintang leaders became apprehensive both of the Communists and of Moscow. After disarming the first, they expelled Borodin and his staff; some Chinese fellow-travelers (including Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and Eugene Chen) joined the Russians in the *hegira* to Moscow. Rapprochement was now possible with Nanking—when Chiang left. Wang Ching-wei was leader.

Chiang resigned his posts. Some thought he was through. But he went to Japan, and for weeks he talked with Japanese leaders. He returned to Shanghai with important assurances which gave him prestige such as that which the Russians at Canton had given him two years previously. With this supplementing his Western and gangster support, Chiang was again making good. He had earned his way into the Soong family, with its wealth, influence and contacts.

Chiang married Soong Mei-ling; he and T. V. Soong cooperated closely in reorganization of the Nanking Government; negotiations were carried on in the French Concession at Shanghai. Chiang became Generalissimo of the reorganized Government on January 7, 1928, with brother-in-law Soong as Finance Minister. The Foreign Minister resigned, stating that the projected policies made China's progress in foreign relations impossible. The British Customs Commissioner at Shanghai started pay-

ing to T. V. Soong the bulk of the Chinese Customs surplus, instead of remitting it to the still-recognized Chinese Government at Peking. The Soong Dynasty was born. Wang Ching-wei refused to cooperate.

Since that time, fifteen years ago, the Soong history has been central in Chinese history. That same year came the first big Japanese military intervention in China, and China itself began to be remilitarized by the Powers. This was the beginning of the Japanese Army's new aggressions, and the remilitarization of the world. The roots of the new World War were in China; and the Soong Dynasty, headed by General Chiang Kai-shek, has been at the core of the events of war. Chiang's Government was recognized as the National Government of China after the Japanese Army invaded Shantung, expelled Chang Tso-lin from Peking, and murdered him at Mukden. It was Chiang's Army that was first to be built up in the new Remilitarization of Man.

Chapter 21.

PRESERVING OUR RIGHTS

IN JANUARY, 1943, the American Government signed a new treaty with the Chinese National Government at Chungking, abandoning our long-standing Imperial privileges in China, the right of gunboat patrols and exemption from Chinese law and taxation being the core in this whole structure of special privileges. For a hundred years we had possessed these and other privileges, and were thus partners in an ever-increasing foreign domination of China. Today, we have recognized by treaty the right of the Chinese people to be sovereign in China. The British Government has acted similarly except for Hongkong. The Japanese have also acted. The Japanese treaty was with their dependent Chinese regime at Nanking, and preceded our treaty with Chungking.

The position which we have now abandoned has been central and basic in our policies toward China, and in our attitude toward the Soong Dynasty's regime from its very foundation. In recent years, our rights and privileges have been most seriously threatened by the Japanese, and by such Chinese as Wang Ching-wei. Fifteen years ago, however, they were most seriously threatened by Soviet Russia and the Comintern, and such Chinese as

Wang Ching-wei. In January, 1928, this threat had apparently subsided, but there was still bitter hostility to foreign privileges among Chinese Nationalists and militarists and other Chinese leaders, and the Peking Government of Marshal Chang Tso-lin was working steadily for the abridgement of such privileges. They were revived and re-established, however, and stood firm right down to the present year. That they are now being abandoned is no fault of the Soong Dynasty. The Soongs have served us faithfully and well, and they have cooperated consistently with foreign powers in the maintenance of these rights.

The whole edifice of foreign treaty rights seemed to be collapsing in 1927, sixteen years ago. For the greater part of a century, the Powers had dictated China's Customs tariffs and the Open Door for foreign imports. But the Kuomintang's economic war against the British was now bringing ever more anxious concessions, and Great Britain was the leading Power in China. Chang Tso-lin, at Peking, in December, 1926, announced that he would collect surtaxes on Customs; when the British Inspector-General refused, he was dismissed and replaced. The Kuomintang at Wuhan took over the British Concessions there and at Kiukiang, by shrewdly manipulated mob action. The British sent a special envoy to Wuhan, who officially recognized the transfer. The British Government announced its readiness to apply Chinese laws and equal taxation to British subjects in China, to bring other British concessions under Chinese administration, to withdraw protection from Britain's Chinese proteges in mission and business enterprises.

Chang Tso-lin's actions against Belgian and Spanish treaty privileges, against the revenues of British investors

in Manchurian railways, and against American investments in the South Manchurian Railway, are now history. So, also, are his approaches to the Japanese and French for relinquishment of their special privileges and unequal treaties. He was consolidating his power at Peking, and his announcement of a new National Tariff meant increased revenues and the re-expansion of his power south to the Yangtze. Where the British Customs officials were not taking his orders, Chinese provincial authorities were themselves collecting Customs surtaxes, ignoring foreign protests and vetoes. The British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang on the Yangtze had been rendited to Chinese authority, and the Peking Government obtained a similar agreement from the British in regard to the Tientsin Concession. In the International Settlement at Shanghai, the greatest center of foreign capital and investment and trade, the Chinese were demanding equality of treatment in the Shanghai Municipal Council, and an end of taxation without representation. They rejected the Powers' grudging offer of three seats out of twelve on the Shanghai Municipal Council.

It was these and other threats to foreign privileges and foreign financial control in China which brought foreign support to the Soong regime at Nanking in 1928. General Chiang had already made arrangements with some foreign Powers, and it was on the basis of cooperation with them that the Nanking Government was reorganized at the beginning of 1928, with Chiang Kai-shek as Generalissimo and T. V. Soong as Finance Minister, dominating and ruling through the Kuomintang Party dictatorship. The Nanking Foreign Minister and other National Revolutionists resigned. Wang Ching-wei, "Left" leader, went abroad.

The policy, however, brought in immediate funds. The British Customs Administration at Shanghai, despite the fact that the Government at Peking was still the recognized Government of China, began turning over most of the Chinese Customs surplus, outside of Chang Tso-lin's own northern and northeastern provinces, to the newly reorganized Nanking Government. The latter cooperated with the Powers in settling the dispute in the International Settlement. It accepted the three seats offered, brought pressure on the Chinese ratepayers to agree, and supervised the subsequent election on its own behalf. The "Green Gang," the powerful group of opium dealers, slave traders, and racketeers with which Chiang Kai-shek had long been associated, was of importance and value in the bringing of pressure. Chinese approved by Nanking, and satisfactory to the Powers, now participated in and supported the foreign oligarchy at Shanghai, without possessing any actual power.

The new Customs revenues made it possible for the Nanking regime to borrow money from Chinese bankers at Shanghai for the northern expedition against Chang Tso-lin. General Chiang Kai-shek's northern expedition from Canton to the Yangtze had been financed, supported and advised by Moscow and its agents. His new northern expedition from Nanking to Peking was actively and decisively supported by British funds and Japanese military intervention. The Japanese sent several thousand troops to Shantung, making it useless to the Chinese Government at Peking. The Peking Government's protests, and appeals to the League of Nations, were fruitless. The Japanese further intervened to prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching the Government's forces further west, on the railway from Hankow to

Peking, increased their forces at Tientsin and finally ordered Marshal Chang Tso-lin out of Peking, murdering him as he reached his old capital at Mukden.

The Kuomintang Government at Nanking had taken over from its predecessors at Wuhan and Canton a strong propaganda and publicity organization, which now had the cooperation of foreign news and propaganda agencies in China. Through this, the effective intervention of Japanese troops against the Peking Government and its forces was actually represented as intervention against the *Nanking* forces, though the expulsion and murder of Marshal Chang made things wholly clear to anyone who wanted clarity. Nanking's propaganda was greatly aided by a serious clash between its own soldiers and those of the Japanese at Tsinan-fu. The Nanking troops had been ordered to circle the city, leaving the Japanese in possession. But these soldiers, inspired by their successes and their belief that they were fighting for Chinese Nationalism against the domination of foreign Powers, entered the city, where they came into conflict with Japanese forces. This bloody battle greatly aided Kuomintang propaganda to the effect that the Japanese intervention was directed against Nanking and not Peking.

The atrocious murder of Nanking's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Tsai Kung-shih, was somewhat in the category of the murder of Chang Tso-lin. He was no Fengtien or Chiang adherent, but an honest and sincere Nationalist who opposed foreign domination of China and Chinese deals with foreign Powers.

Japanese military intervention in Shantung and further north, whatever its ostensible aims and purposes, was armed invasion of China, in precisely the same category as their action in Manchuria in 1931 and at Shanghai in

1932. It was outright aggression, it dominated whole provinces of China, and it carried out military operations in which thousands of Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed and wounded. Its ostensible purpose was the defense of foreign treaty rights in China—Japanese and other. The American Government did not protest at these Japanese aggressions. American military forces at Tientsin cooperated with the rapidly increasing number of Japanese forces, dominating Peking's communications with Manchuria. Secretary Stimson subsequently wrote, covering and including this very period of military invasion, that the Japanese Government had "for ten years given an exceptional record of good citizenship in the life of the international world."*

After the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the American Government emerged as the direct patron of the Nanking regime, and was first to recognize it as the National Government of China. The Japanese had plans for a special sphere in Manchuria, but we negotiated with Nanking for arrangements confirming and assuring our own treaty privileges throughout China. Nanking had no direct, genuine authority in North China, but our Government proceeded to recognize it, before a new Chinese Government should be set up at Peking.

Unlike Peking, Nanking was not dominated by armed forces in the garrisoned Legation quarter and along the railway to the sea, and close to the Japanese Army's centers of power and influence. It was mainly dependent on the great treaty port of Shanghai, and on the Customs and other revenues collected by British and other foreign cooperation there. American, British, and French forces

* Stimson, Henry L.: *The Far Eastern Crisis*.

and gunboats, not Japanese, dominated Shanghai and its International Settlement and French Concession. The Customs Commissioner at Shanghai had his center in the International Concession; funds were deposited in the British banks there and elsewhere. When the Nanking Government established its own National bank, it was in the International Concession of Shanghai, not in its nominal capital at Nanking. At Shanghai it had direct foreign protection, under a foreign administration. At Nanking it had the support of foreign gunboats moving up and down the Yangtze, and intervening at times of crisis. No Legation Quarter whatever was established at Nanking.

In the latter months of 1928, American diplomatic pressure in cooperation with the Soong regime brought the ousting of the British Inspector-General at Peking (who had taken orders from Chang Tso-lin), his transfer to Nanking and Shanghai, and finally his dismissal, unifying the Peking and Shanghai administrations which had been separated during the previous political conflicts. The Customs Commissioner at Shanghai became the highest Customs authority, and turned Customs surpluses over to the Soong regime at Nanking. The various Customs surtaxes collected by local regimes throughout China were unified in a national tariff schedule, and diverted to Nanking; they were its main financial support. The foreign-dominated Salt Administration had almost disintegrated; people and provinces had done away with this evil tax or were diverting it to local uses. It was re-established with Nanking's cooperation throughout the country, and brought in ever greater revenue for the Powers and for the Soongs. A considerable part of this latter, however, was nominal, much of the rev-

venues actually being turned over to provincial rulers in exchange for a cut with Nanking and formal acceptance of the latter's suzerainty.

The damaged structure of extraterritorial privilege was repatched. The Nanking Government negotiated new treaties with Belgium and Spain, restoring the extraterritorial rights which had been taken away by the Peking regime. New treaties were negotiated with other Powers as well, confirming their extraterritorial privileges for an indefinite period.* The British Concession at Tientsin, already retroceded officially to Peking, was retained under British control by a new agreement with Nanking. The Chiang Kai-shek Government abandoned Peking's formal request that the Japanese and French revise their treaties with China on a basis of equality. All this was done under an amazing propaganda smoke-screen of militant Nationalism, Kuomintang publicity bureaus and controlled press setting it forth that Nanking was doing away with foreign privileges.

The Japanese, whose brutal intervention had been decisive in North China, gained little. In Shantung, however, the Nanking regime confirmed Japan's hold on the Shantung railway, and granted new rights of residence, travel, and trade in that area. In the British-dominated area of Weihaiwei, on the northern coast of Shantung, the Nanking Government negotiated a treaty which brought the area under nominal Chinese sovereignty, but left the British in control of the British settlement and

* These treaties were drawn up with abandonment of extrality privileges in the "main" texts, and indefinite postponement in the all-important annexes. By omitting the annexes in press and cable reports, these treaties were presented as if the Powers were *abandoning* their extrality privileges in China, with a great advance for Chinese Nationalism! Such is the power of propaganda!

naval base, with British ships continuing to use it and enjoy all facilities as previously.** Chinese Governments at Peking had for many years refused to make an agreement on such terms, demanding that the British abandon this naval base in Chinese territory—to which they had had no legal claim since 1905, and which was not only a naval but a smuggling center, since goods entered the port duty-free and were easily shipped into the interior.

The Japanese, despite their diplomatic setback, complied with the Nanking Foreign Ministry's urgent request to hold Shantung until Chiang Kai-shek's forces, which as yet had no direct military authority north of the Yangtze valley, should take over the province. This was finally done, and the Japanese evacuated. At Weihaiwei, the British agreed to postpone "rendition" of the naval base—actually, the establishment of a Customs office there and remittance of revenues to Nanking—until the Peking Government, established in 1930 by northern military leaders, was liquidated and Nanking again became sole claimant to recognition as the National Government of China.

Thus, the privileged Powers retained a superior position in China. Some Americans, not subject to Chinese law and with no formal regulation by American law, have gone out to China with nothing and made millions in ways that would be impossible in the United States. Arms and munitions and war-plane salesmen flourished. To make this possible, and in order to aid the Chiang regime, the Powers in April, 1929, canceled the ten-year embargo on arms to China. In the International Settle-

** The British lease had expired in 1905, following the Russian surrender of Port Arthur, but the British continued to hold the naval base by force majeure.

ment at Shanghai, and in some areas near this and other treaty ports, there was new investment of American capital.

Americans, at long last, got their hands on Chinese communications. The idea of investment in Chinese railways still survived, but air transport and motor transport were the new fields, and we got in on the ground floor. American Airways obtained contracts for airlines over China, and did excellently out of it. There was some strong opposition even in the Nanking regime, some officials protesting that it was further derogation of China's sovereign rights to have foreign planes flying over Chinese soil, and declaring that the airlines should be developed with Chinese capital. One Government department started its own airline, with native capital. But our Soong friends took care of this, and the native line was discontinued. Our airways admitted the Nanking Government to partnership, allowing them a half-share in the business. American and German airlines, in partnership with the Nanking Government, jointly monopolized this field in China. When Japanese airlines tried to enter this field, the Nanking Government stood firmly for our rights.

We also disposed of hundreds of war-planes in China. American officers trained and built up Chiang Kai-shek's air forces during the 1930's—forces which were effective against the Chinese Communists and other native opponents, though they did little damage to the Japanese in 1937. We were ousted from this training position in 1935 by the Italians; but during the war with Japan, after the Italians were withdrawn, our men got back again, not merely training but virtually directing Chiang Kai-shek's air forces since 1941.

Increased numbers of automobiles were sold in China,

as well as fuel gasoline. This was made possible by the road-building campaign started by the Nanking Government ten years ago. Thousands of miles of motor roads were constructed, and a number of bridges. This was of value not only for civilian transportation and for touring and joy-riding by foreigners and wealthy Chinese, but for military purposes. Military trucks and military forces could be moved to various areas much more rapidly than by the inadequate railroads, steadily extending the effective military domination of Chiang Kai-shek. Bus lines ran out into the country also; merchants and peddlers carried foreign and native goods in this way, to sell in the rural districts.

It was understandable that American commercial attaches and trade agents should be loud in their praises of this progressive government of China. Trade expansion, however, was limited by the tariff increases. The surtaxes given Nanking in 1928 were insufficient for the Government's ever-growing military needs, and the Powers gave Chiang tariff autonomy, permitting him greatly to increase his revenues. Superficially, this appeared as an expansion of Chinese sovereignty. We had given the Japanese Government such tariff autonomy twenty years previously, enabling the Japanese militarists to expand *their* forces. In China, however, collection of the Customs revenues continued in the hands of the British Customs Administration, which held the purse-strings. Its central authority was in the International Settlement at Shanghai, protected by foreign forces and gunboats. When Chiang and Soong were forced to give way to a wider Kuomintang group at Nanking, at the end of 1931, the Customs authorities simply did not give the new regime any money. This, and the firm control exercised by General

Chiang and the "Green Gang" over opium revenues, was almost decisive. The 19th Route Army, however, had to be cleared out of the Shanghai area by Japanese forces.

Because of the greatly increased Chinese tariff, only special groups of privileged American business men actually increased their sales to China. For years, there was a general decline in our exports to the country. The new Chinese tariffs, it must be emphasized, meant the end of the Open Door. The phrase is still used, for political purposes, but every business man interested in China knows that it disappeared more than ten years ago. There has been a continuously Open Door for manufacturers of war-planes or other military equipment purchased by the Government, but for ordinary consumers' goods the door was closed to a narrow crack. We ourselves closed the Open Door; we found it necessary to do so, in order that the Nanking regime should have money to carry on.

These funds for the Nanking regime were devoted almost wholly to the building up of military forces, with foreign advisers. At the beginning, General Chiang Kai-shek had not only the secret support of foreign Powers, but the open support of outstanding Chinese military leaders such as Pai Chung-hsi and Feng Yu-hsiang. Without their armies, the 1928 expedition against Peking could not have reached the northern capital at all. It was these armies which fought so desperately against the Fengtien forces south of Peking, and which entered the capital when Chang Tso-lin was ousted. They were Kuo-mintang forces, allies of Nanking. But they were not inclined to take orders from Nanking or the foreign Powers, and after the elimination of the Peking Government from the scene in 1928 it was against them that the

steadily growing and well-equipped Nanking forces, under their new German military advisers, were directed.

Few Americans know of the cancellation of the embargo on arms to China in April, 1929, and its significance. The embargo had been established in 1919, the same year as the Versailles Treaty which disarmed the Germans. Arms continued to be smuggled into China, but these were mostly old stock and second-rate. The Washington Conference in 1921-2 adopted a resolution for the reduction of China's armed forces. Had foreign forces also been reduced, and prohibited from further aggressions in China, this would have been a splendid move. But that was not done, and Japanese forces in 1928 launched their biggest invasion of China since the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese war. At the time the arms embargo was canceled, the Japanese Army was holding Shantung for the Nanking forces, until General Chiang's new army could move in. The arms were for the use of the Nanking Government, pledged to support and maintain the treaty privileges of the Powers in China.

Conditions had changed since 1919. During the World War, China had joined the Allies, and sat in at the Versailles conference as an ally. During this period, arms came openly to China. At Versailles, however, the Allies betrayed China and turned over Shantung to the Japanese. This roused fierce opposition in China, with a great student and popular upheaval in Peking and elsewhere; the Chinese envoys at Versailles refused to sign the treaty. The Arms Embargo was a direct result of this May Fourth movement in China, since the revolt made it clear that ever-greater numbers of Chinese were determined to oppose foreign double-dealing and aggression. The Arms

Embargo was imposed then because the Chinese would not accept the orders of the Powers. It was canceled in 1929 because the Powers whose troops and financial control dominated China felt that they now had a Chinese Government which would support and maintain their privileges. At the very time the embargo was lifted, the final touches were being put on the Kellogg-Briand Pact to Renounce War. At the time the Japanese signed this, their forces were engaged in armed invasion and aggression in North China. When Nanking signed it, its armies were engaged in war against other Chinese forces, and the Powers were canceling the Embargo and openly supplying arms to Nanking.

The lifting of the Arms Embargo opened the way for Nanking's successes in wider areas. It also opened the way for increased imports of arms from Germany, where Krupp and other manufacturers were permitted by the Powers to export arms to China—despite the clear provisions of the Versailles Treaty against German armament exports.

Despite its foreign support, the Nanking Government was unable to assert any direct authority over most of China. If it had continued its cooperation with other Kuomintang armies and leaders, it might have sustained its power. But its launching of war against one after another of these leaders resulted in chaos, and its new-made enemies combined against the Soong regime. In 1930, the leading Kuomintang generals in North China, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, united in the establishment of a new government at Peking. Their native Chinese forces inflicted serious defeats on General Chiang's German-directed armies in North China, and seemed destined to continue. All the skill and strategic knowledge

and experience of the Nazi officers, and heavy borrowings on Customs and other revenues, were necessary to prevent a debacle. But these great advantages finally began to tell. And Chang Hsueh-liang, in Manchuria, desperately appealed to by Nanking and its foreign friends, finally intervened and took over Peking himself.

The widening war and the heavier levies on the peasantry helped the Communists in China to stage their remarkable comeback, and to establish themselves in the interior in South and Central China. Moscow and Communism in China were at their lowest ebb at the time the Soong regime was established at Nanking in January, 1928. A continuation of Kuomintang unity, and the establishment of a Chinese Government devoted to the tasks of peace and reconstruction, might have dealt with some of the grievances of the peasantry and prevented any serious recrudescence of Communist influence in China. But the increasing destitution of the peasantry, and the increasing number of embittered and disbanded soldiers, nourished the development of Communist power in China.

The Communist regime was a Party dictatorship. But the Government which the Powers promoted and patronized at Nanking was also a Party dictatorship. Many who had supported Nanking in 1927 because of their opposition to Moscow rule in China now turned to support of the Chinese Communists, accepting them as at least a lesser evil. Thousands of young men from the cities made their way to the growing Soviet areas, and actively cooperated with the Communists against Nanking—which they denounced as the agent of foreign Imperialism in China.

When Nanking, after its war against the northern

forces, was able to concentrate against the Chinese Reds, the latter were so well-established and had developed such capable guerrilla tactics that they defeated one Kuomintang expedition after another. It was from these Kuomintang expeditions that they captured the bulk of their new arms, and emerged as an ever greater force. Our cancellation of the Arms Embargo actually assisted, quite contrary to our plans, the growing military power of the Chinese Red Armies. The Chinese Reds laughingly referred to Nanking's military expeditions as their own "supply trains." That was not how the arms were intended by the Powers.

Nanking's setbacks by the Chinese Red Armies in South China following the war against Peking enabled the Kwangsi military leaders, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, to re-establish themselves in their old province, and to cooperate with Kuomintang leaders at Canton against Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking. The Nanking regime was bankrupt, having drawn its Customs revenues far in advance and borrowed heavily on future revenues. Nanking anxiously negotiated with Western Powers for new loans; an international loan was planned on security of Nanking's opium revenues, control of which was to be turned over to foreign Powers. There was bitter opposition to this and to the opium traffic itself, a traffic which would have been made legal and permanent in foreign hands.

The civilian Party leader Hu Han-min opposed the terrible drain of military expenditures. He favored an end of the civil war, and opposed a political move by General Chiang to turn the Party dictatorship into a personal one. Chiang put him under arrest. Other Kuomintang leaders assembled at Canton, where a new Na-

tional Government was proclaimed, including most of the outstanding Party leaders who were still at liberty. Nanking became an almost wholly personal dictatorship of the Soongs, with their American and other Western advisers. Chinese bankers at Shanghai refused further loans to the bankrupt regime. The majority Kuomintang Government at Canton took possession of the local Customs revenues, as the Peking Government had done in its areas the previous year. The British Labor Government declined to interfere with the taking over of Chinese funds by a Chinese Government headed by Wang Ching-wei.

In the North, Chang Hsueh-liang's officials in Manchuria began taking ever more determined measures against Japan's unjust privileges in Manchuria. His was the most powerful Government north of the Yangtze, and was expanding its power. It was diplomatically considerate of Western Powers, but it was asserting itself against the Japanese. The Japanese civilian Government sought agreement, and opposed Japanese military action against the assertion of Chinese rights.

Not only the Japanese militarists, but the privileged Western Powers and business men in China viewed Marshal Chang's actions with apprehension. What he was doing to the Japanese today, he would do to Western Powers tomorrow. The American and other Governments continued to recognize General Chiang's regime at Nanking, and refused to acknowledge the existence of the majority Kuomintang Government at Canton. The latter, its appeals for foreign recognition ignored, sent Foreign Minister Eugene Chen to Japan to negotiate. The Shidehara Government, devoted to peaceful cooperation with all Powers, continued its diplomatic collaboration with the American Government in China, declined to recog-

nize Canton, and suggested that Canton combine with Nanking. The Japanese militarists, however, saw their opportunities in this situation and shrewdly played Canton off against Nanking. When the Japanese Army struck at the Chinese forces in Manchuria in September, 1931, the Canton Government's forces were already starting a northern expedition against Nanking and driving into Hunan province. Chiang Kai-shek was Chang Hsueh-liang's ally.

The history of those momentous years may seem complex, but there is one guiding thread throughout: foreign military and financial intervention in China on behalf of foreign privileges. The Japanese troops sent to Shantung in April, 1928, were an invading army, engaged in military aggression and intervention in China's internal affairs; their ostensible reason for sending troops was protection of foreign rights in China. The British Government had the previous year sent 20,000 troops to the Shanghai area, and we and other Western Powers had sent smaller ones, similarly without treaty rights, and for protection of foreign rights in China. In our patronage of the Nanking regime, and the building up of its military forces, we moved a step further, seeking to build Chinese military support for the protection of our privileges and the gaining of some new ones in China. Nanking's wars were directed against Chinese who would not take orders from Nanking or from us.

From beginning to end, the American Government was primarily interested in the preservation and consolidation of our treaty privileges in China—primarily against the Chinese themselves, but also against other Powers. This was the whole basis of our Government's shifting and seemingly devious policies, of the spread of war and

suffering over ever wider areas of tortured China. The Chiang-Soong regime was our Chinese protege, ruling through a party dictatorship and pledged to the protection of our treaty rights in China.

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Chapter 22.

OUR CHINESE PAYROLL

THE FINANCIAL mainstay of the Soong Dynasty at Chungking is the United States Treasury. Our \$500,000,000 subsidy of last year was much the greatest of our contributions at any one time, and is more than four times the size of the entire military expenditures of the Chinese Government in an ordinary year of war. We also made lend-lease shipments to China, down to the end of 1942, amounting to \$156,738,000.

We started our regular subsidies in December, 1935, a year and a half before China went to war with Japan. We started them in order to encourage and promote Chinese resistance to Japan. We continued them in order to encourage the Chinese to make war on Japan, and later to encourage them to continue as the defenders of our endangered treaty rights in China. We formally relinquished these rights on January 11, 1943, after the Japanese and our Chinese enemies at Nanking had taken them away from us.

In terms of Chinese internal politics, our subsidies have been the most powerful support of the Soong Dynasty. General Chiang Kai-shek became fully supreme in February, 1939, when absolute control of military and civil affairs was taken over by the Supreme National Defense Council under his permanent leadership. We had already

—for more than three years—supplied his Government with the major portion of its income. In the four years since that time we have supplied it with funds far greater than its entire military and civil expenditure.

From Washington to Chungking the funds are wholly in Soong hands and under Soong control. T. V. Soong, Chairman of his Government's foreign exchange bank, is at Washington—Chungking's Foreign Minister. Brother-in-law H. H. Kung, Governor of the sole note-issuing bank, is at Chungking; he is Finance Minister, and acting head of the civil government on behalf of the Generalissimo. Brother-in-law Chiang Kai-shek is himself Chairman of the Joint Board of Government Banks, with the two other Soongs and the Chairman of the Communications Bank (the railway and industrial bank). Free China is not exactly a one-man democracy. In China, the family is the unit.

Our subsidies had radically altered the basis of Chiang Kai-shek's power. Eleven years ago he was dependent on Japanese troops. At the beginning of 1932, with Chiang in retirement and another Kuomintang Government at Nanking and its 19th Route Army in the Nanking-Shanghai area, it was necessary for Japanese troops to attack the Chinese army and drive it out before it was safe for Chiang and his associates to return to Nanking. As Dr. Cyrus H. Peake of Columbia University has correctly noted, "the glorious stand of Tsai Ting-kai's army at Shanghai was, in the light of internal politics, merely an unexpected result of an adroit effort on the part of Chiang Kai-shek to use Japanese armies to eliminate an opponent."*

* *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1934, p. 410.

Our Government warmly supported Chiang Kai-shek at that time also, as the defender of our treaty rights in China. But American as well as British popular feeling at the time made it impossible for us to intervene directly, with our own troops, on his behalf. It was necessary, therefore, for Japanese troops to do the actual fighting.

The record is wholly clear, however unfamiliar. We know from the League of Nations' report, as well as from Henry Stimson's book, "The Far Eastern Crisis," that the Japanese attack was launched by agreement between the Japanese and the American, British, and other military commanders in the Shanghai area—the International Settlement Defense Committee. The Western garrisons, like the Japanese, were forces of armed invasion and occupation; none of them had any treaty right whatsoever to land in this Chinese territory. These commanders divided Shanghai into "defense" sectors among themselves—details being kept a secret until after the Japanese attack. The Japanese sector included an area outside the Settlement, garrisoned by the 19th Route Army. The Japanese attack was made treacherously, late at night, in accordance with the agreement:

"The Japanese troops sent to the Chapei sector in conformity with the plans of defense came into contact with the Chinese troops which, as the first report of the Consular Commission notes, would not have had time to withdraw even had they wished to do so. This was the beginning of the battle of Shanghai."*

* League of Nations report, Feb. 24, 1933. The text may be found in W. W. Willoughby: "The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations," p. 701.

The Chinese troops, however, learned the Japanese plans at the last moment, and were ready and waiting. They drove the surprised invaders in panicky rout back to the shelter of the International Settlement with its Western garrisons, which the legally-minded Chinese, anxious not to offend the Western Powers and our treaty claims, refrained from invading and occupying. The Japanese, having no desire to fight a serious war at Shanghai on behalf of the Powers jointly and of Chiang Kai-shek, arranged a truce with the Chinese commander, and agreed to withdraw from the salient assigned the Japanese by the International Defense Committee.

Tokyo, however, to meet American objections, referred the matter to Washington. Secretary Stimson objected strongly, proposing instead that the Chinese troops withdraw from Chapei, both sides withdrawing from "mutual contact" and leaving "neutral zones" on Chinese territory, which would be policed by neutrals—i. e., by the Western Powers which had conspired with the Japanese forces in the original attack.

The Chinese submitted; the Japanese agreed. Mr. Stimson, however, brought in the Manchurian question, demanding that the Japanese "settle all outstanding controversies with the aid of neutral observers or participants." Otherwise, our Government "was not anxious for any termination of the fighting which would involve a real surrender of principle."* The principle in question was our treaty privileges in Manchuria. As shown clearly by the Lytton Commission's report, participated in and endorsed by the United States, our aim was joint foreign domination of Manchuria instead of exclusively Japanese

* Stimson, Henry L.: *The Far Eastern Crisis*. Harpers, 1936. Page 152.

domination. We would participate as partners in the rule of this joint colony, with the Chinese subjected to joint Imperial rule instead of to Japanese Imperial rule.

The Japanese refused this condition, agreeing instead to continue the fighting at Shanghai. Heavy reinforcements finally overwhelmed the Chinese defenders, and drove them from the Shanghai area. Another truce was arranged. "The fighting at Shanghai . . . stopped on March 3rd. The Japanese were anxious to withdraw their troops and get free of an embarrassing situation. Several of the governments with large commercial interests in Shanghai were pressing vigorously to have this accomplished as soon as possible. . . . It seemed to me now, however, that these details could wait."**

Pressure was brought upon London, which finally gave way and joined Washington in asking that the Japanese troops remain. The Japanese, who were already starting to withdraw, reoccupied some evacuated points, and remained until the 19th Route Army left for Fukien and Chiang Kai-shek could safely return to Nanking. The area north of Shanghai was made a "demilitarized zone"—so far as Chinese troops were concerned—under the joint supervision and control of the five Powers plus a Nanking representative, with American chairmanship of the Joint Commission.

But the Japanese militarists, fighting our battle at Shanghai, rejected our proposals concerning Manchuria and turned down the League Commission's efforts to negotiate an agreement. Japanese business and political leaders who favored such an agreement were assassinated—starting with the war at Shanghai, which was bitterly

** Same, p. 178.

opposed by all elements in Japan. Premier Inukai himself was assassinated, and the Army extracted from Tokyo official recognition of the Army's own puppet regime in Manchuria.

With regard to Nanking, the Japanese soon began to challenge Western leadership there. When military gangsters send their armed forces to fight a war of intervention in a neighbor's territories, they expect to have something to say about the outcome. Some of us have learned that about Hitler and Mussolini since the Spanish War. It was similarly true of the Japanese Army.

In 1933, Nanking signed the Tangku Agreement with Japan, calling off official resistance to the Japanese in Manchuria; the fighting patriot armies on the border were driven out by cooperation between Japanese and Nanking forces. On the other hand, Nanking promulgated a new tariff greatly increasing the rates on the main Japanese imports, especially cotton goods, and favoring British cotton goods and other imports. European advisers were predominant at Nanking, and were now centered in a growing League of Nations mission.

We moved in by our financial advance to Nanking in June, in the form of a loan negotiated with Mr. T. V. Soong at Washington. Our advance was in the form of credits of \$50,000,000 (one-third of which was actually issued), which among other things enabled American wheat to oust Australian wheat from the Chinese market. It meant, however, increased political influence for ourselves, and was immediately protested by the Japanese; money as well as guns is effective in influencing policy. Some Chinese also objected; Chinese were well acquainted with moneylenders' techniques, and had since the Washington Conference flatly refused foreign loans, which

they knew from experience meant increased foreign control and political intervention.

Our financial advance secured Nanking's adherence to the International Silver Agreement, which enabled us to secure a position of unprecedented leadership by economic pressure and by subsidies to Nanking. By this Agreement, the American Government pledged to purchase 24,400,000 fine ounces of silver yearly, but the Chinese Government bound itself for four years not to sell "silver resulting from demonetized coins," the only kind China possessed. Western Powers were not so bound; they could sell Chinese silver to us—and did. Our Soong friends ratified, despite bitter protests from Chinese business men and others who appreciated the significance of the move.

Superficially, our purchases of foreign silver at greatly inflated prices was an extension of our domestic policy of buying American-mined silver at inflated prices. But our Government's domestic policy meant subsidies to American silver operators—part of the domestic New Deal. Its foreign silver policy meant far greater subsidies to foreign Governments and foreign silver dealers—direct and decisive contributions to the bloody New Deal in the Far East for the past eight years. The great bulk of our silver purchases have been from abroad. But American silver operators, profiting from their own big subsidies from our Government, actively cooperated in the *foreign* silver policy.

Most of the silver bought by the American Government has been from China—much of it via London. The United States Treasury has paid out more than \$1,000,000,000 for foreign silver (mostly from China), and only about one-fifth of this amount for American-mined silver. For every

ounce of domestic silver acquired by the American Government, more than six ounces of foreign silver has been bought. American silver dealers refer to these foreign purchases, simply and accurately, as "subsidy paid abroad." They have drained China of its monetary silver, and made its Government our financial dependency. During the first year, their ruinous effect upon China's economy faced the Chinese with desperate alternatives: financial subjection to the United States, or military subjection to Japan. This war is still continuing.

We started our big-scale purchases of Chinese silver—through London—in August, 1934, when we imported more than 30,000,000 ounces of the metal; our *yearly* purchases under the Silver Agreement were to have been 24,400,000 ounces. During the latter part of 1934 we paid out from \$15,000,000 to \$20,000,000 monthly. A year later this had risen to \$30,000,000 monthly. Our subsidies were at first mainly to the British, who shipped the silver out of China; we refused to buy from the Chinese direct. Later the Japanese horned in on the profits.

Silver was the main commercial currency of China. The fall in silver prices since 1926 had improved China's economy, and steadily increased Chinese exports despite the world economic depression. Early in 1933 the white metal was worth about 26 cents an ounce; we started buying it abroad in 1934 at 64½ cents an ounce. It was rich business for British silver dealers, but China was faced with disastrous deflation and a ruinous drop in prices. Nanking tried to meet the grave internal situation by an export duty and equalization charge on silver, and severe penalties for smuggling, but it had no control over the British and other nationals with extraterritorial privileges, who openly shipped Chinese silver out of Shanghai

and other ports. Our Government refused to buy silver from the Chinese Government direct.

Until December, 1935, our Government patronized this foreign smuggling by ever greater purchases of the silver. The British were the principal smugglers; we bought the silver at London. Our great purchases of silver at inflated prices, paying out twenty to thirty million dollars monthly, contributed much toward maintaining and strengthening the shaky pound sterling. The intensifying economic crisis in China, with ever-widening unemployment and bankruptcy, helped greatly to bring the Chinese into line.

The Soongs reached an agreement with the British (of which the non-Soong members of the Nanking Government were not informed), by which Nanking in March, 1935, seized the leading Chinese banks in the International Settlement at Shanghai, setting up a State banking system headed by T. V. Soong, with effective control of Chinese silver stocks and direct relations with the British banks. The Japanese bitterly protested, and then moved to "balance" the situation. By military moves and demands at Peking, they separated North China from Nanking's political and monetary control, setting up the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. This was the first Japanese aggression of the "new" period. It was in direct retaliation against the Anglo-Soong move. It enabled the Japanese steadily and rapidly to increase their own outward smuggling of Chinese silver—for sale to the United States Treasury. By the latter months of 1935 the Japanese were smuggling out more silver than were the British.

This new business was a veritable windfall to the Japanese, whose internal economy was heavily strained by the big costs of the Manchurian occupation, and the

military industrialization of the subject country. The Japanese obtained some \$50,000,000 of our subsidies, enabling them to increase their expenditures on Manchuria and on other military (and naval) requirements, and to increase their purchases of military and industrial requirements from the United States—while *reducing* their issues of domestic loans.*

The British, who now favored the recognition of Manchuria and economic cooperation with the Japanese there, sent Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government, to Japan to negotiate an agreement. From there he went to China, where he negotiated with the Soongs. On November 3, the Nanking Government nationalized Chinese silver, adopted a paper currency secured on foreign exchange, and joined the sterling bloc. The British now had full financial control at Nanking.

The Japanese, moving simultaneously in North China, vetoed any removal of silver from that area to Nanking, and ousted Nanking's remaining authority from there. They set up a purely puppet regime to the east of the city, moved its forces to Tangku below Tientsin, and prepared to take over Peking. They aimed to add this area to Manchuria, and re-establish the puppet Manchu Emperor in the Imperial Palace at Peking.

The American Government, however, vetoed the arrangement, asserting its now powerful financial position. It publicly announced its serious concern at the new developments in North China, discontinued its silver purchases in London, and subsidized Nanking with \$32,500,000 for 50,000,000 ounces of silver; two years pre-

* For further details see my article: [U. S. Treasury and the Far East, in "Amerasia" for November, 1941.

viously, we had extracted from China a four-year agreement *not* to sell any demonetized silver. Nanking readily joined in our protests against the British move. The British were faced with most serious losses on the great stores of silver in London, where there was a minor panic affecting the pound sterling. The British finally joined us. The Japanese gave in, stopping in their tracks—and subsequently withdrawing their puppet forces from Tangku.

There was a bloody reaction in Japan. The sudden Japanese halt—and retreat—roused furious hostility among the more extreme jingoists in the Japanese Army, and led directly to the military uprising at Tokyo on February 26, 1936. It was high-placed Imperialists in the Army, fiercely opposed to “appeasement” of us, who instigated fanatical young officers to the *coup* of that date, when forces under their command seized the center of Tokyo (outside the Imperial Palace) and assassinated outstanding naval and civilian leaders whom they held responsible for the “appeasement policy.”

The jingoists gained fuller control both of Army and Government. The Army’s higher-ups made no move to save its young stooges. These in time surrendered, and the leaders were executed or committed *hara-kiri*, silent about the generals who had instigated them to murder and to their own death. The generals were also silent. This was *Bushido*.

The central principle of the young Imperialists was made clear in the high-flown jargon of fanatical patriotism but revealing their basic aim:

“Now is the time to bring about an expansion of the power and prestige of Japan. In recent years many persons have made their chief pur-

pose in life the amassment of wealth regardless of the general welfare and prosperity of the people, with the result that the majesty of the Empire has been impaired."

To the Japanese Army, the Dollar was not almighty. The militarists expanded their forces in North China and renewed pressure there. But the American Government had now taken direct financial control from the British at Nanking, and both Chinese and British now followed our lead in protests against the developing and the existing situation in North China. We started further subsidies to Nanking, paying out more than \$75,000,000 to the Soongs in the next six months. Nanking's effective authority, which had been limited to the Yangtze valley, was extended southward to Canton for the first time in five years. Our great subsidies, and Hongkong's cooperation, simply *bought out* the military leaders and the airmen of the existing Canton Government. In North China, General Chiang was able to gain a firm foothold in Shansi.

A few months later, the Generalissimo was kidnapped and reached his historic agreement with the Chinese Reds in Shensi, west of Shansi. The civil war was ended. China was united and strong as never before. Our subsidies ceased in December. From December, 1935, to November, 1936, our payments of \$110,000,000 had more than doubled General Chiang's available military revenues. He actually had more money to spend on his army and air forces than Tokyo had on its corresponding forces in 1936.

In March, 1937, when the agreement between Kuomintang and Communists was made official by the Kuomintang Congress at Nanking, every Power was eagerly and anxiously seeking Chinese friendship. As soon as the

Chinese Government showed its hand clearly by appointing the courageous and capable Wang Chung-hui (not Wang Ching-wei) as Foreign Minister, the Japanese Army's Government at Tokyo also appointed a new Foreign Minister, who on March 8 dumbfounded the country by expressing deep contrition for previous injustices done to China, and declared his Government's desire to jettison past errors and strike out on a new path, establishing friendship between Japan and China on a basis of equality.

Anxiously friendly approaches were made to Nanking, and an Economic Mission was dispatched to China. Customs and other officials accredited to Nanking were permitted to function more effectively in North China. Japanese banks in China turned over their long-hoarded silver to the Chinese Government—a virtual gift—in exchange for the new Government paper. But Nanking, now confident, promptly raised political questions, and challenged the domination established by the Japanese at Peking.

This challenge was wholly justified; but it was backed and encouraged by Western Powers which were apprehensive of their own interests and privileged position in China and the Far East, and feared the effect on these interests of a Sino-Japanese understanding. The British were most apprehensive—especially following the developments at Sian. Ten years previously, Kuomintang-Communist cooperation under Moscow's leadership had been directed against British interests in China and at British Hongkong. Agitation was now overwhelmingly anti-Japanese, but it did not have to remain so; Moscow could change this. The economic war against Britain ten years previously had been developed directly out of the

shooting of a Chinese striker by a Japanese guard in a Japanese mill at Shanghai, and then concentrated wholly on the British. And the British also feared Japan's southward drive.

The British Government immediately followed up the Sian Affair by eager and friendly offers of big credits and investments to China, and economic and other cooperation in the Hongkong-Canton area and elsewhere. British influence contributed decisively to China's rejection of Japan's anxious approaches and professed "reformation." British influence also blocked the idea of a Pacific Conference under Chinese auspices—which was the one really statesmanlike move for the Chinese in their newly strong position. No Far Eastern Power could have refused to attend. All of China's new-found friends would have to show their hands. The Soviet Government is to be credited with having suggested such a Conference to the Chinese Government.

Not only the Japanese position in North China, but the Anglo-American position at Shanghai and the British position at Hongkong, and the whole system of international domination of China through control of revenues and extraterritorial privileges and settlements and concessions, backed by foreign gunboats and troop landings, could have been laid on the table, as at the Washington Conference—but with United China as the leading Power instead of Imperial America. But Britain and other Imperial Powers were extremely apprehensive of a Pacific Conference under Chinese auspices.

As a counter to this, and to the Soviet Government's formal proposal of a Russo-Chinese Mutual Assistance Pact (a full alliance), the British Government made suggestions of an Anglo-Chinese economic, military, and

naval understanding, suggestions so definite and so promising as to bring half the Soong Government to London, in the remarkable mission to "attend the Coronation." It was headed by Finance Minister Kung (who was also Vice-President of the Executive Yuan), and included other high officials of the Executive Yuan and Finance Ministry, as well as of the Chinese Army, Navy, Air Forces, Maritime Customs, and Central Bank. Some ironists termed it "the brightest jewel in the British Crown."*

The double-crossing of China was the first important act of Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister. He took office on May 28, hailed by the Japanese press as a leader of the pro-Japanese group in London and a promoter of Anglo-Japanese cooperation in China. The British Government, while opening formal negotiations with the Chinese mission in London, had *also* accepted a Japanese proposal for informal conversations for "joint action to rehabilitate China." Under Chamberlain, these Anglo-Japanese conversations became formal, while the Chinese mission continued to be "kidded along."

On June 22, the Japanese Ambassador in London was given full power to negotiate an agreement. England would recognize Japan's position and accept her policy in North China; Japan would recognize Britain's position and accept her policy in South China. The two Powers would cooperate in China in finance, banking, railway building, and other projects. Tokyo immediately announced continuation of its former policy in North China; Japanese authorities there would continue to deal with Chinese local authorities, referring nothing to Nan-

* For further details of these diplomatic preliminaries see my article: "The Diplomatic Prelude to the China War," in *Pacific Affairs*, September, 1941.

king except as they themselves saw fit. A Japanese Economic Mission arrived in London, and opened conversations with the Federation of British Industries. It was far more successful than the Economic Mission dispatched to China in March—*against* which the British had warmly encouraged the Chinese. Its conversations dealt with economic cooperation in China. The Japanese announced that North China was to be linked with Korea and Manchuria in a continental bloc, closely linked with Japanese industries but with full opportunities for British capital.

It was with this definite and specific encouragement that the Japanese started ominous night maneuvers at Wanping on the night of July 7, 1937. [It was with night maneuvers that they had started at Mukden in September, 1931—when the British anxiously approached us for cooperation against Japan and we refused it.] Finance Minister Kung, after being double-crossed in London, and welcomed by Hitler, flew to Washington, where he obtained action when the Japanese moved at Wanping.

The Kung-Morgenthau agreement announced on July 10 was as momentous as the Sian Agreement and the developing Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The United States Treasury renewed its silver purchases from the Chinese Government, supplied the latter with a substantial amount of gold, and extended loans to China on the security of gold or silver deposited in the United States. Silver shipments and American payments started at once. China was assured of funds for a year of war.

London, fearful of the effects of war on their own interests in China, approached Washington for joint consultation and action, but without success. The British, French, and Germans tried to mediate; we refused to cooperate. The British, supported by the French, warned

the Chinese that to make the "local incident" a matter of national prestige would be a matter of grave concern to the British Government; the Chinese refused to give way. They had American and Russian friends. The Germans informed the Japanese that a general war with China would be contrary to the spirit of the anti-Comintern Pact; the Japanese were polite, but they could not accept German intervention; they were reaching an understanding with England, and otherwise acting on their own.

Our financial encouragement enabled Vice-President Kung to fly to London and propose that the British reverse their attitude. It was an unprecedented role, both for Mr. Kung and for the shocked and amazed British Government. London, however, was forced to give in; Mr. Kung had our backing. Anglo-Japanese diplomatic and economic negotiations were broken off. The British moved to defend their interests in China by belated cooperation with the Chinese. The Japanese bitterly declared that they had been betrayed by Perfidious Albion. Some Chinese also had Asiatic thoughts on the subject.

The Japanese forces were being rapidly increased in North China, were consolidating their hold on the Peking area, and were launching treacherous attacks on local Chinese troops. Nanking bitterly protested, and declared emphatically that it would not recognize any local settlement. But not until our financial support was promised, and this enabled the Chinese to bring London into line, did Chinese forces start serious retaliation—at Tientsin and at Tungchow, east of Peking. To create a diversion from North China (and from the Hongkong-Canton area, where the Japanese started to move as soon as the British broke off negotiations), the most powerful and

best-equipped of the Chinese National forces were assigned to the Shanghai area, where fighting started on August 13. It was a nation-wide war, with the Chinese in a new-found unity fighting the Japanese invaders wherever they found them. China was fighting back.

To this we had given definite and decisive encouragement. But the record is not clear without mentioning our subsequent moves. The British, at last brought into line by actual bombings, tried to secure the neutralization of Shanghai, the great center of British, American, and French interests in China. The Chinese (and French) agreed. The American Government refused to cooperate. In earlier years, we had cooperated with the British, French, and other Powers in sending tens of thousands of Western troops to Shanghai for protection of our interests and our position there—sometimes in cooperation with the Japanese. But that was against the *Chinese*. As against the *Japanese*, we refused to cooperate. The Chinese were fighting our battle for us.

General Chiang Kai-shek, after fruitless negotiations, addressed an open appeal to his Western friends, emphasizing that China was fighting "not only her own battle but the battle of all those nations who base their lives upon the sanctity and validity of treaties" (a reference to Secretary Hull's lofty, encouraging, and innocuous statement on the subject), "and especially those whose large commercial interests in China are being systematically destroyed and their representatives driven away."

"Intervention," the Generalissimo declared, "is necessary not solely for China's sake, but for international safety." Madame Chiang followed up with a clear call to action by "those Powers who have trading interests and large investments here, and Colonies and Dominions of

their own." But Britain did not dare to assert itself without our cooperation, and we refused to cooperate—against the Japanese. We lost Shanghai in that year of 1937. We shall not get it back.

Two weeks later, on September 13, the Chinese Government appealed to the League of Nations for action against the aggressor. The next day came an amazing move from the American Government. President Roosevelt announced that American Government ships were forbidden to carry "implements of war" to China or Japan, and that other vessels under the American flag did so at their own risk. This move was open encouragement to the Japanese, and gave important aid to them in their bitter war at Shanghai. There was no risk in our carrying war materials to Japan, since China had no ocean-going Navy. The only ban was on shipments to China; airplanes destined for China were taken off an American ship at San Diego. The most urgent need of the Japanese was fuel oil for their bombing planes, of which they were short. They chartered a whole fleet of American tankers to take it across the Pacific and bomb the Chinese forces into mangled flesh and submission.

Standard Oil did not mind our financing China. The more we financed China, the longer the Chinese carried on, the more our enterprising industrialists made by selling war materials to Japan. We were not neutral; our Government refused to apply the Neutrality Act which Congress had passed. An ostensible reason was the absence of a formal declaration of war. But such an absence had not prevented our Government from applying the Neutrality Act to Spain—in such a way as to prevent war materials from reaching the desperately battling Spanish Republic, while we continued to supply them to the

German and Italian invaders. Neither in China nor in Spain was our Government neutral. But in China, unlike Spain, our Government also supplied funds to enable the decimated Chinese forces to carry on.

By December, the Chinese forces had been driven not only from the Shanghai area but also from the long prepared defenses behind Shanghai. Political considerations had outweighed strategic. Hoping week after week for foreign cooperation at Shanghai (the Powers had once been so prompt to intervene with armed forces there), the Chinese fought on against increasing odds until they were so weakened that they were unable to hold the strong defense lines thirty miles behind; they could not even hold the powerful defenses of Nanking. Years of military preparation, and unprecedented unity and heroism and suffering, had gone for nothing. They had been utterly betrayed.

For our Government, after giving the Chinese the financial encouragement which enabled them to break the Anglo-Japanese negotiations, and which definitely decided them to launch their war of nation-wide resistance, gave even more effective support and encouragement to the Japanese. Not only did we obstruct the shipment of war materials to China across the Pacific, and facilitate such shipments to Japan, but we financed the Japanese by enormous purchases of silver taken from China—as well as gold from Manchuria. During 1937-9, the Japanese realized more than \$32,000,000 from our purchases of silver from them—both direct and through London. In the same period, we paid them \$580,000,000 for gold—almost three times as much as we placed to the credit of the Chinese Government in exchange for silver during those years.

There were even strings on our financing of the Chinese. During the first seven months of Sino-Japanese hostilities we paid out more than \$120,000,000, and continued thereafter at a lower and declining rate. But we deducted foreign obligations of \$60,000,000 yearly (including \$10,000,000 for the 1933 loan by which we bought China's signature to the Silver Agreement) before we gave the Chinese any money for military purposes. By the latter part of 1938 the Chinese Government, with our subsidies seriously diminishing and its Customs revenues lost as the Japanese occupied all Chinese ports, were desperately considering making peace with Japan; they actually approached the Japanese for terms.

To prevent peace, our Government on December 17, 1938, offered direct credits of \$25,000,000—to the Chinese Government—to carry on the war. On December 19, Secretary Morgenthau formally announced the further extension of the agreement to purchase Chinese silver. Our move at that time was the direct result of Japan's frank announcements of its "New Order in East Asia," and the clear threat to American interests and privileges in China. The Japanese, as soon as Britain and France reduced themselves to European impotence at Munich, had occupied the Canton area close to Hongking, and accompanied their declaration for a "New Order" with an offer to the Chinese for a deal at the expense of the declining Western Powers in China. Chinese economy would be bound to Japan's, but the Japanese would give "positive consideration" to the abolition of extraterritorial rights and the rendition of foreign concessions and settlements in China.

Our encouragement to the Chinese to carry on the war was successful. Wang Ching-wei had already left

Chungking, with two lesser officials, by Government plane, but General Chiang now notified the American and British embassies in Chungking that Wang was acting on his own, and any peace negotiations he might undertake did not have the Government's approval. On December 26, General Chiang Kai-shek replied to Japan's open offer of four days previous with an emphatic negative, specifically denouncing (among other things) Japan's desire "to expel Europe and American influences from the Far East under the pretext of breaking down economic walls." The American Government on December 31 declared emphatically against any abrogation of its treaty rights in China, specifically mentioned extraterritoriality, and announced that it "reserves all rights of the United States as they exist, and does not give assent to the impairment of any of those rights."

We were now, definitely, subsidizing the Chungking Government to protect our economic and political privileges in China. The British Government in March, 1939, for the same purpose, guaranteed a banking credit of £5,000,000 for an Anglo-Chinese Stabilization Fund to support the Chinese currency—and Government. The Soviet Government, securing its own foothold in China, had in October, 1938, made its first barter agreement with China, and followed it with others—but with no outright subsidies.

The war dragged on. Peace again seemed likely in the summer of 1940, following Hitler's invasion of the Low Countries and France and bombardment of England. The British, desperately anxious to keep their peace with Japan, closed the Burma Road and announced their desire to promote Sino-Japanese peace. But the American Government, reaching an agreement with Britain by

which we exchanged destroyers and tankers for naval bases, also obtained the reopening of the Burma Road. That same month (September) we advanced another \$25,000,000 to Chungking to assist in meeting its needs for foreign exchange. Besides this, we extended credits of \$95,000,000 to Chungking throughout that same year.

Our prime objective was to prevent any peace with Japan in derogation of American interests and privileges in China. In 1940, however, we had a further objective. Moscow had greatly increased its influence in China. Soviet military advisers functioned at Chungking, and a part of the Red Air Force operated in China. The Chinese Communists had greatly expanded their influence and power in Shansi and Shantung, their Red Armies co-operating with sincere patriots and fellow-travelers in "Front" regimes throughout the war area; another Chinese Red Army functioned in the lower Yangtze valley, in the country back of Shanghai and Nanking. While the Burma Road was closed, Moscow had presented to Chungking terms for a new agreement, further strengthening its position in China; Chungking had informed the American Government of this. The Kuomintang was very apprehensive of the expanding Communist influence, and Moscow's growing power in the country.

Our subsidies of 1940, and the opening of the Burma Road, strengthened our position both against Tokyo and Moscow in China. In November, 1940, the Japanese signed and sealed a new peace offer, in the form of a treaty with the Wang Ching-wei regime which had been set up at Nanking, offering the Kuomintang direct military cooperation against the Chinese Communists, and also agreeing to cooperate with the Chinese against extra-territorial and other treaty privileges possessed by West-

ern Powers in China. With regard to naval privileges and the stationing of troops, these would become exclusively Japanese, Western gunboats and troops being ousted from Chinese waters and soil.

To block this offer, which appealed to many Kuomintang men, we made an outright offer of \$100,000,000 to the Chungking Government, half of the amount coming from Washington direct, and half via London. Lauchlin Currie flew to Chungking to negotiate, and was finally successful. The Chinese Government carried on. In the meantime, it had ousted and partly exterminated the Chinese Red Army in the lower Yangtze, and imposed a military and economic blockade against Red Shensi. In Shansi and Shantung, Chinese Communist activities were curtailed as severely as was practicable.

Hitler's invasion of Soviet Russia in June, 1941, affected the entire situation in China. The Red Air Force was withdrawn. The American Volunteer Group took over. Soviet military advisers were withdrawn. American military advisers and consultants came in. The Soviet Government, anxious to keep the peace with Japan, agreed to supply no more war materials to China. The United States became not only the financial mainstay but the actively leading foreign Power at Chungking.

On November 26, we ended our long negotiations with Japan at Washington by presenting wholly new demands—that the Japanese withdraw all their troops from China and French Indo-China and deal with no Chinese Government except our financial dependency at Chungking—the Government of General Chiang Kai-shek. Japanese refusal would be met by the economic strangulation of the Japanese Army. Washington immediately cabled Hawaii that negotiations had ended, but that we must not

make the first overt act. Secretary Hull subsequently stated that he expected the Japanese reply to our note would be war. It was.

Subsequent developments, as the Japanese drove southward, seized the Philippines, the British and Dutch colonies east of India, and pushed their way into Burma, did *not* raise Western prestige in China. Many in Chungking became bitterly convinced that they were fighting on the weaker side, and that it was not for the Chinese to fight against the expulsion of American and British interests and privileges and Empire from Asia. Specific was the question of dispatching Chinese troops to Burma (under an American commander), to defend this part of the British Empire against the invading Japanese forces and their Burmese nationalist allies. The Kuomintang had itself been founded as a Chinese Nationalist organization.

We had to make an outright offer of \$500,000,000—half from Washington direct and half through the British—to deal with the situation at Chungking. Chinese troops were dispatched to Burma, to aid in the defense of the British Empire and to keep open the road by which the Chinese received their foreign arms to fight Japan in China. But the Japanese invaders of British Burma, and their native allies, were too strong; the defending forces were too weak, and were opposed by fiercely hostile Burmese nationalists, revolutionists, and saboteurs. The British—and their Chinese and American allies—were driven out. The Japanese occupied Burma and cut the Burma Road—our line of supplies to our Chinese front.

The Chinese had their own patriotic reasons for fighting a ruthless and brutal invader of China. But they had not intended to fight for American and British interests

and special privileges in China, nor for British Empire in Asia. Both Kuomintang and Communists were fundamentally hostile to such privileges. Moscow had renounced its special privileges in China more than twenty years previously, and had encouraged both Kuomintang and Communists in their economic war against British privileges and British Hongkong a few years later.

There was no mistaking Chinese feeling on the subject. On October 10, the American and British Governments announced that they were relinquishing extraterritorial and associated privileges in China, giving Free China a great day of rejoicing. We did not actually implement our announcement, however, for three months. All our foreign concessions and settlements and administrations in China lay within Japanese-occupied territory, where the only Chinese authority was that headed by Wang Ching-wei at Nanking, representing the openly "peace-with-Japan" elements in the Kuomintang.

On January 10, 1943, the Japanese signed a treaty with Nanking abandoning their extraterritorial privileges and their concessions in China, and agreed to cooperate with Nanking against the similar privileges of the United States and Great Britain. The Nanking Government, which had so far been "neutral," declared war on us, thus altering the official status of Japanese forces in China to that of Nanking's allies. With Japanese cooperation, Nanking ended our special privileges and prepared to take over the International Settlements and remaining British Concessions in China. Our properties in Shanghai and the other great treaty ports (where all our interests except airways and mission property were centered) became enemy property, at the disposal of Nanking's Enemy Property Custodian.

On January 11, 1943, the American and British Governments inaugurated a new era of equality and reciprocity by abandoning our treaty privileges in China. We relinquished them after they had been taken away from us. We had Chinese as well as Japanese enemies at Nanking. These Chinese were not new enemies; they were old ones. They had fought our privileges and our Chinese agents for a generation. Wang Ching-wei had been one of the outstanding leaders in the economic war against British interests in China sixteen years ago. His closest associates at Nanking were ex-Communists, men who had been among the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. All were formerly cooperating with Moscow; they were now cooperating with Japan. But it meant the same thing to our privileges in China. They were finished.

For ten years our government has directly subsidized Chinese leaders in order to protect our interests in China, and to give us a leadership there which has not effectively served the purposes of peace. For five and a half years we subsidized these military leaders to fight a terrible war, mobilizing the courage and patriotism of its soldiers and scorching the earth of its humble, inoffensive peasants, in order that our treaty privileges and our political influence might be maintained.

Whatever our intent may have been in each of the international economic conflicts which arose in the Far East, the purely factual record, as this chapter has set it down, amounts to an indictment of the opportunism which has arisen out of our lack of a comprehensive understanding of knowledge of the democratic and peaceful interests in Asia.

Now our treaty privileges are gone. They have been taken away from us, and we have formally relinquished

them. Some Chinese are fighting on, but they are fighting for their own salvation, not for our privileges. Survival of democracy in the world will depend upon our understanding of that fight, our sympathy with Asiatic peoples struggling for freedom, and our turning at last to a democratic policy for the peoples of China and of all Asia. Our imperial privileges in China are finished forever.

ASIA AND THE FUTURE

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Chapter 23.

CHINA, FASCIST OR FREE?

THE INTERNATIONAL domination of China is broken. The entire basis of our past policy in China has been knocked out from under our feet. Some of China's leading Fascists have made a deal with the Japanese and lined up with them against us. Other Kuomintang men, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, remain at Chungking, still at war against Japan. The military situation long since reached a virtual stalemate. What now?

We cannot wash our hands of China. We are not in Pilate's position. For there is something far more grave than the loss of our paltry privileges there. Great areas of China have become a part of Japan's "New Order in East Asia," with responsible Chinese Fascists allied and cooperating with the Japanese and building up both a revived Kuomintang administration and a new Chinese army through the occupied territories. To refer to the old Kuomintang leader Wang Ching-wei, or such associates as Chou Fu-hai, Chen Kung-po, Chu Min-yi, or Ku Meng-yu, as Japanese "puppets" misses the point altogether. They are Chinese Fascists who have made a deal with Japan.

Wang Ching-wei is best thought of as a Chinese Hitler.

His Nationalism is similar to Hitler's. He was determined to break the international control of China. By a deal with the Japanese, Wang and the old Kuomintang and ex-Communist elements associated with him have achieved their end. There are still Japanese troops in China, but the Japanese are themselves anxious to get them out of the hopeless and exhausting war in the deep interior. That is why they made their deal.

So far as military conquest of China is concerned, the Japanese are beaten. They have known this for the last three years. But so far as *we* are concerned, they have strengthened and not weakened their position. For a strong Chinese Fascism closely allied with them not only by treaty but by an intense racialism and the appeal of "Asia for the Asiatics," and the well-cultivated memory of past grievances at our hands, are far more valuable to Japanese Imperialism than the terribly costly attempts to conquer China by military force. Japan's really profitable fields of Imperial expansion are those to the South—the Philippines, French Indo-China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies. Japanese economists and navalists have pointed this out for a decade.

That is why China is of even more serious importance than ever in the struggle for a free world. For if Tokyo's Chinese Fascist allies can extend their influence throughout most of China, the Japanese will actually have achieved their Far Eastern Empire—the most populous empire in the history of the human race. They will have 800,000,000 increasingly regimented subjects—regimented not only by themselves but by their Fascist allies and vassals. They will outnumber us six to one, and their industrial resources are enormous. It will be a tremendous step toward world Empire.

For this reason, first of all, the fate of China deeply concerns all of us who work and fight and believe in a free world. Our selfish and muddled policies in China have led directly to the present impasse. We still have allies in China—Chinese Christians and Communists and bitter-end patriots. But this is not enough. We need a democratic front of the Chinese people, with arms to fight with and something to fight for. The Japanese have become the leading patrons of Fascist Nationalism in China. We can no more defeat this by subsidies and deals with rival groups than we can defeat Hitler in Europe by deals with Franco and Darlan. In China, as in Europe, the one hope for democracy and the Four Freedoms ultimately lies in the people themselves. In the Far East, as in Europe, there are two alternatives to the bloody Imperialism now in the ascendancy: a people's war inspired by democracy and the Rights of Man, or a Communist upheaval inspired and directed by Moscow.

The central reasons for our supporting Chinese reaction are gone. Now, at long last, we might support the Chinese Republic. It is not far-fetched—no more than support of democratic elements in the European countries under the Nazi heel. The Chinese war itself has made clear the fighting spirit of the Chinese people when they feel they are fighting oppressors and enemies. The people who fought did not think they were fighting for our privileges. They believed they were fighting for freedom—the freedom they have fought for throughout an entire generation. Part of their fight they have won. To some Chinese leaders it is a great achievement. To some German leaders it was a great achievement when Germany was freed from international control. But did that mean that the German *people* were free? How free have they been under Hitler?

The Chinese Government at Chungking is not only our ally in the war against Japan. It is also our financial dependency; and it is still the actual authority in most of China. If our Government takes the momentous and historic step of permitting and encouraging democracy in China, the way is clear. The People's Political Council which now exists under the Chiang Kai-shek rule *must be made a body elected by the Chinese people themselves, and not appointed by the Kuomintang*. The Kuomintang itself must cease to be a dictatorial Party. It was made such a Party—we must understand this—under *foreign* influence. Its 1924 reorganization was carried out by Moscow and its Chinese associates, under the agreement reached between the Soviet envoy Yoffe and the unhappy refugee Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai. Dr. Sun accepted it because it seemed hopeful, and came from a strong and evidently friendly Power prepared to cooperate with the old revolutionist against the international domination of his beloved country. But Moscow was working for its own idea of political organization—a one-Party dictatorship. Is this our idea also?

The most elementary requirement of representative democracy is that the people should be free to join or leave any party they wish, to nominate and elect or vote down any candidates they want or do not want. It is time we abandoned the Fascist sophistries of Party dictatorships “educating the people up to democracy.” The reorganized Kuomintang started out on this path nineteen years ago. There is less democracy in China now than when it started.

But the central fact remains that the Chinese people—except in the Communist areas—have not been *regimented*. They have been robbed and oppressed and ex-

ploited and killed, but they have not been *regimented*. In every village of China outside the Red areas, the villagers carry on their business themselves, and govern themselves. The basis of Chinese democracy must be the same as our own was—and, largely, still is—the ordinary farmer. In Free China, farmers make up 80 per cent of the population. The village is a genuine social and political unit; there are very few farm-houses outside of villages. Representative government throughout the country must be based primarily upon these common farmers sending their own representatives to the county council. (The distinctions between *chu*, *hsien*, and other administrative units need not be gone into here.) There must be no pressure upon them; the representatives must be their own, whether of any Party or of no Party.

About things within his direct field of knowledge, the Chinese farmer is emphatically no fool (the fools are mostly in the cities). Every farmer knows who is evading taxes and who is being gouged; every farmer knows the immediate necessities of his village as well as his county, and a smaller or greater area beyond. About national affairs and statesmanship he is handicapped; but this is true of some of our own American hillbillies—even after they leave their mountain homes for the big cities.

The great handicap of widespread illiteracy is modified by the possibilities of radio. The Chinese farmer can listen in by radio on what his representatives are saying and doing in the county council, and can hold them to account. The representative county council must be a real administrative unit, with effective control over local affairs and local officials. It must also choose representatives to higher bodies. In the presence of widespread illiteracy, democracy would not be immediately furthered by the

villagers voting for unknown candidates for the provincial councils. If the county council is directly representative of the free-voting farmers it will consist of the most politically intelligent and reliable citizens, and in company with town representatives can elect representatives to higher bodies. There is a stage between the county and the vast province; this detail must be dealt with on the same principle.

The only way the people can learn democracy is by practicing it. That is the way we learned it, and it is worth while learning. Some Americans who know nothing of dictatorial and other despotic countries seem to think democracy is outdated. The difficulty is often that they haven't been around much, and have no idea of the hopeless misery of the people under every dictatorship—military or Party, hereditary or non-hereditary, Red or Black, Christian or Nazi. Comfortable persons can argue violently about the respective virtues and ideals of various forms of dictatorship. But to the crushed peasant in the fields and the enslaved worker in the factories they look very much alike. Americans knew this once upon a time. American patronage and admiration for despotism is a modern development.

In regard to China, the truth still holds that the people are not regimented, and there are even democratic individuals in the Government itself. They do not hold directive political posts, but they are there. It should not be difficult to understand what they are doing there. One point is the bitter struggle through which China has passed and is passing, bringing the loyal services of all kinds of men doing their bits as patriots in this crisis. Others are abroad; there are outstanding military men and diplomats and educators and economic specialists who

either are not wanted or simply cannot agree. Some names might be mentioned, but few are familiar to Americans.

Far the best known to Americans is Dr. Hu Shih, recently Chinese Ambassador to Washington, who has been at times condemned by the Kuomintang for his political writings, who faced personal danger for his activities in the Chinese Civil Liberties Union, but who has courageously remained a consistent advocate of democracy and the Rights of Man. He gave his loyal services to China in this crisis, but he is no supporter of Kuomintang dictatorship. In a democratic China, such a man would be Minister of Education, and would encourage instead of suppressing the teaching of applied democracy in Government schools and American mission schools in China. There are other men of similar convictions but of lesser fame in every useful walk of Chinese political and economic life. Shall we give a hand to them now—now that Chinese Fascism has moved into the enemy camp? Or do we object *on principle* to democracy for China?

The Powers opposed the Chinese Republic for the very reason which impels us today to support it. Representative government would have made China united, free, and strong. Such a China would not take orders from foreigners—as it demonstrated at the very beginning. But our interests in China and the Far East today *demand* such a China. The basic interest of the American people today is the preservation of a democratic world, for our own liberties can live in no other kind of a world. This interest transcends every other. We must have *democratic* allies in Asia. And China's war has cut the Gordian knot that tied us to Imperialism and reaction in China.

But what of our *other* interests—trade, and investment, and similar things? These would actually be advanced,

and not hindered. This is no easy generalization, but a fact clearly attested by the whole record of our economic relations with China. It was our special privileges in China, and the rivalry of the Powers, which most seriously blocked economic investment of all kinds. The Chinese Government's old hostility to foreign investment in Chinese railways was based soundly upon its fear of an extra-territorial interest, above and outside of Chinese law and control, in the interior of China—in addition to the fear of these railways being used as vehicles for foreign invasion. This last fear has been fully justified in recent years.

Because of this, the Powers *forced* their capital into Chinese railways built by Chinese capital, forcing out Chinese investors. There was bitter Chinese hostility to such a process, and this has continued. The objection to foreign loans, year after year, has rested upon the same basis. The loans were being made by foreign Powers with troops and gunboats in China, able to attach Chinese revenues and extort new privileges—limited mainly by the rivalry among the Powers themselves.

Apologists for Japan (there used to be a number of them) have pointed with pride to the industrial development in Manchuria under Japanese occupation. Such development—so far as useful aspects are concerned—might have taken place a generation ago had it not been for the rivalry of the Powers. Japan and Russia combined against our capital. Later, when the Chinese became stronger, the latter refused foreign capital and used their own. Not until this struggle was ended by the Japanese making Manchuria their own colony was greater development possible. And, for excellent political reasons, we and other capitalist Powers did not cooperate.

A free China would be the greatest field of investment

in the world. It must be free investment. Capitalists must take their own risks, as they do elsewhere in the world. There must be no political pressure or political backing. It must be on the same basis as the hundreds of millions in British capital that helped build up our own West during the nineteenth century. We were a free people, and we needed it. The Chinese objected to it for reasons of sound statesmanship. Some of the stories about Chinese "superstitious objections" to railways have some factual basis (as everywhere), but most of them are tall tales made up out of the whole cloth; these were not the *decisive* things.

With regard to trade, the "enormous potential market" of China has been talked about until business men are sick of it. Some think it is a myth. It is a myth, and will be a myth, so long as ninety per cent of the Chinese people live in utter destitution. What can people buy whose earnings are seized by the tax-gatherer and militarist and usurer and other extortionists, leaving them only the barest existence? Even with this drastic limitation of the market, however, there was for a time a considerable development of certain exports to China, such as oil. American oil for the lamps of China was a real benefit to the Chinese people, giving many of them lighting they had never previously possessed during the long winter evenings. The decline in kerosene sales to China for more than a decade have been signs of two things—first, shamefully high tariffs for military and Party revenue (China has no native kerosene industry to protect), and, secondly, the increasing destitution of the masses of the people under the crushing burden of taxation and exploitation.

The minority of officials, usurers, landlords and militarists who had money were in themselves a very limited

market. And so far as capital investment was concerned, the needy Chinese peasant was the most obvious opportunity. Eight hundred per cent annual profit is rather unlikely in industry—in peace times. But it could be extorted from Chinese peasants in difficulties. It was an almost flawless racket. Why should the usurer go in for anything so mundane as productive industry?

Democratic freedom for the Chinese people, with the blow that will inevitably be struck at the tax-extorter and the usurer, will raise the economic level of ninety per cent of the Chinese people. It is not a wild statement but a conservative one to estimate that the Chinese market can be increased tenfold by such internal changes and by tariffs determined by popular needs and not by the military rulers' needs. Free China would actually be the greatest market in the world.

Regarding economic organization, the development of cooperative societies of various kinds in China must be mentioned. It was making considerable strides in China before the war. In this work, American and other foreign cooperators have an excellent record. There are old mutual credit societies in China of native types, but these were much less efficient than the modern ones, the organization of which was started by the China International Famine Relief Commission, established in 1921, which soon went on from the immediate relief of famine to prevention of its causes.

Rural credit societies were one of the first kind developed, to gain relief from the ever-present usurer. From this the work went on to cooperative marketing. Sun Yat-sen strongly endorsed cooperative societies, which spread into various provinces both through the Relief Commission and through other bodies. Intelligent Chinese bank-

ers saw the possibilities of rural credit, and promoted such societies as responsible units to which they could lend money—at rates greatly undercutting the local usurers.

The International China Famine Relief Commission did splendid work in many ways. It was not connected with political activities, and devoted itself single-mindedly to its tasks. It saved no less than twenty million lives in China down to the period of the war with Japan. It did not merely relieve famine, it developed well-digging and built dikes, roads and dams and reclaimed land and promoted cooperatives and credit societies and helped broken men to get on their own feet and take care of themselves. It was limited by shortage of funds, but if it had a hundred million dollars and political backing it could have abolished famine in China in a few years. It is strange that we could not give even thirty million dollars to this, but could give a thousand million dollars to precisely the contrary end.*

Since the outbreak of war, a group of workshops have been organized by the "Chinese Industrial Cooperatives," a Chinese Government organization. A "social organization under the Executive Yuan" is its official status and it has carried out some excellent work among worker refugees from the war zones. They have employed more than 30,000 workers at times, and have roused great enthusiasm among many Americans. The number of persons actually aided, however, has been far less than by the mutual credit and similar societies with their half a million members.

That the "Indusco" should be so greatly advertised and the rural cooperatives largely unknown in Amireca is

* See Mallory, "China, Land of Famine."

simply because the latter had no political connections. They had no Communists, fellow-travelers, and other political opportunists sharing the funds and publicity and an element of control. The Famine Relief Commission was interested only in saving lives; it had nothing to do with the heroic business of scorching the earth, burning the crops, cutting the dikes and dooming twenty million Chinese peasants to death by famine.

It is time that we took an interest in these things. A Free China must be built upon a decent life for its common people. For this they must have political control of their own lives—popular sovereignty. And for this they must also have economic methods which will help free themselves from the usurer and profiteer and limit the takings of the landlord. The landlords are a serious problem. In some areas, popular sovereignty might mean a peaceful agrarian revolution; great estates might go as the royal estates went here. Democracy, however, could first of all deal with the landlords by a decent redistribution and regrading of taxes, which should rest upon those most capable of paying, and exempt the poorest—exactly the opposite of the usual custom in China.

Such a program of political democracy and economic improvement must not be thought of as something alien to China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese Revolution, laid down clearly the three main requirements of the people's revolution: Democracy, sovereignty, and the people's livelihood. And democracy he did not use in any vague and loose sense. It meant not only representative government, but the most thoroughgoing forms of popular control over government. To him, democratic government meant the universal right of free suffrage, and the further rights of initiative, referendum, and recall. "Only

where these four powers are effectively applied can we say that there is real, direct, popular sovereignty." This was Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Millions of Chinese have fought and died for the people's revolution. The "reorganized" Kuomintang had the dangerous formula of a "temporary" dictatorship, to unify the country and educate the people "up" to democracy. In nineteen years it has done neither. And every Chinese who is faithful to the ultimate ideals of Sun Yat-sen—whose name is the most powerful name in all China—must acknowledge that it has done neither, and that the 1924 tactic introduced by Moscow has been a tragic failure. It is not up to us to promote alien political concepts in China. It is up to us to move with the great democratic spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. If we do this, the organization he founded may not wholly become a tool of Fascist dictatorship in a monstrous new Empire of the East.

One thing we must do here in the United States, if we believe that the Chinese people are entitled to a democratic and free life. We must at once end our official attitude and Supreme Court doctrine which declare that neither the Chinese nor any other Asiatics are fit for democratic citizenship in the United States. We must also end the complete exclusion of Chinese and other Asiatic immigration on a *racial* basis. This would not mean unlimited immigration from Asia; there are economic matters involved here. But it would mean an immigration quota for Chinese on the same basis as for Europeans and Africans.

Many Americans do not even know of this discrimination. But every literate Asiatic knows, and bitterly resents it. Every Chinese knows, also, that in peace-time he can

go to Japan without even a passport, that Japan has no anti-Chinese immigration act, and that a Chinese can become naturalized as a Japanese subject if he so desires. These facts have given definite meaning and support to the propaganda slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics." At Versailles in 1919, Japanese and Chinese combined to secure a statement for racial equality in the Preamble to the Constitution of the League of Nations. They failed, wholly because of British and American opposition. It is time for us to wipe out the memory of this.

What are the alternatives, today, to a strong, free, and united China, linked with other Governments in an *equal* League of United Nations? One alternative is a Fascist China, linked to the tank treads of Japanese empire. The Japanese are extending their rule through and with a Chinese Fascist bureaucracy.

Western Powers are back where they were a century ago, before the British started the Opium War. They are, in fact, further back. For the new Power in China is not an archaic regime with primitive weapons, but a military-feudal Power with all the weapons of the modern world and with full knowledge of its military, industrial, and propagandist techniques. And it is based not only on Manchuria but on 75,000,000 subjects in Japan itself. It includes not only the old Imperial territories on the mainland but the great island empires of the Philippines and the East Indies. And Japanese Empire, unlike Manchu Empire, has ambitions which extend far beyond the East.

For the last couple of years they have had a period of consolidation, so far as the China coast is concerned. Trade and industry are reviving under the re-established Fascist regime headed by Wang Ching-wei, with the grow-

ing markets of Free China to the west. The Nanking dollar is dependent on and linked to the Chungking dollar, and the Chungking dollar is dependent on the United States Treasury. *Finance Minister Kung officially reported imports amounting to a billion Chinese dollars from Japanese-occupied territories during 1941.* With our contribution of \$500,000,000 to Chungking and the cutting of the Burma supply line, business with Nanking's China greatly increased during 1942. The Chungking Government is actively promoting its further increase.

The ordinary Chinese of Shanghai and of other occupied territories know nothing of our democratic ideals. The Shanghai ricksha-man is more likely to remember having been kicked by a white man, or beaten by a British policeman. And the mass of the Chinese did not shed tears, but celebrated wildly, when the "Orthodox Kuomintang" Government took over the International Settlement and ended Western rule early this year. For two years, they had seen the civil war between rival gangsters at Shanghai die down, with Nanking's gunmen liquidating the opposition—including Japan's puppet mayor of Shanghai, Fu Hsiao-an. They saw his Nanking successor, ex-Communist Chen Kung-ho, receive a royal if not obsequious welcome at the British Club, once the exclusive premises of the Master Race and its Chinese servants. They saw Shanghai's business trade functioning effectively. The surviving unemployed got jobs; some of them moved back to their country homes, where there was again peace. It was the peace of subjection. But subjection with peace is easier on the peasant than subjection plus war.

It is the old Kuomintang set-up that the peasants have moved back to. They still give half their crop to the

landlord and tax-gatherer. The rent-collectors still have police powers, and the hapless peasant goes to jail or worse if his tribute is not forthcoming. But they have some of their crops for themselves; it is no longer requisitioned or destroyed outright by the armies that march over the land. And they see, in one area after another, the Japanese forces and the Rising Sun flag move out, and Chinese forces with the Kuomintang flag move in—this time without war. There is more land for some of them. So many did not come back—will never come back.

Japanese military moves are sporadic and minor. It is their *political* moves which have counted during the past three years, and these political actions must be countered by actions which will appeal to the common people of China more than the hopeless subjection of peace under Fascism. If we will not assist democratic leadership of popular forces in China, Moscow will take the lead as soon as the Russians are secure in Europe. Let us not grin happily over the prospect. For if Moscow can re-establish its direct leadership in China (it was only the Nazi attack which forced it to relinquish its leadership in 1941), the Soviet Union will be far the greatest Power in Asia and the Old World.

However friendly we may feel toward our Soviet allies in their struggle against the monstrous horror of the Nazi Power in Europe, we must not let this struggle blind us to what may follow in Asia. If the Soviet Union secures its western front, it will be free to give far greater and more effective military aid than it ever gave before in China. It will not be "war." It will be "assistance." The method of peaceful penetration was followed by the Czarist regime long before the Communists, in regard to China; the first Russo-Chinese alliance was concluded

in 1896. The Communists have greatly advanced its techniques, dealing not only with militarists and mandarins but with nationalists and the masses. They will not invade China; they will simply *help their friends*. Those who are are not their friends know what to expect.

If Moscow were able and willing today to give effective aid to the Chinese Communists, as it was doing to the Kuomintang seventeen years ago, they and not the Kuomintang would soon dominate the great interior areas we term Free China. They and not the Japanese would dominate North China. Part of the Kuomintang might be retained—as it was many years ago—as a Communist Front organization, but the center of power would be Moscow.

If Moscow can thus regain, consolidate, and strengthen its former position in China, tying that vast country to itself by the closest political, military, and economic bonds, the Soviet Union will be far the greatest Power in the world. To the Union's 160,000,000 subjects and its vast material resources and its possible European conquests would be added a territory the size of all Europe or the United States, with 450,000,000 people.

There may or may not be a Russian war with Japan. Many Americans, misled by mendacious or stupid propaganda, have been anticipating it for the past ten years. There is not a year during that period that hundreds of books and articles were not written predicting immediate conflict. But Russia did not go to war with Japan, and Japan did not go to war with Russia. It would have been entirely too serious for both of them—and they knew it. But it was Russia that won in the war of propaganda and intrigue. China went to war with Japan—and fought Japan for five and a half years while Russia remained neutral, supplied fish and oil to the Japanese, strengthened

her own position in China, and finally concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with Tokyo. Then, in December, 1941, Japan went to war with *us*. Russia is still neutral.

Moscow has excellent reason to be neutral. Its neutrality has enabled it to concentrate wholly on its western front—just as it has enabled the Japanese to concentrate wholly on their southern fronts. One third of our lend-lease supplies to Soviet Russia travel via the Pacific, and can be cut at will by the Japanese. During the spring and summer months, half of these vital supplies must take that route. The Russo-Japanese Non-aggression Pact of April, 1941, corresponds to the main strategic interests of both powers.

The Soviet Union will not abandon its vital interests in Europe in order to make war on Japan. And when the European war is ended, it will have no reason to help us destroy Japan, occupy it with American troops, and make it an American colony. It does not *want* powerful America to supplant Japan in the Far East. Stalin has no reason to believe that our comradely affection of the last twenty months is going to be permanent.

Russia is a land power. It is also an air power—far more powerful than Japan. Its planes in the Far East are a deadly threat to Japan itself. The Soviet Union's great cities and industrial centers lie far beyond the reach of Japanese planes. When Russia is free to move in the Far East, the Japanese will ask for terms, and they will be Moscow's terms.

Moscow's main interest and ambition in the Far East is direct leadership in China. It has had it before; and if Moscow can re-establish this, with its now powerful forces, it will become the senior partner, with Japan the junior in the Far East. Moscow's land-based planes in Chinese

territory will have Japan's naval communications with China—and with Japan's maritime empire to the south—at their mercy. The two great Asiatic Empires will dominate between them most of the population of the world.

What is the future of China to be? Will it be a Fascist China, linked with Japan's New Order in the most powerful empire in the world? Will it be a Communist-Fascist China, linked with Moscow in a still more tremendous World Empire? Or will it be a strong, united, and free China, linked on a basis of equality to other free peoples of the earth in a world-wide organization for peace and security and freedom? Which shall it be? We have our choice. We shall not have it long.

Chapter 24.

INDIA AND EMPIRE

INDIA is the last great rampart of Western Empire in Asia. The vast subcontinent of India remains—with the old Manchu Imperial dominions of Nepal and Tibet to the north and northeast—ruled by the British Emperor of India, Kaiser-i-Hind, through his Viceroy. India covers some 1,600,000 square miles—more than half the size of the United States, almost half the size of Europe. It ranges from mountainous jungles to the south and to the east, through great plains and valleys in the north and northwest, to the mightiest mountains in the world along its northern and northeastern borders, beyond which lies the vast icy plateau of Tibet—the Roof of the World. It is the only country in the world with a population comparable to that of China in numbers—now more than 390,000,000, and increasing at a rate of four million a year.

Indian civilization, its languages, racial strains, customs, social and religious and political traditions and outlook, have very little in common with those of China. What communion the two nations have had has been mainly due to Western Empire, Western ideas, and hostility to Western Empire. The vast mountains, plateau, and jun-

gles to the north and east of India have throughout history separated the Indian states and the earlier short-lived Empires from Chinese civilization and the great Eastern Empire. Buddhism reached Tibet to the north, and it passed to China and Japan round through Central Asia—as well as eastward through the seas; it has almost died out in India itself.

Buddhism, democratic offshoot of Hinduism, did not take the caste system with it into China—or into simple democratic Burma to the east. But the idea of caste spread eastward from southern India through the seas as far as the China coast and Japan. The Japanese military caste lost its hereditary status and privileges only seventy years ago; Japanese Untouchables have gained equal rights to be miserable only during the past half-century. There are still Chinese pariahs in the Canton area—the Boat People.

India today is dominated by five forces: Empire, caste and religion, Big Business, Nationalism, and the growing concepts of democracy, rationalism and freedom. The British Viceroy, whose powers are actually dictatorial and who is responsible only to London, has the not quite simple task of dealing with the various Indian groups in such a way as to maintain Imperial authority, with military forces the great majority of whom are native Indian, over a population almost ten times that of Britain itself, in a territory about sixteen times as great. It was said that the Japanese failure to launch a serious attack on India last year was partly due to their need of an intelligent man for the Viceroy's job, and no intelligent Japanese would take the job.

Throughout most of its history, India has been as divided as Europe. No invader has ever had to fight India as a whole. The Mohammedan invaders conquered one

Hindu State after another, while those further away remained isolationist. They never conquered the lower part of the Indian peninsula; by the time they got around to it, Europeans had their settlements and footholds along the coast, and the Hindu kings of the south could get foreign arms. The British built up their power in India by making deals with Hindu kings, by building up their own Indian forces and renting them out or participating as allies in local wars, by smashing at Mogul revenues in Bengal and imposing their control over Mogul Imperial authority when the Moslem Empire was desperately beleaguered by Hindu armies from the south and Afghan invasions from the west. Lord Cornwallis, after surrendering to the ragged armies of the two million American colonials after a war of seven years, was sent to India in 1784. He found the task of enforcing British authority over two hundred million Indians a much easier one.

The British continued to hold India, thanks to the cooperation of the Sikhs and various Indian kings who helped the British forces against the Indian Mutiny. They have held it since, and hold it today, thanks mainly to the Indians who make up the bulk of the Indian Army, as well as the vast majority of the Indian Government's officials from the Viceroy's Council down to the local police. In time of crisis, they have had assistance from other Powers. During the Anglo-Japanese alliance, their Japanese allies helped maintain British authority and prestige in India, and landed armies at Singapore to crush a rebellion of Indian forces there. Indian Nationalists who are now cooperating with Japan on behalf of their own power in India are not setting a precedent.

The situation in India today is one of grim seriousness, not only for the war, but even more for the peace. So far

as the war is concerned, most Indian leaders agree that it has to be fought, and are prepared on this basis to cooperate with the British Government on certain terms. The Indian Congress Party's call for civil disobedience last year, though it resulted in widespread disturbances and temporary economic dislocations, never really rocked British rule. The Indian Cabinet continued to cooperate with the British Viceroy. When disturbances became violent, the British authorities dealt with them forcibly, killing scores of Indians and wounding many more; tens of thousands were arrested. But British Imperial rule was not shaken.

Gandhi's recent twenty-one day fast was a last attempt to infuse life into the dying movement of civil disobedience. It also served to reassert his leadership of the Congress Party, still without direct communication or contact with him. Its main result was to bring together most Hindu leaders—including such political opponents as the liberal Sapru and the conservative Rajagopalachari, as well as Hindu members of the Viceroy's Cabinet—in appeals for his release. The Hindu Councillors temporarily resigned their seats in protest. Gandhi had then been detained in the Aga Khan's palace, without trial or formal indictment, for more than six months. Over this or the similar detentions of other leaders, the Councillors had not resigned. The Japanese throughout their "New Order" territories proclaimed five days of sympathetic observances; Wang Ching-wei and his Fascists at Shanghai called mass meetings avowing their solidarity with their Indian fellow-Nationalist; the Chinese National Socialist Party at Chungking (one of the "permitted" organizations) passed resolutions of sympathy and called on the British to release Gandhi. There were widespread expres-

sions of sympathy among Western friends of Gandhi and of Indian independence. But Indian Moslems were almost contemptuous, as were a few Hindus—both Brahmins and Untouchables. Savarkar, ex-terrorist leader of the Mahasabha (the Brahmin-directed orthodox Hindu organization) reduced the fast to absurdity by caustically suggesting a fast by Churchill against Hitler.

There were two serious obstacles to the Congress Party's demands on the British Government last year. For one thing, there was the question of the war. Gandhi thought primarily of India; he had informed the Japanese that the Indian people had no quarrel with the Japanese Government or people, and had frankly declared that he could "see no difference between the Fascist or Nazi Powers and the Allies. All are exploiters, all resort to ruthlessness to the extent required to encompass their end." But many other Indians, including such Congress leaders as Nehru and Rajagopalachari, felt that the war was one that had to be fought, and that Indians had to cooperate (an attitude similar to Gandhi's during the last World War)—though Nehru gave way to Gandhi in the matter. The fighting Moslems, the "official" Indians, the Indian liberals and Moderates, the Indian labor and Untouchable and Communist groups, were also friendly to the war effort. To them, there *was* a difference.

Secondly, the Congress Party demanded things from the British Government that the Congress itself could never induce other Indians to accept.

The Stafford Cripps proposals were for the framing of a new constitution for the Indian people by the Indian people themselves, in a constitutional convention to which Indian native states would also be invited to send representatives in proportion to population. With this consti-

tution-making body the British Government would sign a treaty transferring complete responsibility from British to Indian hands, and imposing no restriction on the power of the new Indian Union "to decide in future its relationship to other member States of the British Commonwealth." India would have as full and complete independence as Ireland or Canada.

The first and main reason for failure lay in the British proposal that any province which did not wish to accept the new constitution did not have to, but could either retain its present status or join with other non-acceding provinces in a self-governing Dominion of their own. Indian native states could formally adhere or not adhere, but their treaty arrangements with the British Government would be revised as required by the new situation. Indian fiscal control, it should be noted, is already in the hands of the British Indian Government, with currency and tariffs, and this would be transferred to the proposed Indian Union.

The elections to the constitutional convention were to be made on the basis of the existing provincial electoral machinery, under the Indian Constitution which went into effect in 1935. In the provincial elections of 1937 the Congress Party (Indian National Congress) showed itself to be the strongest party in British India taken as a whole, with some 45 per cent of the total vote. There was, however, a notable difference in the outcome of the voting in predominantly Hindu and predominantly non-Hindu provinces of India. Congress obtained a majority in all the predominantly Hindu provinces. It obtained a majority in *none* of the predominantly Moslem provinces excepting the little Afghan Frontier province.

The British proposal for the right of provinces to

adhere or not to adhere to the proposed new constitutional setup had to do with this situation. It was possible that the Congress Party, the strongest in India taken as a whole and the outstanding representative of the Hindu majority of India, would be able to form a constitution in which the rights of the predominantly non-Hindu peoples, such as the Bengali to the east of Hindustan and the Punjabi to the west, would be so seriously affected that they would not wish to adhere to the new Indian Union, but would prefer to form a separate Dominion.

These non-Congress provinces are not "atoms," as some misinformed persons have termed them. Bengal is actually a nation, with its own language and literature and a present-day population of 58,000,000. Assam, to the east of Bengal, bordering Burma, has a population of nine million; its Hindus form a majority, Untouchables included; a minority if not included. The Punjab to the west of Hindustan has a population of 27,000,000. South of it is the little Moslem province of Sind—the oldest Moslem area of India. In these four provinces representative provincial governments have carried on for the past six years, despite Congress opposition, and have given an excellent record of political responsibility and progressive administration.*

If democracy has any meaning at all, these hundred million people who are making representative democracy work have a full right to continue to do so. Furthermore, the fighting Moslems of these great areas are perfectly capable of standing up for their own rights if necessary.

* The only interruption was in Assam, where in 1937 the Congress Party gained control, and carried on until the central Party machine (the Party boss, Patel) called Congress members out on their political strike in 1939. The Imperial Governor took over for a time, but a coalition government was subsequently formed despite Congress hostility.

They cooperate with Hindus, but they declare unanimously that they have never been ruled by Hindus and never will be. In the circumstances, the British proposal of the rights of various provinces to self-government and self-determination seems wholly justified from every viewpoint. Neither the Bengali nor Punjabi would object to joining a Federal India, with States' rights as specifically recognized as in the founding of our own Republic. But they would simply refuse to join an Indian Union dominated by a Congress Party oligarchy, based upon the Congress majority in the predominantly Hindu provinces with their two hundred millions.

It was because of this that the Congress Party *rejected* the British proposal, declaring that it "encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at the very inception of union." Briefly, the Congress demanded self-government for "all India" (i. e., the various Indian peoples and states and provinces brought together by the British under a single Imperial rule), but they refused to acknowledge the right of self-determination for the non-Hindu and non-Congress peoples of India. The Party aimed, essentially, to replace the British Empire in India.

But this was a demand that the Congress could not possibly enforce on other Indians by its own powers, if British forces were withdrawn from India and the Indian Army disarmed. The 150,000,000 caste Hindus of British India could not conquer the 80,000,000 self-reliant Moslems of those areas with their fighting traditions; the reverse was more likely. The Moslems are fully convinced that they can get more by their good right arms than they can by ballots, if the Hindus ever want to try it that way. In the meantime, they have accepted political democracy and are making it work.

These political realities of India are issues which must be considered in today's situation. The peoples of India are as fully entitled to self-government as are other peoples anywhere. Indian Nationalists are fully justified in demanding freedom from British rule. And the Bengali, Punjabi and Sindhesi are equally justified in demanding that British rule shall not be replaced by Hindu rule. They will welcome federation; they *will not* accept subjection.

The Congress Party demand last year was countered by a program from Mr. Jinnah, of the Moslem League, for a separate Moslem dominion to be formed by union of the predominantly Moslem states and provinces of northern India—*regardless* of the wishes of their inhabitants. In none of these great areas did the Moslem League have a majority, any more than the Congress Party did; the Moslems elected mostly their own local representatives, with local parties and groups. In the conflict of Congress and League over these great democratic provinces, there was a most sinister omen for the future. As a direct outcome of the Congress attitude during the past six years, the Moslem League has been rapidly and steadily growing, with ever more ominous signs of northern India being divided into two warring camps each of which follows a single Party and a single leader. Those misguided persons who consider that a Party dictatorship is a "new and higher form of democracy" may welcome the prospect. But democrats who regard such dictatorship as a new and lower form of despotism cannot share such enthusiasm. Neither a free India nor a free world can be built upon such foundations.

It is time for liberty-loving Americans to turn for a moment to the realities of India, in human terms and in

expressions familiar to us. Indian claims for self-government are wholly justified, whether they come from Bombay or Bengal. Gandhi is a leader whose devotion to Indian Nationalism and lack of personal material ambitions has gained widespread respect; his religious devotion and his avowed doctrine of non-violence attracts not only many Hindus but many Americans and other Westerners as well, whatever we may think of the sympathy expressed by Japanese militarists and Chinese Fascists. Nehru is a leader whose praise of Soviet Russia's "economic democracy" is similar to that of some high-placed Americans, and whose simultaneous and emphatic declarations for Indian industrialization gains support not only from Indian business interests and Indian Marxists but also from many of their counterparts in the United States. His declarations that the Rights of Man are "outdated," and parliamentary democracy likewise, also finds sympathetic echoes in both East and West. His agnosticism appeals to many who are not appealed to by Gandhi's piety.

But let us consider Indian problems in terms of the problems with which we are actually familiar. What do the various groups and parties of India mean in terms of the common man—the common man who is the only legitimate source of political power and political sovereignty?

First of all, what does all-India Nationalism mean in economic terms? India has greater resources of iron and other industrial requirements than any part of Asia outside the Soviet Union. It is far wealthier in these things than China is. It possesses the economic and human resources for a great industrial empire, including the cheapest labor in the world. British capital has long since financed railways, jute and other plantations, coal and iron

mines, paper mills and cement factories. But it has done little in the financing of textile and other industries competing directly with English export industries in England. The Indian textile and steel industries have been financed by Indian capital, as well as hydro-electric power; Indian capital has also become predominant in the jute industry.

The demand for Government protection and assistance for Indian industrialists is central in the Congress Party's program, which is understandably backed and financed by such Indian industrial magnates as the Birla brothers and Bajaj. Indian industrialists want both tariffs and subsidies, and have gained considerable success in both directions. The Congress Party is openly and definitely the party of Indian industrialists, and it has achieved much on their behalf. *Every* boycott of British goods has been of direct benefit to these industrialists.

Gandhi's advocacy of village handicrafts and a low standard of living is seemingly the reverse of the industrialists' aims. It has, however, been brought into their direct service. Hand spinning could not possibly compete with machine looms, and the "native goods" (Swadeshi) movement gave direct aid and stimulus to the expansion of the Indian textile industry. The first boycotts of "Western goods," twenty-odd years ago, were in a few years brought into the form of later boycotts—specifically directed against foreign cloth, and British goods competing with Indian industries. The industrialists agree with lowering living standards.

This economic development of the Congress Party's Nationalism was marked by the rise of Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhaschandra Bose to leadership, fourteen years ago. Both these leaders, strongly under Marxist influence, associated the unspeakable misery of the Indian masses

with the lack of Indian industrialization. As Nationalists, they looked upon British Imperialism as responsible for this situation, in a Machiavellian conspiracy to keep India non-industrial and subject. Their Socialist aims were not shared by Indian industrialists, but these aims were for the far future. Their belief in the primary necessity of industrial development and Government aid to it was enthusiastically subscribed to by manufacturers. The extension of the world economic crisis to India in 1929 created increased misery, and the denunciation of foreign Imperialism as primarily responsible was as widely listened to and accepted as it was done in Germany. •

In economic terms, the Indian upheaval of 1929-30 presented one of the most remarkable phenomena in history—an enormous regimented “mass movement” demanding *high tariffs*, which would actually mean higher prices to all consumers, and advantages only for the Indian industrialists and the limited number of workers to be employed. In 1930, when Nehru unfurled the flag of the “Indian Republic,” and Gandhi set forth his conditions for calling off civil disobedience, central among these conditions was a specific demand for “protection” both for Indian textiles and for coastal shipping. The great boycott, when the Congress Party’s white-gowned pickets not only closed shops but were permitted to control traffic on the streets and let no loaded vehicles pass without a Congress permit, was specifically directed against foreign cloth, and against British goods in general.

Gandhi, it must be remembered, is primarily a Nationalist. He has no basic sympathy with industrialization, but it had become clear that the industrialists’ support was necessary for his movement. His own “spiritual economics” had been set forth a decade previously:

"Do not use manufactured articles. Laborers suffer much in mills, and manufactured products are products of misery exploited. Foreign goods and goods made by complicated machinery should be tabooed by a votary of *Ahimsa* (non-violence). Use simple clothes, made simply in India."

By 1930, however, in order to secure the support of Nationalism's industrialist and National Socialist allies, Gandhi was formally demanding that the Viceroy give "protection" to "goods made by complicated machinery" in Indian mills, where misery was exploited more bitterly and inhumanly than anywhere in the world, and where laborers suffered more hopelessly than anywhere in the world. The first Indian labor legislation was enacted in 1923, but it was the work of the Indian liberals and Moderates cooperating with the British Government. Congress Nationalists denounced it as a British *plot* designed to hamper the development of Indian industry.

Workmen were still the chattels of Indian labor racketeers, who supplied them as commodities to employers and collected a part of their pay *permanently*. Workmen getting five dollars a month slept in dark unlighted hovels, with neither water nor sanitation, entered through tunnels thick with filth and sewage. The Hindu industrialist, with a few honorable and humane exceptions, is the foulest blood-sucker in the world. His only possible rivals in this respect are the Indian and Chinese moneylenders and labor agents.

Indian Big Business has so far been the main beneficiary of Congress activities. The British Government in 1921, attempting to cooperate with Indian businessmen and Moderates and as a counter-move to the Congress-Moslem

alliance of those years, granted fiscal autonomy to India, involving transfer of control over tariff policy to the Viceroy and the Central Legislature of India. The Indian Government gave increasing subsidies to the embarrassed Indian steel industry.

The Congress demands of 1930 marked the definite emergence of Indian Business as an independent political force; the industrialists gained new tariffs on textile goods that same year, with certain concessions to British goods—the new duties being bitterly opposed in the Indian Assembly. Indian industrialists made their influence felt in the revision of the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement in 1934, and the Anglo-Indian trade treaty the following year. They have now obtained protection, and subsidies to certain industries. They have been greatly benefited by the war prosperity of recent years—despite the interruption of some industries during the Congress upheaval last year. But they won't be happy until they gain the fuller protection, and the greater subsidies for big-scale industrialization, to which the Congress Party is pledged in its independence program. Whether they will be more happy then is another question. Some German industrialists are not very happy today.

There is a clear relationship between the industrialists and the Congress' refusal to permit self-determination for the non-Hindu nations and provinces of India. Bengal, in the east, has some of the greatest resources in India. Calcutta and the Calcutta area in Bengal is the greatest industrial center in the whole Far East; economic autarchy for India requires that it be included, whatever its non-Hindu capitalists or labor organizations or the Bengali Moslems and Depressed Classes think about the future of Bengal. The Punjab to the northwest is one of the most

prosperous areas of India, where the democratic provincial government has done away with the privileges of the Hindu and Pathan moneylender and there is a wider development of mutual credit and other cooperatives than anywhere in the country. It is an excellent market—and has resources as well. But there is no obvious reason why Western believers in democracy and human rights should side with Indian Big Business and the Congress Party in their attitude toward Bengal and the Punjab.

Big Business is not, of course, the only backing of the Congress Party. The Congress Party is the principal political expression of the Hindus of India; only a minority of Moslems (an extreme orthodox group and an unorthodox moneylending group) cooperate with it, as well as a number of Sikhs (Punjab Hindus without caste). The Hindus constitute, according to Congress figures, more than two-thirds of the population of India. This, however, includes the Depressed Classes as Hindus. It is a definitely political numbering. Religiously and socially, the Untouchables are distinct from the Hindu caste communities. Most of them live in squalid rural ghettos, separate from the Hindu caste villages. The Congress has built some Hindu temples among them, and has done good work in ameliorating their condition in some areas. Many of them accept Hinduism, but they are not permitted to enter ordinary Hindu temples. They are Hindus for political purposes, not otherwise. They constitute nineteen per cent of the population of India. Without them, the Hindus constitute approximately half the Indian population.

Aside from Big Business, who are the caste Hindus, in economic terms? They are small business as well as big. They are moneylenders and usurers, competed with by

only a few unorthodox Moslems from the northwest frontier. They are landlords and land owners, whose sharecroppers and laborers are largely Moslems and Depressed Classes. In the cities and towns they are the principal employers—business and domestic—as well as the labor racketeers. They are the Brahmins, who supply most of the responsible officials in Congress Party administrations. They are the millions of parasitic Holy Men who beg and racketeer on the streets. A few educated Hindus and Sikhs go abroad for propaganda work among Western innocents. (The Congress Party is the *only* Indian group with the money to send its own propagandists abroad to compete with the British.) And there are some low-caste Hindus among the wretched wage-earners, though most of the lower proletariat consists of Moslems and Depressed Classes. Of India's 140,000,000 city and town and village proletarians, perhaps one-fourth are low-caste Hindus.

In the Hindu provinces of India, the bulk of the ordinary peasants are Hindus. Like other Hindus, they have for thousands of years obeyed the orders of their caste governments. A caste is a State within the State, absolutely limited by heredity and with its own government whose rules are absolute. An increasing number of Hindus are breaking away from caste rule, but the majority who still obey are the numerical basis of Congress power. They follow their moneyed or white-gowned leaders on election day, or in the great regimented demonstrations and "up-heavals" directed by the flags and whistles and slogans of the Congress gauleiters. They are the salt of the earth—or, more precisely, of the Congress Party. The "sugar" comes from Hindu industrialists.

Indian Mohammedans are nearly all of Hindu origin. Perhaps one-tenth of them are of non-Hindu blood—

remnants of the invaders and conquerors of past centuries, of whom there are a number of wealthy Moslem landlords and other families in northern India. But the great majority of Moslems are of low-caste Hindu origin, descendants of men who were converted to the democratic faith of Islam in past centuries. The difference between them and such Hindus as there are in the same economic levels is not racial. It is something like the difference between our Western Indians and the abject Mexican peon of half a century ago. The only "communal fights" in India take place where the Moslems are a *minority*; where they are a majority there are no fights. They are men who believe—like the splendid Sikhs—that one man is as good as another and maybe better. They have escaped forever from the black horror, fear and discrimination and degradation of Hinduism and the caste system—the blight of Asia.

Many, however, have not escaped from economic dependence on the Hindu landlord, moneylender and employer. Throughout India, the majority of the Indian proletariat—the miserably paid wage-earners of town and country—are Moslems and Depressed Classes. The latter are a "permanent" proletariat—75,000,000 of them. Under the old caste Hindu order they were forbidden to own property; in time of food shortage, the poorer "Aryans" simply seized their "niggers'" little crops or wretched stores of food and let them starve. They have now gained legal rights, but nearly all of them are still at the bottom scale of the economic and social order.

Many of them, in the past, followed the Congress Party because of Gandhi's influence and because of the kindly or calculated aid given them. But the more advanced are now turning to such leaders as B. R. Ambedkar, their

outstanding spokesman, who is now Minister of Labor in the Indian Government; he is a distinguished scholar, an Untouchable, and a politically capable man of high integrity. Other Untouchables have already become political and labor leaders, and assumed Cabinet posts in provincial governments. Their firm and uncompromising demand is Equal Treatment. Proportionally, the Indian Depressed Classes are twice as numerous as Negroes in the United States. Hindu Jim Crow is worse than American.

The Moslems are mostly sharecroppers and laborers. In the predominantly Moslem areas, they constitute most of the ordinary farmers. It will be a serious tragedy if the developing democracy of the Moslem provinces of India is stifled either by a Mohammedan dictatorship under the Moslem League or a National Socialist dictatorship under the Congress Party. And for the Moslem and Untouchable minorities in the predominantly Hindu areas, it will be a tragedy if India is partitioned between the two essentially Fascist groups. For their hope lies largely in the strength and encouragement given them by the growing democratic freedoms of the areas of India not dominated by Hindu business and the Congress Party.

The primary interest of the Depressed Classes lies in human rights even more than in national rights. Their reply to the Cripps proposals, which would have made possible the partition of India with Hindu India under the absolute rule of the Congress Party, must be understood and remembered. It was almost an ultimatum:

"Such a system would place us under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. Any such result, which takes us back to the black days of the ancient past, will never be tolerated by us."

The glorification of India's Hindu past comes from high-caste Hindus—Brahmins like Nehru or Banyas like Gandhi. It does not come from India's bitterly exploited masses—from the sharecroppers or the wretched city and town proletariat or the Depressed Classes. For them the past is dark, and they look forward not only in hope of increasing freedom and human rights and decent livelihood, but also in deadly fear of return to the past.

The British attitude is understandable. They do not like the Congress Party's militance, but they can deal with the Hindu business men and landlords and Brahmins which it represents. They can deal with these elements because they are the elements of British Toryism. In one province after another in India the British might have formed provincial governments resting upon more popular elements, but they preferred not to. In the Madras area, provincial governments could at any time be formed of the strong anti-Brahmin "Justice Party" (low-caste Hindus, largely artisans and similar commoners) in coalition with Depressed Classes. But the British preferred to have no representative government whatever—if it could not be of such men as the Brahmin Congress leader, Rajagopalachari. In other areas, representative governments could have been formed by breaking up the great artificial units such as the United Provinces and Central Provinces and Bengal (which the Congress Party itself divides into four "Congress provinces" based upon differences of language); in some of the smaller units, democratic representative governments could have been formed. This has been repeatedly suggested; it has never been done.

British Toryism does not aim at democracy for India. If it must get out, it will turn the Indian people over to

its Indian counterparts—or to Party dictators who represent these counterparts, and *presumably* will continue to serve their interests. Toryism preferred to do business with Hitler rather than the Weimar Republic, with Franco rather than the Spanish Republic. . . .

During the last year and a half, we have seen Japanese navalists, whom we built up as the allies of Western Imperialism in the Far East, launch their long-planned drive into the colonies of their old patrons. They had been frank about their intentions. Lieut.-Commander Ishimaru's book, "Japan Must Fight Britain," dealt with the British part of it ten years ago. When the Japanese moved south, they had Asiatic allies—allies fed up with the White Man's rule and appealed to by the Japanese propaganda slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics."

They took over Indo-China by an understanding with the White Men there, who became their collaborators and agents. They took British Hongkong with the effective assistance of Chinese Fifth Columnists and guides who had known too much of British rule in Chinese territories. They secured immediate alliance with Siam (after a purely formal pretense of resistance), because Siam had had Japanese diplomatic cooperation when it freed itself from Western Imperial privileges, and also in obtaining the return of some Siamese territories which the French long ago seized and included in Indo-China. The Japanese moved into Malaya from the north through their alliance with the Siamese, and both there and from the east through friendly understandings with Malayan princes and guidance from other Malaysians who had never heard of the Four Freedoms. From Malaya they took Singapore, where our hastily recruited Chinese allies (led by Chinese Communists released from jail for the pur-

pose) were left to be butchered.

The Japanese moved into Burma under four flags. Their forces were accompanied by Siamese allies with their native flag, by a "Burma Freedom Army" with its native flag, by Chinese Fascist forces under the Kuomintang flag—from the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking. Everywhere the Burmese Nationalists cut communications and gave every assistance to the invaders. The Burmese, indeed, had sought an understanding with the British Government. The Burmese Premier was the first to take literally the promises of the Atlantic Charter, and proceeded to London to ask for Dominion Status for Burma. He never returned to Burma. After a few months he was imprisoned, allegedly for "negotiating with the Japanese"; no details were ever given. He was subsequently reported dead—still in British custody. The Atlantic Charter did not seem to apply to Asia.

Japan moved southward into the great Dutch Empire of the East Indies, with a population of 73,000,000—as great as Japan itself—largely Mohammedans of fighting stock who could have fought on indefinitely had they had arms and something to fight for. But the natives (excepting a handful of native Christians) had no arms, and saw nothing to fight for in the White Man's rule. Their outstanding leader, Thamrin, had in 1940 offered full co-operation to the United States if we would peacefully take over the islands by diplomacy with the Dutch Government (as the Japanese were taking over Indo-China from the French), strengthening the islands and their great tin and rubber resources against Japanese or Nazi encroachment, establishing an Indonesian Commonwealth on the model of the Philippines, building Indonesian defense forces. Our Government was not interested; we

preferred the Dutch masters, not the Indonesian people. How the Dutch Government learned of the offer has not yet been revealed. But Thamrin was subsequently arrested, and murdered in prison. The Indonesians had received their reply—both from us and from the Dutch.

Chapter 25.

AMERICA'S ROLE IN ASIA

SOME DAY the soldiers will return to their homes, and the statesmen of the warring Governments will get together and draw up details of the future. What the future will be depends on these Governments. Their envoys may map out an armistice which they call peace, but which will bequeath a new war to a new generation. Or they may lay the foundation for a world without war, a world organized for freedom and security instead of Empire and balance of power.

The Versailles peace brought forth the perfect formula for the next war. It established a League of the Allied Conquerors, levied crushing indemnities upon the leading country among the defeated, prevented that country from paying its indemnities by legitimate trade and commerce, and reduced its new democratic government to the role of tribute-gatherer for foreign Powers from its own people. It affirmed the continued subjection of Asia, and made it specific and emphatic that the League did *not* accept racial equality. The victorious Allies disarmed the defeated countries of Europe and officially disarmed

China, the Ally, as well. They were still making war on Russia the ex-Ally, which had quit fighting a year too early. The League had no place for representatives of the principal peoples of central and eastern and southeastern Europe, or of northern and southern and southeastern and southwestern Asia; the American people themselves withdrew. It was an armistice—except in Russia, where the war went on.

The roots of the war to follow were in Asia. The "peace" and the Washington Conference prepared for it. The victorious Allies retained their military ascendancy, and their international domination of China. To gain our own direct leadership in the Imperial domination of China, we brought the Chinese into financial subjection to us and subsidized and encouraged them in war against the Japanese. Hitler followed the China formula in co-operation with Britain against revolutionary Spain, and secured release from all remaining Versailles limitations; we supplied him with war materials, and blocked those to Spain. With China at war, we supplied the Japanese with war materials for the conquest of China. That was where the World War started.

If the next peace conference is to prepare for the future of a new generation of military and other dictators, it will be on the same basis as in 1919. It will be a peace of "vengeance" and conquest, with enemy peoples reduced to colonial subjection to the victorious Powers—together with the subjection of as much of Asia and Africa as Western Powers can hold or salvage. The Russians will be allies with great opportunities for the future, instead of "Red Beasts" as in 1919. The Japanese will be enemies and "Yellow Beasts" under White rule, instead of allies with great opportunities as in 1919. The victors will dis-

arm the defeated countries, and perhaps permit some democratic developments there—until the Powers are faced with rebellion or revolution of subject peoples somewhere, or start disputing over the spoils of Empire.

If the conference at the end of this war is to prepare for a world without war, if it is to be a peace instead of a mere armistice between wars, it must be on a different basis than in 1919. It must create a real League of Nations—not a League dominated by victorious Empires—representative of the peoples of the world, preferably with direct representation from their democratically elected parliaments. A League of Peoples is far superior to a League of Foreign Offices. It must be based specifically and clearly on the principle of racial equality. The American Government can set the example itself by official treatment of Asiatic peoples on this basis.

The League must have supreme authority over international relations, and over world armaments and armament manufacture. This particular industry must be removed altogether from the hands of private manufacturers. Enemy Powers should be completely disarmed—and *foreign* armies must not take the place of *native*. Without the backing of military force, no native dictatorship or alien despotism can survive. Any Power which aims to police and dominate another country has Imperialist aims, whatever lofty peace phrases or war propaganda may be used to support such ambitions. With the end of enemy armaments, there will cease to be any reason for victor armaments, if the world is to be one of democracy and not of Empire.

With the internal changes that take place in demilitarized countries we *must not interfere*. If democracy has any meaning at all for us, we must let the peoples of the

world work out their own destinies. If we believe that the sole legitimate purpose of Government is to secure for its people equal rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that its one claim to legitimacy is the consent of the governed, this must be our foreign policy as well as our domestic policy. Whether a Government is capitalist or socialist, Catholic or anti-clerical, Christian or Buddhist, Moslem or agnostic, Hindu or pagan, it is not for us to intervene, or to supply arms while we profess non-intervention. No democratic government needs real armaments against its unarmed people.

Japan must be demilitarized. It is the greatest boon we can convey on the Japanese people—if American armies and an American military dictator do not replace the Japanese Army at Tokyo. What of the Japanese Empire? It must be ended like every other—not by the re-establishment of White Empire individual or joint, but by self-government for the peoples of the Empire. Let us remember once and for all that these peoples ruled themselves for thousands of years before they ever heard of the White Man. To accuse them of “incapacity for self-government” is as stupid as it is dishonest.

We have serious grievances against Japan. We encouraged them to do some of the things they did in China and Russia, but we did not ask them to bomb Pearl Harbor. But we are not the best qualified persons to judge the extent of their crimes, and the necessary indemnities, and to place the precise responsibility. A gang of white men in Mobile is not the best judge of a Negro accused of killing a white man. If there is to be a peace based on justice instead of vengeance, such matters are far better adjudicated by competent and friendly neutrals—such as the Swedes or Swiss. No man who believes in

international law and justice can legitimately object to an honest neutral tribunal to decide and award damages and place responsibility.

If we are so stupid as to permit the Japanese Army to survive—as we permitted the German Reichswehr in 1919—we must make it directly responsible for any indemnities to be levied. With the end of the militarists' armed power, there will be parliamentary government in Japan. We must not make this government a collector of crushing tribute for us—as was done to the German Republican Government for more than a decade. The common people of Japan, the parliament of Japan, did not ask for this war or make this war.

But the God-Emperor? And the Japanese people's unanimous and fanatical belief in him, and in their divine mission? And their "innate savagery"? Those of us who remember back to the last war recall the current propaganda about the "unspeakable Turk," unanimously and fanatically devoted to their Caliph-Emperor and to their "Holy War," whose "innate savagery" had its natural expression in the butchery of Christians. Men who had lived in Turkey for years talked about such things; many of them had never even met a Turkish agnostic, and denied that such things existed. But when the Turkish Empire was smashed, and the Turkish revolutionists headed by Kemal Ataturk seized power, these Turks themselves abolished the Caliphate, did away with the political powers of the Moslem Church, and established a far more decent and civilized government than Turkey had ever known. The same thing will happen in Japan some day—if we ever permit it to happen.

And the Chinese? The international domination of China is gone. We who believe in freedom must give

thanks. The central obstacle to a decent policy toward China is ended. The real hope of the people and of the world is a democratic United States of China. A strong, united, representative China would not take orders from us. But we who believe in human equality do not want it to take orders. We want Chinese cooperation, not Chinese subjection. And if we cooperate with Chinese who still believe in the Republic and in the great aims of Sun Yat-sen, we will be able to deal with a truly free China at the end of the war. Not all Chinese have forgotten Dr. Sun's warning to his own comrades, nineteen years ago:

"We revolutionists must not treat the people of our nation as Japan is treating Korea, and wait for the people to fight for democracy before we give democracy to them. . . . Those who pride themselves upon being men of prevision or men of later vision should not, like the Japanese, calculate only for their own interests; they should first calculate for the interests of the people, and give the political sovereignty of the whole state into the hands of the people."

This is the formula not only for the Chinese Government, but for all the Powers dominating Asiatic peoples, or hoping to re-establish their domination over Asiatic peoples. For India, the British Government has already pledged full Dominion Status at the end of the war. Whether it is one Dominion, or two, or three, is for the people to decide. But India must be free.

East of India, the British Empire has been liquidated—in Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Hongkong and the China coast. It should have been done long ago by giving effective authority to the people. The task of liberals and

democrats has been simplified. When the Japanese Army is broken, these countries will be free—if the British do not themselves launch a war of conquest to re-establish their domination over peoples who do not want them. And this is true of all other outposts of White Empire which have been lost to the Powers in the Far East. When Japanese naval power and Japanese communications are broken, Tokyo will no longer be able to exercise any authority over these countries. They will be free. They must remain free. Any Power which tries to invade them we must regard as an aggressor and an enemy of everything that democracy holds dear.

In these Asiatic countries, as elsewhere in the world, international authority vested in a representative League of Peoples must be the supreme arbiter in matters of armaments and international relations and international affairs. Asia must be for the Asiatics, even as America must be for the Americans, Europe for the Europeans, and Africa for the Africans. But Asia is central, for Asia contains the majority of the people of the entire world. Continents are not watertight compartments. They are parts of an ever more integrated world. A free Asia is the surest guarantee and an indispensable part of a free world. The defeat of Western Empire in Asia, and Britain's announced willingness to give full dominion status to India and release her from colonial subjection, make it possible for the United States to take the lead in the truest and deepest of American doctrines. Now, today, while we are still at war with Japan, and devoted to the war which will end the brutal domination of the Japanese Army in the Far East, we must lay down and bring every one of our allies to accept a permanent basis for freedom and security for Asia—the basis of the Monroe Doctrine:

"The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests both of the United States and other peoples are involved, that the Asiatic continent and its fringing islands, by the free and independent condition which they will assume and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power.

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence of European Powers, with whatever military aid or support from outside, and which are able to carry on their effective internal authority when such outside support is withdrawn, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

This must be made an agreement among the Powers, as well as a unilateral declaration by the United States. Our basic rights and interests in Asia lie in the encouragement and promotion of the democratic way of life. The organized world of today cannot survive nine-tenths slave and one-tenth free. This is our deepest task and problem and interest, beside which all else fades into insignificance. If there is to be peace and not wars unending, if free governments are not to perish from the earth, Asia must be free.

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